Reduction of eligious experience

GrowingSmaller · Aug 20, 2012

For instance non-duality (ego death), experienced by certain yoga practitioners etc.

To the subject this might be an intensely profound and meaningful experience, and to a scientist it might just be a function of abberrant brain states induced by certain practices.

On the one hand there is "theoretical knowledge" (of the scientist) and in the other "knowledge by acquaintance" (of the mystic).

How reliable or complete is the reduction of the experience to the theory of brain states if all that meaning is lost in the process? I am not denying the link between mind and brain. I am asking is science mature enough to adequately deal with these issues? Could it be that is we want to commiunicate the essence to others something like poetry might at times be more suitable?

WonderBeat · Aug 20, 2012

Reductionism seems so absurd to me. It isn't honest with the facts as they present themselves.

Received · Aug 20, 2012

I don't think you can really reduce anything to brain activity in a solid empirical sense. At the very most, we can speak of biological correlates between neural activity and phenomenological experiences. And that's fine for many people. But it's jumping the gun to equate the two, strictly epistemologically speaking.

Eudaimonist · Aug 20, 2012

Received said:
I don't think you can really reduce anything to brain activity in a solid empirical sense. At the very most, we can speak of biological correlates between neural activity and phenomenological experiences. And that's fine for many people. But it's jumping the gun to equate the two, strictly epistemologically speaking.

Agreed, which is why I tend to dual-aspect theory rather than trying to collapse one monistically onto the other.

eudaimonia,

Mark

KCfromNC · Aug 21, 2012

Received said:
I don't think you can really reduce anything to brain activity in a solid empirical sense. At the very most, we can speak of biological correlates between neural activity and phenomenological experiences. And that's fine for many people. But it's jumping the gun to equate the two, strictly epistemologically speaking.

Much the same way that you can't reduce disease to infection by germs or other pathogens. At the very most, we can speak of biological correlates between infection and disease. And that's fine for many people. But it's jumping the gun to equate the two, strictly epistemologically speaking.

The Engineer · Aug 21, 2012

The correlation between experiences, thoughts, feelings etc. and brain activity is so clear that a separate soul is simply not needed to explain them. That's why I think the two are one and the same thing.

KCfromNC · Aug 21, 2012

Yeah, agree with the above. Sure, we don't have an airtight explanation for exactly how every bit of the brain works in complete detail. But using that as a reason to pretend there's a soul, despite the lack of any evidence or need for one, is a textbook case of an argument from ignorance.

Received · Aug 21, 2012

KCfromNC said:
Much the same way that you can't reduce disease to infection by germs or other pathogens. At the very most, we can speak of biological correlates between infection and disease. And that's fine for many people. But it's jumping the gun to equate the two, strictly epistemologically speaking.

Good one!

Received · Aug 21, 2012

The Engineer said:
The correlation between experiences, thoughts, feelings etc. and brain activity is so clear that a separate soul is simply not needed to explain them. That's why I think the two are one and the same thing.

So long as we call it a correlation, sure deal. But methinks that precisely because you call it a correlation, you're epistemologically allowing for things like souls. Which doesn't at all mean that a soul is called for; that would require its own argument. Call it a type of metaphysical falsifiability.

I'm not saying anything under the table here; not an argument for a soul or theism in sight.

Eudaimonist · Aug 21, 2012

Received said:
But methinks that precisely because you call it a correlation, you're epistemologically allowing for things like souls.

One is also "epistemologically allowing" for body thetans, but I'm not sure I see why anyone should be concerned about that.

eudaimonia,

Mark

GrowingSmaller · Aug 22, 2012

KCfromNC said:
Much the same way that you can't reduce disease to infection by germs or other pathogens. At the very most, we can speak of biological correlates between infection and disease. And that's fine for many people. But it's jumping the gun to equate the two, strictly epistemologically speaking.

Think of it this way. We could reduce the conscious experience to the brain processes, but without a tip off could someone looking at the mere brain processes infer the conscious experience? If back translation is not possible, then could the initial one be incomplete?

Davian · Aug 22, 2012

KCfromNC said:
Much the same way that you can't reduce disease to infection by germs or other pathogens. At the very most, we can speak of biological correlates between infection and disease. And that's fine for many people. But it's jumping the gun to equate the two, strictly epistemologically speaking.

GrowingSmaller said:
Think of it this way. We could reduce the conscious experience to the brain processes, but without a tip off could someone looking at the mere brain processes infer the conscious experience? If back translation is not possible, then could the initial one be incomplete?

Does that not typically apply to emergent properties of a thing? Could you infer the behaviour of an ant colony, or a flock of birds, from a single individual?

KCfromNC · Aug 23, 2012

GrowingSmaller said:
Think of it this way. We could reduce the conscious experience to the brain processes, but without a tip off could someone looking at the mere brain processes infer the conscious experience?

I don't know, could they? What evidence do you have for your answer?

Received · Aug 26, 2012

Eudaimonist said:
One is also "epistemologically allowing" for body thetans, but I'm not sure I see why anyone should be concerned about that.

eudaimonia,

Mark

Right. So it's a matter of what's credible as a metaphysical placeholder. That's exactly what I'm talking about.

Received · Aug 26, 2012

Davian said:
Does that not typically apply to emergent properties of a thing? Could you infer the behaviour of an ant colony, or a flock of birds, from a single individual?

The idea of emergent properties (and consciousness among possibilities) from physical stuff is a metaphysical postulation, not simply without evidence, but incommensurate with the claim of evidence. You know, asking for evidence already presupposes that what you're looking at is physical and applies to the scientific method. Consciousness as an emergent property precedes the scientific method, and limits itself to a biological correlate -- between physical processes we can observe (via, e.g., fMRI) and conscious experience itself.

The leap will never be made; you just can't go from physical stuff to conscious experience, which doesn't at all mean that the physical stuff *can't* come together to form an emergent conscious experience. We just can't know. Hence the epistemological difficulty. But just because we can't know doesn't mean we can't make theoretical leaps within the bounds of reason.

Davian · Aug 26, 2012

Received said:
The idea of emergent properties (and consciousness among possibilities) from physical stuff is a metaphysical postulation, not simply without evidence, but incommensurate with the claim of evidence. You know, asking for evidence already presupposes that what you're looking at is physical and applies to the scientific method. Consciousness as an emergent property precedes the scientific method, and limits itself to a biological correlate -- between physical processes we can observe (via, e.g., fMRI) and conscious experience itself.

The leap will never be made; you just can't go from physical stuff to conscious experience, which doesn't at all mean that the physical stuff *can't* come together to form an emergent conscious experience. We just can't know. Hence the epistemological difficulty. But just because we can't know doesn't mean we can't make theoretical leaps within the bounds of reason.

I don't follow you. What reason is there to believe that consciousness is not biology?

Eudaimonist · Aug 27, 2012

Received said:
The idea of emergent properties (and consciousness among possibilities) from physical stuff is a metaphysical postulation, not simply without evidence, but incommensurate with the claim of evidence.

Well... somewhat incommensurate.

You make several cogent points, but science can work at least reasonably well with correlations between subjective reports of conscious experience and objective observation of the brain. I don't see an insuperable barrier between science and the study of consciousness, or for the investigation of such issues as emergentism. Granted, this is a difficult field of investigation, perhaps the most challenging so far in science.

eudaimonia,

Mark

GrowingSmaller · Sep 1, 2012

KCfromNC said:
I don't know, could they? What evidence do you have for your answer?

Well i am not wel versed in grammar but i think that reference to consciousness is principally abd definitively in the first person. Brain descriptions are third person. So to draw inspiration from hume's is-pought problem, how is it logically possible to reach a first person conclusion from third person premises?

KCfromNC · Sep 6, 2012

GrowingSmaller said:
Well i am not wel versed in grammar but i think that reference to consciousness is principally abd definitively in the first person. Brain descriptions are third person. So to draw inspiration from hume's is-pought problem, how is it logically possible to reach a first person conclusion from third person premises?

If you saw someone's arm had been cut off and blood was gushing everywhere, could you reach a conclusion about what they might be feeling at the time? If so, apply the same reasoning to more subtle 3rd person observations.

sandwiches · Sep 6, 2012

GrowingSmaller said:
Think of it this way. We could reduce the conscious experience to the brain processes, but without a tip off could someone looking at the mere brain processes infer the conscious experience? If back translation is not possible, then could the initial one be incomplete?

We could reduce the Pepsi bottling process to the bottles, but without a tip off could someone looking at the mere Pepsi bottles infer the Pepsi bottling process? If back translation is not possible, then could the initial one be incomplete?

Edit: That we cannot infer an entire process based on one component of said process is not a revelation of some disconnect between the component and the process.

Reduction of eligious experience

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