Probability Argument Against Determinism

[Ariston]

Argument Against the Justification for Believing in Determinism

If I came to believe in determinism I would also have to believe that my belief in determinism was determined. Would this undercut my belief in determinism? I think so. But it is coherent. If determinism is true then my rational beliefs are determined and likely to be false (see below). But I hold my beliefs to be true (including my belief in determinism) and thus determinism is not justified in believing.
The anticipated objection will be that there are no good reasons to think our beliefs would be false if determinism were true. Importantly, the argument applies to rationality and not sense experience per se. If you believe that a belief was determined out of any number of distinct beliefs and any one of those beliefs could have been triggered and is just as likely as any other, then the likelihood of this particular belief being veridical would be much lower than half.
Suppose there is a dice, and each side represents a different metaphysical belief: 1. Metaphysical Naturalism. 2. Theism, 3. Pantheism, 4. Panentheism, 5. Pansychism, and 6. Platonism. Now this dice is rolled and whatever position is facing up will become your belief about what is true about reality. Let us suppose you roll a 6 and thus take up Platonism and so come to believe that the world is the appearance of a mathematical reality. You might then ask, “What is the likelihood that this belief corresponds to reality granting my means for obtaining it?” Platonism would not be false, but the likelihood would be, in this case 1 and 6 (assuming that one option on the dice is correct). You would give up the belief since the means of obtaining it undercut any warrant for believing it to be true. There is a low probability that a veridical metaphysical paradigm would be produced in this way. That is like the position of the determinist.
If you believe determinism is true, you also will believe that you were selected for the one position you believe is true even though any number of positions that would just as likely be selected. Possible beliefs would range from 1. agnosticism about free will, 2. compatibalism, 3. maximal autonomy, 4. libertarianism, 5. determinism, and 6. indeterminism.
If you believe that your beliefs are produced in this manner, then they would also believe that the likelihood of your position being true would have to be remarkably low (at least as low as one in six). That would undermine the reliability of that belief. The justification for the belief is defeated by the belief itself.
Here is a second distinct way of stating it. Suppose that you have just seen an apparition. Your confidence in that belief would be significantly reduced if you later were told that someone had put hallucinogenic drug in your drink shortly before. That is since your knowledge of the chemical cause would provide a reason to disbelieve the validity of your experience. The principle is the same with determinism. You believe that a non-rational physical cause is responsible for your deterministic belief. Yet if anything that happens in your mind is the byproduct of non-rational physical causes, its validity is undermined. The conclusion is that it will always be that the belief in determinism is unjustified since belief in determinism provides an epistemic defeater for determinism.

 

[Tree of Life]

Unfortunately the argument, among other things, commits a logical fallacy. "If A then B" does not imply "Not B therefore Not A". You would have to say "If and only if A then B" for "Not B therefore Not A" to be implied.

 

[Chesterton]

If I came to believe in determinism I would also have to believe that my belief in determinism was determined. Would this undercut my belief in determinism? No.

I think you're wrong here. That should be more than sufficient to undercut your belief in determinism. I like the rest of the argument.

 

[Ariston]

Unfortunately the argument, among other things, commits a logical fallacy. "If A then B" does not imply "Not B therefore Not A". You would have to say "If and only if A then B" for "Not B therefore Not A" to be implied.

It's not an intended deductive argument. These sorts of arguments show that if A is true than what follows is to absurd to believe not necessarily false. Thus, the argument is intended to show that the belief that determinism is true is always going to be unlikely and thus unjustified.

 

[Ariston]

I think you're wrong here. That should be more than sufficient to undercut your belief in determinism. I like the rest of the argument.

Ya, I think you are right.

 

[essentialsaltes]

If determinism is true (A) then my beliefs are determined and likely to be false (B)

Why would they be likely to be false? When it rains, the rain determines my belief that it is raining. I did not *choose* to believe it is raining.

 

[essentialsaltes]

Unfortunately the argument, among other things, commits a logical fallacy. "If A then B" does not imply "Not B therefore Not A".

It does. That's the contrapositive, which is equivalent to the original statement. Hence, modus tollens.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Why would they be likely to be false? When it rains, the rain determines my belief that it is raining. I did not *choose* to believe it is raining.

Bingo.

 

[Chesterton]

Why would they be likely to be false? When it rains, the rain determines my belief that it is raining. I did not *choose* to believe it is raining.

The rain does not determine your belief. It's not raining in your brain.

 

[Ariston]

Why would they be likely to be false? When it rains, the rain determines my belief that it is raining. I did not *choose* to believe it is raining.

You cannot have a sense experience of determinism so this rebuttal is irrelevant. I suppose the argument would apply to rationality and metaphysics. If you believe that a belief was determined out of a number of different beliefs but any one of those beliefs could have been triggered and was just as likely as any other then the likelihood of this belief would be lower than a half (since you could have just as likely believed in libertarianism, compatibalism, nothing or anything else) and thus unjustified.

 

[Ariston]

Bingo.

You cannot have a sense experience of determinism so this rebuttal is irrelevant. I suppose the argument would apply to rationality and metaphysics. If you believe that a belief was determined out of a number of different beliefs but any one of those beliefs could have been triggered then the likelihood of this belief would be lower than a half (since you could have just as likely believed in libertarianism, compatibalism, nothing or anything else) and thus unjustified. That is why it is unlikely to be true.

 

[Ariston]

It does. That's the contrapositive, which is equivalent to the original statement. Hence, modus tollens.

This argument takes the for of a Reductio ad absurdum (Reductio ad absurdum - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia) If the proposition (A) leads to a conclusion (B) that cannot be believed (not B) then (A) should not be believed. In any case the argument is perfectly sound.

 

[Ariston]

I edited and restated the argument for clarity. Thanks for the critiques thus far.

 

[Radagast]

If determinism is true then my beliefs are determined and likely to be false.

Why "likely to be false"? That doesn't follow at all.

The weather report is calculated, using computers, by a deterministic process, and it's not "likely to be false."

Why would they be likely to be false? When it rains, the rain determines my belief that it is raining. I did not *choose* to believe it is raining.

Exactly! My belief that it's raining comes through a deterministic chain of events, beginning with feeling the rain on my skin and hearing the raindrops strike the ground.

But I hold my belief to be true

That doesn't mean it is true.

 

[Ana the Ist]

You cannot have a sense experience of determinism so this rebuttal is irrelevant. I suppose the argument would apply to rationality and metaphysics. If you believe that a belief was determined out of a number of different beliefs but any one of those beliefs could have been triggered then the likelihood of this belief would be lower than a half (since you could have just as likely believed in libertarianism, compatibalism, nothing or anything else) and thus unjustified. That is why it is unlikely to be true.

Sometimes I think the full extent of determinism is hard to grasp. How did you come across the concept?

 

[quatona]

Argument Against Determinism

If I came to believe in determinism I would also have to believe that my belief in determinism was determined. Would this undercut my belief in determinism?

Doesn´t follow.

If determinism is true then my beliefs are determined and likely to be false.

Doesn´t follow.

But I hold my belief to be true and thus determinism is likely false.

Doesn´t follow at all. Doesn´t even follow from your previous non-sequiturs.

It's not an intended deductive argument. This argument shows that if is true then what follows is too absurd to believe, and thus is likely false. Thus, the argument is intended to show that the belief that determinism is true is always going to be unlikely and thus unjustified to believe.

Ok, then go ahead and show that it is "always going to be unlikely", and how a freely chosen belief that beliefs are freely chosen is always going to be more likely to be accurate.

The anticipated objection will be that there is no good reasons to think our beliefs would be false.

I can´t even form an objection yet, since you haven´t even presented your argument.

The argument applies to rationality and not sense experience per se. If you believe that a belief was determined out of a number of different beliefs but any one of those beliefs could have been triggered and was just as likely as any other,

Well, that´s not a tenet of determinism, to begin with. So I call strawman.

then the likelihood of this belief would be lower than a half (since you could have just as likely believed in libertarianism, compatibalism, nothing or anything else) and thus the belief in determinism would be unjustified.

Pretending for a moment that you had had a sound argument up to now:
And if you could freely choose out of those beliefs the likelihood of being correct would be higher?

Your post looks like the attempt at stuffing as many lögical fallacies into one paragraph as possible.

 

[Ariston]

Hmm, I am not sure if you are getting this argument. Believing in determinism provides a defeater for the belief in determinism since you would have to be committed to the faith that all your reasoning was determined which makes the likelihood of that belief low relative to other metaphysical beliefs that you are just as likely to hold. Believing in determinism undercuts the justification for believing in determinism. It is like shooting yourself in the foot. On cannot sensibly believe it.

 

[quatona]

Do you know what we are debating here or what determinism is?

I don´t know what it is that you are trying to debate here, but I most certainl know what determinism is. Do you know it?

 

[Radagast]

Believing in determinism provides a defeater for the belief in determinism

It really doesn't; your O.P. was full of fallacies and non-sequiturs, as I and others have pointed out above.

Possibly you don't quite understand what determinism is?

Certainly I don't see how freely or randomly choosing a belief, independent of the state of the world, makes that belief likely to be true. On the contrary, I would think.

 

[Davian]