Probability Argument Against Determinism

[quatona]

It does not cut both ways because libertarians do not believe that all beliefs arise through a mental coercion.

The word you would be looking for to accurately describe things in terms of determinism would be "causality", not "coercion".

Limited freedom allows for limited free thought. So if I hold to libertarianism I also hold that I arrived there through a process of partial free rational thinking. That is, it is not clear how your argument would run since libertarians do not believe in all devouring deterministic mechanisms that have established all their beliefs.

Well, I didn´t ask how thinking "freely" means thinking "freely".
I asked why you think that an undetermined (i.e. random, arbitrary) decision between various options is more likely lead to an accurate result.

 

[Radagast]

So if I hold to libertarianism I also hold that I arrived there through a process of partial free rational thinking.

To the extent that beliefs are rational, they are actually determined by the facts and by the laws of logic.

The word you would be looking for to accurately describe things in terms of determinism would be "causality", not "coercion".

Well, I didn´t ask how thinking "freely" means thinking "freely".
I asked why you think that an undetermined (i.e. random, arbitrary) decision between various options is more likely lead to an accurate result.

Good point.

 

[Ariston]

The word you would be looking for to accurately describe things in terms of determinism would be "causality", not "coercion".

Well, I didn´t ask how thinking "freely" means thinking "freely".
I asked why you think that an undetermined (i.e. random, arbitrary) decision between various options is more likely lead to an accurate result.

It's a semantic game to claim that mental determinism is compatible with free thought when the two ideas are mutually exclusive. Coercion is more accurate and thus faithful to the mental determinist position. Calling your thinking free is like calling your genes free to give you blue eyes and brown hair if you are a determinist. It's unintelligible or dishonest. Libertarians do not the view choices as random or arbitrary. And free will is justified because it is properly basic not on the basis of an inductive or deductive argument. It is also inferred from experience and confirmed more directly than anything else that a person could believe. If I want to raise my hand I am free to do it when I want to do it. That is as good of a verification for any position that you can have in life. If you want to show that it is illusory, the burden of proof is on you but the argument will have to be as sound any argument showing that other minds do not exist or that there is not an external world since we are more immediately and directly cognizant of our free volition. Moreover, we all believe this so strongly that we hold ourselves responsible and hold others responsible in some cases. Nevertheless, this is a deflect and I am not taking the bait. You can either show how determinism is justified to believe which would defeat my argument or show what is wrong with my argument instead of just claim that is permeated with non sequitors (which isn't tremendously helpful).

 

[quatona]

It's a semantic game to claim that mental determinism is compatible with free thought when the two ideas are mutually exclusive.

Fortunately nobody here claimed that. So much for your strawman.

Coercion is more accurate and thus faithful to the mental determinist position.

No, it isn´t. "Determined" is the word, and "coercion" adds a lot of load and noise to it.

Calling your thinking free is like calling your genes free to give you blue eyes and brown hair if you are a determinist. It's unintelligent or dishonest.

Fortunately nobody here claimed that. So much for your strawman, again.

Libertarians do not the view choices as random or arbitrary.

Well, if they aren´t determined, what are they, then?

And free will is justified because it is properly basic not on the basis of an inductive or deductive argument.

So again, after trying to construct an argument but are unable to substantiate it logically, you simply define the position you tried to argue against out of existence?

It is also inferred from experience and confirmed more directly than anything else that a person could believe.

How so?

If I want to raise my hand I am free to do it when I want to do it. That is as good of a verification for any position that you can have in life.

If it´s that simple - i.e. you simply declare "free will" to exist - why did you construct this argument that you aren´t willing to defend, in the first place?

If you want to show that it is illusory, the burden of proof is on you but the argument will have to be as sound any argument showing that other minds do not exist or that there is not an external world since we are more immediately and directly cognizant of our free volition.

I don´t want to show anything illusory. I am not even taking a position here. I am just investigating the validity of your argument as presented. However, whenever I point out the non-sequiturs in it and ask you to fill in the missing logical steps, you just declare "free will" to be a fact and therefore determinism wrong. That doesn´t make the argument in the OP any more convincing.

You can either show how determinism is justified which would defeat my argument

In order to defeat your argument I don´t need to show that your conclusion is wrong. I am investigating the validity of your argument. Your argument is wanting - which doesn´t mean that determinism is true. It just means that you have presented a poor argument.

or show what is wrong with my argument instead of just claim that is permeated with non sequitors (which isn't tremendously helpful).

Well, you presented the argument, so the onus is on you to make sure your conclusions follow from your premises. I have pointed out where this was not the case.
I have also shown you where you ascribed notions to determinism that determinism doesn´t hold.
Furthermore I tried to help you add the missing logical links by asking a couple of questions, but unfortunately you evaded them each time.

 

[Ariston]

Fortunately nobody here claimed that. So much for your strawman.

No, it isn´t. "Determined" is the word, and "coercion" adds a lot of load and noise to it.

Fortunately nobody here claimed that. So much for your strawman, again.

Well, if they aren´t determined, what are they, then?

So again, after trying to construct an argument but are unable to substantiate it logically, you simply define the position you tried to argue against out of existence?

How so?

If it´s that simple - i.e. you simply declare "free will" to exist - why did you construct this argument that you aren´t willing to defend, in the first place?

I don´t want to show anything illusory. I am not even taking a position here. I am just investigating the validity of your argument as presented. However, whenever I point out the non-sequiturs in it and ask you to fill in the missing logical steps, you just declare "free will" to be a fact and therefore determinism wrong. That doesn´t make the argument in the OP any more convincing.

In order to defeat your argument I don´t need to show that your conclusion is wrong. I am investigating the validity of your argument. Your argument is wanting - which doesn´t mean that determinism is true. It just means that you have presented a poor argument.

Well, you presented the argument, so the onus is on you to make sure your conclusions follow from your premises. I have pointed out where this was not the case.
I have also shown you where you ascribed notions to determinism that determinism doesn´t hold.
Furthermore I tried to help you add the missing logical links by asking a couple of questions, but unfortunately you evaded them each time.

It still seems to me that the argument is sound. But asserting that the same problem befalls libertarianism (which is an assertion and a stated position), which it doesn't, is not an argument against my argument. Also, I am not arguing that libertatianism is true or that determinism is false but only that there can be no justification for determinism because the belief provides a defeater for the belief. You claim that the conclusion does not follow the premise. I still did not get an answer on what is wrong with my argument. I understand what you believe but I am still waiting for an answer as to why?

(I'll state the argument again below).

 

[Ariston]

Argument Against the Justification for Believing in Determinism

If I came to believe in determinism I would also have to believe that my belief in determinism was determined. Would this undercut my belief in determinism? I think so. But it is coherent. If determinism is true then my rational beliefs are determined and likely to be false (see below). But I hold my beliefs to be true (including my belief in determinism) and thus determinism is not justified in believing.

The anticipated objection will be that there is no good reasons to think our beliefs would be false. But this seems easy to counter. The argument applies to rationality and not sense experience per se. If you believe that a belief was determined out of a number of different beliefs but any one of those beliefs could have been triggered and was just as likely as any other, then the likelihood of this belief would be lower than a half (since you could have just as likely believed in libertarianism, compatibalism, nothing or anything else) and thus the belief in determinism would be unjustified.

Suppose there is a dice, and each side represents a different coherent metaphysical option each of which excludes the other. 1. Metaphysical Naturalism. 2. Christian Theism 3. Pantheism. 4. Panentheism 5. Pansychism 6. Platonism. Now this dice is rolled and whatever position is heads up that becomes your position about what it true of reality. So Platonism comes up and you believe that the world beyond appearances has an elegant mathematical reality that underlies everything else. But then you would ask, what is the likelihood of that worldview granting the means for obtaining it. It would not follow that Platonism was wrong, you just could not have justification for thinking it true because you would have to believe that there is a low probability that a true metaphysics will be produced in this way. That is like the the position of the determinist as I see it.

If you believe determinism is true then you also have to believe that the beliefs produced could have been a number of alternatives. Deterministic mechanisms are like the dice. Yet one side of it, of what could be produced is 1. agnosticism about free will, 2. another compatibalist, 3. another libertarian, 4. another is a very limited libertarianism, 5. one is determinism, 6. and one is "never thought about it." If you believe that your beliefs are produced in a manner like that, then the reliability of the belief in the deterministic mechanisms would have to be thought to be remarkably low. The justification for the belief is defeated by the grounds for the belief (although this is not to say that determinsim itself like Platonism is necessarily false). So it always will have to be an unjustified belief and will be given up or just presupposed.

 

[quatona]

It still seems to me that the argument is sound. But asserting that the same problem befalls libertarianism, which it doesn't, is not an argument against my argument.

Yes, it would - simply because you made it out to be a problem rooted in, caused by and linked to determinism. If the same problem befalls the alternative views, as well, you haven´t made an argument against determinism, but against the idea that we can come to valid conclusions by way of thinking.

Also, I am not arguing that libertatianism is true or that determinism is false but only that there can be no justification for determinism because the belief provides a defeater for the belief.

I know, but we are still waiting for you to show how it does - beyond simply claiming it does.

You claim that the conclusion does not follow the premise. I understand what you believe but the question I am still waiting for and answer for is why?

Well, if (as you did above again) say that determinism is self-defeating, this is not an argument but a mere claim. In order to make it an argument you would have to walk us through your chain of logical steps towards the conclusion ("determinism is self-defeating"). Unless you do so, these logical steps are missing, and all we see is a non-sequitur.

The main flaw in your argument is the missing explanation as to why a determined belief is more likely to be inaccurate than a determined one. Maybe you have just forgotten to show this (because it seemed so obvious to you, or something), but until you haven´t shown it, there is a fatal gap in your argument as presented.

(I'll state the argument again below).

I think you have repeated it often enough, without adding any more substance to it.
Now it´s time to fill the missing blanks.

 

[Albion]

Thanks. Martin Luther (but not Lutherans typically) and Blaise Pascal were both determinists.

I don't believe that's true at all.

There has been large schools of theological determinists and many Calvinists have held not only that salvation is entirely determined (irresitable grace + unconditional election = determined salvation) but have held that God determined every in the act of creation. This is technically called fatalism meaning that every event is predetermined and thus inevitable and distinct from the more modest claim just that our actions are determined. By far most Christians have held to limited free well (libertarianism).

I' m just going to say that your contentions here need evidence because predestination dose not mean determinism, and the idea that God has an overall plan does not mean determinism.

 

[Radagast]

I' m just going to say that your contentions here need evidence because predestination dose not mean determinism, and the idea that God has an overall plan does not mean determinism.

Calvinist Christians typically hold to some form of determinism, together with a "compatibilist" notion of free will. To quote Berkhof's Systematic Theology:

"Reformed theology stresses the sovereignty of God in virtue of which He has sovereignly determined from all eternity whatsoever will come to pass, and works His sovereign will in His entire creation, both natural and spiritual, according to His predetermined plan. It is in full agreement with Paul when he says that God 'worketh all things after the counsel of His will' (Eph. 1:11). ...

But now the question arises, Is the predetermination of things consistent with the free will of man? And the answer is that it certainly is not, if the freedom of the will be regarded as indifferentia (arbitrariness), but this is an unwarranted conception of the freedom of man. The will of man is not something altogether indeterminate, something hanging in the air that can be swung arbitrarily in either direction. It is rather something rooted in our very nature, connected with our deepest instincts and emotions, and determined by our intellectual considerations and by our very character. And if we conceive of our human freedom as lubentia rationalis (reasonable self-determination), then we have no sufficient warrant for saying that it is inconsistent with divine foreknowledge."

Thomist Catholics would have a similar view, though drawing a distinction between determination by necessity, and determination by predestined contingent causes.

 

[Albion]

Calvinists typically hold to some form of determinism, together with a "compatibilist" notion of free will. To quote Berkhof's Systematic Theology:

"Reformed theology stresses the sovereignty of God in virtue of which He has sovereignly determined from all eternity whatsoever will come to pass, and works His sovereign will in His entire creation, both natural and spiritual, according to His predetermined plan. It is in full agreement with Paul when he says that God 'worketh all things after the counsel of His will' (Eph. 1:11)."

Thomist Catholics would have a similar view.

I believe that the reference there clearly tis o a general or overall plan in history, NOT to God scripting" each and every event and thought as was claimed.

 

[Ariston]

I think it is true that Luther and Pascal were determinists.

 

[Albion]

God has a divine plan. That's widely agreed to among Christians and is taught by the Bible. But that's not "determinism" since determinism implies the idea that he causes every action, every event, and every thought and decision to be done as he has planned. Nor is predestination or election determinism because that applies only to the matter of a person coming to Faith.

Respond to the above if you wish.

 

[Ariston]

Yes, it would - simply because you made it out to be a problem rooted in, caused by and linked to determinism. If the same problem befalls the alternative views, as well, you haven´t made an argument against determinism, but against the idea that we can come to valid conclusions by way of thinking.

I know, but we are still waiting for you to show how it does - beyond simply claiming it does.

Well, if (as you did above again) say that determinism is self-defeating, this is not an argument but a mere claim. In order to make it an argument you would have to walk us through your chain of logical steps towards the conclusion ("determinism is self-defeating"). Unless you do so, these logical steps are missing, and all we see is a non-sequitur.

The main flaw in your argument is the missing explanation as to why a determined belief is more likely to be inaccurate than a determined one. Maybe you have just forgotten to show this (because it seemed so obvious to you, or something), but until you haven´t shown it, there is a fatal gap in your argument as presented.


I think you have repeated it often enough, without adding any more substance to it.
Now it´s time to fill the missing blanks.

If the problem is linked to epistemology in general (as you would have to prove and appears by presupposing mental determinism as I claimed my objector would) it would still be adequately applied to determinism and thus successful. Its not unsuccessful because it can be applied to other positions obviously. In any case, as libertarians hold their view which was briefly described above, its not clear that it would apply to libertarianism as it is held and justified as properly basic and directly verifiable in experience. Consequently, belief would not be believed to arise in the same way as for the determinist since all beliefs would be mentally determined. At the very least, it is not clear that it would be successful relative to libertarianism, and since you are making that claim, the burden of proof would be on you to make an argument. On the one hand, you claim that my conclusion doesn't follow from the premises. But you do not even have premises for how libertarianism, as it is held, would face this problem. They do not believe in mental determinism which is why deterministic belief is uniquely undermined in my argument. Now you again claim that my conclusion does not follow from my premises. This is quite remarkable. I am still waiting to see how it does not. I know that you believe that it does not. I knew that 7 posts ago. I am still waiting for a serious criticism. My argument carefully walks through the steps, offers up a user friendly analogy, it has embedded premises followed by a conclusion that shows that the determinist (at least) could never be justified in their belief. So I am quite satisfied with the argument until I hear an actual critique.

 

[Radagast]

If the problem is linked to epistemology in general (as you would have to prove and appears by presupposing mental determinism as I claimed my objector would) it would still be adequately applied to determinism and thus successful. Its not unsuccessful because it can be applied to other positions obviously. In any case, as libertarians hold their view which was briefly described above, its not clear that it would apply to libertarianism is held and justified as properly basic and directly verifiable in experience. Consequently, belief would not arise in the same way as for the determinist. At the very least, it is not clear that it would be successful relative to libertarianism, and since you are making that claim, the burden of proof would be on you to make an argument. On the one hand, you claim that my conclusion doesn't follow from the premises. But you do not even have premises for how libertarianism, as it is held, would face this problem. They do not believe in mental determinism which is why deterministic belief is uniquely undermined in my argument. Now you again claim that my conclusion does not follow from my premises. This is quite remarkable. I am still waiting to see how it does not! I know that you believe that it does not. I knew that 7 posts ago. I am still waiting for a serious criticism. My argument carefully walks through the steps, offers up a user friendly analogy, it has embedded premises followed by a conclusion that shows that the determinist (at least) could never be justified in their belief. So I am quite satisfied with the argument, but I am beginning to think that deep down you are too because I haven't heard what these numerous non sequitors are.

I've read this several times, and it makes no sense at all.

And you haven't replied to any of the clearly stated objections to your "argument." To pick just one: why would a freely chosen or randomly chosen belief be more reliable than one which was determined by the facts? This seems to be one of the key claims in your "argument."

Also, you seem to misunderstand what determinism is. In particular, you seem to have it confused with materialism. Some Christians hold to a form of determinism. You haven't defined exactly what you mean by "free will," either.

 

[Radagast]

I believe that the reference there clearly tis o a general or overall plan in history

Not so, actually. I've extended the quote in my post to clarify.

 

[Albion]

Not so, actually. I've extended the quote to clarify.

IMO, the extension didn't change anything unless it reinforced the idea that theological determinism does not refer to God having caused to occur as it does every last thing that happens in life.

 

[quatona]

If the problem is linked to epistemology in general (as you would have to prove and appears by presupposing mental determinism as I claimed my objector would) it would still be adequately applied to determinism and thus successful. Its not unsuccessful because it can be applied to other positions obviously. In any case, as libertarians hold their view which was briefly described above, its not clear that it would apply to libertarianism as it is held and justified as properly basic and directly verifiable in experience. Consequently, belief would not be believed to arise in the same way as for the determinist since all beliefs would be mentally determined. At the very least, it is not clear that it would be successful relative to libertarianism, and since you are making that claim, the burden of proof would be on you to make an argument. On the one hand, you claim that my conclusion doesn't follow from the premises. But you do not even have premises for how libertarianism, as it is held, would face this problem. They do not believe in mental determinism which is why deterministic belief is uniquely undermined in my argument. Now you again claim that my conclusion does not follow from my premises. This is quite remarkable. I am still waiting to see how it does not. I know that you believe that it does not. I knew that 7 posts ago. I am still waiting for a serious criticism. My argument carefully walks through the steps, offers up a user friendly analogy, it has embedded premises followed by a conclusion that shows that the determinist (at least) could never be justified in their belief. So I am quite satisfied with the argument until I hear an actual critique.

I don´t have the patience to put up with this anymore, sorry.
Obviously you are determined (! ) to simply ignore all objections and critique of your argument.

 

[Chesterton]

Visual centers interpret the images. Correlation engines match water droplets in air with previous history. Linguistic engines match droplets with 'rain'. Weather dipswitches flick to 'rain'. Who knows what the actual links look like, but I don't see anything to prevent something like that.

Metaphors of invisible engines and dipswitches don't tell me anything. I could diagram the Holy Trinity with "Father" and "Son" metaphors but I don't think it would help convince you of Christianity one bit.

None. Mind is an emergent property of purely physical systems. As wetness is of atoms.

Everything is an emergent property. Stars and planets have emerged. Apes have emerged. That's not saying anything particular about mind other than "it now exists".

But, having seen and/or felt the rain, could you decide otherwise? Unless you lie to yourself, I say no. If you perceive the rain, it leads inexorably, deterministically, to a belief that it is raining. Feel free to call it a judgment that you are 'making', but there is no choice in the result. If it's raining, and you're not insane or defective, then you believe it is raining.

Yes you're right. Immediate sense perceptions can't really be denied. (I usually pick better fights. ) To do so would be to disbelieve your own senses. But that's not really what the topic of free will deals with.

Possibly you didn't read my post. I did not say that beliefs were physical things.

Sorry I guess I thought you meant a physical chain. I think asking if there's a causal chain involves some semantics. Instead of the immediate sense perception of rain, take the example of being a juror in a trial. Say it lasts a week, so for 7 days all day long you hear all kinds of different evidence, and hear it disputed. Afterwards someone might ask you the same question two different ways:

1. What caused you to determine that the defendant was guilty?
2. Why did you decide that the defendant was guilty?

The metaphor of a chain implies that each step in the mind is linked, which I agree it must be, but the chain exists only after a decision is made. Before, it's free and undetermined.

 

[Albion]

I've read this several times, and it makes no sense at all.

I don´t have the patience to put up with this anymore, sorry.

 

[Ariston]

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