Pragmatism, Idealism, and Skepticism

[Eudaimonist]

I like virtue ethics too. It fits nicely under the umbrella of utilitarianism, improves personal well-being.

Virtue ethics is not a branch of utilitarianism. They are separate types of ethical theory.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtue_ethics

Virtue ethics (or aretaic ethics /ˌærəˈteɪɪk/ from the Greek arete) emphasizes the role of one's character and the virtues that one's character embodies for determining or evaluating ethical behavior. Virtue ethics is one of the three major approaches to normative ethics, often contrasted to deontology, which emphasizes duty to rules, and consequentialism, which derives rightness or wrongness from the outcome of the act itself. (bolding mine)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism [...] can be contrasted with deontological ethics, which does not regard the consequences of an act as a determinant of its moral worth; virtue ethics, which primarily focuses on acts and habits leading to happiness; pragmatic ethics; as well as with ethical egoism and other varieties of consequentialism.

You seem to have an overly expansive view of what utilitarianism means. It doesn't mean "any ethics that advances personal well-being".


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Davian]

You could say that; but that would also be begging the question.

However, you would be the one left wrestling with parsimony.

 

[Percivale]

In my opinion, God not healing people who suffer greatly would be greatly immoral. Just saying.

It is a tough issue, but there are several possible justifications for it. Would you feel it equally immoral for a western doctor to abstain from interfering in a tribal situation where a witch doctor was using his herbs and chants to heal a sick person?
Or is it possible that disease's effect in motivating scientific progress and giving scope to acts of compassion would be enough to justify God's not eradicating it?
Also, God's existence makes an afterlife probable, which makes suffering in this life a much smaller portion of a person's total experience in the long run, and may result in future happiness being more appreciated.

I'm not sure why would act religious is you aren't believing in that religion.

If those actions enrich one's life, why not?

I'd think you can be Marxist and theist

Theoretically, maybe, but Mao and Lenin didn't seem to think so. Their brand of marxism was quite hostile to religion of any kind. And some claim you can follow religions, especially Buddhism and Judaism, and be an atheist. But those are exceptions to the general rule.

Eudaimonist:
I'll study the issue more, but at present the only difference I can see between utilitarianism and virtue ethics is that the latter is more focused on personal happiness rather than sum total happiness, and may be more specific on what is most conducive to it. Utilitarianism seems to be a more umbrella type theory, under which many different theories of what actually is most conducive to total happiness can exist.
I see that your name comes from virtue ethics, that's cool.

 

[quatona]

I wouldn't personally call that metaphysics then. It needs to be made more obvious that it's about fiction. Perhaps calling it myth... metaphysical myths; to make t clear that you are just telling stories for enjoyment or value conveyance.

I wouldn´t call story-telling about the physical world "metaphysics", either
Here, though, I am talking about metaphysical ideas, and, thus, I would call them "metaphysical".

Fair enough. I suppose I agree, but to me saying rape (in general) is moral, would be similar to saying 2+2=3.

So I guess you are a "moral realist" (in that you feel there are moral facts that need to be discovered), and I am not.
That´s why I told you right from the start that this part of the discussion is leading us to a completely different topic and discussion.
You are invited to demonstrate that there are moral facts in the same way mathematical facts like 2+2=4 can be demonstrated, but, to be honest, I am not holding my breath. Have been around too long, and have seen people failing at this demonstration on a regular basis.

I get that nice ideas might be more important than truth if you live in absolute poverty, or have a terrible life. You might need it to get you through.

Well, that´s your personal threshold and you are welcome to apply it to yourself. If you want to apply it generally, I think you need to bring more to the table than your subjective threshold for justification.

It isn't about physical size, its just a way of phrasing things. I mean that truth exists beyond my life, unlike my desires. I want to be part of something beyond my life.

Sounds like a metaphysical concept, to me.

I'd say my values are higher because they are relevant whether I am alive or not. I don't mean that in a condescending way, I'm just explaining my thoughts, and I may be wrong.

Fair enough. If you want to subdue your life to an ideology that´s your prerogative.
When it comes to priorities of values, I have problems to come up with rational reasons - beyond reasons that are post-hoc rationalizations or spontaneous reasons that are hand-selected to support a certain view (like "bigger, because they are relevant whether I am alive or not").
Particularly when - as is my position - metaphysical truths are not to be known, i.e. in the absence of the criterium you are alluding to. In the absence of such a criterium I am fine with picking the next best criterium.

If I say 'This pen I'm holding exists', is that a belief? Is it a truth claim?

I guess, from your perspective it´s meant to be a truth claim.
The question what it can be at best from my perspective would lead us deep into the tenets of radical constructivism. In short: I think it can be a truth claim within the frame of reference of our collective pragmatic ideas and terminology of physical reality.

I'm say that psychological, that phrase and 'God exists' tend to be the same.

I am sure that many people say "God exists" in the intention to make a truth claim (if that´s what you mean by "psychologically").
But I am not agreeing with them. I don´t think it can be a truth claim. I am a die hard agnostic when it comes to metaphysical ideas. I think there are not truths to be known in this field, and therefore all a person can express are their beliefs.

Well obviously we use the word 'belief differently.

So what would you call the expression of a belief that´s not meant to be a truth claim? (Let´s say I have no whether the shop is open or closed, and I just believe that it is open?)

I think beliefs are things we consider true. Ie: I believe that I'm typing on a laptop.

I find the "I believe" in this sentence pretty redundant.
What, in your terminology, would be the difference between "I´m typing..." and "I believe I am typing..."?

What word do you use for truth claims?

"Truth claim"?`

You don't think that "I believe God exists" means "I think it's true that God exists"?

Yes, I don´t think it does. Just like I don´t think "I believe blue is better than read" means "I think it´s true that blue is better than red."
I wouldn´t use "I think God exists" and "I think it´s true that God exists" as synonyms. I do not tend to add strong affirmations ("it´s true that...") for no reasons, i.e. when they are redundant.
I do not know how often I have to repeat my base premise until it sinks in:
Metaphysical truths can not be known. This is the field where we beliefs can´t appeal to the criteria that distinguish beliefs from facts in the physical world.

I think most people who speak English would disagree with you. That's how they use English. You might disagree with their use of English, but psychologically they mean the same thing in the minds of the speakers.

Well, they may be under the impression that they are in the position to make metaphysical truth claims.
I, however, don´t believe they are (and neither am I).

I think we are talking past each other because we aren't using the same definitions.

This may be part of the problem. For me, however, the actual problem is that I would like to keep the opportunity to differenciate between what I prefer to believe in the absence of the option for verification/falsification and truth claims.
I use the word "belief" for the former. If, in your terminology this is the collective term for all of the above, I would like you to supply with another word that allows me to make that distinction which is important to me.

Ok, but many people actually think it's true that a God exists.

But here, you are talking to me.
A lot of people believe a lot of things. I don´t know how to respond to this your objection.

But they could be false, so I can just withhold judgement.

You didn´t withhold judgement. You called them "not real".
I withhold judgement. That´s why I signify my position as a mere "belief" (and in the meantime I hope you have understand the differenciation I make between a belief and a judgement, and even if you don´t agree with the terminology I use, you are still understanding the idea.

Someone doesn't have to exist to think she's beautiful. You could have a Photoshop created picture. If you are asked if she's beautiful, whether or not she's real, you could answer that.

Sure, but it´s not an epistemic question nor answer.

Whether or not God is real, you can answer whether God is possibly perfectly moral, based on the state of the world. You don't need to answer the epistemic question first.

I see why you got the impression that my statement was about "first" and "next". It wasn´t meant to be, though. Sorry for the confusion.
It was meant to point out that it´s not a good idea to combine a value judgement and an epistemic question, pretending it was one question.

When we look at a picture, the question "Is this displaying a real person or not?" and "Is this person beautiful?" are two entirely different questions.
Even if we agree that the person is beautiful we might disagree whether she´s a real person or not.
Even if we agree that she exists we might disagree whether she´s beautiful or not.

 

[Paradoxum]

I wouldn´t call story-telling about the physical world "metaphysics", either
Here, though, I am talking about metaphysical ideas, and, thus, I would call them "metaphysical".

If someone is making up scientific ideas, but isn't trying to attain truth, we'd call that science-fiction. Would you agree that your metaphysics is perhaps better named 'metaphysical-fiction'?

I wouldn't name it metaphysics because I'd say it's more reasonable for that to apply to theories that are aiming at truth, or a reason based conclusion.

So I guess you are a "moral realist" (in that you feel there are moral facts that need to be discovered), and I am not.
That´s why I told you right from the start that this part of the discussion is leading us to a completely different topic and discussion.
You are invited to demonstrate that there are moral facts in the same way mathematical facts like 2+2=4 can be demonstrated, but, to be honest, I am not holding my breath. Have been around too long, and have seen people failing at this demonstration on a regular basis.

I'm a moral realist, but I'm open on that, and still thinking about it.

Me going into my thinking on moral foundations might be too long for a post that is already long. Unless you really want me to explain my fallible work in progress thinking?

Fair enough. If you want to subdue your life to an ideology that´s your prerogative.

Are you in favour of standing for nothing but self-interest?

I am sure that many people say "God exists" in the intention to make a truth claim (if that´s what you mean by "psychologically").
But I am not agreeing with them. I don´t think it can be a truth claim. I am a die hard agnostic when it comes to metaphysical ideas. I think there are not truths to be known in this field, and therefore all a person can express are their beliefs.

I'd say that whether there are 'truth claims' depends on psychology, not epistemology. So if someone thinks they are making a truth claim, then they are probably making a truth claim.

So for me, if someone is claiming X to be true, then they are making a truth claim.

I think that's a more straightforward (and common) use of English than your apparent definition of 'truth claim'.

So my question would be, what word would you use to describe someone claiming something to be true? And whose definitions should we use?

So what would you call the expression of a belief that´s not meant to be a truth claim? (Let´s say I have no whether the shop is open or closed, and I just believe that it is open?)

I'd think that believing a shop is open is a truth claim (to yourself).

But if there is no truth claim at all (eg: it would be nice is heaven existed, but I don't believe in heaven), I'd say that was a fantasy.

I find the "I believe" in this sentence pretty redundant.
What, in your terminology, would be the difference between "I´m typing..." and "I believe I am typing..."?

"I believe..." is more explicitly about my mental state. I could be delusional... I might not actually be typing.

Anyway, my point is that if I think something is true, then I'd say I believe it. Belief is the mental state of holding something to be true, in my opinion.

"Truth claim"?`

Fair enough.

Yes, I don´t think it does. Just like I don´t think "I believe blue is better than read" means "I think it´s true that blue is better than red."

So to you, what does it mean to believe something.

Does "I believe in God" = "I enjoy fantasising about God existing"?

I do not know how often I have to repeat my base premise until it sinks in:
Metaphysical truths can not be known. This is the field where we beliefs can´t appeal to the criteria that distinguish beliefs from facts in the physical world.

I know; my problem is understanding your use of words.

Well, they may be under the impression that they are in the position to make metaphysical truth claims.
I, however, don´t believe they are (and neither am I).

I'd say whether or not they are correct, they are in a position to make truth claims about anything. As I said above, I think psychology defines 'truth claims', not epistemology.

This may be part of the problem. For me, however, the actual problem is that I would like to keep the opportunity to differenciate between what I prefer to believe in the absence of the option for verification/falsification and truth claims.
I use the word "belief" for the former. If, in your terminology this is the collective term for all of the above, I would like you to supply with another word that allows me to make that distinction which is important to me.

Can you give an example?

Fantasies, assumptions, educated guesses? I'm guessing what you mean might be 'assumptions' to me... perhaps.

You didn´t withhold judgement. You called them "not real".
I withhold judgement. That´s why I signify my position as a mere "belief" (and in the meantime I hope you have understand the differenciation I make between a belief and a judgement, and even if you don´t agree with the terminology I use, you are still understanding the idea.

I think I have reasons for my beliefs, that's why I'm not withholding judgement on some things.

I see why you got the impression that my statement was about "first" and "next". It wasn´t meant to be, though. Sorry for the confusion.
It was meant to point out that it´s not a good idea to combine a value judgement and an epistemic question, pretending it was one question.

When we look at a picture, the question "Is this displaying a real person or not?" and "Is this person beautiful?" are two entirely different questions.
Even if we agree that the person is beautiful we might disagree whether she´s a real person or not.
Even if we agree that she exists we might disagree whether she´s beautiful or not.

If it gets us to the point; I said "If your God exists, he hasn't acted morally perrfectly" do you get my point?

 

[Eyes wide Open]

To me, pragmatism and idealism (in the colloquial sense) are closely woven together. Idealism I define as having high hopes about the ultimate things in life, believing in or pursuing things because they are good and valued, not just because of factual evidence. Pragmatism is making decisions based on what works to attain a desired end, and the basic end to desire is a fulfilled life. So I consider it a pragmatic choice to be idealistic in how I view some things, if doing so contributes to my well-being.

I don't actually put this into practice all that much, since one of my primary values is searching out truth based on evidence. That is a fulfilling, praiseworthy, and useful pursuit we should all engage in, especially those with my personality and position. But if I hit a wall in seeking evidence, and just don't know which of two or more options is true, I believe choosing the belief my ideals lead to is the most logical choice, rather than adopting skepticism. This is mainly true if the decision affects actual choices concerning action--in the case of Pascal's wager, the action in question was whether to go to Mass and participate in the rites. (I'm not a proponent of the wager, but it gives some food for thought).

Skepticism has value regarding epistemology: there really is a lot we don't know for sure, and recognizing that can pave the way to new discoveries, and protect us from bigotry. But as a philosophy of life, skepticism is just not very pragmatic or ideal. It boils down to accepting the negative answer to every question, which is actually a choice in itself, and usually the less fulfilling or useful one. I also find it annoying when skeptics act so sure of their skepticism, like Hume did, building his whole philosophy around it. I prefer being skeptical of skepticism, especially in practical life, but also in philosophical questions; keep the option open as to how sure we can be about the issue under discussion.

An essay I like on the issue is William James' The Will to Believe. Check it out if interested.

What is a negative answer? as per your bolded statement. Also if you are skeptical of skepticism in that instance you are a skeptic. We are all skeptics to differing degrees and applications.

 

[quatona]

dp

 

[quatona]

If someone is making up scientific ideas, but isn't trying to attain truth, we'd call that science-fiction. Would you agree that your metaphysics is perhaps better named 'metaphysical-fiction'?

I wouldn't name it metaphysics because I'd say it's more reasonable for that to apply to theories that are aiming at truth, or a reason based conclusion.

What you´d need to understand in order to get my position (without necessarily agreeing with it): I don´t think there is metaphysical knowledge to be had, and I even strongly doubt that there is such a thing as a metaphysical "truth".
Under this premise, there is no point in comparing science and metaphysics.

I'm a moral realist, but I'm open on that, and still thinking about it.

Me going into my thinking on moral foundations might be too long for a post that is already long. Unless you really want me to explain my fallible work in progress thinking?

I´m always more interested in hearing thoughts in progress rather than hearing rationalized conclusions (and I would be happy to take a look at and comment on your thoughts in progress in another thread), but remember:
You are the gal who brought meta-morality into this thread, and I am the guy who said right from the start: "Please no - this is not helpful for the question at hand and will lead us off-topic."

Meta-morality is itself a branch of metaphysics, and as such at best part of the subject of our discussion, and not the way to the solution.

"Moral realism", in my opinion, is a great example for people holding a rationally unsubstantiable view. They hold it because it fits their (psychological -since you keep bringing up that term lately) needs best. (I am aware that this must sound like an insult to you, but as I said already: From my perspective this is as good a reason to hold a metaphysical view as it gets).

Are you in favour of standing for nothing but self-interest?

Huh? Where did that come from?

I'd say that whether there are 'truth claims' depends on psychology, not epistemology. So if someone thinks they are making a truth claim, then they are probably making a truth claim.

I´m not disputing that often people are intending to make a truth claim when they say "I believe...".
I am disputing that this is always so.

But this isn´t the point, anyway. I don´t think there is a space for metaphysical truth claims, and therefore I don´t care much what people intend the presentation of their metaphysical ideas to be.
Just like it doesn´t make much difference for me whether people say "Blue is better than red" or "I believe blue is better than red" or "It´s true that blue is better than red", "I believe that it´s true that blue is better than red", "It´s true that I believe that it´s true that blue is better than red". I am taking it as an expression of their preference - no matter what they intend it to be.

So for me, if someone is claiming X to be true, then they are making a truth claim.

I think that's a more straightforward (and common) use of English than your apparent definition of 'truth claim'.

So my question would be, what word would you use to describe someone claiming something to be true? And whose definitions should we use?

Look, Paradoxum, I feel that this semantics thing is not the core of our disagreement. I am sure you have understood the conceptual difference I am making here. I will be happy to use your terminology - unless it is designed in a way that defines this difference away, and therefore stacking the deck against my concept.
Further down you suggest "assumption", and I am fine with that.

I'd think that believing a shop is open is a truth claim (to yourself).

Then you are in error about the way I communicate with myself. I don´t have the habit of making truth claims to myself.
Often I do believe stuff that I wouldn´t for the life of me present as the "truth" publicly. This could be "the shop is open" (if I don´t have sufficient information to issue that as a truth claim, yet mean to recall the opening hours correctly).
There are many assumptions I work from which I would strongly object to being taught in science classes.

But if there is no truth claim at all (eg: it would be nice is heaven existed, but I don't believe in heaven), I'd say that was a fantasy.

Here you use the word "believing" yourself. And I am sure you see the difference between "I don´t believe in heaven" and the affirmative "Heaven doesn´t exist!", IOW you are using "I (don´t) believe" in the very way I suggested it can be and is used: As a signifier that you aren´t intending to make an affirmative truth claim. Indeed, I would agree you are talking about your psychological make-up.

Anyway, my point is that if I think something is true, then I'd say I believe it. Belief is the mental state of holding something to be true, in my opinion.

Well, I think that "I believe" actually covers a wide range of more or less certain assumptions.

So to you, what does it mean to believe something.

Does "I believe in God" = "I enjoy fantasising about God existing"?



I know; my problem is understanding your use of words.



I'd say whether or not they are correct, they are in a position to make truth claims about anything. As I said above, I think psychology defines 'truth claims', not epistemology.



Can you give an example?

Fantasies, assumptions, educated guesses? I'm guessing what you mean might be 'assumptions' to me... perhaps.

"I believe..." can point to any of these (and some more).
As I said, I am a bit tired of this semantics thing. So let´s settle for "assumption", ok?

I think I have reasons for my beliefs, that's why I'm not withholding judgement on some things.

The question - when it comes to metaphysical assumptions - is "What constitutes (good) reason to hold a metaphysical assumption?"
Under my premise (metaphysical knowledge can not be had) "good reason" for a metaphysical assumption can impossibly be the same as "good reason" (pure rationality and logic) is in science.
I don´t think you yourself have the sort of "reason" you are postulating, for your claim that fairies "aren´t real".

If it gets us to the point; I said "If your God exists, he hasn't acted morally perrfectly" do you get my point?

I have always understood that your main beef with the Christian god concept is the fact that this God´s behaviour isn´t reconcilable with your moral convictions/beliefs/assumptions (and I can´t reconcile it with my moral ideas, either - just so we are clear).
Also, we have agreed earlier in this thread, that certain metaphysical ideas can be discounted - e.g. if they are internally illogical or make claims about physical reality that are demonstrably wrong).
However, since I am not a moral realist, I don´t think that your moral views are a good way to arrive at negative epistemic conclusions about God´s existence by way of showing an internal contradiction. In fact, the contradiction is between your moral convictions and their God concept.

Just like when my friend tells me his girlfriend is the most beautiful girl in the world, and upon being introduced to her I find her rather ugly, I won´t conclude that she doesn´t exist or is not his girlfriend. Rather, I am inclined to assume that the seeming contradiction is owed to different ideas of "beauty".

 

[Percivale]

What is a negative answer? as per your bolded statement. Also if you are skeptical of skepticism in that instance you are a skeptic. We are all skeptics to differing degrees and applications.

A negative answer is answering "no" to any question. We are all skeptical of some things, but I'm arguing against skepticism as a general philosophy, as practiced by the ancient Greek skeptics and their fans, such as David Hume.

Quatona and Paradoxum,
I've been enjoying following your discussion with pleasure, and this thread has been quite educational for me. Thank you for participating. (I'm not trying to wrap it up if there is more to say, by the way).