Moore's Refutation of Skepticism

[public hermit]

BIV adds a whole other story that you lack access to: the world where the vat exists. So now we have two worlds to account for. Absent evidence for vat world, it seems contrived. Plus, I dont prefer it. But thats the best I can do. I cant declare it definitively false like Moore attempts and fails to do.

I agree that Moore does not prove something like BIV is definitively false, which is the idea of the argument in the OP. The framing of the argument that I took from wiki is a strong rejection of skepticism (technically-skepticism regarding external objects). It moves from not knowing that not-sk, which is simply doubt, to knowing that not-sk, and that is too strong. I don't know how we could know the skeptical possibility is false (even if we limited our skepticism to the reality of external objects).

But I could accept a weaker form of the argument, something along the lines of, it is more reasonable (practical?) to accept our common sense intuitions than the skeptical possibility, which is basically what I do.

Im referring to everything from the miracles of Jesus to the idea of afterlife consequences for what you believe now.

Yes, I think those would fall outside the domain of "common sense." Moore certainly thought so.

 

[durangodawood]

Actually, Moore himself realized that his "hand" analogy wouldn't satisfy everyone and wouldn't provide more than a practical substantiation of a local presence in reality.

not-sk (also called "skepticism is false" here) seems to me a lot stronger than a local presence of apparent reality can establish.

Whereas Descartes reached his axiomatic position of "I think, therefore I am," Moore was simply saying that "I see my hand, therefore I know I am."

"I know" there^ is basically just "works for me!" So he feels good about dismissing sk for his own purposes. But it doesnt render sk definitively false. In this regard I'm with him. I go through life as if my ever changing self and things I encounter are real.

At center, the more nuanced levels of investigation into a more overall ontology of reality as well as of the epistemological consideration of Sufficiency of Evidence (which is difference and relative much of the time for each one of us) prevents Moore's hand analogy from providing anything comprehensive and universally compelling on lesser forms of Skepticism.

What do you mean "lesser forms of skepticism" ?

As an aside, we shouldn't think of Moore's hand analogy as some sort of heuristic for application about religious views; Moore was no theist and wasn't trying to prove anything in the way of theology since he didn't believe.

I'm hardly surprised hes not a theist given how he seems to highly privilege the immediately apparent.

 

[durangodawood]

 

[2PhiloVoid]

not-sk (also called "skepticism is false" here) seems to me a lot stronger than a local presence of apparent reality can establish.

Perhaps, but I'd have to review Moore's writing again to see to what degree he was denying skepticism. As far as I can remember at the moment, he was arguing against more robust forms of skepticism.

"I know" there^ is basically just "works for me!" So he feels good about dismissing sk for his own purposes. But it doesnt render sk definitively false. In this regard I'm with him. I go through life as if my ever changing self and things I encounter are real.

Actually, Descartes wasn't referring to "it works for me" in a general sense, but on a practical level I suppose you're right since Descartes still felt he had to 'build' a defense of his affirmation of reality, one guaranteed by particular metaphysical (theological) ideas, much of which still begged a number of questions.

What do you mean "lesser forms of skepticism" ?

Lesser forms would be like moral, religious, scientific, and/or 'ordinary skepticism,' the last of which essentially equates to what probably should be called "practical incredulity," where we believe the world is real but that we have to inquire about basic details about it along the way (like: will the restaurant require me to make a reservation or is it open on a walk up basis? Does she love me? .... Everyday stuff).

I'm hardly surprised hes not a theist given how he seems to highly privilege the immediately apparent.

G.E. Moore, generally hung around with a generally non-believing crowd, but subscribed to a more practical level of analytic assessment.

 

[public hermit]

Perhaps, but I'd have to review Moore's writing again to see to what degree he was denying skepticism. As far as I can remember at the moment, he was arguing against more robust forms of skepticism.

I've been wondering about that, too. The "here is a hand" argument shows a couple places at least, "A Defense of Common Sense" and "Proof of an External World." In the first he is arguing against universal or global skepticism and the hands argument is part of it, but in the second I think the "hands" argument is more directed at showing that one can know common sense intuitions like the existence of an external, material world. Still, he seems quite certain skepticism is false (not just about about external, material objects but global skepticism).

Here's a quote from "External World" (SEP):
I knew that there was one hand in the place indicated by combining a certain gesture with my first utterance of ‘here’ and that there was another in the different place indicated by combining a certain gesture with my second utterance of ‘here’. How absurd it would be to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case! You might as well suggest that I do not know that I am now standing up and talking — that perhaps after all I'm not, and that it's not quite certain that I am! (‘Proof of an External World’ 166)

Here's an interesting detail. According to the SEP entry, he distinguishes between proving an external world and proving one can know there is an external world.

I have sometimes distinguished between two different propositions, each of which has been made by some philosophers, namely (1) the proposition ‘there are no material things’ and (2) the proposition ‘Nobody knows for certain that there are any material things’. And in my latest British Academy lecture called ‘Proof of an External World’ … I implied with regard to the first of these propositions that it could be proved to be false in such a way as this; namely, by holding up one of your hands and saying ‘This hand is a material thing; therefore there is at least one material thing’. But with regard to the second of the two propositions …. I do not think I have ever implied that it could be proved to be false in any such simple way … (‘A Reply to my Critics’ 668)

George Edward Moore (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

For the life of me, I can't make sense of that distinction. I don't see how one can show there is an external world without also showing, by entailment, that at least one person knows there is an external world.

ETA: I should add, the author of the SEP article doesn't think Moore is arguing against skepticism, per se, but against the rejection of an empirical truism, i.e., I have hands. I'm not sure that helps Moore's argument all that much. From the SEP author:

Although, as I have indicated, Moore did not intend his ‘proof’ as a refutation of skepticism, he did frequently argue against skeptical views; and in his early writings, despite the passage quoted just now, he does sometimes give the impression that he thinks one can refute skepticism by simply bringing forward a straightforward case of knowledge, such as ‘I know that this is a pencil’. But on examination it turns out that his strategy here is more subtle; he wants to argue that we get our understanding of knowledge primarily through straightforward cases of this kind, and thus that skeptical arguments are self-undermining: for, on the one hand, they rely on general principles about the limits of knowledge and thus assume some understanding of knowledge but, on the other hand, they undermine this understanding by implying that there are no such straightforward cases of it.

 

[PloverWing]

What do you think should count as justification that you have a hand and that it is 'real' and not a simulation?

Like Descartes, I am most confident in the experiences of the inner world: I'll say that "I know that I am thinking right now", and that "I know that there is an 'I' that is doing the thinking". Maybe even "I know that I am experiencing sensations that seem to be sensory perceptions of an outer world". But once we cross over into the outer world, my certainty drops. I'm not willing to say that I know with certainty that I have a pair of hands that are currently typing on a laptop.

Obviously, there's a huge category of assertions for which I'm willing to say that they're likely enough to be true that I can act on them and get on with my life. Speaking loosely, I do utter sentences like "I know we bought cereal at the store yesterday", meaning "I have a memory of ... ". But when I'm speaking carefully, I reserve the words "know" and "certain" for a very few assertions, all of which are about my inner state of mind.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Like Descartes, I am most confident in the experiences of the inner world: I'll say that "I know that I am thinking right now", and that "I know that there is an 'I' that is doing the thinking". Maybe even "I know that I am experiencing sensations that seem to be sensory perceptions of an outer world". But once we cross over into the outer world, my certainty drops. I'm not willing to say that I know with certainty that I have a pair of hands that are currently typing on a laptop.

Wow, seriously? You're the first person I've ever heard actually say that.

Obviously, there's a huge category of assertions for which I'm willing to say that they're likely enough to be true that I can act on them and get on with my life. Speaking loosely, I do utter sentences like "I know we bought cereal at the store yesterday", meaning "I have a memory of ... ". But when I'm speaking carefully, I reserve the words "know" and "certain" for a very few assertions, all of which are about my inner state of mind.

On that point, I'd say I'm more or less similar in being guarded against asserting the denotative value of knowing or having bona-fide certainty, but I think I'm a bit more willing to assert instances of knowing beyond those of my inner state of mind.

Would you count yourself as an anti-realist in the mode of Richard Rorty or a similar theorist?

 

[PloverWing]

Would you count yourself as an anti-realist in the mode of Richard Rorty or a similar theorist?

I'm afraid you've once again given me some reading to do. I'm not at all familiar with Richard Rorty. My knowledge of him comes entirely from the Wikipedia page I skimmed just now, so I will have to reserve judgment until I'm better educated.

I can perhaps say that my first and greatest loves in philosophy are formal logic and foundations of mathematics, and those are the kinds of places I look when I'm trying to find certainty. How logic and mathematics connect to the physical world -- well, that's one of the great puzzles.

My study of epistemology has been put on hold for a bit while I work through a computer science career. (In fact, I need to stop reading CF and go write my syllabuses for the fall semester...) When my retirement years allow me more time for leisure reading, I'll probably look at the epistemological writings of some of the 20th century logicians (Quine, Putnam, Russell, folks like that), and I may find some answers there.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I've been wondering about that, too. The "here is a hand" argument shows a couple places at least, "A Defense of Common Sense" and "Proof of an External World." In the first he is arguing against universal or global skepticism and the hands argument is part of it, but in the second I think the "hands" argument is more directed at showing that one can know common sense intuitions like the existence of an external, material world. Still, he seems quite certain skepticism is false (not just about about external, material objects but global skepticism).

Here's a quote from "External World" (SEP):
I knew that there was one hand in the place indicated by combining a certain gesture with my first utterance of ‘here’ and that there was another in the different place indicated by combining a certain gesture with my second utterance of ‘here’. How absurd it would be to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case! You might as well suggest that I do not know that I am now standing up and talking — that perhaps after all I'm not, and that it's not quite certain that I am! (‘Proof of an External World’ 166)

Here's an interesting detail. According to the SEP entry, he distinguishes between proving an external world and proving one can know there is an external world.

I have sometimes distinguished between two different propositions, each of which has been made by some philosophers, namely (1) the proposition ‘there are no material things’ and (2) the proposition ‘Nobody knows for certain that there are any material things’. And in my latest British Academy lecture called ‘Proof of an External World’ … I implied with regard to the first of these propositions that it could be proved to be false in such a way as this; namely, by holding up one of your hands and saying ‘This hand is a material thing; therefore there is at least one material thing’. But with regard to the second of the two propositions …. I do not think I have ever implied that it could be proved to be false in any such simple way … (‘A Reply to my Critics’ 668)

George Edward Moore (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

For the life of me, I can't make sense of that distinction. I don't see how one can show there is an external world without also showing, by entailment, that at least one person knows there is an external world.

ETA: I should add, the author of the SEP article doesn't think Moore is arguing against skepticism, per se, but against the rejection of an empirical truism, i.e., I have hands. I'm not sure that helps Moore's argument all that much. From the SEP author:

Although, as I have indicated, Moore did not intend his ‘proof’ as a refutation of skepticism, he did frequently argue against skeptical views; and in his early writings, despite the passage quoted just now, he does sometimes give the impression that he thinks one can refute skepticism by simply bringing forward a straightforward case of knowledge, such as ‘I know that this is a pencil’. But on examination it turns out that his strategy here is more subtle; he wants to argue that we get our understanding of knowledge primarily through straightforward cases of this kind, and thus that skeptical arguments are self-undermining: for, on the one hand, they rely on general principles about the limits of knowledge and thus assume some understanding of knowledge but, on the other hand, they undermine this understanding by implying that there are no such straightforward cases of it.

Yeah, the portion I had to read years ago was from the second work you've cited, "Proof of an External World." Towards the end of that excerpt, and in line with what you've already quoted, Moore said,

... ... they will say that I have not given what they mean by a proof of the existence of external things. In other words, they want a proof of what I assert now when I hold up my hands and say "Here's one hand and here's another"; and, in the other case, they want a proof of what I assert now when I say "I did hold up two hands above this desk just now." Of course, what they really want is not merely a proof of these two propositions, but something like a general statement as to how many propositions of this sort may be proved. This, of course, I haven't given; and I do not believe it can be given: if this is what is meant by proof of the existence of external things, I do not believe that any proof of the existence of external things is possible... ... (p. 245).

Reference

Moore, G.E. (2001). Proof of an External World. In J.J. Lingberg (Ed.), Analytic Philosophy: Beginnings to the Present (pp. 233-247). Mayfield Publishing Company.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I'm afraid you've once again given me some reading to do. I'm not at all familiar with Richard Rorty. My knowledge of him comes entirely from the Wikipedia page I skimmed just now, so I will have to reserve judgment until I'm better educated.

I can perhaps say that my first and greatest loves in philosophy are formal logic and foundations of mathematics, and those are the kinds of places I look when I'm trying to find certainty. How logic and mathematics connect to the physical world -- well, that's one of the great puzzles.

My study of epistemology has been put on hold for a bit while I work through a computer science career. (In fact, I need to stop reading CF and go write my syllabuses for the fall semester...) When my retirement years allow me more time for leisure reading, I'll probably look at the epistemological writings of some of the 20th century logicians (Quine, Putnam, Russell, folks like that), and I may find some answers there.

No worries. But I don't think any of us will find answers in Epistemology other than in perhaps better understanding how "other people" assert that beliefs of all kinds must be justified, in one format, theory or praxis ...... or another.

Although I lean toward the use of Philosophical Hermeneutics, Critical Realism, and Abductive style investigation over and above Deductive style, linear thinking, I realize no epistemological systems are self-evident, fool-proof or conclusive in their effects.

This I'm certain of..............................................