Objective morality, Evidence for God's existence

[Davian]

Objective moral values cannot be logically, or justifiably accounted for via evolution by natural selection.

Therefore your only other option is that they exist as a result of God creating us with the capacity to apprehend and comprehend such a conceptual realm as morality and all that it entails.

False dichotomy. There is always another option, such as 'we don't know'.

Begging the question - what objective morals?

Argument from ignorance. "I don't know how evolution through natural selection can account for morals, therefore God."

Did you excuse yourself from the "no logical fallacies" rule for this thread? If not, you are in trouble with the OP.

 

[Davian]

That's an interesting question. Consider for example the debate between McDowell and Williams on internal and external reasons for action. That debate doesn't center on whether deities exist to make morality "objective".

I will look that one up.

This relates to my previous question on how we are able to obtain knowledge about the supernatural. Elio refuses to even address the question, but he expects us to accept supernatural claims; and not just any supernatural claims, the supernatural claims of his religion.

Yes, the argument does rest on more than a few presuppositions.

 

[quatona]

1. If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.

Doesn´t follow - needs substantiation.

2. Objective moral values and duties do exist

Unsubstantiated assertion.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

1. If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.

I have never seen any positive substantiantion for that claim. Premise rejected.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

Objective moral values cannot be logically, or justifiably accounted for via evolution by natural selection.

Therefore your only other option is that they exist as a result of God creating us with the capacity to apprehend and comprehend such a conceptual realm as morality and all that it entails.

Here, let me show you something:

Objective moral values cannot be logically, or justifiably accounted for via divine creation.

Therefore your only other option is that they exist simply because that is the way the world is, including the possibility of minds which have the capacity to apprehend and comprehend such a conceptual realm as morality and all that it entails.​

I mean we can say a lot.


What I would like to see for a change is positive argumentation. You have not shown that God and absolute morality are compatible, for example. All you have is the assertion that otherwise it is not possible. That is pretty, pretty thin. (Anybody can make up such assertions.)

Please back up your premises. Properly. Until then, premise rejected.

(And always keep in mind, that in order for a premise to be accepted it needs to be shown true. In the case it has been shown to be false and in the case when we don't know if its true a premise is to be rejected.)


Edited to add:
Of course, I full well know from experience that there will be no such good substantiation forthcoming and that it would be pretty foolish of me to wait for it here. So, as far as I am concerned the argument is dead. Dead, dead, dead. Dead as a doornail.

 

[Eudaimonist]

Originally Posted by Elioenai26

1. If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.
​

That's one hell of a weak premise. It's basically an argument from ignorance.

Personally, I'm a moral realist who thinks that morality need not be some form of ethical subjectivism or non-cognitivism. But it not my job to defend my ethics here, since even if no one knew how to ground objective moral values without a God, that doesn't mean that it can't be done. It would simply mean that no one knows how. So this premise is basically resting on ignorance, not knowledge.

That makes the conclusion of the argument dubious. It's building your castles on sand instead of rock, and smells suspiciously like a cheap debator's trick where one tries to shift the burden of proof somewhere it doesn't belong in order to confound the unwary and score "debating points" with an audience, which is unbecoming of any honest philosophical individual.

2. Objective moral values and duties do exist
​

As I had said, I'm a moral realist, so I agree for reasons of my own that moral values and duties do exist, however, your premise has the flavor of a fallacious appeal to popularity or some appeal to a self-evidency that may be controversial. One had better have an argument to back that up, and one that does not beg the question of this argument by assuming the existence of God.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Archaeopteryx]

I will look that one up.

The McDowell paper is titled 'Might there be external reasons?' and it is, from memory, partly a reply to Williams' notion of internal and external reasons for action. It is, IMO, an interesting discussion.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

"Without God there are no morals. I don't like that, therefore God"

I mean, do we even have to bother?

 

[Genersis]

William Lane Craig? Really?

 

[Elioenai26]

I've seen various responses from people here regarding premise (2) which I will take the time to address broadly.

To deny that there are some acts which are morally reprehensible and inexcusable independently of what individual's opinions of them might be, is itself inexcusable.

In the absence of some defeater, we are justified in trusting our perceptions that there is in fact an apprehendable realm of objective morality in the same way that we trust our perceptions regarding the objective reality of the physical world around us. Can we be absolutely certain of these realities. No. It is logically possible that we are all brains in a vat, or bodies lying in the Matrix. Likewise, it is logically possible that there are no objective moral values, that they are simply illusory. However, seeing as how there is very little in experience that we know with complete certainty, if anything, we do not need to be certain beyond all doubt that there actually exists a realm of objective morality, but simply need to be sure beyond a reasonable doubt, and our moral experiences validates the assertion that there are objective moral values.

Now, there are two ways one might want to object by using the view that objective moral values and duties are illusions built in us by socio-biological evolution. They are as follows:

1. As a defeater for the truth of (2)

or

2. As a defeater for the warrant of believing (2)

With regards to 1., such an objection is an example of commiting the genetic fallacy because the proponent of 1. maintains that there are no objective morals or duties because they originated as by-products of socio-biological evolution.

With regards to 2., the proponent is begging the question on one hand and ultimately is in a self-defeating position on the other. If there is no God, then it is plausibly true that moral experience is illusory. But why think naturalism is true? Naturalists themselves must maintain that God could possibly exist. Therefore, in the absence of a proof on naturalism, the warrant from our moral experiences reinforces (2).

The objection is also self-defeating in that it fails to take into account that on naturalism, all of our beliefs have been selected for their value with relation to survival, not some abstract concept such as truth. Therefore all of our beliefs, not just moral ones, are unwarranted. But if all of our beliefs are unwarranted on naturalism, then the belief in naturalism and the socio-biological explanation of moral beliefs are unwarranted. The objection defeats its own warrant and because of this it cannot be rationally affirmed and in turn cannot defeat the warrant of (2).

In summation, when people like Skavau say that torture is wrong independently of what people think, they are justified in their position. When Michael Ruse himself a defender of Darwinism states: "The man who says it is morally acceptable to rape little children is just as mistaken as the man who says 2+2=5", he is making the comparison of an objective mathematical truth with an objective moral judgment. 2+2 is 4 in Paris, as well as in Pyongyang. 2+2 is 4 even if people say it is 6 or 5 or 3 or 2. Likewise, raping children is wrong whether you're in Paris or Pyongyang and it is wrong whether people think it is or not.

 

[keith99]

Is it ever permissible to rape a child?

I will save you the trouble. The answer is no. The answer is no regardless what anyone or any group of people say or believe.

This is an objective moral value judgment. It is an objective moral obligation to protect young children.

So your assertion above simply is not pertinent to my point... No one in their right mind would say that it is ever permissible to rape a young child.

So you are arguing that if everyone agrees then somethign is an objective moral law?

Seems you are then arguing there can be such without God.

 

[Elioenai26]

So you are arguing that if everyone agrees then somethign is an objective moral law?

When did I say that?

I said it is wrong regardless of what people say, not because of what people say.

 

[Skavau]

I've seen various responses from people here regarding premise (2) which I will take the time to address broadly.

To deny that there are some acts which are morally reprehensible and inexcusable independently of what individual's opinions of them might be, is itself inexcusable.

That's an emotionally strung argument, not a logical one.

I may say that murder is always wrong but that is not the same as asserting that it is somehow objectively wrong. The different is subtle, but there. It is my assertion that murder is wrong. It is my assertion that it serves no purpose and directly harms individuals and society at large.

In the absence of some defeater, we are justified in trusting our perceptions that there is in fact an apprehendable realm of objective morality in the same way that we trust our perceptions regarding the objective reality of the physical world around us. Can we be absolutely certain of these realities. No. It is logically possible that we are all brains in a vat, or bodies lying in the Matrix. Likewise, it is logically possible that there are no objective moral values, that they are simply illusory. However, seeing as how there is very little in experience that we know with complete certainty, if anything, we do not need to be certain beyond all doubt that there actually exists a realm of objective morality, but simply need to be sure beyond a reasonable doubt, and our moral experiences validates the assertion that there are objective moral values.

No, it doesn't. Your frequent examples on this also only refer to acts that are prohibited because of their obvious negative effects on society. You don't seem to refer to any of the large grey issues.

In summation, when people like Skavau say that torture is wrong independently of what people think, they are justified in their position.

I love how you have to negate your own moral philosophy when you argue for objective morality. You say I'm correct that torture is always wrong.

So how do you reconcile that with hell?

When did I say that?

I said it is wrong regardless of what people say, not because of what people say.

This begs the question then: What makes an action wrong according to you?

 

[Mr. Pedantic]

I've seen various responses from people here regarding premise (2) which I will take the time to address broadly.

To deny that there are some acts which are morally reprehensible and inexcusable independently of what individual's opinions of them might be, is itself inexcusable.

In the absence of some defeater, we are justified in trusting our perceptions that there is in fact an apprehendable realm of objective morality in the same way that we trust our perceptions regarding the objective reality of the physical world around us. Can we be absolutely certain of these realities. No. It is logically possible that we are all brains in a vat, or bodies lying in the Matrix. Likewise, it is logically possible that there are no objective moral values, that they are simply illusory. However, seeing as how there is very little in experience that we know with complete certainty, if anything, we do not need to be certain beyond all doubt that there actually exists a realm of objective morality, but simply need to be sure beyond a reasonable doubt, and our moral experiences validates the assertion that there are objective moral values.

Now, there are two ways one might want to object by using the view that objective moral values and duties are illusions built in us by socio-biological evolution. They are as follows:

1. As a defeater for the truth of (2)

or

2. As a defeater for the warrant of believing (2)

With regards to 1., such an objection is an example of commiting the genetic fallacy because the proponent of 1. maintains that there are no objective morals or duties because they originated as by-products of socio-biological evolution.

With regards to 2., the proponent is begging the question on one hand and ultimately is in a self-defeating position on the other. If there is no God, then it is plausibly true that moral experience is illusory. But why think naturalism is true? Naturalists themselves must maintain that God could possibly exist. Therefore, in the absence of a proof on naturalism, the warrant from our moral experiences reinforces (2).

The objection is also self-defeating in that it fails to take into account that on naturalism, all of our beliefs have been selected for their value with relation to survival, not some abstract concept such as truth. Therefore all of our beliefs, not just moral ones, are unwarranted. But if all of our beliefs are unwarranted on naturalism, then the belief in naturalism and the socio-biological explanation of moral beliefs are unwarranted. The objection defeats its own warrant and because of this it cannot be rationally affirmed and in turn cannot defeat the warrant of (2).

In summation, when people like Skavau say that torture is wrong independently of what people think, they are justified in their position. When Michael Ruse himself a defender of Darwinism states: "The man who says it is morally acceptable to rape little children is just as mistaken as the man who says 2+2=5", he is making the comparison of an objective mathematical truth with an objective moral judgment. 2+2 is 4 in Paris, as well as in Pyongyang. 2+2 is 4 even if people say it is 6 or 5 or 3 or 2. Likewise, raping children is wrong whether you're in Paris or Pyongyang and it is wrong whether people think it is or not.

You're just trying to guilt us into submission. Again, it's ironic that you say we should avoid logical fallacies, because you've committed another one: appeal to emotion.

 

[Elioenai26]

I find it ironic that many internet infidels are unaware that no naturalist or secular humanist when debating this topic will deny premise (2), but rather focus their argument on the ontological basis of objective morality.

I guess this is to be expected. And just to think, I was hoping someone would be capable of defending the naturalistic view with some sort of proficiency.

 

[Paradoxum]

And the capacity to take an objective perspective on an issue, combined with empathy, facts, evidence etc. etc...where does this come from?

Evolution.

You keep talking about "basic instincts". What is the source of these basic instincts? If you maintain that it was not God, you must maintain that it was according to the theory of evolution via natural selection, right? I.e. as a socio-biological adaptation.

Yes.

Surprisingly simple responses, when it sounded if you you wanted to properly discuss morality without God.

I find it ironic that many internet infidels are unaware that no naturalist or secular humanist when debating this topic will deny premise (2), but rather focus their argument on the ontological basis of objective morality.

I guess this is to be expected. And just to think, I was hoping someone would be capable of defending the naturalistic view with some sort of proficiency.

*Cough* That's what my position is. One can have secular humanist morals without God.

I'll happily defend it if you give me more critical questions.

 

[Elioenai26]

Evolution.



Yes.

Surprisingly simple responses, when it sounded if you you wanted to properly discuss morality without God.



*Cough* That's what my position is. One can have secular humanist morals without God.

I'll happily defend it if you give me more critical questions.

How do you derive an "ought" from an "is"?

 

[Wiccan_Child]

How do you derive an "ought" from an "is"?

Morality is an evolved instinct. What is - the instinct - gives us a subjective, emotional, nebululous sense of ought. This is an explanation for why we feel that things ought to be X or oughtn't be Y

For example, we feel we ought not to kill each other, and that feeling is rooted in our biology: we have evolved to feel this way because there exists a selection pressure driving us towards societal cohesion, and rampant unchecked murder is detrimental to that.

Whether this makes for a tidy or comforting ethical system is quite irrelevant.

 

[Paradoxum]

How do you derive an "ought" from an "is"?

I don't. I get an objective ought from an instinctual subjective desire or repulsion. People naturally run from pain, and this is objectively turned into a moral not to hurt others. This is just a small part of the story though.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

I've seen various responses from people here regarding premise (2) which I will take the time to address broadly.

To deny that there are some acts which are morally reprehensible and inexcusable independently of what individual's opinions of them might be, is itself inexcusable.

In the absence of some defeater, we are justified in trusting our perceptions that there is in fact an apprehendable realm of objective morality in the same way that we trust our perceptions regarding the objective reality of the physical world around us. Can we be absolutely certain of these realities. No. It is logically possible that we are all brains in a vat, or bodies lying in the Matrix. Likewise, it is logically possible that there are no objective moral values, that they are simply illusory. However, seeing as how there is very little in experience that we know with complete certainty, if anything, we do not need to be certain beyond all doubt that there actually exists a realm of objective morality, but simply need to be sure beyond a reasonable doubt, and our moral experiences validates the assertion that there are objective moral values.

If our moral experiences give the impression that there are objective moral values, then perhaps that is because, in our moral valuing, we create values not only for ourselves but for everyone else:

Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law without contradiction.

Now, there are two ways one might want to object by using the view that objective moral values and duties are illusions built in us by socio-biological evolution. They are as follows:

What do you mean by illusions? If objective moral values do exist, and they are wired in us, I think that would hardly make them illusory.

1. As a defeater for the truth of (2)

or

2. As a defeater for the warrant of believing (2)

With regards to 1., such an objection is an example of commiting the genetic fallacy because the proponent of 1. maintains that there are no objective morals or duties because they originated as by-products of socio-biological evolution.

That's like saying that there is no such thing such as colour perception because colour perception evolved. No one is saying that.

With regards to 2., the proponent is begging the question on one hand and ultimately is in a self-defeating position on the other. If there is no God, then it is plausibly true that moral experience is illusory. But why think naturalism is true? Naturalists themselves must maintain that God could possibly exist. Therefore, in the absence of a proof on naturalism, the warrant from our moral experiences reinforces (2).

This is bare assertion on your part. You are switching the burden of proof.

The objection is also self-defeating in that it fails to take into account that on naturalism, all of our beliefs have been selected for their value with relation to survival, not some abstract concept such as truth. Therefore all of our beliefs, not just moral ones, are unwarranted. But if all of our beliefs are unwarranted on naturalism, then the belief in naturalism and the socio-biological explanation of moral beliefs are unwarranted. The objection defeats its own warrant and because of this it cannot be rationally affirmed and in turn cannot defeat the warrant of (2).

Your logical fallacy is strawman

In summation, when people like Skavau say that torture is wrong independently of what people think, they are justified in their position. When Michael Ruse himself a defender of Darwinism states: "The man who says it is morally acceptable to rape little children is just as mistaken as the man who says 2+2=5", he is making the comparison of an objective mathematical truth with an objective moral judgment. 2+2 is 4 in Paris, as well as in Pyongyang. 2+2 is 4 even if people say it is 6 or 5 or 3 or 2. Likewise, raping children is wrong whether you're in Paris or Pyongyang and it is wrong whether people think it is or not.

Earlier in this post you made a comparison between moral perception and sensory perception. Let's contemplate that some more. I can sense the colour red without presupposing the existence of a deity. I can make claims about the world - about the colour of a flower, about its shape, and so on - without presupposing the supernatural. Why should I have to suppose that a deity exists when it comes to my moral sense then?