My only problem with hard determinism

[elman]

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Originally Posted by elman
I decided to move my arm. That is what happened that caused my arm to move.

Please answer the question I asked, not the one you'd like to answer - I asked what happened which caused your decision. You already told me an immediate cause of your arm moving. I want to know what happened to cause your decision.

There may have been and probably were many factors that I used to arrive at my decision to move my arm. Whatever factors there were that I used to decide to move my arm, it was not these factors that caused me to move my arm. They were only contributing factors. They were the reasons upon which I based my decision, but they were not the cause of my decision. I was the cause of my decision while using these reasons.

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I refuse to deny my observations and experience as being what they appear to be. I do not deny they are dependable and without flaws, but they are the best we have and you have not shown me any reason to believe they are completely illusion.

What is a complete illusion? Tell me, what sensory experience do you have that makes you so sure that you have free will?

Moving my hand to type this answer.

David Hume gives us a valuable heuristic here - every empirical fact should be based on an impression, that is to say, something we receive directly from the senses. What do you receive from the senses that convinces you so surely that the outcome of your decision isn't determined?

Sometimes I decide not to answer a post and I always am involved in what I anwer.


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Because robots follow their programing and humans create programing.

But you don't know whether or not humans have their own programming, either given to them by nature or by a deity (simple molecules certainly have a kind of programming) so your argument seems to be based entirely on the fact that you don't know that humans have "programming."

I would not be surprised if we have some programming in our dna. That is not the question. The question is does this programing that we have determine the details of what we do?

Arguments based on lack of knowledge are generally considered to not be very good.

What knowledge proves I am unable to change my mind and do something different than I did?

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You build a straw horse to knock down. I never assumed experience is utterly infallible. Have you assumed experience is utterly fallible?

I assume that such experience as I think you are relying on (since you've not actually detailed your experience at all) is so shaky, and also so similar to the same kind of experience as Libet proved to be utterly fallible, that it should certainly bow to rational thought.

I doubt that Libet or anyone else has proven our experiences to be utterly fallible.

You seem to be unable to follow the argument though, so perhaps it's not surprising you cling to whatever experience it is you have.

You have failed to present an argument that convinces me to assume my experiences are uttlerly illusiuon.

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You should not make those kind of assumptions. If you mean I am not part of the cause, then I don't agree.

Again, you're not looking at the argument, or the examples, or anything I say except for the conclusion. Take the example of Lee Harvey Oswald. Did he cause J.F.K.'s death?

I doubt it. I think someone else caused his death.

Well, of course he did. But I bet the death certificate didn't say, "cause of death: Lee Harvey Oswald." You see, what happened was that the bullet entered Kennedy's body, and that caused it to collide with nerves and blood vessels in his brain. This caused signals passed from other nerves in his brain, and blood from other vessels, to be disrupted. Etc etc.
We can also work backwards. The bullet's motion was caused by Oswald pulling the trigger, right? But in actual fact what happened was Oswald's finger muscles contracted, causing his finger to move, causing the trigger to move, causing the firing pin to strike the bullet, causing the volume around the propellant to decrease, causing the propellant to react, causing the pressure to increase, causing the bullet to move.

You stopped going back too soon. You should go back to Oswald deciding to pull the trigger if we assume he did in fact shoot Kenedy.

Now, both of these accounts of each action are correct, yes? But if we were trying to conduct a rigorous analysis of the causes involved, we'd want the more detailed one, right? But notice that it's not "Oswald" and it's not "The Bullet" which did any causing. It's the bullet's colliding or the movement of Oswald's finger.

If we assume Oswald did the shooting, then the cause of the shooting is Oswald, not the gun or bullet he used.

I'm not leaving out the bullet, Oswald, or you in any of these accounts. You're still there it's just I'm not saying "The Bullet," "Oswald," or "You." I'm using certain events that are linked with these things. Because using the events is more accurate than just referring to the thing with which the events are associated. If I was conducting an inquest and I asked the autopsy team for the cause of death and they kept insisting it was Oswald, or the bullet, I'd be pretty irritated. Even though it's fine and accurate to say this in normal conversation, when we actually get into the analysis of causes it's not.
That doesn't mean it suddenly becomes wrong, it just means it's wrong in the particular context. Now, do or don't you agree that in these examples it is more accurate to talk about the events associated with the things we might usually say were the causes? Do you or don't agree that, therefore, what we really mean when we say "some thing caused an event" is actually something to do with an event associated with that thing?

I guess if you say Oswald acted alone, he caused the event by deciding to shoot. If you say Oswald was part of a conspiriacy, then perhaps someone else is partly the cause, along with Oswald. I assume you are arguing philosopically that Oswald had no choice but do what he did and should therefore not have been held responsible.


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What prejudice? The one about not assuming all experience is just illusion?

The one about assuming that you really do have any experience relating to free will. The one assuming that that experience is reliable. Even the one assuming that, when you are aware of starting to make a decision, you've already "got ready" to do the action, completely unawares.

First of all I question the validity of that report and secondly our not know exactly when we begin to make a decision does not surprise me that much. That does not mean we don't make a decision. It just means science is not able to analize it completely and determine when and how it is made.

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If it is not true in everyday language it is not true in the search for truth and reality-philosophy.

Irrelevant since you don't talk about causal chains in everyday language. But your point appears to be that, if you say something in normal conversation, then you must entirely agree with that in every other context.

No I am saying words have meaning and they don't stop having meaning just because we start using them in a discussion on phiolosophy.

You need to read some Wittgenstein - he has a lot to say about contextualism - that is, the philosophical principle that the truth value of a statement depends on the context in which you say it. For example, now you would say, presumably, that you know what you had a couple of days ago for breakfast. But if I said, are you certain, or, if you were in the witness box perhaps, then you wouldn't say you knew. In fact, it would be false to say you know, because the context implies a different standard.

This is not understandable.

Same here. The context of philosophy requires a different standard of language. Just because you can say it in everyday language doesn't mean it makes sense now.

If we agree on the meaning determinism and it means we are fooling ourselves into thinking we are moving our arms when actually something that happened billions of years ago is moving my arm at this particular moment in time, then the unreasonableness of that is not about context and definition of words.

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My perceptions are that I do have the ability to move or not move my arm just about anytime I decide either way. What is your perception on that, that is different from mine?

Most of the time I move my arm I have no perception of any ability to move or not move it whatsoever. I just think "I want a cookie" and reach for it. Mostly, I am completely unaware of any choice at all. For much of my childhood, I had never even considered the question yet, crucially, I still thought I had some kind of free will because that just seems to be the inbuilt assumption in the absence of evidence.

Did your perception include the fact you were forced to eat the cookie? Did you get away with that excuse when you at a cookie you were told to not eat?

Now, suppose I am to make a decision - when, or whether, to move a finger. I am aware of making a decision. I have the experience of not knowing whether I am going to move it. I then have the experience of deciding to move it, and then it moves. At no point is there any perception which leaps out at me and shouts, "you have a choice! You could or could not move your finger!"

Then you and I are in different worlds. When I move my finger I am very aware that I chose to do that.

The only thing that implies that is not knowing whether I am going to move it. But that is pure ignorance - I don't somehow know that the outcome is not yet determined. I know I have not yet decided, but I do not perceive that the outcome of my decision is as yet undetermined.

You may be ignorant of the timeing and your senses may not be correct on the timing. It may begin in your subconscious before occuring in the consicious, that is just a question of timing, not a question of cause.



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I refuse to thow it out simply because you tell me philosophy and logic demands I do so.

You refuse also to even engage with that philosophy.

I have been attempting to engage it with you for some time now and no evidence is yet presented.


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Present your argument that will prove my perception of reality is an illusion. You have stated this over and over but you have not presented a compelling argument to support it.

We already know that introspection is unreliable via Libet. So you need a pretty good reason to say that another closely related kind of introspection is infallible.

As I recall did not Libet agree this did not prove lack of free will or choice?

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The programer's decision is what caused the selection as it occured.

But that is not saying that he decided which bucket the ball will going in - as you have already agreed with me.
So, who or what did make that selection?

It was the consequences of the programers decision even if unforseen by the programer. I have said this many times now and you have not refuted it.

 

[FishFace]

There may have been and probably were many factors that I used to arrive at my decision to move my arm. Whatever factors there were that I used to decide to move my arm, it was not these factors that caused me to move my arm. They were only contributing factors. They were the reasons upon which I based my decision, but they were not the cause of my decision. I was the cause of my decision while using these reasons.

In what way were they not causative? How do you know - what do you use to establish whether A causes or does not cause B, and how are you applying this principle here?
You say they are "contributing factors" - well, in my book, if A1, A2, A3 and so on all contribute to determining B (whether or not B is absolutely determined) then of course they are causes. If I tell you that it is 10 past 5 and your bus is at 12 minutes past, and you run to catch the bus then surely, my informing you of the time is a cause of you running to catch your bus, as it is a contributing factor.
But you're still not answering the question properly. I asked, what event causes you to make the decision. Now strictly, I should have said events, because there are no doubt more than one. But you're still not answering in terms of events. You say that several events contribute to your decision but (somehow) do not play a part in causing it. You then add that it is still you that cause it. But as you know, "you" is not an event.

Now, I'm pretty sure we can translate "you" into a series of events that are to do with, surprise, your mental state - your memories, emotions and so on. So these causes - I'm sorry - contributing factors - cause certain memories to be triggered and the whole combination ends up causing your decision. "You" are present in the form of your memories and your emotions and the rest of it. But ultimately, everything gets translated into proper, philosophical, rigorous "event language."

Moving my hand to type this answer.

Sometimes I decide not to answer a post and I always am involved in what I anwer.

I'm missing the inference that takes you from experiencing your hand moving to inferring that, given the exact same state of your brain and everything around you, you could have chosen not to move your hand.
Sometimes deciding not to answer a post merely indicates that in different situations, it is possible to choose differently, not that in the exact same one, it is possible to choose differently.

I would not be surprised if we have some programming in our dna. That is not the question. The question is does this programing that we have determine the details of what we do?

And you don't know whether that is true or not - so what evidence do you have? You've been saying for ages that you have some kind of really good evidence for free will based on personal experience yet, when I inquire about this, you merely experience the hand moving in response to your decision, not that your decision was undetermined. So your entire argument seems to be based on "I don't know that I am determined, so I'm not."

I doubt that Libet or anyone else has proven our experiences to be utterly fallible.
First of all I question the validity of that report and secondly our not know exactly when we begin to make a decision does not surprise me that much. That does not mean we don't make a decision. It just means science is not able to analize it completely and determine when and how it is made.
You may be ignorant of the timeing and your senses may not be correct on the timing. It may begin in your subconscious before occuring in the consicious, that is just a question of timing, not a question of cause.

It doesn't matter that we can't analyze it completely. It doesn't even matter that we make the decision - it is evident that we all make decisions, it's just that you object to the word being used in the case of determinism, something which Libet doesn't even try to show.
The point is that, about half a second before you move your finger, you do not think that you are getting ready to move your finger. Yet you are doing so, nonetheless.
Likewise, when you examine your decisions, you do not think that they are determined. It remains to the causal argument, which you refuse to engage with, to show that your decision is probably determined.
However, whatever you say about the causal argument, you can't justifiably claim that introspection is reliable. Libet shows that when examining your decisions, you can be, and are, wrong.

As I recall did not Libet agree this did not prove lack of free will or choice?

Yes he did. And I never said otherwise. Libet proves that your introspection is inaccurate. So when you rely on introspection for your entire point, can you not see why I'm not convinced?

You have failed to present an argument that convinces me to assume my experiences are uttlerly illusiuon.

If you flesh out these experiences, then we'll see what we can do.

I doubt it. I think someone else caused his death.

Good for you, and all the other conspiracy theorists. I'm sure we can talk about wacky explanations in some other thread.

You stopped going back too soon. You should go back to Oswald deciding to pull the trigger if we assume he did in fact shoot Kenedy.

Irrelevant, as you should see.

If we assume Oswald did the shooting, then the cause of the shooting is Oswald, not the gun or bullet he used.

I didn't say the cause of shooting. I said the cause of death. Of course, Oswald did cause Kennedy's death. So did Oswald's finger. So did the bullet. So did the hemorrhage. However, on the death certificate, it did not and should not say "Cause of Death: Lee Harvey Oswald." That's because the language of autopsies is more precise than the language of Joe Sixpack. Philosophy is more precise still. I can't BELIEVE we're still stuck here. It's also rather rude that you didn't answer my very explicit questions:

"Now, do or don't you agree that in these examples it is more accurate to talk about the events associated with the things we might usually say were the causes? Do you or don't agree that, therefore, what we really mean when we say "some thing caused an event" is actually something to do with an event associated with that thing?"

Give reasons, please.

I assume you are arguing philosopically that Oswald had no choice but do what he did and should therefore not have been held responsible.

I'm not arguing anything - it's an example. (In fact, if Oswald were not determined, his actions must have been random, so how could he be held responsible. No need to argue about that here, though.) The idea is to show you how it is more accurate to speak of the individual events leading up to an event as the causes, rather than a single object. The bullet did not cause Kennedy's death because if the bullet were just lying on the ground he would've been fine. Strictly speaking nor did Oswald, because if he'd been in bed, Kennedy would again have been alive. However, Oswald's pulling the trigger - an event - coupled with the other particulars at the time - did cause Kennedy's death. In fact, so did the motion of the bullet, and so did the impact of the bullet.
I ask you again to make sure you answered those questions above - which is it more accurate to speak of causing things - the bullet, or an event associated with the bullet?

No I am saying words have meaning and they don't stop having meaning just because we start using them in a discussion on phiolosophy.

This is not understandable.

They change meaning. That is just an accepted and demonstrable fact. Lots of words change meaning depending on context. Does someone who loves Jazz have sexual desire for a type of music? Nope.
Saying that contextualism isn't "understandable" is just plain false. Philosophers everywhere understand it. Perhaps you don't understand it, in which case I will rephrase the example.
Suppose you are at the scene of a crime the day before it was committed. When you get home, you are asked about the details of a painting at the scene, purely out of interest. You say, "It was of flowers." The inquirer asks, "are you sure?" (for he thought it was a woodland scene) and you reply, "Yes," because that's what you remember.
A painting was stolen from the place shortly after your visit and you are asked about the same painting by the police. You say, "It was of flowers." The inspector asks, "are you sure?" (for he thought it was a woodland scene, too) and you think, and say, "no, I could be mistaken.")

Now, assuming that your memory hasn't decayed significantly, what's going on here? Well, it's quite simple. In both cases, you were correct, but in the latter case, the meaning of the word, "sure" is different due to the context.

If we agree on the meaning determinism and it means we are fooling ourselves into thinking we are moving our arms

Strawman 1 - determinism means that every event is completely caused by other prior events. That implies that, when we move our arms, there was no possibility that we could have not moved our arms.

when actually something that happened billions of years ago is moving my arm at this particular moment in time, then the unreasonableness of that is not about context and definition of words.

Strawman 2 - causation, as far as physics knows, does not stretch across time to act on things now. However, if A causes B, and B causes C, then A causes C. If I knock a pen off the desk (A) and the pen hits the floor (B) and frightens the cat (C) then I caused the cat to be frightened.
If I aim a gun at JFK and pull the trigger (A) and the trigger causes the firing pin to strike the bullet (B) and the propellant explodes (C) causing the bullet to shoot at JFK (D) causing a wound (E) causing death (F) then I caused the death.

Did your perception include the fact you were forced to eat the cookie?

In that case, my perception did not include any element of my will at all, really - I didn't make a decision, "I will have a cookie" and then decide "I will reach for the cookie" etc - I just wanted a cookie and got one. So in that case, I almost did get that perception. If you look for this in retrospect, I expect you will notice that you do plenty of things "on autopilot."

Did you get away with that excuse when you at a cookie you were told to not eat?

Why are you still labouring under the assumption that I'm trying to absolve myself from blame? I've told you enough times that I agree with Hume that the only way I could have been responsible is if my action was determined. You apparently don't understand this.

Then you and I are in different worlds. When I move my finger I am very aware that I chose to do that.

Next time you write something down, I would like you to remember this conversation and think to yourself - did you decide where you would put your fingers? No, you just wanted to write something down and did it. Think back further - did you actually make a conscious decision to write it down? Perhaps, but you may well have "decided" without thinking about it at all. I bet that you don't have any perception whatsoever of any "possibility" of being able to not write something down. I bet you "perceive that you could choose not to" but I further bet that the "could" in that sentence is indicative only of ignorance - you don't know whether you'll choose, so as far as you're concerned, you could still choose.

I have been attempting to engage it with you for some time now and no evidence is yet presented.

If you've been attempting to engage, then why do you still think determinism implies lack of responsibility? Why do you think that Libet tried to prove determinism? Why do you think that I'm trying to provide evidence when I've made it quite clear that I'm trying to A) show your evidence isn't as sure as you think it is and then B) use the causal argument not "evidence" to reach my conclusion.

Honestly, how can you hope to debate when, after 20 or so pages mostly of us, you still don't know the structure of my position?

It was the consequences of the programers decision even if unforseen by the programer. I have said this many times now and you have not refuted it.

That's because I agree with it! But you've not answered the question of who or what selected the bucket for the ball!
Or the original question of what the robot does with respect to the bucket. You're defining yourself out of the argument by refusing to have a word that means decide but without implying non-determined-ness. Determinsts aren't going to be bothered using "decide" or "choice" - you're just making an artificial language barrier.

 

[elman]

Originally Posted by elman
There may have been and probably were many factors that I used to arrive at my decision to move my arm. Whatever factors there were that I used to decide to move my arm, it was not these factors that caused me to move my arm. They were only contributing factors. They were the reasons upon which I based my decision, but they were not the cause of my decision. I was the cause of my decision while using these reasons.

In what way were they not causative? How do you know - what do you use to establish whether A causes or does not cause B, and how are you applying this principle here?

I don't know just as you don't know but my experience and perceptions would indicate I move my are when I wish and when I wish to not move it, it does not move. It is obvious there is some control of my arm on my part.

You say they are "contributing factors" - well, in my book, if A1, A2, A3 and so on all contribute to determining B (whether or not B is absolutely determined) then of course they are causes.

Well in my book if I could have done different, they are not the causes. I have no reason to believe I could not have chosen different and you have not yet presented me with one.

If I tell you that it is 10 past 5 and your bus is at 12 minutes past, and you run to catch the bus then surely, my informing you of the time is a cause of you running to catch your bus, as it is a contributing factor.

It is a cause, not the only cause and not the controling or primary cause.

But you're still not answering the question properly. I asked, what event causes you to make the decision.

No event--my choice.

Now strictly, I should have said events, because there are no doubt more than one. But you're still not answering in terms of events. You say that several events contribute to your decision but (somehow) do not play a part in causing it.

I did not say they did not play a part. I did say theirs was not a controling part, and not the only parts.

You then add that it is still you that cause it. But as you know, "you" is not an event.

Then you have a cause that is not an event.

Now, I'm pretty sure we can translate "you" into a series of events that are to do with, surprise, your mental state - your memories, emotions and so on.

I am pretty sure you cannot. I am more than a series of events.

So these causes - I'm sorry - contributing factors - cause certain memories to be triggered and the whole combination ends up causing your decision.

My memories are a part of me but I am more than my memories.

"You" are present in the form of your memories and your emotions and the rest of it. But ultimately, everything gets translated into proper, philosophical, rigorous "event language."

Only by you--not by me.


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Moving my hand to type this answer.

Sometimes I decide not to answer a post and I always am involved in what I anwer.

I'm missing the inference that takes you from experiencing your hand moving to inferring that, given the exact same state of your brain and everything around you, you could have chosen not to move your hand.

The state of my brain is an indefinite reference. I am partailly responsible for the state of my brain, so you have not left me behind yet.

Sometimes deciding not to answer a post merely indicates that in different situations, it is possible to choose differently, not that in the exact same one, it is possible to choose differently.

That is your unproven theory.
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I would not be surprised if we have some programming in our dna. That is not the question. The question is does this programing that we have determine the details of what we do?

And you don't know whether that is true or not

- And neither do you and so far you have not indicated why I should believe I am controlled completely by my dna.

so what evidence do you have? You've been saying for ages that you have some kind of really good evidence for free will based on personal experience yet, when I inquire about this, you merely experience the hand moving in response to your decision, not that your decision was undetermined.

I guess it would be more lack of any evidence that I am not the one doing the moving of my hand.

So your entire argument seems to be based on "I don't know that I am determined, so I'm not."

That would certainly be the default position based on our observations.


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I doubt that Libet or anyone else has proven our experiences to be utterly fallible.
First of all I question the validity of that report and secondly our not know exactly when we begin to make a decision does not surprise me that much. That does not mean we don't make a decision. It just means science is not able to analize it completely and determine when and how it is made.
You may be ignorant of the timeing and your senses may not be correct on the timing. It may begin in your subconscious before occuring in the consicious, that is just a question of timing, not a question of cause.

It doesn't matter that we can't analyze it completely. It doesn't even matter that we make the decision - it is evident that we all make decisions, it's just that you object to the word being used in the case of determinism, something which Libet doesn't even try to show.

It does matter when you are trying to use to prove we are not in control of anything.

The point is that, about half a second before you move your finger, you do not think that you are getting ready to move your finger.

How exactly does science tie this down at to the timing that I think I am getting ready to move my finger? Can science explore the subconcious yet?

Yet you are doing so, nonetheless.
Likewise, when you examine your decisions, you do not think that they are determined. It remains to the causal argument, which you refuse to engage with, to show that your decision is probably determined.

No it does not and I have been engaging it for a long time now.

However, whatever you say about the causal argument, you can't justifiably claim that introspection is reliable. Libet shows that when examining your decisions, you can be, and are, wrong.

Being partially incorrect does not mean it is all incorrect. What I am wrong about may be the time, and not the source.


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As I recall did not Libet agree this did not prove lack of free will or choice?

Yes he did. And I never said otherwise. Libet proves that your introspection is inaccurate. So when you rely on introspection for your entire point, can you not see why I'm not convinced?

I don't rely on introspection for my entire point.


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You have failed to present an argument that convinces me to assume my experiences are uttlerly illusiuon.

If you flesh out these experiences, then we'll see what we can do.

We have already done that over and over.

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You stopped going back too soon. You should go back to Oswald deciding to pull the trigger if we assume he did in fact shoot Kenedy.

Irrelevant, as you should see.

That is the reason you keep missing the point. You don't see it as relavant that I cause somethings. Most human being do see the relavance of my being able to cause things.


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If we assume Oswald did the shooting, then the cause of the shooting is Oswald, not the gun or bullet he used.

I didn't say the cause of shooting. I said the cause of death. Of course, Oswald did cause Kennedy's death. So did Oswald's finger. So did the bullet. So did the hemorrhage. However, on the death certificate, it did not and should not say "Cause of Death: Lee Harvey Oswald." That's because the language of autopsies is more precise than the language of Joe Sixpack.

No it is because every normal human being understand that if Oswalt shot and killed Kennedy, Oswald is the cause of his death.

 

[elman]

Philosophy is more precise still. I can't BELIEVE we're still stuck here. It's also rather rude that you didn't answer my very explicit questions:

"Now, do or don't you agree that in these examples it is more accurate to talk about the events associated with the things we might usually say were the causes? Do you or don't agree that, therefore, what we really mean when we say "some thing caused an event" is actually something to do with an event associated with that thing?"

No I do not agree. When we talk about the cause of Kennedy's death, most of us talk about Oswald being the cause, not an event, a person.

Give reasons, please.

See above.
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I assume you are arguing philosopically that Oswald had no choice but do what he did and should therefore not have been held responsible.

I'm not arguing anything - it's an example. (In fact, if Oswald were not determined, his actions must have been random, so how could he be held responsible. No need to argue about that here, though.)

So you are arguing Oswald is not responsible for killing Kennedy even if he shot him because everything is determined.

The idea is to show you how it is more accurate to speak of the individual events leading up to an event as the causes, rather than a single object.

You are so wound up in this events leading up to events, you cannot even see the truth and reality of Kennedy being killed by Oswald rather than by events leading up to Oswald's killing of Kennedy.

The bullet did not cause Kennedy's death because if the bullet were just lying on the ground he would've been fine. Strictly speaking nor did Oswald, because if he'd been in bed, Kennedy would again have been alive.

This is not reasonable. If Oswald had been in bed, Kennedy would be alive, therefore Oswald is not the cause of Kennedy's death. This is just not logical.

However, Oswald's pulling the trigger - an event - coupled with the other particulars at the time - did cause Kennedy's death. In fact, so did the motion of the bullet, and so did the impact of the bullet.
I ask you again to make sure you answered those questions above - which is it more accurate to speak of causing things - the bullet, or an event associated with the bullet?

Neither. The accurate way is to look at the person that caused the death.

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No I am saying words have meaning and they don't stop having meaning just because we start using them in a discussion on phiolosophy.

This is not understandable.

They change meaning. That is just an accepted and demonstrable fact.

If you are going to change the meaning to the point they are not understandable you are not further the search for reality and truth, but hindering it.

Lots of words change meaning depending on context. Does someone who loves Jazz have sexual desire for a type of music? Nope.
Saying that contextualism isn't "understandable" is just plain false.

I did not say that.

Philosophers everywhere understand it.

I doubt many philosophers would understand or agree with you that Oswald was not the dause of Kennedys death, although he did shoot him.

Perhaps you don't understand it, in which case I will rephrase the example.
Suppose you are at the scene of a crime the day before it was committed. When you get home, you are asked about the details of a painting at the scene, purely out of interest. You say, "It was of flowers." The inquirer asks, "are you sure?" (for he thought it was a woodland scene) and you reply, "Yes," because that's what you remember.
A painting was stolen from the place shortly after your visit and you are asked about the same painting by the police. You say, "It was of flowers." The inspector asks, "are you sure?" (for he thought it was a woodland scene, too) and you think, and say, "no, I could be mistaken.")

Now, assuming that your memory hasn't decayed significantly, what's going on here? Well, it's quite simple. In both cases, you were correct, but in the latter case, the meaning of the word, "sure" is different due to the context.

Being unable to remember details exactly is not prove we are not in contol of anything.

Quote:
If we agree on the meaning determinism and it means we are fooling ourselves into thinking we are moving our arms

Strawman 1 - determinism means that every event is completely caused by other prior events. That implies that, when we move our arms, there was no possibility that we could have not moved our arms.

Not a stawman. You just repeated what I said. Determinism means when I think I am moving my arms, I am not. They are being moved by other forces than me.


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when actually something that happened billions of years ago is moving my arm at this particular moment in time, then the unreasonableness of that is not about context and definition of words.

Strawman 2 - causation, as far as physics knows, does not stretch across time to act on things now. However, if A causes B, and B causes C, then A causes C. If I knock a pen off the desk (A) and the pen hits the floor (B) and frightens the cat (C) then I caused the cat to be frightened.
If I aim a gun at JFK and pull the trigger (A) and the trigger causes the firing pin to strike the bullet (B) and the propellant explodes (C) causing the bullet to shoot at JFK (D) causing a wound (E) causing death (F) then I caused the death.

What is your point here?
Quote:
Did your perception include the fact you were forced to eat the cookie?

In that case, my perception did not include any element of my will at all, really - I didn't make a decision, "I will have a cookie" and then decide "I will reach for the cookie" etc - I just wanted a cookie and got one.

When you wanted a cooke and reached for one, you made a decision that you will have cookie and then you decide I will reach for the cookie.

So in that case, I almost did get that perception. If you look for this in retrospect, I expect you will notice that you do plenty of things "on autopilot."

You did not eat the cookie on autopilot. You did it on purpose.


Quote:
Did you get away with that excuse when you ate a cookie you were told to not eat?

Why are you still labouring under the assumption that I'm trying to absolve myself from blame?

There is no blame if there is no responsiblity. There is no responsiblity if there is no control. Control and ability to chose are what establishes blame and responsibility.

I've told you enough times that I agree with Hume that the only way I could have been responsible is if my action was determined. You apparently don't understand this.

Not at all and I suspect Hume would not either.

 

[pikatore]

Quantum fluctuations are enough to dispel the idea of determinism. Even the smallest random fluctuations can cause big differences over a vast stretch of time.

 

[FishFace]

Quantum fluctuations are enough to dispel the idea of determinism. Even the smallest random fluctuations can cause big differences over a vast stretch of time.

I don't have time to reply to elman until tomorrow, but I can deal with this.
Basically, you could well be right. But not in the kind of way that, say, elman needs you to be right. Quantum fluctuations, although they don't actually disprove determinism (although they do knock down great swathes of "kinds" of determinsim) provide only the basis for randomness, and that's not what a libertarian wants. The crux of my argument is that if something doesn't have a cause, it's got to be random, and if it's random, it ain't free and you CERTAINLY aren't accountable for it!
Elman can't understand that when we look at causal chains, things just don't show up, so he can't understand that, once he comes up with enough causes for his action, he will either A) end up with every single cause being something in the external world or B) with some events having no causes, and hence being random. Neither is what he believes currently.

 

[FishFace]

I don't know just as you don't know but my experience and perceptions would indicate I move my are when I wish and when I wish to not move it, it does not move. It is obvious there is some control of my arm on my part.

What is obvious is that your wish to move your arm caused your arm to move and, if you had not wished to move it, you wouldn't. What is not obvious is that you could have not wished, all other things being equal.
Compatibilist determinism hinges on this - that there was a possibility of you doing something different, but only if the situation was different.

Well in my book if I could have done different, they are not the causes. I have no reason to believe I could not have chosen different and you have not yet presented me with one.

So wait, are you saying that "you have no reason to believe different" or are you saying that "you have good evidence indicating you have free will?" Because I thought it was the latter, but now you're saying the former.

No event--my choice.

Then we can't take this any further until you've responded to the Oswald example.

I am pretty sure you cannot. I am more than a series of events.

And so is a bullet, but when we say "the bullet caused Kennedy's death" we can easily translate that into a series of events. In fact, it is more precise to do so - why is it not as precise in this case? (Just saying, 'because I am the cause' will not suffice, by the way.)

Only by you--not by me.

Only by philosophers.

The state of my brain is an indefinite reference. I am partailly responsible for the state of my brain, so you have not left me behind yet.

I don't need to leave you behind - remember your aim here is to convince me that you have good reason to believe that you could have chosen not to do something in an instance where you did, all other things being equal. So far you've only convinced me that you can choose not to do something if you don't want to, but then your want, your desire, has to be different. So the difference in your desire caused your different decision.
You have to show me how you actually perceive this possibility, and you're not doing a good job of it.

That is your unproven theory.

No - that's exactly what it shows. If I drop a ball from a metre, and it bounces higher when I drop it from two metres that obviously doesn't show that the ball has a choice in how high it bounces - it shows that the height of drop is a determining factor in the height of bounce.
Your telling me that when you have a different desire, a different mental state, you are capable of doing something different is indicative not of you having a choice independent of other causes, but, if anything, dependent on your desires.

And neither do you and so far you have not indicated why I should believe I am controlled completely by my dna.

But your ignorance of control is not indicative of the absence of control, is it not? So when your main quarrel with my argument seems to be that it disagrees with what you already think, and it turns out that what you already think is based on nothing but a lack of knowledge of control, why are you so keen to hang onto that prior belief?

I guess it would be more lack of any evidence that I am not the one doing the moving of my hand.

Strawman. Stop it, please.

That would certainly be the default position based on our observations.

No - not based on our observations, but rather based on the lack of an observation. So this "default position" must bow to any argument that comes along and is sound, mustn't it? Not getting into the particulars of the argument now, do you or don't you agree that what you have at the moment is a belief based not on evidence of a lack of control, but on lack of evidence of the presence of control? If you disagree, please present your positive evidence. If you agree, do you or don't you agree that this position must be removed if some rational argument came along.

It does matter when you are trying to use to prove we are not in control of anything.

But you know that's not what I'm trying to use it for. I'm using it to prove that your introspection - the entire basis of your belief - is not reliable. You really need to separate the parts of the debate here.

How exactly does science tie this down at to the timing that I think I am getting ready to move my finger? Can science explore the subconcious yet?

It can and it does - Libet outlines his method in his paper which you should be able to obtain from a university library or online. I'm reading it now and the term used is "readiness potential." Basically, the researchers attach electrodes to your head and look at what's happening. Half a second before you decide to act, there's a load of specific activity that corresponds to getting ready to move your finger/arm/whatever. This is just some neuropsychology - you're welcome to be skeptical about it, but that's what the science says and I'm more inclined to go with scientists than yourself.

So, assuming that Libet is correct up to this point - what do you conclude about introspection? Clearly, you are unaware of something going on that happens before you think you make the decision. So when you use your lack of awareness of something else - control - to argue that there is none, I find that rather unsound.

Being partially incorrect does not mean it is all incorrect. What I am wrong about may be the time, and not the source.

It means that introspection is unreliable, plain and simple. I'm not concerned with the time, merely with the fact that at some point in time, you are getting ready to move but don't know it. That means your introspection is not to be relied upon.

I don't rely on introspection for my entire point.

So by what other means do you work out that you have free will? What is your point if that's not it?

That is the reason you keep missing the point. You don't see it as relavant that I cause somethings. Most human being do see the relavance of my being able to cause things.

It is irrelevant because it is more accurate to speak of events as causes, than of things. As with the example of the bullet.

No it is because every normal human being understand that if Oswalt shot and killed Kennedy, Oswald is the cause of his death.

Is that what was written on Kennedy's death certificate? I think you'll find people are rarely written as the cause of death. That's because causation is transitive and there were many causes lying in a long causal chain. In this instance, we need more accuracy than is afforded by just looking at people, so we need to break down "Oswald" into the events involved in the causal chain.
Coroners can understand this, not just philosophers - what's so difficult?

 

[FishFace]

No I do not agree. When we talk about the cause of Kennedy's death, most of us talk about Oswald being the cause, not an event, a person.

So if I asked you, "what caused Kennedy's death?" or indeed, what caused any murder victim's death, you would give a name? What do you think they should write on death certificates? Don't you think it's more accurate to write down a person as the cause or, say, hemorrhage, or blood loss, or shock? Why is it more accurate to talk about the person, and more importantly, why is it inaccurate to talk about the events?
Because that's what we're dealing with here. I fully accept that Oswald caused the death. However, I also insist that, once you really get down to it, the word 'Oswald' in the phrase 'Oswald caused...' does not mean the actual thing that was Lee Harvey Oswald, but rather it means certain sets of events that occurred in or around Oswald. So you have to tell me, not why your view is accurate - because I accept it as accurate, but why mine is inaccurate.

So you are arguing Oswald is not responsible for killing Kennedy even if he shot him because everything is determined.

No.

You are so wound up in this events leading up to events, you cannot even see the truth and reality of Kennedy being killed by Oswald rather than by events leading up to Oswald's killing of Kennedy.

Of course Oswald killed Kennedy. However, when we are talking about causation, it is more accurate to talk about events. So we can also say - correctly - that the bullet caused Kennedy's. However, what we mean is not that the bullet, just by being a bullet, somehow effected Kennedy's death, but that its motion, and its collision with Kennedy, and the energy thus imparted to Kennedy's head, caused Kennedy's death.
Now, suppose I say the cause of Kennedy's death was brain damage, and I ask, "what caused the brain damage?" you could correctly reply, "the bullet." Suppose I say the cause of Kennedy's death was the interruption of vital nervous signals in the brain. Now it wouldn't make sense to say the bullet caused this interruption. You would have to say that the collision of the bullet caused damage to the nerves which caused the interruption which caused the death. That is a more accurate account.

Now, more relevant to my point is what happens when we try to trace a causal chain. I want to trace a causal chain from Kennedy's death a long way back. So I say what caused Kennedy's death. You reply, with something and I ask, what caused that? And I carry on asking that for as long as possible.
Now, at some point, you are going to say, Oswald caused that. But to get there, you had to go through the nerves, the collision, the propellant's explosion, the firing pin, the trigger, the finger, the muscles, Oswald's nerves, Oswald's brain and so on. Now, would you say that that is an accurate picture of the causes in between Oswald and Kennedy's death? Hopefully you do.
Now switch our positions around. You are asking for the causal history, and I, after the nerves in Kennedy's brain, I say that "The bullet caused the damage." Now, you, trying to establish the chain of causes, ask, "And what caused the bullet?" But now we're off into some factory somewhere that makes bullets. That's not what caused Kennedy's death. So you ask me, "No, I want to know what happened to cause the damage to the nerves." And I say something like, nothing happened, the bullet caused the damage. Clearly I'm wrong - there was obviously an event associated with the bullet that was the cause.
So, when we get back to Oswald, why should we assume there is no event that caused his decision?

This is not reasonable. If Oswald had been in bed, Kennedy would be alive, therefore Oswald is not the cause of Kennedy's death. This is just not logical.

It means that, philosophically speaking, a thing is not a cause. A cause causes something by virtue of its existence. The bullet doesn't cause anything if its still in its box, but the collision of the bullet with Kennedy's skull does cause, purely by virtue of the existence of the collision.

Neither. The accurate way is to look at the person that caused the death.

So you're saying that the collision of the bullet with Kennedy's head did not cause Kennedy's death?

That... is just plain wrong.

If you are going to change the meaning to the point they are not understandable you are not further the search for reality and truth, but hindering it.

I'm not changing the meaning. It's just what happens when talking in a philosophical context - a higher standard is required.

I doubt many philosophers would understand or agree with you that Oswald was not the dause of Kennedys death, although he did shoot him.

Do I need to count how many times I've said that Oswald did cause Kennedy's death? I've also told you more times that it is more accurate to think in terms of events.

Being unable to remember details exactly is not prove we are not in contol of anything.

Oh. My. Goodness. Please try and connect the examples to the point I was using them for. Your statement is a strawman, and a poor one at that.

Determinism means when I think I am moving my arms, I am not. They are being moved by other forces than me.

No, you are moving them. But there was no chance that you weren't going to move them. Other forces may have caused you to cause your arms to move, so, yes, other forces caused your arms to move. But you still seem to be labouring under the misapprehension that if A cause C then B cannot also cause C.

You did not eat the cookie on autopilot. You did it on purpose.

Of course I did it on purpose - I did it in order to satisfy my desire for a tasty snack. However, I didn't sit there and think, "well, I could take the cookie or I could not." I just had the desire, and that led to my taking the cookie without even thinking about it, almost.

There is no blame if there is no responsiblity. There is no responsiblity if there is no control. Control and ability to chose are what establishes blame and responsibility.

That's fine. I just use the word control differently to you. In my book, if in the exact same situation there is a chance of more than one outcome, that means the outcome is partially random. Random is not control.

Not at all and I suspect Hume would not either.

Then you really need to go and educate yourself, since he is one of the most famous proponents of this point of view!

 

[elman]

Quote:
Originally Posted by elman
I don't know just as you don't know but my experience and perceptions would indicate I move my are when I wish and when I wish to not move it, it does not move. It is obvious there is some control of my arm on my part.

What is obvious is that your wish to move your arm caused your arm to move and, if you had not wished to move it, you wouldn't. What is not obvious is that you could have not wished, all other things being equal.
Compatibilist determinism hinges on this

-It seems very obvious that if I cause it to move I could have opted to not move it.

that there was a possibility of you doing something different, but only if the situation was different.

That is your theory and faith system but it is an unreasonable one.
Quote:
Well in my book if I could have done different, they are not the causes. I have no reason to believe I could not have chosen different and you have not yet presented me with one.

So wait, are you saying that "you have no reason to believe different" or are you saying that "you have good evidence indicating you have free will?" Because I thought it was the latter, but now you're saying the former.

Both.

Quote:
No event--my choice.

Then we can't take this any further until you've responded to the Oswald example.

Already done that.

Quote:
I am pretty sure you cannot. I am more than a series of events.

And so is a bullet, but when we say "the bullet caused Kennedy's death" we can easily translate that into a series of events. In fact, it is more precise to do so - why is it not as precise in this case? (Just saying, 'because I am the cause' will not suffice, by the way.)

If would if you were not in denial of the obvious.


Quote:
Only by you--not by me.

Only by philosophers.

Probably a minority.


Quote:
The state of my brain is an indefinite reference. I am partailly responsible for the state of my brain, so you have not left me behind yet.

I don't need to leave you behind - remember your aim here is to convince me that you have good reason to believe that you could have chosen not to do something in an instance where you did, all other things being equal. So far you've only convinced me that you can choose not to do something if you don't want to, but then your want, your desire, has to be different. So the difference in your desire caused your different decision.

No it is you that have to convince me that I have no control over anything.


Quote:
That is your unproven theory.

No - that's exactly what it shows. If I drop a ball from a metre, and it bounces higher when I drop it from two metres that obviously doesn't show that the ball has a choice in how high it bounces - it shows that the height of drop is a determining factor in the height of bounce.

And this has what to do with a being with a brain?

Your telling me that when you have a different desire, a different mental state, you are capable of doing something different is indicative not of you having a choice independent of other causes, but, if anything, dependent on your desires.

I am telling you I can act against my desires if I chose to do so.


Quote:
And neither do you and so far you have not indicated why I should believe I am controlled completely by my dna.

But your ignorance of control is not indicative of the absence of control, is it not?

Not an intelligble statment.

So when your main quarrel with my argument seems to be that it disagrees with what you already think, and it turns out that what you already think is based on nothing but a lack of knowledge of control, why are you so keen to hang onto that prior belief?

It has not turned out that what I think is based on nothing but a lack of knoweldge of control.

Quote:
I guess it would be more lack of any evidence that I am not the one doing the moving of my hand.

Strawman. Stop it, please.

I guess you are simply unable to understand what I say.

Quote:
That would certainly be the default position based on our observations.

No - not based on our observations, but rather based on the lack of an observation. So this "default position" must bow to any argument that comes along and is sound, mustn't it?

I don't know. You have yet to present a sound argument.

Not getting into the particulars of the argument now, do you or don't you agree that what you have at the moment is a belief based not on evidence of a lack of control, but on lack of evidence of the presence of control?

I agree you have presented no evidence that would indicate I am not in control of my arm moving.

If you disagree, please present your positive evidence. If you agree, do you or don't you agree that this position must be removed if some rational argument came along.

Perhaps. Lets see the rational argument and why have you withheld it up to now if you have one?

Quote:
It does matter when you are trying to use to prove we are not in control of anything.

But you know that's not what I'm trying to use it for. I'm using it to prove that your introspection - the entire basis of your belief - is not reliable. You really need to separate the parts of the debate here.

Talk about a straw man. You are arguing that my perceptions are not without any flaws. That has never been an issue. I have always admitted my perceptions are flawed. That my perceptions are less than perfect does not prove I am not in control of moving my arm.

Quote:
How exactly does science tie this down at to the timing that I think I am getting ready to move my finger? Can science explore the subconcious yet?

It can and it does - Libet outlines his method in his paper which you should be able to obtain from a university library or online.

Bull. You have too much faith in researchers and what they have found and what it means. Libet said it does not prove we do not have free will. You are not in agreemenbt with Libet.

I'm reading it now and the term used is "readiness potential." Basically, the researchers attach electrodes to your head and look at what's happening. Half a second before you decide to act,

How do they know when I decide to act exactly?

there's a load of specific activity that corresponds to getting ready to move your finger/arm/whatever.

And what occurs before this specific activity?

This is just some neuropsychology - you're welcome to be skeptical about it, but that's what the science says and I'm more inclined to go with scientists than yourself.

I am more inclined to go with the scientists interpretation than with yours.

So, assuming that Libet is correct up to this point - what do you conclude about introspection?

I conclude there is till much for us to learn about the subconcious and Libet is probably right in thinking I have something to do with my are moving.

Clearly, you are unaware of something going on that happens before you think you make the decision. So when you use your lack of awareness of something else - control - to argue that there is none, I find that rather unsound.

Libet has not proven I cannot move my arm. Your findings of the consequences of Libet's research, I find rather unsound.

Quote:
Being partially incorrect does not mean it is all incorrect. What I am wrong about may be the time, and not the source.

It means that introspection is unreliable, plain and simple.

Being unrealiable does not mean of no use.

I'm not concerned with the time, merely with the fact that at some point in time, you are getting ready to move but don't know it. That means your introspection is not to be relied upon.

What it means is you have not yet located the beginning of a thought.


Quote:
I don't rely on introspection for my entire point.

So by what other means do you work out that you have free will? What is your point if that's not it?

Observation and logic.--empericism.


Quote:
That is the reason you keep missing the point. You don't see it as relevant that I cause some things. Most human being do see the relevance of my being able to cause things.

It is irrelevant because it is more accurate to speak of events as causes, than of things. As with the example of the bullet.

The bullet without a brain again. I understand how objects without brains are completely controlled from outside themselves. The issue has always been about being with brains who can make choices.

Quote:
No it is because every normal human being understand that if Oswalt shot and killed Kennedy, Oswald is the cause of his death.

Is that what was written on Kennedy's death certificate?

Not relevant.

I think you'll find people are rarely written as the cause of death. That's because causation is transitive and there were many causes lying in a long causal chain.

No that is not the reason.

In this instance, we need more accuracy than is afforded by just looking at people, so we need to break down "Oswald" into the events involved in the causal chain.
Coroners can understand this, not just philosophers - what's so difficult?

I understand. It is not difficult. What is so difficult about understanding that if Oswald shot Kennedy and killed him, Oswald is the cause of his death?

 

[elman]

Originally Posted by elman
No I do not agree. When we talk about the cause of Kennedy's death, most of us talk about Oswald being the cause, not an event, a person.

So if I asked you, "what caused Kennedy's death?" or indeed, what caused any murder victim's death, you would give a name? What do you think they should write on death certificates?

not relevant.

Don't you think it's more accurate to write down a person as the cause or, say, hemorrhage, or blood loss, or shock? Why is it more accurate to talk about the person, and more importantly, why is it inaccurate to talk about the events?

The death certificat is not addressing the person who caused the death, but as you indicate the event that caused it.

Because that's what we're dealing with here. I fully accept that Oswald caused the death. However, I also insist that, once you really get down to it, the word 'Oswald' in the phrase 'Oswald caused...' does not mean the actual thing that was Lee Harvey Oswald, but rather it means certain sets of events that occurred in or around Oswald. So you have to tell me, not why your view is accurate - because I accept it as accurate, but why mine is inaccurate.

Yours is inaccurate because it is contradictory, you admit it was the person Oswald that caused the death of Kennedy, but you deny it was the thing that was Oswald. The person Oswald and the thing Oswald is the same and you saying one caused the death and the other did not, is contradictory.

Quote:
So you are arguing Oswald is not responsible for killing Kennedy even if he shot him because everything is determined.

No.

Explain.


Quote:
You are so wound up in this events leading up to events, you cannot even see the truth and reality of Kennedy being killed by Oswald rather than by events leading up to Oswald's killing of Kennedy.

Of course Oswald killed Kennedy. However, when we are talking about causation, it is more accurate to talk about events. So we can also say - correctly - that the bullet caused Kennedy's. However, what we mean is not that the bullet, just by being a bullet, somehow effected Kennedy's death, but that its motion, and its collision with Kennedy, and the energy thus imparted to Kennedy's head, caused Kennedy's death.

That is more detailed. It is not more accurate. You cannot get more accurate than Oswald cause the death of Kennedy.

Now, suppose I say the cause of Kennedy's death was brain damage, and I ask, "what caused the brain damage?" you could correctly reply, "the bullet." Suppose I say the cause of Kennedy's death was the interruption of vital nervous signals in the brain. Now it wouldn't make sense to say the bullet caused this interruption. You would have to say that the collision of the bullet caused damage to the nerves which caused the interruption which caused the death. That is a more accurate account.

No just more details.

Now, more relevant to my point is what happens when we try to trace a causal chain. I want to trace a causal chain from Kennedy's death a long way back. So I say what caused Kennedy's death. You reply, with something and I ask, what caused that? And I carry on asking that for as long as possible.
Now, at some point, you are going to say, Oswald caused that. But to get there, you had to go through the nerves, the collision, the propellant's explosion, the firing pin, the trigger, the finger, the muscles, Oswald's nerves, Oswald's brain and so on. Now, would you say that that is an accurate picture of the causes in between Oswald and Kennedy's death? Hopefully you do.
Now switch our positions around. You are asking for the causal history, and I, after the nerves in Kennedy's brain, I say that "The bullet caused the damage." Now, you, trying to establish the chain of causes, ask, "And what caused the bullet?" But now we're off into some factory somewhere that makes bullets. That's not what caused Kennedy's death. So you ask me, "No, I want to know what happened to cause the damage to the nerves." And I say something like, nothing happened, the bullet caused the damage. Clearly I'm wrong - there was obviously an event associated with the bullet that was the cause.
So, when we get back to Oswald, why should we assume there is no event that caused his decision?

Oswald had a brain.
Quote:
This is not reasonable. If Oswald had been in bed, Kennedy would be alive, therefore Oswald is not the cause of Kennedy's death. This is just not logical.

It means that, philosophically speaking, a thing is not a cause. A cause causes something by virtue of its existence. The bullet doesn't cause anything if its still in its box, but the collision of the bullet with Kennedy's skull does cause, purely by virtue of the existence of the collision.

Meaningless.
Quote:
Neither. The accurate way is to look at the person that caused the death.

So you're saying that the collision of the bullet with Kennedy's head did not cause Kennedy's death?

Of course the bullet caused his death and Oswald caused the bullet to do it.


Quote:
If you are going to change the meaning to the point they are not understandable you are not furthering the search for reality and truth, but hindering it.

I'm not changing the meaning. It's just what happens when talking in a philosophical context - a higher standard is required.

I don't think it is a higher standard to move from meaning to meaningless, from comprehendable to not comprehendable.

Quote:
I doubt many philosophers would understand or agree with you that Oswald was not the cause of Kennedys death, although he did shoot him.

Do I need to count how many times I've said that Oswald did cause Kennedy's death? I've also told you more times that it is more accurate to think in terms of events.

No it is not more accurate. More misleading? yes.


Quote:
Being unable to remember details exactly is not proof we are not in contol of anything.

Oh. My. Goodness. Please try and connect the examples to the point I was using them for. Your statement is a strawman, and a poor one at that.

It is a response to your allegation that since our perceptions are flawed, they are therefore useless in perceiving reality.


Quote:
Determinism means when I think I am moving my arms, I am not. They are being moved by other forces than me.

No, you are moving them. But there was no chance that you weren't going to move them.

Then I was nothing more than the bullet that killed Oswald. If I am unable to not move my arm then when it moved I did not do it. I was simply the tool that was used to move it by whomever or whatever moved it.

Other forces may have caused you to cause your arms to move, so, yes, other forces caused your arms to move. But you still seem to be labouring under the misapprehension that if A cause C then B cannot also cause C.

No I understand nothing stands alone and all is in the context of everything else. This being true does not prove I am unable to effect things around me.


Quote:
You did not eat the cookie on autopilot. You did it on purpose.

Of course I did it on purpose - I did it in order to satisfy my desire for a tasty snack. However, I didn't sit there and think, "well, I could take the cookie or I could not."

If you were on a diet you may well have thought that very thing.

I just had the desire, and that led to my taking the cookie without even thinking about it, almost.

Is determinism almost?

Quote:
There is no blame if there is no responsiblity. There is no responsiblity if there is no control. Control and ability to chose are what establishes blame and responsibility.

That's fine. I just use the word control differently to you. In my book, if in the exact same situation there is a chance of more than one outcome, that means the outcome is partially random. Random is not control.

If I can hurt someone or help them and I chose either way, neither is random. Both choices indicate some form of selfcontrol.

 

[FishFace]

OK, I'm going to have to stop quoting you since A) the thread is sprawling and B) you're just repeating the same old misunderstandings of my point. Please read this entire post before replying, and come back when you have understood that:

1. I am not arguing that Libet proves a lack of free will
2. I am not arguing that your lack of perception of control/non-control indicates that you don't have free will.
3. I am not arguing that determinism makes us blameless
4. I am not arguing that you don't cause your arm to move.
5. I am not arguing that Oswald did not cause Kennedy's death. I'm arguing that the statement means something different than you think it means. (This one is really beginning to irritate me, elman - about five times in those last two posts I explicitly pointed that out and you STILL don't get it. That's either unbelievably rude, or unbelievably ignorant.)

You really have to pay more attention to the way people's arguments fit together. This is NOT a simple topic. I am trying to use multiple pieces of evidence and multiple arguments to establish different conclusions. Those conclusions are intended to produce my main conclusion.

Here are my propositions and lemmas:

1. Proposition: People do not have perception of an ability to do differently than they did if everything had been the same. Evidence: when asked, you can't identify any experience that can be used to infer that. Lemma: you don't have evidence that you have free will in the way you define it.
2. Proposition: Introspection is unreliable. Evidence: Libet. Lemma: you can't use introspection alone to justify your belief in free will.
3. Proposition: causes, when you get down to it, are events, not things. Evidence: it is more accurate to think of the collision of a bullet with a person causing the death than using the bullet itself as the cause. In fact, substitute a falling rock in a landslide for the bullet. Then we don't need to bring Oswald in to confuse matters. Lemma: when we speak of a thing being a cause, we really mean certain events that are related to the thing, not the thing itself.

On their own, these don't demonstrate anything much about free will. In fact, even together they don't. But you, for some reason, are still arguing as if each of these points are my main argument. They're not.
Now, I suggest you pick one of these arguments and we concentrate on that one for a while, since it seems you're going to get confused if we carry on trying to discuss the whole topic at once. So please don't quote little bits of this post and start back on the road to sprawling confusion. Pick an argument. Deal with that.

 

[levi501]

Fish, you're fighting the good fight, but as I said earlier this poster can't help himself. He asserts the same thing over and over again, convienently ignoring counter arguments. Many posters like yourself have taken the time to explain this topic to him in various different ways, but to no avail. From what I've seen there's never been any concession no matter how falacious his points have been exposed to be. I gave up over a year ago.

Unfortunately I have to put him on ignore now. Not because he's a bad guy (he actually seems to be a very nice person), but for his tendency to spam the same things ad nauseum derailing anything I attempt to read on this topic.

 

[FishFace]

Fish, you're fighting the good fight, but as I said earlier this poster can't help himself. He asserts the same thing over and over again, convienently ignoring counter arguments. Many posters like yourself have taken the time to explain this topic to him in various different ways, but to no avail. From what I've seen there's never been any concession no matter how falacious his points have been exposed to be. I gave up over a year ago.

Unfortunately I have to put him on ignore now. Not because he's a bad guy (he actually seems to be a very nice person), but for his tendency to spam the same things ad nauseum derailing anything I attempt to read on this topic.

You should pop your head round the CrEvo door sometime and check out one of the wonderful homes of insanity that constitute the threads of "dad."
I'm stubborn. That isn't to say I won't change my mind - that's what philosophy's about. But it does mean that if someone isn't bringing anything new to the table, isn't fleshing out their arguments, or they're having problems with the basic concepts necessary to do the philosophy, it takes a long time for me to give up. And here, I can be fairly confident that elman's got at least some of it fairly wrong, even if I'm not completely right. When you disagree with with every philosopher on every side of the debate on a topic, that's usually a hint.

P.S. I got a philosophy essay back today, "Do Causal Arguments Give us Good Grounds for Thinking the Mind is Physical?" A first - yay!

 

[elman]

OK, I'm going to have to stop quoting you since A) the thread is sprawling and B) you're just repeating the same old misunderstandings of my point. Please read this entire post before replying, and come back when you have understood that:

1. 
   

   [*]I am not arguing that Libet proves a lack of free will

   But you argue lack of free will and use Libet as support for that .
   

   [*]I am not arguing that your lack of perception of control/non-control indicates that you don't have free will.

   But you argue lack of free will and use lack of perception of control to support that argument.
   

   [*]I am not arguing that determinism makes us blameless

   No I am arguing that because it is the natural and reasonable result of not having any free will.
   

   [*]I am not arguing that you don't cause your arm to move.

   Yes you are. You are arguing that I am not the cause of my arm moving.
   

   [*]I am not arguing that Oswald did not cause Kennedy's death.

   You argued both sides of this, that Oswald caused Kennedy's death but that thing called Oswald did not.
   

   I'm arguing that the statement means something different than you think it means. (This one is really beginning to irritate me, elman - about five times in those last two posts I explicitly pointed that out and you STILL don't get it. That's either unbelievably rude, or unbelievably ignorant.)[/

   I will have to use my free will and pick ignorant, because I have no intention of being rude.
   
   

   Here are my propositions and lemmas:

   What is a lemma?
   
   1. 
      

      [*]Proposition: People do not have perception of an ability to do differently than they did if everything had been the same. Evidence: when asked, you can't identify any experience that can be used to infer that.

      We have already crossed this territory many times I think. I believe everyone understands it is not possible to ever recreate a moment in time exactly as it was, and thus neither of us can prove what will or will not happen in such an event.
      

      Lemma: you don't have evidence that you have free will in the way you define it.
      [*]Proposition: Introspection is unreliable. Evidence: Libet. Lemma: you can't use introspection alone to justify your belief in free will.
      [*]Proposition: causes, when you get down to it, are events, not things. Evidence: it is more accurate to think of the collision of a bullet with a person causing the death than using the bullet itself as the cause. In fact, substitute a falling rock in a landslide for the bullet. Then we don't need to bring Oswald in to confuse matters. Lemma: when we speak of a thing being a cause, we really mean certain events that are related to the thing, not the thing itself.

   On their own, these don't demonstrate anything much about free will. In fact, even together they don't. But you, for some reason, are still arguing as if each of these points are my main argument. They're not.

   Then please state your main argument.
   

   Now, I suggest you pick one of these arguments and we concentrate on that one for a while, since it seems you're going to get confused if we carry on trying to discuss the whole topic at once. So please don't quote little bits of this post and start back on the road to sprawling confusion. Pick an argument. Deal with that.

   I suggest we not go around the horn on these arguments which you say are not your main argument and do not prove the absence of free will and simply go to your main argument that you say does prove the absence of free will.

 

[elman]

Fish, you're fighting the good fight, but as I said earlier this poster can't help himself. He asserts the same thing over and over again, convienently ignoring counter arguments. Many posters like yourself have taken the time to explain this topic to him in various different ways, but to no avail. From what I've seen there's never been any concession no matter how falacious his points have been exposed to be. I gave up over a year ago.

Unfortunately I have to put him on ignore now. Not because he's a bad guy (he actually seems to be a very nice person), but for his tendency to spam the same things ad nauseum derailing anything I attempt to read on this topic.

Not agreeing with counter arguments is not the same thing as ignoring them. Can you provide an example where one of my points was exposed to be falacious? Are you suggesting I should not be able to oppose the idea that we have no free will? You seem to applaud posters who tried unsuccessfully to convince me I have nothing to do with my apparent choices. Why would you applaud them when they could not have done otherwise? And you seem to be giving me a hard time for not agreeing with you and them. Why would you do that since you believe I had no choice and could not have done otherwise?

 

[FishFace]

But you argue lack of free will and use Libet as support for that .

I do.

But you argue lack of free will and use lack of perception of control to support that argument.

I do.

No I am arguing that because it is the natural and reasonable result of not having any free will.

Many people disagree with you - not so natural.

Yes you are. You are arguing that I am not the cause of my arm moving.

No I'm not.

You argued both sides of this, that Oswald caused Kennedy's death but that thing called Oswald did not.

I subtle distinction. The statement, "Oswald caused Kennedy's death" is true. The statement, "The thing that we call Oswald caused Kennedy's death" is false because by stressing "thing" we change the context. In the former case, "Oswald" did not mean "The thing that we call Oswald." It might seem obvious that this would always hold, but in actual fact it's not true.

What is a lemma?

A conclusion used in further argument to establish a main conclusion.

I suggest we not go around the horn on these arguments which you say are not your main argument and do not prove the absence of free will and simply go to your main argument that you say does prove the absence of free will.

No, because these lemmas, or at any rate, a subset of them, are required as premises to my main argument. This is how a normal philosophical argument works - you don't just state your premises, reach your conclusion and finish, you have to argue that each of those premises is correct in many cases.
You appear to be confusing the arguments for the premises with the argument for my conclusion.

 

[elman]

Quote:
No I am arguing that because it is the natural and reasonable result of not having any free will.

Many people disagree with you - not so natural.

So you say but you have provided no reason to desagree with me.

Quote:
Yes you are. You are arguing that I am not the cause of my arm moving.

No I'm not.

That certainly seemed to be what you were saying. When I would say I was the cause of my arm moving, you disagreed.

Quote:
You argued both sides of this, that Oswald caused Kennedy's death but that thing called Oswald did not.

I subtle distinction. The statement, "Oswald caused Kennedy's death" is true. The statement, "The thing that we call Oswald caused Kennedy's death" is false because by stressing "thing" we change the context. In the former case, "Oswald" did not mean "The thing that we call Oswald." It might seem obvious that this would always hold, but in actual fact it's not true.

Yes very subtle. Perhaps the reason I cannot see it. What does Oswald mean if it does not mean the thing we call Oswald?

Quote:
I suggest we not go around the horn on these arguments which you say are not your main argument and do not prove the absence of free will and simply go to your main argument that you say does prove the absence of free will.

No, because these lemmas, or at any rate, a subset of them, are required as premises to my main argument. This is how a normal philosophical argument works - you don't just state your premises, reach your conclusion and finish, you have to argue that each of those premises is correct in many cases.

Well you have to prove your lemmas then to get to your main argument which you have not done. I don't understand why we are avoiding your main argument, especially when you admit these lemmas do not prove lack of free will.

You appear to be confusing the arguments for the premises with the argument for my conclusion.

If your premises don't prove lack of free will how do you expect them to support that conclusion?

 

[FishFace]

Yes very subtle. Perhaps the reason I cannot see it. What does Oswald mean if it does not mean the thing we call Oswald?

In what context? In most everyday language? It does mean the thing called Oswald. When discussing causes, it's more accurate to speak of events not things - since "Oswald" just by being, never caused anything much.
This contextualism is not anything spooky, mysterious or rare. Another instance of this kind of thing is with sense data. I see a desk in front of me. However, what I see, what I am aware of will, clearly, appear to get smaller if I move away. The image - and it is only the image that I actually experience - diminishes. However we can agree that the real desk stays the same size. Indeed, different people will all say, "I see the desk" but they must all be looking from different angles and so what they actually see is not the object but a piece of sense-data in their minds.
It's a relatively simple argument:

1. As I move away, what I see changes size
2. As I move away, the actual object remains the same size
3. Therefore what I see is not the actual object.

So there are two possibilities. Either, whenever we say "I see the desk" or things like it, we are just plain wrong, or it means something a bit different to how it looks on the face of it.
Now, a non-philosopher needn't really concern himself with all this analysis. But it's still true. And when we DO do philosophy, it may well be necessary to draw out this distinction. And this is what I'm trying to show you with Oswald. The phrase "Oswald caused Kennedy's death" is true. But it does not mean "The thing that is `Oswald' is the cause of Kennedy's death." Because by faffing around with quotes and saying "the thing that is" we make it clear that are not saying anything different from what we appear to be saying.
So, "Oswald caused Kennedy's death" - true. "The thing that is Oswald caused Kennedy's death" - false.

Complex? No. Subtle? Perhaps.

Well you have to prove your lemmas then to get to your main argument which you have not done. I don't understand why we are avoiding your main argument, especially when you admit these lemmas do not prove lack of free will.
If your premises don't prove lack of free will how do you expect them to support that conclusion?

Imagine the following argument:

1. All Foos are Bars.
2. All Bars are Bazs.
3. All Foos are Bars.

Now take the following premises:

1. 'X' is a Foo.
2. All Bars are green.

Neither of these two sets of claims alone prove that 'X' is green. In fact, the argument plus premise 1 doesn't prove that, nor does the argument plus premise two. You have, several times, done the equivalent of claiming, "Well, that argument doesn't prove X is green!" No but it is necessary as part of that proof.

So - pick an argument, stick to it, or else the posts will get unmanageable again. There's a little bit of debate on causes and events up there - shall we stick with that? It's up to you.

 

[elman]

Originally Posted by elman
Yes very subtle. Perhaps the reason I cannot see it. What does Oswald mean if it does not mean the thing we call Oswald?

In what context? In most everyday language? It does mean the thing called Oswald. When discussing causes, it's more accurate to speak of events not things - since "Oswald" just by being, never caused anything much.
This contextualism is not anything spooky, mysterious or rare. Another instance of this kind of thing is with sense data. I see a desk in front of me. However, what I see, what I am aware of will, clearly, appear to get smaller if I move away. The image - and it is only the image that I actually experience - diminishes. However we can agree that the real desk stays the same size. Indeed, different people will all say, "I see the desk" but they must all be looking from different angles and so what they actually see is not the object but a piece of sense-data in their minds.
It's a relatively simple argument:
As I move away, what I see changes size
As I move away, the actual object remains the same size
Therefore what I see is not the actual object.
So there are two possibilities. Either, whenever we say "I see the desk" or things like it, we are just plain wrong, or it means something a bit different to how it looks on the face of it.
Now, a non-philosopher needn't really concern himself with all this analysis. But it's still true. And when we DO do philosophy, it may well be necessary to draw out this distinction. And this is what I'm trying to show you with Oswald. The phrase "Oswald caused Kennedy's death" is true. But it does not mean "The thing that is `Oswald' is the cause of Kennedy's death." Because by faffing around with quotes and saying "the thing that is" we make it clear that are not saying anything different from what we appear to be saying.
So, "Oswald caused Kennedy's death" - true. "The thing that is Oswald caused Kennedy's death" - false.

Complex? No. Subtle? Perhaps.


Quote:
Well you have to prove your lemmas then to get to your main argument which you have not done. I don't understand why we are avoiding your main argument, especially when you admit these lemmas do not prove lack of free will.
If your premises don't prove lack of free will how do you expect them to support that conclusion?

Imagine the following argument:
All Foos are Bars.
All Bars are Bazs.
All Foos are Bars.
Now take the following premises:
'X' is a Foo.
All Bars are green.
Neither of these two sets of claims alone prove that 'X' is green. In fact, the argument plus premise 1 doesn't prove that, nor does the argument plus premise two. You have, several times, done the equivalent of claiming, "Well, that argument doesn't prove X is green!" No but it is necessary as part of that proof.

So - pick an argument, stick to it, or else the posts will get unmanageable again. There's a little bit of debate on causes and events up there - shall we stick with that? It's up to you.

I give up. I cannot understand your logic or what you are saying.