A long while back I made a thread about The Evil God Challenge. It wasn't really an exercise to show that God is evil, moreso it was an argument that what God likes is inscrutable. You participated, briefly. Most of the arguments consisted of people telling me that "whatever god likes is good, that's the definition of 'good' and the definition of 'evil' is whatever god doesn't like". I think that's a silly semantic argument to bypass the actual challenge, but we can still conceive of an infinite number of gods that value an infinite variety of things. So for every concept of a higher being that can grant eternal happiness or cause/allow eternal torment, good or evil, how do you know the thing you value is valued by that higher being? Maybe that higher being values physical prowess, maybe that higher being values intellect, maybe that higher being values sexual pleasure. Who knows?I don't think that works. For one thing, it runs into the same problem that much of the Abrahamic tradition does--could a God that would condemn anyone to eternal torment be anything but an evil God? The Abrahamic traditions can potentially get around this problem by positing an existential version of hell, where damnation is something one ultimately does to oneself by failing to pursue higher meaning in life (or worse), but I see no way to reframe Blerg's arbitrary rules in a way that makes sense existentially.
Actually, I do see one way out. If worship of Blerg for whatever reason turns people into vicious mockeries of themselves, or otherwise destroys them, then it would make sense for such worship to end in damnation. But that would also make Blerg an evil God.
The first thing you would need to do for any Pascalian Wager is to frame salvation and damnation in a way that doesn't look like a caricature. Once you do that, though, the objections stop working.
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