Is there an absolute morality?

[Bradskii]

Now to mine. Would you say that I "stole" from the drunk man? Or is there more to "stealing" than "taking without permission"?

There's more. There has to be an intention to keep it. And I'm not going to give my neighbour's gun back. Will I make use of it myself? Yeah, I might enjoy hunting. Or no, I might keep it locked up. It's still stealing. And we're almost at the point where we could say 'Well, if you take it for a good reason then it's not stealing'. Which is where we redefine the word so that the problem of whether it's right or wrong dissapears. And as Kylie just said, it leads to nonsensical statements like 'I'm not escaping. I'm just leaving the establishment'. It's almost as if you're not escaping if you plan to come back at some point.

I don't get the push back on matters like this. Sometimes lying is the right thing to do ('there's no-one hiding in the attic'). That seems obvious to me. It's only if you take the position that lying is always wrong that you have to twist the scenario like a pretzel to justify that position.

Well, actually, I do get it. The pretzel twisters are those that deny that morality is relative. It's all black and white to them. It's either right or wrong, whatever the conditions. So it's not stealing. It's 'confiscating'. It's not lying, it's 'avoiding telling the truth'. It's not jailing someone. It's simply 'restricting their movements'.

And apart from mangling the language, those who hold to this position always seem to know exactly what is right or wrong. So if we are in any doubt about any act then there is a simple answer to be had. They live with no doubt. It's kinda scary...

 

[Moral Orel]

There's more. There has to be an intention to keep it.

Right, I already explained that distinction here:

I think the distinction you're looking for is that the person taking the would-be-murder-weapon isn't keeping it for themselves, which would make it stealing.

If my friend is drunk at the bar, and I take his keys despite his belief that he is ferfectly pine to drive himself, I haven't "stolen" his keys because I fully intend to return them.

To "take without permission" is an insufficient definition of "stealing".

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And apart from mangling the language

A "mangling of the language" is why I'm jumping in to the conversation. You mangled it by defining "stealing" as this and nothing more:

taking something that belongs to someone else without their permission

When that is an inadequate definition. It isn't so much "taking" as "seizing ownership".

If you take the gun for the sole purpose of holding it until murderous intent dissipates, then "confiscate" is an apt word to use.

If you take it to prevent the murder, but then use it for your own purposes, then you have stolen it because you took it for your sake.

Before anyone jumps to any conclusions, just a reminder, that my claim is that no act "is wrong" so I'm not taking the C-Man's side in that regard. I'm only popping in to address the semantic argument y'all seem to be making.

 

[Bradskii]

Right, I already explained that distinction here:

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A "mangling of the language" is why I'm jumping in to the conversation. You mangled it by defining "stealing" as this and nothing more:

When that is an inadequate definition. It isn't so much "taking" as "seizing ownership".

If you take the gun for the sole purpose of holding it until murderous intent dissipates, then "confiscate" is an apt word to use.

If you take it to prevent the murder, but then use it for your own purposes, then you have stolen it because you took it for your sake.

Before anyone jumps to any conclusions, just a reminder, that my claim is that no act "is wrong" so I'm not taking the C-Man's side in that regard. I'm only popping in to address the semantic argument y'all seem to be making.

There's nothing there with which I would really argue. And as you say, using examples as we have can drag a discussion down a semantic rabbit hole. But it's difficult to make the point without using examples. And rather than take the principle and discuss it, we end up trying to define specific words and how they can be used in specific circumstances. I try to generalise and then get caught up in details.

It should be as simple as asking how we determine right from wrong. We look at the circumstances of the act. Period. Whether we personally think that the act is right or wrong is irrelevant. The determination depends on the facts relative to the act.

 

[Moral Orel]

There's nothing there with which I would really argue. And as you say, using examples as we have can drag a discussion down a semantic rabbit hole. But it's difficult to make the point without using examples. And rather than take the principle and discuss it, we end up trying to define specific words and how they can be used in specific circumstances. I try to generalise and then get caught up in details.

I don't see anything wrong with distinguishing between different aspects of an act. That's all I think Chrill is doing.

It should be as simple as asking how we determine right from wrong. We look at the circumstances of the act. Period. Whether we personally think that the act is right or wrong is irrelevant. The determination depends on the facts relative to the act.

Spoken like a true Objectivist, and I disagree wholeheartedly. How you personally feel about the act, the circumstances, and the outcomes is all you really have to justify whether that act be "right" or "wrong". We look at the circumstances of the act and ask ourselves how we personally feel about them.

If all that matters were the facts of the circumstances, then you could define a hypothetical which controls all the variables, and all the circumstances to such a point that you could prove, logically and rationally, that such an act would in fact be wrong. And sure, no such situation would ever present itself in the real world, to be sure.

But I hold that no matter how well you define the circumstances you could never justify rationally that the act be wrong based on anything other than your personal feelings or the personal feelings of other subjects about how things "ought to be".

 

[Bradskii]

I don't see anything wrong with distinguishing between different aspects of an act. That's all I think Chrill is doing.

Spoken like a true Objectivist, and I disagree wholeheartedly. How you personally feel about the act, the circumstances, and the outcomes is all you really have to justify whether that act be "right" or "wrong". We look at the circumstances of the act and ask ourselves how we personally feel about them.

If all that matters were the facts of the circumstances, then you could define a hypothetical which controls all the variables, and all the circumstances to such a point that you could prove, logically and rationally, that such an act would in fact be wrong. And sure, no such situation would ever present itself in the real world, to be sure.

But I hold that no matter how well you define the circumstances you could never justify rationally that the act be wrong based on anything other than your personal feelings or the personal feelings of other subjects about how things "ought to be".

And I have no argument with that either. If circumstances change then what we determine to be right or wrong changes. That's the matter in a nutshell. But if you want to take it a step further and ask who actually makes the determination...then it's us. As individuals. So your determination might be different to mine.

Some people will say it doesn't matter what we think. Or what the circumstances are. It's right or wrong anyway.

 

[Moral Orel]

And I have no argument with that either. If circumstances change then what we determine to be right or wrong changes. That's the matter in a nutshell. But if you want to take it a step further and ask who actually makes the determination...then it's us. As individuals. So your determination might be different to mine.

The question to ask is "What exactly are we evaluating?"

We aren't evaluating the act itself, but how the act makes us feel. When we say an act "is wrong" we are saying that we don't like the experience we have with the act. We aren't determining anything about some quality of the act itself. "Wrongness" isn't a property that a behavior can have.

The same way I don't determine whether or not chocolate ice cream "is good". I don't evaluate any sort of property of the chocolate ice cream itself, I evaluate my personal experience of the chocolate ice cream and state that I personally like that experience. "Goodness" isn't a property that a thing can have.

 

[Bradskii]

The question to ask is "What exactly are we evaluating?"

We aren't evaluating the act itself, but how the act makes us feel. When we say an act "is wrong" we are saying that we don't like the experience we have with the act. We aren't determining anything about some quality of the act itself. "Wrongness" isn't a property that a behavior can have.

The same way I don't determine whether or not chocolate ice cream "is good". I don't evaluate any sort of property of the chocolate ice cream itself, I evaluate my personal experience of the chocolate ice cream and state that I personally like that experience. "Goodness" isn't a property that a thing can have.

I disagree here. It's certainly our personal decision whether something is wrong or not. But it's not a matter of a feeling - of a personal preference. It's whether we consider that harm (or good) has been done. Just saying 'I think it's harmful' or 'this what I prefer' doesn't cut it. We need to be able to give reasons for our decisions.

 

[Moral Orel]

I disagree here. It's certainly our personal decision whether something is wrong or not. But it's not a matter of a feeling - of a personal preference. It's whether we consider that harm (or good) has been done. Just saying 'I think it's harmful' or 'this what I prefer' doesn't cut it. We need to be able to give reasons for our decisions.

Well you've decided harm is what makes an act "wrong". What reason do you have for that decision?

 

[Chriliman]

I think the distinction you're looking for is that the person taking the would-be-murder-weapon isn't keeping it for themselves, which would make it stealing.

If my friend is drunk at the bar, and I take his keys despite his belief that he is ferfectly pine to drive himself, I haven't "stolen" his keys because I fully intend to return them.

To "take without permission" is an insufficient definition of "stealing".

Exactly, thank you

 

[o_mlly]

Intent is obviously one of the conditions which is relates to any act. The act is relative to the conditins so it's also relative to the intent. If I shoot at you and miss, no harm has been done. But the intent was to cause it. Therefore it was immoral. If someone steals my gun to prevent me shooting at you then the intent was to prevent harm. Therefore it was moral.

The morality of a human act is dependent (better word selection imo than "relative") on three determinations: the object of the act, the intention of the actor, and the circumstances. All three must be deemed good in order to judge the act as moral. A failure in any one of the three renders the act immoral. So far, it appears, we agree: no set of circumstances can change an act evil in its object or intention to be a moral act.

As to the guns scenario, the right to private property is not absolute. One who takes the property of another to prevent them from doing evil does not steal. One steals by taking w/o permission the property of another who justly possesses it. One does not justly possess property that he uses to do evil.

And a definition of harm? One could write a whole thesis on that. From Mills (via Stanford: Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)): 'To constitute a harm, an action must be injurious or set back important interests of particular people...' And must be non consensual. And injurious can be physical or mental. And must be differentiated from offence. It's lime pornography. We'll know it when we see it. And as in pornography, not everyone will agree.

Perhaps, "We'll know it when we see it" really means "I'll know it when I see it". If so then morality is both relative and subjective. If one cannot name and agree on at least one human need that is global then the notion of morality is pure nonsense.

And rape? We've been there. It's non consensual sexual intercourse. So (for the benefit of anyone who either missed or was not bored witless by the last conversation on this matter), if someone has sex with a partner where he or she has not given consent (drunk perhaps) it is technically rape. But if there was no evil intent (as per your point above) and the partner had no problem with it, it wouldn't be immoral.

"Technically rape"? No evil intent? As long as the victim is drunk and cannot say "no" then rape is a moral act? Is there any community whose legislation reflects those conditions? I think not.

 

[Chriliman]

I don't see anything wrong with distinguishing between different aspects of an act. That's all I think Chrill is doing.

Spoken like a true Objectivist, and I disagree wholeheartedly. How you personally feel about the act, the circumstances, and the outcomes is all you really have to justify whether that act be "right" or "wrong". We look at the circumstances of the act and ask ourselves how we personally feel about them.

If all that matters were the facts of the circumstances, then you could define a hypothetical which controls all the variables, and all the circumstances to such a point that you could prove, logically and rationally, that such an act would in fact be wrong. And sure, no such situation would ever present itself in the real world, to be sure.

But I hold that no matter how well you define the circumstances you could never justify rationally that the act be wrong based on anything other than your personal feelings or the personal feelings of other subjects about how things "ought to be".

Our personal feelings and those of others are also facts to consider in any given circumstance, so why look any further than the facts of the circumstance and base our reasoning on those objective facts?

So when it comes to stealing we can say it’s always wrong to take someone else’s property for the sole reason of personal(selfish) gain with no intention of returning it and knowing they wouldn’t want you to steal it. There’s a lot of conditions there, but it’s important to have those to make the point that it’s objectively wrong given those specific conditions.

 

[Moral Orel]

So when it comes to stealing we can say it’s always wrong to take someone else’s property for the sole reason of personal(selfish) gain with no intention of returning it and knowing they wouldn’t want you to steal it. There’s a lot of conditions there, but it’s important to have those to make the point that it’s objectively wrong given those specific conditions.

Okay, you've described the circumstances. Now why is it wrong?

 

[Chriliman]

Okay, you've described the circumstances. Now why is it wrong?

Because of the objective facts described in the circumstance. If you’re someone who doesn’t care about objective facts other than what you want, then I’d understand you wouldn’t care about what’s objectively right or wrong as it relates to others, but the objective facts are still there. (This is feeling like a repeat of our earlier discussion, lol)

Also, if you don’t mind trying to answer my question in my post before this, I’d appreciate it.

 

[Eight Foot Manchild]

Because of the objective facts described in the circumstance. If you’re someone who doesn’t care about objective facts other than what you want, then I’d understand you wouldn’t care about what’s objectively right or wrong

That's a big leap you just made. No amount of objective facts will ever get you to an "objective right or wrong". You cannot derive an "ought" from an "is", without adding an "if" clause with respect to a desired goal.

You even said it yourself, before you leaped off the track - "If you’re someone who doesn’t care about objective facts..."

The objectively quantifiable facts of the harm caused by stealing, killing, etc, are only relevant if you value the goal that harm is to be avoided. Values are necessarily subjective, not objective. "Objective value" is an oxymoron.

There you have, as far as I can tell, what morality is - standards based on objective, quantifiable facts (regarding harm and wellbeing), coupled with subjective value. But my mind remains open to being convinced otherwise.

 

[Moral Orel]

Our personal feelings and those of others are also facts to consider in any given circumstance, so why look any further than the facts of the circumstance and base our reasoning on those objective facts?

There's a list of facts to consider, but first there is your claim that those facts combined equal a "wrong". Your claim is not a fact until you give reason for it. For clarity, let's add some names to the people described in those situations. Bob and Jill. Here are the facts:

• Jill owns X.
• Bob took X.
• Bob used X for himself and no one else.
• Bob never intends on returning X.
• Bob knows that Jill doesn't want Bob to have X.

This is your claim:

• Bob's action of taking X was wrong.

You still need to tell me why those listed facts equal a wrong.

 

[Chriliman]

There's a list of facts to consider, but first there is your claim that those facts combined equal a "wrong". Your claim is not a fact until you give reason for it. For clarity, let's add some names to the people described in those situations. Bob and Jill. Here are the facts:

• Jill owns X.
• Bob took X.
• Bob used X for himself and no one else.
• Bob never intends on returning X.
• Bob knows that Jill doesn't want Bob to have X.

This is your claim:

• Bob's action of taking X was wrong.

You still need to tell me why those listed facts equal a wrong.

I already answered this. Could you do me a solid and answer the question I asked you first?

Here it is again: Our personal feelings and those of others are also facts to consider in any given circumstance, so why look any further than the facts of the circumstance and base our reasoning on those objective facts?

 

[Moral Orel]

I already answered this. Could you do me a solid and answer the question I asked you first?

Here it is again: Our personal feelings and those of others are also facts to consider in any given circumstance, so why look any further than the facts of the circumstance and base our reasoning on those objective facts?

Take another look at my post and pay close attention to what I quoted you.

 

[Moral Orel]

You cannot derive an "ought" from an "is", without adding an "if" clause with respect to a desired goal.

I take it a step further and say that even that doesn't work. I know that it seems valid to say, "If I want to run, then I ought to run".

I want to run.
Therefore I ought to run.

But that's an invalid argument. You presuppose an "ought" already.

I want to run.
I ought to do what I want to do.
Therefore I ought to run.

And that presupposed premise is only true if "want" = "ought".

 

[Chriliman]

That's a big leap you just made. No amount of objective facts will ever get you to an "objective right or wrong". You cannot derive an "ought" from an "is", without adding an "if" clause with respect to a desired goal.

Is what you just said an objective fact? If you don't think it is then why is your reasoning based on it?

If you do think it's an objective fact then it's self-defeating because that implies I should accept what you're saying as true or fact. I said the same to Moral Orel before, but to little effect, but maybe I'm missing something.

I'd appreciate actual answers to these questions before we continue.

 

[Moral Orel]

Is what you just said an objective fact? If you don't think it is then why is your reasoning based on it?

If you do think it's an objective fact then it's self-defeating because that implies I should accept what you're saying as true or fact. I said the same to Moral Orel before, but to little effect, but maybe I'm missing something.

I'd appreciate actual answers to these questions before we continue.

Whether you believe it or not has no effect on whether it is true or not. You're free to believe false things if you wish.