Is divine command ethics demonstrable/falsifiable?

[muichimotsu]

While I cannot say I've done a great deal of research into meta ethics, I find that the common thread in terms of defending the idea of goodness itself is often couched in terminology that, whether one is aware or not, is fairly close to divine command ethics, arguing that goodness is identical to God's nature and commands thereof, rather than being something we can deduce ourselves

But even without applying the Euthypro dilemma, is it not a tautology to basically define God in such a way that its nature is goodness and thus any commands you ascribe to it by divine revelation and faith would necessarily have to be good?

How can you justify any aspect of divine command theory without making appeals to either tautological ideas of God that are goalpost shifting to avoid confronting the essence of goodness without reference to God's nature or holy scriptures?

 

[variant]

Well you could always present one God and see whether it has any commands it wants to share.

I've never believed the Euthypro dilemma was a problem.

A God powerful enough to create a universe may very well also be powerful enough to dictate the nature of goodness.

 

[muichimotsu]

Well you could always present one God and see whether it has any commands it wants to share.

I've never believed the Euthypro dilemma was a problem.

A God powerful enough to create a universe may very well also powerful enough to dictate the nature of goodness.

That seems to just ignore the meta ethical issues in favor of relegating it back to a concept that in itself doesn't necessarily make sense beyond appeals to us not having absolute knowledge or such

 

[variant]

That seems to just ignore the meta ethical issues in favor of relegating it back to a concept that in itself doesn't necessarily make sense beyond appeals to us not having absolute knowledge or such

I'm not ignoring the issue I am dismissing it. If God can set up the universe any way it wants then it can create a sentient species with any concept of "the good", and even make basic changes to the nature of the universe that would come from what it saw as "good".

This means that a being powerful enough to make fundamental changes to reality has to be powerful enough to dictate goodness.

 

[muichimotsu]

I'm not ignoring the issue I am dismissing it. If God can set up the universe any way it wants then it can create a sentient species with any concept of "the good", and even make basic changes to the nature of the universe that would come from what it saw as "good".

This means that a being powerful enough to make fundamental changes to reality has to be powerful enough to dictate goodness.

Fair point, basically sending home how God is an easy way to goalpost shift and not confront any real issues but shift the responsibility back to God as the absolute

 

[variant]

Fair point, basically sending home how God is an easy way to goalpost shift and not confront any real issues but shift the responsibility back to God as the absolute

Yes, that's the problem with the concept from my point of view. All the other questions generally end up there.

 

[Kenny'sID]

While I cannot say I've done a great deal of research into meta ethics, I find that the common thread in terms of defending the idea of goodness itself is often couched in terminology that, whether one is aware or not, is fairly close to divine command ethics, arguing that goodness is identical to God's nature and commands thereof, rather than being something we can deduce ourselves

But even without applying the Euthypro dilemma, is it not a tautology to basically define God in such a way that its nature is goodness and thus any commands you ascribe to it by divine revelation and faith would necessarily have to be good?

How can you justify any aspect of divine command theory without making appeals to either tautological ideas of God that are goalpost shifting to avoid confronting the essence of goodness without reference to God's nature or holy scriptures?

Overthinking makes me suspicious.

It's often a way to reach a preferred end over a truthful one.

 

[SkyWriting]

While I cannot say I've done a great deal of research into meta ethics, I find that the common thread in terms of defending the idea of goodness itself is often couched in terminology that, whether one is aware or not, is fairly close to divine command ethics, arguing that goodness is identical to God's nature and commands thereof, rather than being something we can deduce ourselves,

"Goodness" is the action of creation or the support of such.
There ya go.

 

[muichimotsu]

"Goodness" is the action of creation or the support of such.
There ya go.

That still seems tautological, because you've failed to explain why goodness is this act of creation or support. That acts like death and destruction can never be a good thing, which nature already suggests contrary to your claims.

 

[SkyWriting]

That still seems tautological, because you've failed to explain why goodness is this act of creation or support. That acts like death and destruction can never be a good thing, which nature already suggests contrary to your claims.

I don't see that it does. Your logic fails.

Easy to explain. If existence is good then I can explain why.
If existence is not good, then I cannot explain.

With Creation, I can form thoughts.
With destruction, no one can.
Existence proves it's own value
by attempting to explain itself.

 

[muichimotsu]

I don't see that it does. Your logic fails.

That's an argument from ignorance, your logic actually fails far more than anything mine would, since you're saying that because you don't see that, my claim is false. My claim could be false, but your not seeing it is insufficient to conclude that

I can demonstrate destruction and death are beneficial, and nature in particular does it the best, in that without death, the population would peak to a point that resources could not sustain them and destruction in terms of forest fires, for one example, can actually stimulate growth of the forests after the fact, they don't just disappear, they can flourish.

Nature is not just generation, but destruction, two halves of a whole, neither innately beneficial or detrimental, because excess or deficit of either is the issue. Kudzu are "creative" in nature, yet they're considered an invasive species, correct?

 

[SkyWriting]

That's an argument from ignorance, your logic actually fails far more than anything mine would, since you're saying that because you don't see that, my claim is false. My claim could be false, but your not seeing it is insufficient to conclude that

I can demonstrate destruction and death are beneficial, and nature in particular does it the best, in that without death, the population would peak to a point that resources could not sustain them and destruction in terms of forest fires, for one example, can actually stimulate growth of the forests after the fact, they don't just disappear, they can flourish.

Nature is not just generation, but destruction, two halves of a whole, neither innately beneficial or detrimental, because excess or deficit of either is the issue. Kudzu are "creative" in nature, yet they're considered an invasive species, correct?

But you are not destroyed, which ruins your attempt to disregard yourself.

Your ability to do any analysis falsifies your claim to being inconsequential.
Even claiming you have no value dismisses the claim.
The big picture is one of my gifts.

 

[Kenny'sID]

That acts like death and destruction can never be a good thing, which nature already suggests contrary to your claims.

Think I'll consider the death of people/pets I know and love, a bad thing, you can call it good for whatever reason you like.

 

[FireDragon76]

I think the liberal Christian perspective is more coherent, and doesn't reject humanistic learning- if God exists and is good, then we can use our rational minds to understand God's will viz a viz goodness, apart from religious authority. It's the fundamentalist Christians, Muslims, and Jews that Euthyphro skewers.

 

[HTacianas]

While I cannot say I've done a great deal of research into meta ethics, I find that the common thread in terms of defending the idea of goodness itself is often couched in terminology that, whether one is aware or not, is fairly close to divine command ethics, arguing that goodness is identical to God's nature and commands thereof, rather than being something we can deduce ourselves

But even without applying the Euthypro dilemma, is it not a tautology to basically define God in such a way that its nature is goodness and thus any commands you ascribe to it by divine revelation and faith would necessarily have to be good?

How can you justify any aspect of divine command theory without making appeals to either tautological ideas of God that are goalpost shifting to avoid confronting the essence of goodness without reference to God's nature or holy scriptures?

Sexual immorality in general and homosexuality specifically have always been prohibited. How many abortions are we up to now? How many illegitimate children are public wards with no fathers? How many dead from AIDS?

 

[FireDragon76]

Sexual immorality in general and homosexuality specifically have always been prohibited.

This is demonstrably false to anyone with a cursory knowledge of the diversity of human cultures attitudes towards sexuality.

 

[HTacianas]

This is demonstrably false to anyone with a cursory knowledge of the diversity of human cultures attitudes towards sexuality.

So does that mean we don't have a whole boatload of illegitimate kids?

 

[Lobster Johnson]

I'm not ignoring the issue I am dismissing it. If God can set up the universe any way it wants then it can create a sentient species with any concept of "the good", and even make basic changes to the nature of the universe that would come from what it saw as "good".

This means that a being powerful enough to make fundamental changes to reality has to be powerful enough to dictate goodness.

Not sure I'd agree. The only definition of 'goodness' that's really relevant is 'that which allows life to thrive'. A creator could create any number of species for whom 'goodness' is different - it's counter to goodness for humans to be set on fire (therefore being set on fire is 'bad') but a creator could make a species that thrives by being set on fire, therefore it's 'good' for them.

But that wouldn't change the fact that 'goodness' is still fundamentally whatever allows a particular species to thrive.

At best you might have some all-knowing entity with complete knowledge of exactly what the perfect recipe for human thriving was, and therefore knew what ultimate human goodness would be, but that's still besides the point that goodness is what allows for thriving.

If an entity tried to declare that something harmful and dangerous that detracted from human thriving was 'good', what exactly would be the motivation to care about what they have to say?

 

[Lobster Johnson]

So does that mean we don't have a whole boatload of illegitimate kids?

Well, there's a solution for that, but you were complaining about abortion too, so I don't know what you want. There's just no pleasing some people.

 

[SkyWriting]

That's an argument from ignorance, ...

Your ability to protest has value. This undermines your argument.
Unless you insist it has no value?