Is Belief a Moral Construct?

[cvanwey]

First let me say that although our last discussion on free will has me settled pretty firmly in the "all free will is an illusion camp" for the sake of this discussion, I'll merely take the stance that @cvanwey has that belief is not a choice, but actions are.

A recent speaker at UC Irvine, or some adjacent campus, stated:

"Free will" is the ability to control your thoughts, not your actions.

I feel this looks to apply here.

 

[Moral Orel]

A recent speaker at UC Irvine, or some adjacent campus, stated:

"Free will" is the ability to control your thoughts, not your actions.

I feel this looks to apply here.

Thinking is an action.

 

[Moral Orel]

Is that a bid for a new thread?

I don't think it warrants a new thread. If we didn't have doubt of God's existence or what His commands are, there would be justification for judging our actions because they aren't made in ignorance. That's what it would build to anyways, which would link directly to the OP (I'm not starting there).

Edit: After thinking on it I would say that doubting God's existence and doubting God's commands are rather different. Focusing on one at a time would probably be helpful.

Sure. Let's stick with just God's existence first.

The low-hanging fruit is trust, which God commands. Can there be a world in which trust is possible but doubt is not possible?

Pay close attention to what I claimed. If there is a God, He can make it so there is no doubt about His existence, while still allowing for doubt in other things. Maybe it requires magic, doesn't really matter. Knowing God exists does not force us to trust Him or distrust Him.

 

[zippy2006]

I don't think it warrants a new thread. If we didn't have doubt of God's existence or what His commands are, there would be justification for judging our actions because they aren't made in ignorance. That's what it would build to anyways, which would link directly to the OP (I'm not starting there).

Okay. I tend to think that in both cases we have partial knowledge which results in partial ignorance, etc., but we can consider it.

Pay close attention to what I claimed. If there is a God, He can make it so there is no doubt about His existence, while still allowing for doubt in other things. Maybe it requires magic, doesn't really matter. Knowing God exists does not force us to trust Him or distrust Him.

Right, but if we have perfect knowledge of what God commands, and he commands trust, then the question becomes entirely relevant. This particular question of trust relates to his commands, not his existence. I rather anticipated this reply and wrote an argument for why trying to follow God's commands would entail doubt. Since you want to start with existence we can come back to it later, but I will include it since similar ideas will be at play.

Spoiler: God's Commands

The difficulty is that what God wants from us is a free and meritorious choosing of the good. If something is meritorious then it must involve freedom, for freedom is basically just the ability to move oneself. If I am moved by something outside of myself then the movement cannot be attributed to me. In that case the movement cannot be meritorious or free because the cause of the movement is extrinsic to me. We would say that rather than acting I am being acted upon.

Now freedom and merit require a mixture of determinacy and indeterminacy. Suppose that what God wants from us is to climb a rock face. You might say that God could give the command indubitably and yet freedom and merit would remain insofar as we climb well or poorly, promptly or tardily, etc. There is determinacy in our goal and indeterminacy in our means. Very well. That is a reasonable counterargument.

The difficulty is that in falling into this Euthyphro mindset we tend to misunderstand the will of God and impose an arbitrariness on the moral landscape. God's commands are by and large more general than particular. Rather than telling us to climb a particular rock, the God of the Bible is more apt to tell us to love our neighbor, or give to the poor, or not to do evil for the sake of good. Such commands require the reason in order to be applied to practical situations, and rather than being simple tasks or goals will tend to impinge upon our moral and affective or emotional life. Doubt seems to arise naturally in the practical application of these commands, their competition with one another, and their competition with other emotions, desires, and people.

Sure. Let's stick with just God's existence first.

There are two main arguments I can think of that will apply to both: 1) Our relation to God is defined by actions, dispositions, and ways of life as much as intellectual beliefs, and 2) God is an infinite being who will always transcend us and our knowledge of him.

The second point is particularly relevant with respect to God's existence. Belief and the Christian life are essentially a moving-into-God and a coming-to-know-him-better-and-better. You think it would be nice if God declared his existence as a sort of preamble, in order to aid us in our search and our religious life. I'm not really sure what that would look like. After all, what is God? Does anyone really know? It's not really an either/or existential proposition, for to know God is not to know a thing in the world. We begin with a basic conception of God which is then refined over and over again, almost like a snake shedding its skin. Some theologians would say that that process never ends. Because that starting point is basically arbitrary it is hard to know what a revelation of the existence of God would even look like. Maybe it would look like what it now looks like (Romans 1:19-20).

Another point is that there is a difficulty in your entire approach insofar as we have moved from a merit-based system to a non-merit-based system. For example, you seem to be saying that if the teacher just told the student the answer (12x12=144), forced them to memorize it, and indoctrinated them into believing it without any possibility of error or doubt, then we wouldn't have to worry about this pesky issue of the student's ignorance. In God's case we might say that he could just create us as beings who fully know the answer in advance, a priori, and do not need to do any work to reach the answer at all. That's fine as far as it goes, but you've also altogether destroyed the meritorious aspect of human action and human knowledge. If the teacher stands over the student each moment and forces them to "believe" the mathematical proposition, then the student is all but relieved of both responsibility and merit (praise/blame). In that case I would praise the teacher, not the student (if in fact I believe that such 'indoctrination' is meritorious). This would just move the sphere of merit and doubt elsewhere, and to what purpose?

Although I did not address it in any depth, Cvanwey faces the same issue of destroying responsibility, though by a different route:

On the contrary, if choice were arbitrary then we could not be held responsible for it.

 

[cvanwey]

Thinking is an action.

Seems like a good point. I can no longer find what he exactly quoted. I may have butchered or over simplified his exact words a bit? Sometimes a missing word or phrase can completely change the meaning.

The OP's intent is to ask if one's discernment or apprehension of incoming information counts as a moral/immoral construct? Is what you conclude considered 'good' or 'bad', or is the process of reaching the conclusion itself instead benign from 'good or 'bad'? I would argue apprehension is not a moral concept. How one processes information differs from person to person. And yet, God tells His readers, who currently believe, to proselytize a claim to the ones whom don't believe. If these recipients continue not to believe, they will be condemned.

Yes, one can attempt to protect an existing belief. One can close their ears to select incoming information, and/or only listen to specific people, and/or other. The fact people do this may demonstrate a larger point. Maybe we know that what we ultimately discern/apprehend, is not by choice????

I have changed beliefs about many things, time and time again. It seems that the mechanism for changing this belief, back and forth, is due to newly presented catalyst(s), which forces my hand to acknowledge new information. Which-in-turn, sometimes changes my belief(s) about a presented proposition.

Yes, many theists and atheists alike close their ears to the "other side". Maybe in part, because we somehow know that what we believe, is not really a choice? Some may rather protect a current conclusion or position, since maybe we feel comfortable in that current conclusion???

The topic of 'freewill' can go in many directions. I too likely share your position; that " 'freewill' is an illusion." But the point of this thread is to hyper-focus on Mark 16:15-16, in relation to what I eluded to above in red.

 

[cvanwey]

Although I did not address it in any depth, Cvanwey faces the same issue of destroying responsibility, though by a different route:

Actions have consequences - ('good', 'bad', or benign). In summation, I state:

Most will ultimately apprehend "12 X 12 = 144". If they do not, then questions arise. Are they not actually listening in class? Are they too lazy to study the process? Do they have a learning disability? Other?

Okay, so how about?:

Most will ultimately apprehend "Jesus rose from the grave." If they do not, then questions arise. Are they not actually listening in class? Are they too lazy to study the process? Do they have a learning disability? Other?

********************

However, your argument is apples to my oranges. I just responded to @Moral Orel in post #65. If you care to take a wack at it, by all means, please do. All I did is to elaborate on the OP.

 

[cvanwey]

Although I did not address it in any depth, Cvanwey faces the same issue of destroying responsibility, though by a different route:

Second response:

I completely see [your] angle, and will play devil's advocate and see where this goes... You seem to have written me off as illogical and/or deceptive, and have stopped responding. It's a free country, do as you will. Though I hope you may reconsider your prior conclusion(s)? Believe it or not, (no pun intended), my OP inquiry is earnest in it's intent. And yes, you can make a case in your given claim. Moving forward...

Can we be assigned responsibility for our thoughts/actions? Sure. It happens all the time. Is it 'justified'? I guess it depends on the 'objective'? But who assigns the 'objective', if anyone?

(2 rhetorical questions below):

- I make a comment which offends another. I either do it intentionally or unknowingly. In many cases, accountability is assigned regardless. Is this accountability "justified"?
- Someone kills another, either with 'justified' or 'unjustified' intent. In many cases, accountability is assigned regardless. Is this accountability "justified"?

In your case, I'd wager to state that a proposition has been placed forth. The proposition of what the Bible states. We are sinners and Jesus sacrificed Himself to save us from our sin, and the otherwise alternative deserving of eternal condemnation. And some or all of what we need to do, as fallible humans, is to believe and follow Him to save ourselves from this otherwise eternal condemnation.

Well, so here we are... If I do not truly believe in this story line, should I be responsible for this claim anyhow, which was presented to me?

 

[Moral Orel]

The difficulty is that what God wants from us is a free and meritorious choosing of the good. If something is meritorious then it must involve freedom, for freedom is basically just the ability to move oneself. If I am moved by something outside of myself then the movement cannot be attributed to me. In that case the movement cannot be meritorious or free because the cause of the movement is extrinsic to me. We would say that rather than acting I am being acted upon.

Now freedom and merit require a mixture of determinacy and indeterminacy. Suppose that what God wants from us is to climb a rock face. You might say that God could give the command indubitably and yet freedom and merit would remain insofar as we climb well or poorly, promptly or tardily, etc. There is determinacy in our goal and indeterminacy in our means. Very well. That is a reasonable counterargument.

Knowing what God wants doesn't force me to comply at all. And if I do choose to comply, I still choose how to do so. So I see indeterminacy in both. The Devil knows God better than any of us do, and knows better what God wants, yet still freely chose to do evil, yes?

The difficulty is that in falling into this Euthyphro mindset we tend to misunderstand the will of God and impose an arbitrariness on the moral landscape. God's commands are by and large more general than particular. Rather than telling us to climb a particular rock, the God of the Bible is more apt to tell us to love our neighbor, or give to the poor, or not to do evil for the sake of good. Such commands require the reason in order to be applied to practical situations, and rather than being simple tasks or goals will tend to impinge upon our moral and affective or emotional life. Doubt seems to arise naturally in the practical application of these commands, their competition with one another, and their competition with other emotions, desires, and people.

I dunno, I think the Bible actually does a pretty good job of defining what those sorts of vague commands mean (at least once you get to the NT). As a Christian, you're saying that you don't?

The second point is particularly relevant with respect to God's existence. Belief and the Christian life are essentially a moving-into-God and a coming-to-know-him-better-and-better. You think it would be nice if God declared his existence as a sort of preamble, in order to aid us in our search and our religious life. I'm not really sure what that would look like. After all, what is God? Does anyone really know? It's not really an either/or existential proposition, for to know God is not to know a thing in the world. We begin with a basic conception of God which is then refined over and over again, almost like a snake shedding its skin. Some theologians would say that that process never ends. Because that starting point is basically arbitrary it is hard to know what a revelation of the existence of God would even look like. Maybe it would look like what it now looks like (Romans 1:19-20).

You don't know anyone completely, but that doesn't mean there's a problem with knowing that they exist.

Another point is that there is a difficulty in your entire approach insofar as we have moved from a merit-based system to a non-merit-based system. For example, you seem to be saying that if the teacher just told the student the answer (12x12=144), forced them to memorize it, and indoctrinated them into believing it without any possibility of error or doubt, then we wouldn't have to worry about this pesky issue of the student's ignorance. In God's case we might say that he could just create us as beings who fully know the answer in advance, a priori, and do not need to do any work to reach the answer at all. That's fine as far as it goes, but you've also altogether destroyed the meritorious aspect of human action and human knowledge. If the teacher stands over the student each moment and forces them to "believe" the mathematical proposition, then the student is all but relieved of both responsibility and merit (praise/blame). In that case I would praise the teacher, not the student (if in fact I believe that such 'indoctrination' is meritorious). This would just move the sphere of merit and doubt elsewhere, and to what purpose?

We would be moving the sphere of merit to our choices instead of our beliefs. What is the purpose of doing the work to reach the answer that He exists? Other than, of course, to then do what He wants. And then what is the purpose of doing the work to reach the answer of what He wants? Other than of course to do what He wants. The sphere of merit would fall in the arena of whether our choices align with what He wants those choices to be and why we chose to comply or not.

In your math example, the purpose of doing the work to learn that 12x12=144 is so that you can do that same work in different situations for other solutions and other input. You don't have different situations with God's existence; learning that work is useless once you come to the correct conclusion. This is another area where your analogy falls short.

Let's take my thoughts to the extreme. Let's say that we all simply know that there is an eternal omnimax creator of the cosmos and we have a perfect conscience that isn't merely an emotional nudge one way or the other that can ever be corrupted, but that we know, in every situation exactly what the good choice is. What's the problem with that? I can still trust or not trust that God is going to reward or punish me for choosing the good choices or the bad choices, respectively. I might even choose the good choices for bad reasons and God can judge me for that. What good is eliminated in such a world?

 

[zippy2006]

You seem to have written me off as illogical and/or deceptive, and have stopped responding.

It's more that I'm not convinced that you are able to engage in real argument. You don't seem to be able to give clear arguments for your own or others' positions and evaluate them according to objective standards. When dealing with such people I require that they formalize their arguments in a step by step fashion, as I have asked you to do a few times. If you don't do that I probably won't answer you.

The other thing is that all of the points you are now raising have already been answered in the thread. To take one example, you keep claiming that the student isn't capable of arbitrarily believing that the answer is 144 rather than 156, and therefore according to premise (1) their action is not subject to praise or blame (or reward or punishment). This is argument (9-10-11). But I answered this idea in some detail in post #21 and then repeated myself in post #23. I'm not going to play that game where I sit here repeating myself while you continually ignore my answers to your objections.

 

[cvanwey]

It's more that I'm not convinced that you are able to engage in real argument. You don't seem to be able to give clear arguments for your own or others' positions and evaluate them according to objective standards. When dealing with such people I require that they formalize their arguments in a step by step fashion, as I have asked you to do a few times. If you don't do that I probably won't answer you.

I did not realize there exists one universal format in structure for answering questions? I feel my responses are quite clear. You just instead do not address some of them. If you take a close look at the OP, you will see what my position is.... To make a very long story short, we cannot help what we apprehend. God expects that your apprehension/conclusion is that He did rise from the grave to save me. I begin to chased you, starting at post #5, but then later realized that I should have instead redirected post #5....

The other thing is that all of the points you are now raising have already been answered in the thread. To take one example, you keep claiming that the student isn't capable of arbitrarily believing that the answer is 144 rather than 156, and therefore according to premise (1) their action is not subject to praise or blame (or reward or punishment).

And yet, I have neither seen or read any effort, on your part, in demonstrating otherwise; that belief/apprehension/discernment is a free choice. Is what we apprehend a free choice?

I also conceded, that just because we cannot choose what we believe, does not mean we cannot be punished. Some of these reasons can be explained in post #66 (i.e.)

Most will ultimately apprehend "12 X 12 = 144". If they do not, then questions arise. Are they not actually listening in class? Are they too lazy to study the process? Do they have a learning disability? Other?

Okay, so how about?:

Most will ultimately apprehend "Jesus rose from the grave." If they do not, then questions arise. Are they not actually listening in class? Are they too lazy to study the process? Do they have a learning disability? Other?

*****************

It's like I asked you, at the bottom of post #37:

Even though I can mark you "wrong", is your belief then volitional?

This is argument (9-10-11). But I answered this idea in some detail in post #21 and then repeated myself in post #23. I'm not going to play that game where I sit here repeating myself while you continually ignore my answers to your objections.

I can just as well state you have ignored my responses. However, I'm concerned with the OP, and it's intent.

I'm trying to remain humble here, and now address what YOU want to address - (that I'm attempting to destroy responsibility). But instead, you now wish to try and belittle my abilities.

[EDIT] This is not what I'm even attempting to do, "destroy responsibility". My point is that I find it quite odd that God would place the whole shebang for salvation/condemnation, based upon an attribute you cannot will or choose?

Again, you have yet to demonstrate that belief/apprehension is a choice. Hence, my position goes unchallenged. The fact teachers can assign blame, for incorrect inferences, is irrelevant to my claim - that belief is not a choice.

 

[zippy2006]

Knowing what God wants doesn't force me to comply at all. And if I do choose to comply, I still choose how to do so. So I see indeterminacy in both.

First, I would agree that your proposal merely shifts the quantities and proportions of indeterminacy, ignorance, etc. That's why I'm wondering why it would be desirable.

Second, the indeterminacy is objectively reduced, for in the initial scenario there was indeterminacy about the command/end, the means, and whether to follow God's command. In the rock scenario the indeterminacy about the command/end has been eliminated, and so we are left with two kinds of indeterminacy rather than three. We will have to come back to this question about the third kind of indeterminacy: whether to follow God's command (for this is the Euthyphro point I spoke to).

The Devil knows God better than any of us do, and knows better what God wants, yet still freely chose to do evil, yes?

Yes, probably.

I dunno, I think the Bible actually does a pretty good job of defining what those sorts of vague commands mean (at least once you get to the NT). As a Christian, you're saying that you don't?

I think more generalized commands are less clear than more particular commands. It is much easier to understand a command to climb a rock face than a command to love one's neighbor, or even to not steal. Also, that last sentence of the quote you were responding to is particularly important, "Doubt seems to arise naturally in the practical application of these commands, their competition with one another, and their competition with other emotions, desires, and people."

To take a current example: are Christians permitted to receive Covid vaccines that have been produced with the help of aborted fetal cell lines? The answer is not at all clear. We have duties to oppose abortion, to promote a healthy society, to care for our families and loved ones, to not cooperate with evil, etc. There have been dozens of articles written on this topic in the last few months.

You don't know anyone completely, but that doesn't mean there's a problem with knowing that they exist.

We don't know anyone completely, but God is intrinsically beyond our capacity of comprehension in a way that is quite different from other humans. Also, the most basic way we posit a human existence is by perceiving the material form of a human. God has no material form.

We would be moving the sphere of merit to our choices instead of our beliefs.

I don't find this strong distinction between choices and beliefs very useful. I actually think beliefs entail an element of choice, but even if you don't, beliefs are still just natural fruits of choices made. Apples are just natural fruits of the apple tree. Saying that we critique choices rather than beliefs seems somewhat vacuous to me, almost like saying that we are evaluating the quality of the tree rather than the apple. The teacher who blames for a false belief is surely not blaming for the belief in isolation from its formation, but that is just common sense. A belief and the choices that led up to it are part of one integral whole. The volitional processes that formed the belief are included when we speak of the belief. Anyway, that's a bit of a tangent...

What is the purpose of doing the work to reach the answer that He exists? Other than, of course, to then do what He wants. And then what is the purpose of doing the work to reach the answer of what He wants? Other than of course to do what He wants. The sphere of merit would fall in the arena of whether our choices align with what He wants those choices to be and why we chose to comply or not.

In your math example, the purpose of doing the work to learn that 12x12=144 is so that you can do that same work in different situations for other solutions and other input. You don't have different situations with God's existence; learning that work is useless once you come to the correct conclusion. This is another area where your analogy falls short.

I don't agree with much of this. Apparently according to your logic the means are dispensable and God should have just created robots who "do what He wants," because apparently the only thing that matters is that we do what he wants. It seems like you are saying that God is concerned only with ends and not with means, no?

I think the math example you give really is analogous to the theological cases. The means really do form us in a particular way, and the means always have to be in due order and proportion to the end. Part of the point is building character and instilling virtue. I think the means are valuable and indispensable even in the case of searching out the existence of the Lord of all creation.

Let's take my thoughts to the extreme. Let's say that we all simply know that there is an eternal omnimax creator of the cosmos and we have a perfect conscience that isn't merely an emotional nudge one way or the other that can ever be corrupted, but that we know, in every situation exactly what the good choice is. What's the problem with that? I can still trust or not trust that God is going to reward or punish me for choosing the good choices or the bad choices, respectively. I might even choose the good choices for bad reasons and God can judge me for that. What good is eliminated in such a world?

There are a few problems. First, how could anything be meritorious if we had perfect knowledge of what was good and how to act? Why would we ever choose a bad choice? Isn't is a bad choice to choose good for bad reasons? Wouldn't that possibility be eliminated entirely? I mean, to give a weird metaphor, if you are going to build a tower you have to start at the base and build upwards. If everything is just handed to us then nothing is ours and we have no responsibility or dignity.

The other big problem is that you are really bulldozing the whole idea of diversity and multiplicity in creation, as well as its value. This is a rather big theological point that is so encompassing that it is hard to explain. We can poke a hole in the sky and get a glimpse of it by asking this question: if every person had a "perfect" conscience from the get-go, then wouldn't every person be exactly the same? Wouldn't we all do the exact same thing in every situation? A key point here is that good is diffusive of itself and therefore it is not constrained to a single path. There are many saints and each has a different personality, history, and set of choices that made them they way they are. In a real sense they created and shaped themselves through their choices and this led to a legitimate diversity of sanctity among people. Yet I don't see how this diversity would obtain if everyone was simply granted moral omniscience from the get-go.

Finally, I don't see why your solution wouldn't just reboot the initial problem. If we lived in that world then we would be having this exact same discussion about the people who know God's will beyond the shadow of a doubt and nevertheless disobey it and are damned. You would say, "Wouldn't it be better if God removed some of our indeterminacy of will and made it so that these people don't disobey God?" Or else, in a similar vein, Cvanwey would be asking why these people, who could not have acted otherwise, are damned, and his case would be much stronger in that universe.

Anyway, I know it's not entirely fair to criticize the model of free will you are putting forth due to the fact that you don't even believe in free will. Still, these discussions may be useful in fleshing out more robust conceptions of free will.

 

[zippy2006]

Again, you have yet to demonstrate that belief/apprehension is a choice. Hence, my position goes unchallenged. The fact teachers can assign blame, for incorrect inferences, is irrelevant to my claim - that belief is not a choice.

You compared the two as direct parallels in this very post:

I also conceded, that just because we cannot choose what we believe, does not mean we cannot be punished. Some of these reasons can be explained in post #66 (i.e.)

Most will ultimately apprehend "12 X 12 = 144". If they do not, then questions arise. Are they not actually listening in class? Are they too lazy to study the process? Do they have a learning disability? Other?

Okay, so how about?:

Most will ultimately apprehend "Jesus rose from the grave." If they do not, then questions arise. Are they not actually listening in class? Are they too lazy to study the process? Do they have a learning disability? Other?

If you think that we can be punished for non-chosen beliefs then your OP is actually logically invalid. In that case it would be possible that "God's criteria (sic) for condemnation" could be belief, even when that belief is not chosen. Again:

God: You will now be punished for your unbelief.
Person: But I can't believe! You can't punish me for things I have no control over!
God: I am not punishing you for your lack of propositional belief per se, but rather for all of the choices and deliberations that led up to your unbelief. You were very much in control of those choices and deliberations.

 

[cvanwey]

You compared the two as direct parallels in this very post:

If you think that we can be punished for non-chosen beliefs then your OP is actually logically invalid. In that case it would be possible that "God's criteria (sic) for condemnation" could be belief, even when that belief is not chosen. Again:

I will be more than happy to address your response. But I'm noticing a pattern here. I keep asking, or re-phrasing the same fundamental question, over and over again.

Can you choose what you apprehend? Yes or no?

And before you answer this simple question, please take care of what I have already acknowledged === (addressed to @Moral Orel in post #65). -- I already acknowledge you can shelter, protect, and/or be unaware of other existing evidence(s) in circulation which may alter an existing belief. Which seems to further demonstrate that final discernment to new information is not a choice.

 

[cvanwey]

God: I am not punishing you for your lack of propositional belief per se, but rather for all of the choices and deliberations that led up to your unbelief. You were very much in control of those choices and deliberations.

Are you suggesting that God's position is He has provided sufficient and justified evidence to His existence and resurrection? And the ones whom still do not believe are merely suppressing information, or unaware of the available evidence, or maybe even being controlled by wickedness? Ala Romans 1:18-22?

Well, like I stated prior, we have many ex pastors, priests, ministers, graduates of seminary, Biblical scholars, Christians, earnest seekers, etc, whom attest to the contrary - (they do not believe). They have been presented with all available evidence(s) apparently. They genuinely do not believe. Final apprehension to a presented proposition is not a choice.

 

[zippy2006]

Can you choose what you apprehend? Yes or no?

You would have to define apprehension, but in general I think it parallels the belief question that we have already covered. Like belief, in some ways we can choose what we apprehend and in some ways we can't. For example, a racist person can't control their reaction to persons of a certain race in a proximate way. Yet in a remote way they can change their beliefs and attitudes which will in turn alter their perceptions and reactions.

Are you suggesting that God's position is He has provided sufficient and justified evidence to His existence and resurrection? And the ones whom still do not believe are merely suppressing information, or unaware of the available evidence, or maybe even being controlled by wickedness? Ala Romans 1:18-22?

I believe in the fairly mainstream doctrine of sufficient grace. That doctrine is an answer to the assertion that there will be people who are condemned and who can legitimately say that they did not receive sufficient [insert whatever you like here] to be saved. The doctrine of sufficient grace says that God gives everyone sufficient means to be saved, and that no one will be punished for failing to do the impossible. The only Christians that I know of who deny this doctrine are Calvinists.

 

[Moral Orel]

@zippy2006 Throughout your responses there seems to be this hidden premise that "If we know what is good, we will do that thing". I disagree.

Adam and Eve didn't know everything about good and evil, but they knew God didn't want them to eat from that tree, but they did anyways. So where does this hidden premise come from?

 

[cvanwey]

You would have to define apprehension,

Thank you for this response. I do not yet want to type-cast a finite definition of 'apprehend/apprehension', since it looks as though we might still be in some needed additional discovery phase. See directly below...

but in general I think it parallels the belief question that we have already covered. Like belief, in some ways we can choose what we apprehend and in some ways we can't. For example, a racist person can't control their reaction to persons of a certain race in a proximate way. Yet in a remote way they can change their beliefs and attitudes which will in turn alter their perceptions and reactions.

Sounds to me like you are saying each person has a set of biases which may influence their path to a conclusion?

Allow me to also add an example or two, which I feel may better parallel the OP - (a particular political example as well as a Biblical education example) - which can certainly also stem much emotion, just like your example of racism.

The 2016 US election was underway. All poles pointed to Clinton. All major publications pointed to Clinton as the projected winner. I honestly did not care for either one. I did not favor one over the other. I did not have a bias toward either. I thought they both sucked. I was completely indifferent, as I thought both candidates were equally untrustworthy, corrupt, incompetent, etc. I then made a small and friendly wager with my wife that Clinton would win. She bet on Trump. I saw so much "overwhelming evidence", in favor or Clinton, that I did not even consider Trump as having any chance. Well, as the results started to unfold, I then saw, right before my eyes, another imminent conclusion. I then had no choice but to apprehend the conclusion Trump would be our newest incumbent.

Please also consider another recent example I provided:

(post #74) We have many ex pastors, priests, ministers, graduates of seminary, Biblical scholars, Christians, earnest seekers, etc, whom attest to the contrary - (they do not believe). They have been presented with all available evidence(s) apparently. They genuinely do not believe. Final apprehension to a presented proposition is not a choice.

In the direct above example, many of these folks may actually want Christianity to be true. They felt they have left no stone unturned. They may even have a bias or presupposition to conclude Christianity. And yet, then cannot [choose] to believe, as they have not apprehended "Jesus rising from the grave" as their ultimate conclusion.

I hope, that in some round about way, you can see what I now mean by apprehension not being a choice?

The political example demonstrates almost an indifference to the actual conclusion. Meaning, looking at all presented evidence to determine what is correct. - Unemotional... But the prior presumption was demonstrated incorrect, regardless of the provided "evidence".

The second example demonstrates a bias towards Christianity. Maybe even very emotional... And yet, apprehending the final conclusion that the claim is a work of fiction.

I believe in the fairly mainstream doctrine of sufficient grace. That doctrine is an answer to the assertion that there will be people who are condemned and who can legitimately say that they did not receive sufficient [insert whatever you like here] to be saved. The doctrine of sufficient grace says that God gives everyone sufficient means to be saved, and that no one will be punished for failing to do the impossible. The only Christians that I know of who deny this doctrine are Calvinists.

Can you demonstrate where God assigns sufficient grace? And if you can, in your experience, why do Calvinists reject this assertion?

Furthermore, doesn't sufficient grace conflict with Mark 16:15-16?

 

[zippy2006]

@zippy2006 Throughout your responses there seems to be this hidden premise that "If we know what is good, we will do that thing". I disagree.

What is the alternative? You attempted to give two alternatives above: 1) We can trust or not trust (doubt) whether God will reward or punish, and 2) We can choose a good thing for a bad reason. The first involves a measure of doubt and ignorance, which is precisely what you were trying to avoid. The second involves a belief that a bad thing is good. Namely, the person believes that the bad reason is good enough to leverage for the sake of the good end (and perhaps this person is ignorant of the principle that evil cannot be used as a means to good). Neither case you gave involves a person choosing evil with full knowledge that it is evil.

Adam and Eve didn't know everything about good and evil, but they knew God didn't want them to eat from that tree, but they did anyways. So where does this hidden premise come from?

Well they literally got in trouble for eating from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, so that imperils your thesis a bit.

 

[zippy2006]

Thank you for this response. I do not yet want to type-cast a finite definition of 'apprehend/apprehension', since it looks as though we might still be in some needed additional discovery phase. See directly below...

Given your two examples it seems you are still talking about belief.

I then had no choice but to apprehend the conclusion Trump would be our newest incumbent.

If you trust to a method and that method yields a conclusion, then you will believe that conclusion. So if you trust CNBC and CNBC tells you that Trump won then you will believe that Trump won.

There are a number people who for the last few months have denied Trump's defeat even while you accept it. Are they too undeterrable in their conclusion? There's really no significant difference between this example and the math problem.

And yet, then cannot [choose] to believe, as they have not apprehended "Jesus rising from the grave" as their ultimate conclusion.

Complex historical conclusions are certainly not apprehensions. I'm not sure why you're using that word.

I don't even know what your argument is supposed to be, which is why formalization becomes important. Apparently it is something like, "Hey, these guys tried really hard, so they can't be mistaken. Or at least they can't be culpably mistaken." I don't see why that would follow. It would be less likely for an honest seeker to be deceived than a dishonest seeker, but someone who has considered lots of evidence could still be deceived, and could still be examining it in blameworthy ways.

Furthermore, doesn't sufficient grace conflict with Mark 16:15-16?

If something is in conflict with a proposition then it must represent the contradictory proposition. Let's consider it then:

P: God gives everyone sufficient grace to be saved.
~P: God denies some people sufficient grace to be saved.
​

Mark tells us that unbelievers will be condemned. Does that support ~P? Does that provide us with some reason to believe that the condemned did not receive sufficient grace from God to believe? No, I don't think so. A key point here is that Mark is speaking about people who have been confronted with the good news. He is talking about people who are presented with the possibility of belief and yet do not believe, not people who are not presented with such an option.

 

[cvanwey]

Given your two examples it seems you are still talking about belief.

Like I stated prior, I do not want to type-cast the definition. Looks as though we could delve into this topic alone, for quite a while. I say we table this one, for now, as I see another topic which looks to be of even graver concern, in direct relevance to the OP. (i.e.) Your assertion to 'sufficient grace'??? Why? If 'sufficient grace' is true, then God's judgement might be based upon how much each person tried to believe/apprehend/other, after receiving "the news", via the act of proselytizing/other.?.?.?

If something is in conflict with a proposition then it must represent the contradictory proposition. Let's consider it then:

P: God gives everyone sufficient grace to be saved.
~P: God denies some people sufficient grace to be saved.
​

Mark tells us that unbelievers will be condemned. Does that support ~P? Does that provide us with some reason to believe that the condemned did not receive sufficient grace from God to believe? No, I don't think so. A key point here is that Mark is speaking about people who have been confronted with the good news. He is talking about people who are presented with the possibility of belief and yet do not believe, not people who are not presented with such an option.

Even though Mark 16:15-16 speaks to the word (all), even I concluded here that this passage only speaks to the ones whom received the word/etc. Some may not at all -- (death at birth, dying in youth, other other other). For which might then spark a new conversation about if God invokes a free pass to all whom never received proselytism/other.

I'm asking about the ones whom have been exposed, and still fall short of earnest belief/apprehension, to the assertion that the claim is true?

Q1# Does the Bible speak about 'sufficient grace' anywhere coherently in the Bible?
Q2# Does 'sufficient grace' conflict with Mark 16:15-16?