IF objective morality is true, is existentialism false?

[Lopez 15721]

Granted that is a big "if." Though, hypothetically if there are objective morals, would that diminish an existentialist view of morality? Why or why not?

 

[Eudaimonist]

Granted that is a big "if." Though, hypothetically if there are objective morals, would that diminish an existentialist view of morality? Why or why not?

Most likely. It could weaken the "existence precedes essence" premise of existentialist philosophy. Essence may co-exist with existence, since purpose would be implied by objective oughts.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Granted that is a big "if." Though, hypothetically if there are objective morals, would that diminish an existentialist view of morality? Why or why not?

This might depend on whether we are talking Kierkegaard or, instead, Sartre.

 

[quatona]

Granted that is a big "if." Though, hypothetically if there are objective morals, would that diminish an existentialist view of morality? Why or why not?

Would you please define "objective morals", for purposes of your question?

 

[DogmaHunter]

I'm with quatona here.

Indeed, in order for this subject to have any substance, one would have to define what an "objective morality" really is.

For example, I consider the morality I adhere to, to be objective. But I'm an atheist and theists constantly try to claim that my morality must be subjective because i don't believe in some god that commands morals (as if commanded morals are objective by definition...)


I consider my morality objective, because I have "rules" (if you wish) to decide what is moral and what isn't, based on objective data - not on what I want or don't want.

However, I do start from an assumption in order to be able to engage in that objective process... The formulation of this assumption I have borrowed from Sam Harris (book: The Moral Landscape). Upon reading his book, it made a lot of sense to me and I realised that I've always viewed it this way. He just gave me a great way to communicate it.

This assumption is:
- best possible well-being for all sentient beings = good.
- worst possible suffering for all sentient beings = bad.


Starting from those two assumptions, we are perfectly able to objectively conclude what is moral and what isn't, based on the knowledge we have. Based on knowledge, because it's through knowledge that we can understand the consequences of our actions, behaviors and decisions.

Those actions, behaviors and decisions that take us closer to the utopia of best possible well being = moral.

Those that take use closer to the hell that is worst possible suffering = immoral.

Makes perfect sense to me. I wonder how anyone could not agree to such trail of thought.

 

[All Souls]

Most likely. It could weaken the "existence precedes essence" premise of existentialist philosophy. Essence may co-exist with existence, since purpose would be implied by objective oughts.


eudaimonia,

Mark

Isn't that formulation more Sartre than Heidegger? Which may alter responses

 

[durangodawood]

Some people say "objective morality" when they are thinking "absolute or divinely revealed morality".

 

[Lopez 15721]

By objective morality I mean a set of moral standards that is factually true, not just true for each individual. Murder for example. Under objective morality murder is not immoral just for you and Joe, it's immoral for everyone.

I knew something was missing from the OP, and it was the definition of objective morality as well as existentialism. By existentialism I meant a broad, general, definition as making ones own life purposes. I understand existentialism isn't that specific of a definition which is where Sartre and Kierkegaard come into play, which makes the topic all the more interesting.

So according to each existentialist views, does the truth of objective morality falsify them? I'd have to say that the idea of determinism has to deal a lot with Sartre's meaning of existentialism, so I'd personally argue from that view rather than that of morality. For me the truth of determinism would falsify said philosophy. Although I am sure Sartre existentialism disregards objective morality and rather claims man defines his own ethics. Kierkegaard on the other hand some what confuses me. Since he ascribes to a divine command theory, wouldn't that imply he does indeed believe in objective morality?

 

[DogmaHunter]

Does objective morality have explanations?

Like your murder example for instance....
Is there a reason why murder is "objectively" wrong? Is there an explanation? Or is it just so because "it is so"?

What about my moral compass I shared here?

I start from the premises
- best possible well being for all = good
- worst possible suffering for all = bad

With these two premises, it seems to me that we can draw objective moral conclusions.
Those actions and decisions which objectively increase the total sum well-being = moral
Those actions and decisions which objectively increase the total sum suffering = immoral


Does that qualify as "objective morality" in your book?
If not, then why not?

Also, if not, how do you find out what is objectively moral or not?
Also, if not, how do you define the words "moral" and "immoral"? What is the difference between both? If you would have to explain to someone who's brain has been whiped clean completely, what moral actions and immoral actions are, what would you tell that person?

What is "acting morally"? And what is "acting immorally"? What's the difference between both?

It seems to me that if you wish to be able to objectively judge actions in terms of moral merrit, you would need some basis from where to start. My basis are the two premises layed out above. What are yours? What is your foundation?

 

[Lopez 15721]

I'm not trying to debate the truth or falsehood of objective morality. I'm asking whether or not objective morality, as I defined it, can falsify either or both Kierkegaard or Sartre existentialism. You can even answer that question according to your definition of morality or even how Sam Harris defines it.

 

[DogmaHunter]

I'm not trying to debate the truth or falsehood of objective morality. I'm asking whether or not objective morality, as I defined it, can falsify either or both Kierkegaard or Sartre existentialism. You can even answer that question according to your definition of morality or even how Sam Harris defines it.

I get that. I'm just trying to further clarify what is being meant by "objective morality". It's one of those terms I see people throw around all the time, but when actually zooming in on it, what it is and what it means... I always run into a wall and am not getting any satisfying answers.

So that's why I ask the question... does the moral compass I adhere to (based on the 2 premises I mentioned) qualify as an "objective morality" according to how you defined it?

If you think it doesn't, then why doesn't it?

And if you think it doesn't, then can you define what an "objective moral action" and an "objective immoral action" is in such a way that I can differentiate between both, without make starting assumptions as a foundation?

How can this discussion take place if "objective morality" is not defined properly? To me, a morality is not properly defined if the definition can't be used to differentiate a moral action from an immoral action.

edit: you know what? nevermind. If you don't wish to discuss this here, i'll create a thread on exactly that topic. Hope to see your input there then.

 

[Lopez 15721]

Yes but I defined what I mean by objective morality. Either that definition falsifies the existentialist positions referred to or not. We can say how you defined morality is objective if you want. In that case, the question again still stands: does your definition of objective morality falsify said existentialism?

 

[DogmaHunter]

To be honest, and this comes from a guy who doesn't care one bit about philosphy, I don't see how existentialism provides a moral framework to begin with.

If you agree that the moral compass I adhere to qualifies as an objective morality... Then I think the answer to your question is simply "no".

Because within existentialism, to my knowledge at least, nothing stops you from coming to such a moral framework based on those two premised.

Personally though, I'm not to keen on all those -isms.
I just try to reason through life and reality and don't really care which trail of thought puts me under which "-ism" label. I just go where sensible reasoning, rational argumentation and evidence takes me.

I'll shut up now.

 

[quatona]

By objective morality I mean a set of moral standards that is factually true, not just true for each individual.

I´m not quite sure how "factually true" and a valuation/prescription belong in one sentence. So I still have no idea what would be required for a moral statement to be "factually true". This appears to be word salad.

On a sidenote: the definition you gave is traditionally the definition of absolute morality.

Murder for example. Under objective morality murder is not immoral just for you and Joe, it's immoral for everyone.

Murder is wrong, by definition. What, however, isn´t universaly agreed uponl: answers to the question "What renders a killing murder"?

I knew something was missing from the OP, and it was the definition of objective morality as well as existentialism. By existentialism I meant a broad, general, definition as making ones own life purposes. I understand existentialism isn't that specific of a definition which is where Sartre and Kierkegaard come into play, which makes the topic all the more interesting.

Kierkegaard on the other hand some what confuses me. Since he ascribes to a divine command theory, wouldn't that imply he does indeed believe in objective morality?

Maybe he believes that there are divine commands, but doesn´t think that "divine command" isn´t enough to render said command "objective"?
Plus - since you actually seem to be talking about absolute morality: God could give different commands to different groups - so relative morality and the fact that this morality is decreed by divine command aren´t irreconcilable notions.

 

[Lopez 15721]

I´m not quite sure how "factually true" and a valuation/prescription belong in one sentence. So I still have no idea what would be required for a moral statement to be "factually true". This appears to be word salad.

On a sidenote: the definition you gave is traditionally the definition of absolute morality.

Murder is wrong, by definition. What, however, isn´t universaly agreed uponl: answers to the question "What renders a killing murder"?

I knew something was missing from the OP, and it was the definition of objective morality as well as existentialism. By existentialism I meant a broad, general, definition as making ones own life purposes. I understand existentialism isn't that specific of a definition which is where Sartre and Kierkegaard come into play, which makes the topic all the more interesting.


Maybe he believes that there are divine commands, but doesn´t think that "divine command" isn´t enough to render said command "objective"?
Plus - since you actually seem to be talking about absolute morality: God could give different commands to different groups - so relative morality and the fact that this morality is decreed by divine command aren´t irreconcilable notions.

Well a moral statement is one such as, "murder is wrong." You're saying you have no idea what constitutes that as true? These ethical sentences obviously construct propositions. Some propositions, like "murder is wrong" are true. Those propositions that are true are so due to objective features of the world. That is moral realism which gives way to objective morality. What I described just now and in my earlier post is not moral absolutism, which is the view that some actions are right or wrong no matter what the circumstances are. That is not what I said.

I think Kierkegaard refers to "ethics" in two different ways. The first is some normalcy within society, and the second is a divine command theory which is considered more significant than the normalcy. Whether or not either or both of those 'ethics' are subjective I am not sure, but the norm aspect does seem subjective. And again I am not talking about moral absolutism rather realism. Also, if there is a divine commands in the first place it seems as if any other derivative of morality would originate from that. Sure some were meant from a certain group of people, like A&E being told not to eat the one fruit. That wouldn't apply today obviously.

 

[quatona]

Well a moral statement is one such as, "murder is wrong." You're saying you have no idea what constitutes that as true?

Well, in the particular case of murder I said I know what constitutes is as true: the definition of the word "murder" (=immoral killing). But you don´t get to define facts into existence.

These ethical sentences obviously construct propositions. Some propositions, like "murder is wrong" are true.

Yes, apart from circular reasoning (as in the particular case of "murder") I am asking: What constitutes such a statement as true?

Those propositions that are true are so due to objective features of the world.

I am asking: How do you get from objective facts to the idea that a value judgement is "true"? This process needs to be explained.

What I described just now and in my earlier post is not moral absolutism, which is the view that some actions are right or wrong no matter what the circumstances are. That is not what I said.

Yes, it is. You said:
"...is not immoral just for you and Joe, it's immoral for everyone."
Who does it is one of the circumstances (other circumstances are: where he does it, when he does it, to whom he does it, and countless others).

I think Kierkegaard refers to "ethics" in two different ways. The first is some normalcy within society, and the second is a divine command theory which is considered more significant than the normalcy. Whether or not either or both of those 'ethics' are subjective I am not sure, but the norm aspect does seem subjective. And again I am not talking about moral absolutism rather realism. Also, if there is a divine commands in the first place it seems as if any other derivative of morality would originate from that. Sure some were meant from a certain group of people, like A&E being told not to eat the one fruit. That wouldn't apply today obviously.

Ok, but the problem is that this is in direct contradiction to your earlier definition:
"...is not immoral just for you and Joe, it's immoral for everyone."

 

[Lopez 15721]

Well, in the particular case of murder I said I know what constitutes is as true: the definition of the word "murder" (=immoral killing). But you don´t get to define facts into existence.

Yes, apart from circular reasoning (as in the particular case of "murder") I am asking: What constitutes such a statement as true?

I am asking: How do you get from objective facts to the idea that a value judgement is "true"? This process needs to be explained.

Yes, it is. You said:
"...is not immoral just for you and Joe, it's immoral for everyone."
Who does it is one of the circumstances (other circumstances are: where he does it, when he does it, to whom he does it, and countless others).


Ok, but the problem is that this is in direct contradiction to your earlier definition:
"...is not immoral just for you and Joe, it's immoral for everyone."

Many things could constitute such a statement as true. Apparently one constitution is a definition. That would seem to be the case for more than just murder, or would it not?

I think you are confused on what moral absolutism is. Moral absolutism is the idea that certain actions are wrong no matter what the significance of the consequence is, perhaps even if it is beneficial. I am not saying that. What you even quoted from me is not me saying anything about moral absolutism as I didn't say certain actions are wrong or right no matter what. I said certain actions like murder are wrong for everyone and not just some people. Again that is moral realism. That is moral realism to the tee.

 

[quatona]

Many things could constitute such a statement as true. Apparently one constitution is a definition. That would seem to be the case for more than just murder, or would it not?

Sure, but such "truth by definition" doesn´t constitute any epistemological progress. If "murder" is defined as "wrongful killing", it is - merely by virtue of this definition - impossible to say "right murder".

I think you are confused on what moral absolutism is. Moral absolutism is the idea that certain actions are wrong no matter what the significance of the consequence is, perhaps even if it is beneficial. I am not saying that. What you even quoted from me is not me saying anything about moral absolutism as I didn't say certain actions are wrong or right no matter what. I said certain actions like murder are wrong for everyone and not just some people. Again that is moral realism. That is moral realism to the tee.

Apart from the fact that you now have changed "objective morality" to "moral realism" - your latter definition seems to imply the former: if a certain action is wrong no matter who does it, how can it possibly be right under certain conditions? Since different people find themselves in different circumstances and conditions, and since the consequences and the significance of their actions depends on those circumstances, it appears as if "different people" and "different circumstances, conditions, significances, consequences" are saying the same thing.

 

[Eudaimonist]

Again that is moral realism. That is moral realism to the tee.

Not really, no.

Moral realism does not require universality. It is possible for moral realism to encompass contextual moralities where facts regarding specific contexts can influence the moral principles that are in play.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Lopez 15721]

Sure, but such "truth by definition" doesn´t constitute any epistemological progress. If "murder" is defined as "wrongful killing", it is - merely by virtue of this definition - impossible to say "right murder".

Apart from the fact that you now have changed "objective morality" to "moral realism" - your latter definition seems to imply the former: if a certain action is wrong no matter who does it, how can it possibly be right under certain conditions? Since different people find themselves in different circumstances and conditions, and since the consequences and the significance of their actions depends on those circumstances, it appears as if "different people" and "different circumstances, conditions, significances, consequences" are saying the same thing.

I haven't changed a thing. I defined objective morality and explained how I was referring to moral realism and not moral absolutism. Objective morality can be included in a moral realism context as moral realism includes a sense of objectivity. Moral realism includes the possibility of having objective moral knowledge.

I am saying an action such as murder is wrong for everyone and not just some people. Stealing is wrong for everyone and not just some people. Everyone is held to the same standard and punishment for the same action. Stealing can be justified under certain conditions although it is punishable given that the consequences are morally beneficial, like if a poor mother steals food to feed her family for a week. Stealing in such a circumstance wouldn't be justified just for the mother, it would be for any who did it. Stealing thousands of dollars from one's employer is wrong for all.