... within the collective unconscious you will find the archetypes and dark shadows. Jungian psychology identifies these dark shadows as the archetypes of our historic ancestry bringing with them the darkness and evil that we need to come in contact with and identify with so that we can cohabit with the evil
I don't find these concepts anywhere in Scripture. What I do find in Scripture is that the archetypes and dark shadows are in fact evil spirits, principalities, powers, and the rulers of the darkness of this world.
Actually, the conception of the archetypes is grounded in something much, much different:
Jung's Kant:The Making of a Philopsycher
The unique contribution which Carl Jung made to man's
understanding of himself is still in the process of being digested by the
modern world. All too often Jung's work is regarded as solely that of a
psychologist, so that the philosophical underpinning of his entire life's
work tends to be ignored or misunderstood. This, like most mistakes in
interpreting the intentions of past masters, is largely Jung's own fault. For,
although he was acutely aware of the importance of his philosophical
training (see below), he often responded to criticisms (such as "you are
nothing but a mystic in psychological clothing!") by protesting that he was
nothing but an empirical scientist. This protest cannot be taken entirely
seriously, however, if we recognize the wide variety of interests and
methods which came under the view of Jung's critical eye. In this paper I
will take a first step towards demonstrating the extent of Jung's debt to
philosophy (and vice versa) by demonstrating the structural identity between
Kant's favorite twelvefold divisions (e.g. in his table of twelve categories)
and Jung's theory of psychological types.
When not defending himself against the charge of mysticism Jung
readily admitted that he saw himself not so much as merely a psychologist
in the ordinary sense of the word, but more as a "lover of the soul".2 Thus,
it is quite misleading to group Jung together with the likes of a Skinner or
any other experimental psychologists, who would hardly grace (or
disgrace!) their science with such an epithet. Indeed, it was precisely his
love of the soul which put Jung in a different category from the
psychological sciences, such as behaviorism, which claim to take a more
strictly "objective" stance. This difference, which motivated Jung to study
the soul from such a diversity of perspectives, makes him more like a
philosopher than many psychologists would want to allow into their own
territory. Yet neither can Jung accurately be called a philosopher in any
ordinary sense of that word, since his emphasis was indeed always focused
on an empirical understanding of the human soul. This ambiguity gives rise
to the need to name a new category, for which Jung's own self-description
gives us the best of clues. Jung's peculiar brand of "philosophical
psychology" can best be described as "soul-loving", which we can render
with the Greek word "philopsychy". Throughout this article I will therefore
adopt this new term, and refer to Jung as a "philopsycher". Hereafter, the
term "philopsycher" will refer to any person whose work is devoted to
"soul-loving", as an art which can be learned through an approach which
synthesizes methods in philosophy and psychology.
Jung's philopsychy is based directly on the philosophical system of
Immanuel Kant, and can therefore be regarded as its (empirical)
psychological complement.3 Although Jung never develops in great detail
the precise ways in which his ideas depend on or assume Kant's, he does
say on numerous occasions that in Kant he found a philosophical
foundation for his own intellectual development.4 Indeed, it was his
immersion in philosophy prior to and during his medical training which
Jung believed was ultimately responsible for the differences between his
own view of the soul and that of his materialist colleague, Sigmund Freud.5
Kant's "transcendental perspective"--i.e., his search for the
necessary conditions for the possibility of experience6--is adopted by Jung
and transformed into a method for describing the contents of the hidden
depths of the human soul. For Kant, the "a priori" is never something
which can be found, as such, in experience. That is, it cannot be observed
as an empirical object in nature, but is always real only in virtue of man's
making it real by reading it into the fabric of nature. The a priori is the
unseen basis of the unity of the diverse aspects of our ordinary experience.
What is rarely appreciated by readers of Jung is that the same concept of
apriority operates in most of his theories of the structure of the human soul.
In other words, when Jung claims to have discovered an "objective
psyche", or a "collective unconscious", he is not asserting the empirical
reality of such constructs, but rather is postulating the necessity of an
underlying (a priori) objectivity. Consequently, the statement that (for
instance) "every human being has a shadow-figure living in the
unconscious" should not be regarded as an empirically-verifiable or
falsifiable fact. No, its objectivity stems from its logical necessity.
Although Jung's claims that his theories are established as matters of
empirical fact may give the impression that he would object to this way of
characterizing the epistemological status of his philopsychical theories, he
does on occasion clearly demonstrate his recognition of their apriority.7 In
fact, their apriority, as we shall see in section III, explains why they are
invariably found in the psychic experiences of human persons.
Philopsychy is an empirical discipline, as Jung so regularly stressed,
yet it is not therefore an empirical science in the supposedly purely
"objective" sense in which the term "science" is often employed. Rather, it
is a discipline: empiricism which is fully conscious of the transcendental
(subjective) basis of its objectivity; and as such it is the perfect counterpart
of Kant's transcendental philosophy, with its fully conscious insistence
upon the equally important status of "empirical reality".8 Indeed, just as
one of the primary goals of Kant's transcendental philosophy is to
demonstrate the reality of the empirical world, so also one of the primary
goals of Jung's empirical philopsychy is to demonstrate the reality of an
unconscious (cf. transcendental) underpinning for the world of our ordinary
consciousness.
As I have argued elsewhere, the concept of the "architectonic" unity
of reason, as an a priori method of planning out the structure of a whole
system of philosophy, was of central importance to Kant. In the following
section I will therefore take a step back from Jung and investigate in some
detail just how Kant understood such patterns. Then, in the third section I
will demonstrate the surprising extent to which the same patterns can be
found permeating many aspects of Jung's philopsychy. Finally, in the
fourth section I will explain in more detail why the "philo" is necessary to
Jung's philopsychical system and how this necessity is related to Kant's
own (somewhat mystical) tendencies. [Steve Palmquist, "The Architectonic Logic of Jung's Philopsychical Types," sec. 1]