Galen Strawson's argument for why physical reality is experiential

[Halbhh]

The more I try with the posts in this thread the less I think I understand. This one I think I almost understand, so now I will demonstrate that I do not. (I also understood most of SelfSim's post and Halbhh's discussion of dark matter.)

Consciousness, experience, perception, et al. are things brains do. I don't know if
perception requires consciousness, or vice versa, or neither. I'm not a experimental psychologist or neurobiologist (just a simple country physicist) and even they don't seem to have a full comprehension yet of these things.

I wonder if some of this is about a conflation of two concepts:

1) That all that I know about reality comes through the perception of my senses.

2) That reality's existence doesn't require my awareness of it to exist.

While these seem in conflict I don't think that they are; rather there is an asymmetry between them that gets lost.

The second statement, while it may not be "provable", is the baseline assumption of scientific inquiry (and frankly many other modes of our existence) often termed "methodological naturalism". It is, as far as we can determine, consistent with the nature of reality.

The first statement seems incompatible, but it really is just a recognition that our understandings of reality can only come via our intake of information through our senses and they are therefore subject to our perception. We should not assume that if someone else receives the same sensory input that they will have the same perception or understanding. We develop tools to confirm the similarities of the understandings of others and to communicate our understandings (formal logic, mathematics, language, symbols, rules and methods). Unfortunately, this simple "truism" seems to lead to a lot of philosophical jibber-jabber that confuses our subjective understanding of the experiences and perception of reality with reality itself.

Well, while the OP topic seems to be more about a hypothetical other reality termed at one point "NE" to which our own perceptions, even through physics, don't necessarily capture the essence of even partly (if I understood), but instead would then be putatively I think only corresponding to measurable observables, as if that more fundamental reality is very other (very different and alien to us) than we think....and then the author being quoted is saying that idea of such a "NE" doesn't seem a best theory (if I get it, he thinks it's a theory that needs more to support it to be taken very seriously), and therefore that our perceptions are instead more likely to be about the actual reality (if I understood so far, the limited things I read)....

@public hermit -- you could say if I got that correct and/or left out key stuff...


I'd like to comment though instead about an interesting aspect here that involves concept #2 you wrote above, which itself is also an old favorite of mine, because there's more about it here worth a look (in my view).

First, I bet we all like or subscribe to #2. I've probably said it to like a 50-100 people over the years I bet in various wordings -- "That reality's existence doesn't require my awareness of it to exist." -- and we all have a lot of everyday evidence for it also...or...evidence for something a lot like it. Like, say, for most people they might think of a macro thing like they go out and find a new tree branch has fallen on the ground -- it did not need observation to happen, but happened independently. And of course there is small scale stuff like rust starts on some metal object without us observing it begin, etc....

So, we all have everyday support for that practical belief/conclusion about reality, and probably most all subscribe to it for everyday reality, where it works reliably. Or appears to work that way.

It's not such a closed case (yet) in QM (quantum mechanics), and that matters here in this thread because QM almost certainly is involved in consciousness.

For elementary particles, QM shows, it's a more open question whether what happens will certainly not depend on the observer.

That's a reasonable theory (one linked just below I like), but as you'd agree I bet we can not say #2 is how things are in QM just closed case (because it's an open question), and thus maybe in relation with consciousness also this is a good open question.

We don't yet have strong (extensive) evidence that supports another interpretation of QM past the Copenhagen Interpretation enough to win out over other interpretations and eliminate them -- instead there is a plethora of interpretations trying to go beyond the Copenhagen Interpretation.

Since observation is at least when things seem to become definite (QM), there's a lot of room there for speculation about what is happening.

I was sorta disappointed actually to see one interesting candidate idea not getting confirmation here: Famous Experiment Dooms Pilot-Wave Alternative to Quantum Weirdness | Quanta Magazine So, it's not that I am preferring one of the many possible observer or outside system causes something interpretations that makes everything a lot more....open to conscious influence. But also, I have to allow that possibility, since it's not a closed case. And it would explain things interestingly though.

Well, one of the fun ways some have come up with to try to go past the basic Copenhagen Interpretation is to think the observer is participating more than just at a distance somehow, but influencing the observed system more than in most interpretations. It's interesting not just in terms of possible connection to observers (consciousness entities in the usual way most people think of), but even to other somewhat similar things one could think of like maybe just a removed (not immediately interacting in an obvious way) assemblage of matter that somehow has an effect enough to cause wave function collapse. (all speculation, but that's QM right now). In other words, an specific idea (see post #19 for a link) about an observer/consciousness causing collapse of the wave function doesn't have to only mean consciousness, but could mean some similar acting agent, like...some energetic assemblage of matter even. Ok, very speculative. But, the initial idea is interesting -- see post #19 just above re the link to the QM interpretations about the conscious observer helping cause the outcome. I just think it's good to keep in mind that#2 is a good macro conclusion, but doesn't tell us what's happening prior on the say molecular/atomic level, ahead of time. It's a good way to try to open up QM interpretations to how there could be a wider field of physical systems affecting events we tend to assume are fully independent. They may be less independent than we tend to think from everyday experience.

 

[public hermit]

I think the reification of consciousness as a mysterious attribute of matter or reality is a red-herring (it sounds like a hang-over from dualism).

Yes, I understand why it would seem that pansychism is a kind of reification of consciousness. Strawson is arguing that the assumption that matter is essentially non-experiential (his term) is where the reification is happening. Likewise, if there is a hangover from dualism it is the non-experiential, not the mental, that still lingers.

Part of his argument in post #12:
Let E = experientiality
Let NE = non-experiential

"[1] We know for certain that E exists (biological E, at the very least).
[2] We don’t know for certain that any NE exists. So right from the start,
[3] the burden of proof is on those who believe that NE exists.
[4] There is, to begin, a burden on them to prove that it exists at all.

This burden is very heavy; in fact it can’t be lifted. It’s a very old and familiar point that [5] it can’t be proved that NE exists. The point [5] that it’s impossible to prove that there is any NE being is weighty" The rest of his argument in #12 is worth a look.

Why should one have to decide between one or the other, since neither option is deliverable by physics. He believes that pansychism is the most natural and parsimonious hypothesis. In terms of what physics can deliver, from post #11:

Strawson is a monist, so φ = the fundamental stuff of reality (whatever that may be, experiential or not, or something else).

It's important to point out, his argument depends on the fact that physics deals with the structural relational aspects of φ, not the ultimate structure-transcendent nature of φ. Strawson, "It is at the same time a commonplace that physics is incapable—essentially incapable—of revealing the ultimate structure-transcendent nature of φ, i.e. the nature of the stuff that has to be there given that the structural relations expressed in the equations of physics are actually exemplified by something concretely real. Physics is silent on this aspect of the nature of φ. Why? Because physics is as Hawking says ‘just a set of rules and equations.'"

In sense, we are dealing with metaphysics, for sure. But, the one who holds that reality is fundamentally non-experiential is assuming something we have no experience of, and frankly, no knowledge of. On the other hand, the one who holds that reality is fundamentally experientially can, at least, point to something we all know intimately, i.e. experience. If one buys Strawson's argument against radical emergence (post #14), then clearly pansychism has the upper hand.

 

[SelfSim]

I wonder if some of this is about a conflation of two concepts:

1) That all that I know about reality comes through the perception of my senses.

2) That reality's existence doesn't require my awareness of it to exist.

While these seem in conflict I don't think that they are; rather there is an asymmetry between them that gets lost.

I wouldn't say they are in conflict with each other at all. Both are mind models .. (1) is objectively testable, (2) is not, yet both produce different concepts of what 'reality is'. Both are dependent on human minds.

We regard consciousness as a fundamental property of our own model of minds (which includes some other species' minds).

The observable and significant thing to notice about these respective conclusions is that they follow from two distinctly different processes: (1) is the scientific process; (2) is the belief based process.

The second statement, while it may not be "provable", is the baseline assumption of scientific inquiry (and frankly many other modes of our existence) often termed "methodological naturalism". It is, as far as we can determine, consistent with the nature of reality.

One has to wonder what role, or difference, any untestable baseline 'assumption' (ie: 'methodological naturalism') plays in the outcomes of following the scientific process?
The answer is clearly: 'None whatsoever'. If it did, then the scientific process would only ever be reaffirming an untestable belief and science couldn't really work that way in its purpose of making reliable predictions.

The first statement seems incompatible, but it really is just a recognition that our understandings of reality can only come via our intake of information through our senses and they are therefore subject to our perception. We should not assume that if someone else receives the same sensory input that they will have the same perception or understanding. We develop tools to confirm the similarities of the understandings of others and to communicate our understandings (formal logic, mathematics, language, symbols, rules and methods).

We don't have to assume human variations in perception (or understanding). We can put that to the test, then observe and record the results. It tests out very well (ie: the tests verify it - this very forum is a classic example!)

The commonalities which fall out of those same tests, which we can agree on, form the basis of what we mean when we use science's term 'objectivity'. If we formalise those tested commonalities and put them through more formalised logic processes (mathematics), the outcomes have physical signficance.
If on the other hand, logic takes in beliefs and processes them, what comes out, can only ever return (at best) the same truth value as were originally inputted, (aka: those original beliefs), and all we've generated is yet another belief system.

Unfortunately, this simple "truism" seems to lead to a lot of philosophical jibber-jabber that confuses our subjective understanding of the experiences and perception of reality with reality itself.

'Reality itself' is the truism here .. its a hang over of the misconception that science is pursuing knowledge of some kind of reality which exists independently from the mind doing the pursuit.
I agree this notion comes from the belief that science is dependent upon philosophical realism (inherited from methodological naturalism?), but using the scientific method, it can be shown that it does not.
(So much for the necessity of holding such a belief before undertaking science, I say!?)

What we have in all of the above, is a mind exploring itself and its own limits of understanding.

 

[Gottservant]

In as much as we share unity with God, with the Holy Spirit, I am all for consciousness expanding and contracting.

Becoming something conscious in its own right, on the basis of physicality alone: I found doubtful, however.

The soul fills the gap, where uncertainty about the consciousness of God is in question - there is no need for one to impart the life of the soul, to the body, in order to make the body something strong or stronger in its own right.

It is basically self worship in a psuedo scientific garb - fine if you want to waste talent that God gives you and you alone, but you would be a fool to think that Mr Strawson is going to be somehow grateful that you believe his spiel!

 

[Halbhh]

In as much as we share unity with God, with the Holy Spirit, I am all for consciousness expanding and contracting.

Becoming something conscious in its own right, on the basis of physicality alone: I found doubtful, however.

The soul fills the gap, where uncertainty about the consciousness of God is in question - there is no need for one to impart the life of the soul, to the body, in order to make the body something strong or stronger in its own right.

It is basically self worship in a psuedo scientific garb - fine if you want to waste talent that God gives you and you alone, but you would be a fool to think that Mr Strawson is going to be somehow grateful that you believe his spiel!

It took me a several questions and rereading to begin to get some parts of what Srawson was trying to say. As I understand it, a key thing Strawson is saying is basically something like --

What we see with our senses are aspects of the actual real stuff of nature around us, and not just illusions created in our brains.

In contrast to the competing idea that what we see is only our own perceptions and mental creations that are not even close to the more real aspects nature around us.

Are we seeing essential, genuine, real aspects of the water, rocks, clouds, trees, things around us?

I think Strawson is saying that theory that there is some essentially totally different real nature that we don't see -- so that we are not seeing the essential real nature -- this theory of us just having our own illusions basically isn't to be taken seriously without a lot more proof.

Therefore, we should think we really are seeing aspects of what is the way it is -- that we are seeing things like water, rocks, trees, etc. in some real degree just as they are, instead of illusions created by our minds.

 

[essentialsaltes]

On this view, concrete stuff isn’t well thought of as something that is distinct from energy and that has energy. Rather concrete physical stuff is energy. This is one way to make a first step towards PP.

This is the weakest sauce. Certainly E=mc^2 tells us that mass and energy are equivalent. But energy seems just as unlikely as a home for consciousness as mass/matter (and since they are the same thing, one can't be more likely than the other). We haven't taken a step anywhere, except in the direction usually taken by pseudoscientists who equivocate on the meaning of energy, man, whoa, like wow. This is not to say this is pseudoscience, but it does seem to be equivocation.

Then the argument strikes me as something like a sorites paradox, combined with an argument from ignorance.

individual specks of matter do not seem to be heaps or wet or mountains or conscious.
But there's no avoiding the fact that there are heaps, wetness, mountains, and consciousness.
It seems absurd that you could add together a lot of nonwet things and suddenly wetness would radically emerge. My efforts in the backyard to add matter together to make a mountain produced only a molehill, and that is certainly not a mountain.
Thus, despite our first misgivings, bits of energy are conscious mountainous wet heaps.

I will admit that nothing (so far as I know) in physics prevents matter from being experiential (though I'm not entirely sure I know what this even means, so it's hard to say whether it is 'forbidden' by what we know). But so far I have seen no reason to entertain the idea.

Conscious things react to their surroundings. Electrons react to their surroundings. But this can't (I hope) mean what Strawson means by consciousness. (though this sounds dismissive, I think more and more complex reactions to stimuli could be the path to radical emergence of consciousness)

Conscious things have hopes and dreams. Do electrons have hopes and dreams? While I have no slamdunk riposte to deny it, I also do not feel moved to seriously entertain the idea.

 

[Ophiolite]

This is the weakest sauce. Certainly E=mc^2 tells us that mass and energy are equivalent. But energy seems just as unlikely as a home for consciousness as mass/matter (and since they are the same thing, one can't be more likely than the other). We haven't taken a step anywhere, except in the direction usually taken by pseudoscientists who equivocate on the meaning of energy, man, whoa, like wow. This is not to say this is pseudoscience, but it does seem to be equivocation.

Then the argument strikes me as something like a sorites paradox, combined with an argument from ignorance.

individual specks of matter do not seem to be heaps or wet or mountains or conscious.
But there's no avoiding the fact that there are heaps, wetness, mountains, and consciousness.
It seems absurd that you could add together a lot of nonwet things and suddenly wetness would radically emerge. My efforts in the backyard to add matter together to make a mountain produced only a molehill, and that is certainly not a mountain.
Thus, despite our first misgivings, bits of energy are conscious mountainous wet heaps.

I will admit that nothing (so far as I know) in physics prevents matter from being experiential (though I'm not entirely sure I know what this even means, so it's hard to say whether it is 'forbidden' by what we know). But so far I have seen no reason to entertain the idea.

Conscious things react to their surroundings. Electrons react to their surroundings. But this can't (I hope) mean what Strawson means by consciousness. (though this sounds dismissive, I think more and more complex reactions to stimuli could be the path to radical emergence of consciousness)

Conscious things have hopes and dreams. Do electrons have hopes and dreams? While I have no slamdunk riposte to deny it, I also do not feel moved to seriously entertain the idea.

I had wanted to participate in this thread since its inception, but couldn't find a way of expressing my thoughts on the topic with any clarity. Then you nailed it. Thanks.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

interesting to consider this:

Philosopher Philip Goff describes a form of panpsychism whereby the properties of fundamental particles, such as charge and spin, are themselves expressions of consciousness - so that consciousness is not an ontological extra, the physical world as we know it is an expression of consciousness at a fundamental level. I wonder how he would answer the questions above (or if he could answer them).

in relation to this:
Interpretations of quantum mechanics - Wikipedia
such as for instance Wheeler's idea, etc. To what extent does the conscious observer, for for that matter simply other.....strong assemblies of matter...as it were, cause particles to come into (change and begin to be, or take on) certain spin or location, etc.

The von Neumann-Wigner interpretation was pretty quickly abandoned as unworkable - even by Wigner himself; it generally only persists in the 'quantum-woo' mysticism camp, reinforced by the misunderstanding of what an 'observer' and a 'measurement' mean in QM (a quantum system, and its interaction with an entangled quantum system leading to decoherence, respectively).

Wheeler's Participatory Anthropic Principle is also relegated to the fringe, and has a circular chicken & egg feel to it - the universe only comes into existence if there's someone there to observe it, but someone only comes into existence if there's a universe in which they can do so (to the best of our knowledge). The delayed choice quantum experiments claimed to support his idea are adequately explained by other interpretations, and can be performed without conscious involvement in the measurement process (e.g. by automated equipment that makes the choices randomly and records the outcomes).

The strong anthropocentrism of these ideas is a poor fit for scientific enquiry, isn't supported by empirical evidence, and seems to lead to solipsistic or dualistic dead-ends.

Of course the idea most of us would like was Einsteins that simply there are hidden but definite things happening, a local realism, etc. And of course the Bell Test experiments to date suggest that's not so likely...though still there could be a 'superdeterminism' (Superdeterminism - Wikipedia) which to me seems only a possibility, but never something I'd accept as a confident presumption (I'll be skeptical about it, until there is more proof for it).

As I understand it, the current mainstream view is that we should yield locality, but only in a limited sense - due to the no-communication theorem. Superdeterminism is a very long shot - a recent experiment used variation in the light from distant quasars to set the experimental parameters, pushing back the timescale for superdeterminsim to approaching the age of the universe... If superdeterminism were a fact, it would put all of science into question.

But many tend to think we could not merely simulate a consciousness of our own kind with only a sufficiently complex computer program running at a high enough rate of processing -- we aren't so sure of that -- it might not be so. (for example, what if there is a true quantum randomness in ordinary physical matter) Though it's possible a human level consciousness might be merely numerically possible to simulate in full, I'm skeptical. But of course we will definitely continue to attempt to get closer to just such a physical AI being conscious, and possibly it could work well enough to be convincing in time. Wait on see on that. I don't expect that to work all the way to what we have though. We've got more I think, that is....another way of saying it is that there may be more to 'physics' than we can discover. Not that there isn't physics, mind, but rather that we may hit a wall or two about how much of the physics we can discover.

I think it would be possible in theory to create an artificial consciousness; if it's just what the brain does, we could, in principle, emulate it. But not only would we first have to clearly define what we mean by consciousness and what we would accept as evidence of it in an artificial system, but we'd have to establish the processes that facilitate consciousness. It may well be true that consciousness is a relatively recent evolutionary development, but it piggybacks on over a billion years of embodied signal processing, so the technical challenge of isolating a minimal requirement would be immense.

As far as the physics goes, our best physical theory (QFT) tells us that the physics of everyday life at human scales is basically just a question of protons, neutrons, electrons, and electromagnetic interactions. There may well be as yet undetected particles and forces, but they must either be too short-range or too weak to be significant to us or they (or their influence) would already have been detected. This means that consciousness emerges from the interactions of protons, neutrons, electrons, and the electromagnetic field, which constrains the possibilities. The evidence suggests that it is complex information processing (Tononi's Integrated Information Theory gives an idea of the basic requirements - in my view necessary but not sufficient).

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

I'd like to comment though instead about an interesting aspect here that involves concept #2 you wrote above, which itself is also an old favorite of mine, because there's more about it here worth a look (in my view).

First, I bet we all like or subscribe to #2. I've probably said it to like a 50-100 people over the years I bet in various wordings -- "That reality's existence doesn't require my awareness of it to exist." -- and we all have a lot of everyday evidence for it also...or...evidence for something a lot like it. Like, say, for most people they might think of a macro thing like they go out and find a new tree branch has fallen on the ground -- it did not need observation to happen, but happened independently. And of course there is small scale stuff like rust starts on some metal object without us observing it begin, etc....

So, we all have everyday support for that practical belief/conclusion about reality, and probably most all subscribe to it for everyday reality, where it works reliably. Or appears to work that way.

It's not such a closed case (yet) in QM (quantum mechanics), and that matters here in this thread because QM almost certainly is involved in consciousness.

For elementary particles, QM shows, it's a more open question whether what happens will certainly not depend on the observer.

That's a reasonable theory (one linked just below I like), but as you'd agree I bet we can not say #2 is how things are in QM just closed case (because it's an open question), and thus maybe in relation with consciousness also this is a good open question.

We don't yet have strong (extensive) evidence that supports another interpretation of QM past the Copenhagen Interpretation enough to win out over other interpretations and eliminate them -- instead there is a plethora of interpretations trying to go beyond the Copenhagen Interpretation.

Since observation is at least when things seem to become definite (QM), there's a lot of room there for speculation about what is happening.

For a very readable history of the long neglect of the fundamentals of QM and why the Copenhagen interpretation has hung around so long without serious question and has only recently begun to fall out of favour, check out Adam Becker's 'What Is Real? - the unfinished quest for the meaning of quantum physics'.

 

[public hermit]

I appreciate the thoughtful comments, especially from those who have scientific backgrounds. I understand the basic philosophical argument Strawson is making, but I don't have the scientific background to navigate that side of things. Honestly, I would have been shocked if those with scientific backgrounds, or even those who consider themselves physicalists, had responded with, "Yep, this sounds right on to me."

It is such a far out consideration. And yet, I won't lie that I am terribly intrigued by it. At any rate, I am grateful that some have considered it enough to respond.

 

[Halbhh]

The von Neumann-Wigner interpretation was pretty quickly abandoned as unworkable - even by Wigner himself; it generally only persists in the 'quantum-woo' mysticism camp, reinforced by the misunderstanding of what an 'observer' and a 'measurement' mean in QM (a quantum system, and its interaction with an entangled quantum system leading to decoherence, respectively).

Wheeler's Participatory Anthropic Principle is also relegated to the fringe, and has a circular chicken & egg feel to it - the universe only comes into existence if there's someone there to observe it, but someone only comes into existence if there's a universe in which they can do so (to the best of our knowledge). The delayed choice quantum experiments claimed to support his idea are adequately explained by other interpretations, and can be performed without conscious involvement in the measurement process (e.g. by automated equipment that makes the choices randomly and records the outcomes).

The strong anthropocentrism of these ideas is a poor fit for scientific enquiry, isn't supported by empirical evidence, and seems to lead to solipsistic or dualistic dead-ends.

Yup.

heh heh....

As I understand, we are all waiting for any interpretation beyond Copenhagen to get unique support/evidence.

Any.

heh heh

So, on the whole, I see the totally reasonable objections to consciousness causes collapse theories as...merely my own personal prejudice showing up in other people.

It only shows you are like me in that way, at least in part.

But, I don't dismiss it though. I'm quite ok to be able to consider such a far out idea along with ones I like a lot more, like the pilot wave one that seems not to have been reproduced (and I still hope that might turn out in some other setup somehow).

It didn't turn out yet though:
Famous Experiment Dooms Pilot-Wave Alternative to Quantum Weirdness | Quanta Magazine

So, see, my overall attitude towards your objections to consciousness causes collapse, is to only smile and say,

"Yup."

heh heh

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Yes, I understand why it would seem that pansychism is a kind of reification of consciousness. Strawson is arguing that the assumption that matter is essentially non-experiential (his term) is where the reification is happening. Likewise, if there is a hangover from dualism it is the non-experiential, not the mental, that still lingers.

Part of his argument in post #12:
Let E = experientiality
Let NE = non-experiential

"[1] We know for certain that E exists (biological E, at the very least).
[2] We don’t know for certain that any NE exists. So right from the start,
[3] the burden of proof is on those who believe that NE exists.
[4] There is, to begin, a burden on them to prove that it exists at all.

This burden is very heavy; in fact it can’t be lifted. It’s a very old and familiar point that [5] it can’t be proved that NE exists. The point [5] that it’s impossible to prove that there is any NE being is weighty" The rest of his argument in #12 is worth a look.

Why should one have to decide between one or the other, since neither option is deliverable by physics. He believes that pansychism is the most natural and parsimonious hypothesis. In terms of what physics can deliver, from post #11:

Strawson is a monist, so φ = the fundamental stuff of reality (whatever that may be, experiential or not, or something else).

It's important to point out, his argument depends on the fact that physics deals with the structural relational aspects of φ, not the ultimate structure-transcendent nature of φ. Strawson, "It is at the same time a commonplace that physics is incapable—essentially incapable—of revealing the ultimate structure-transcendent nature of φ, i.e. the nature of the stuff that has to be there given that the structural relations expressed in the equations of physics are actually exemplified by something concretely real. Physics is silent on this aspect of the nature of φ. Why? Because physics is as Hawking says ‘just a set of rules and equations.'"

In sense, we are dealing with metaphysics, for sure. But, the one who holds that reality is fundamentally non-experiential is assuming something we have no experience of, and frankly, no knowledge of. On the other hand, the one who holds that reality is fundamentally experientially can, at least, point to something we all know intimately, i.e. experience. If one buys Strawson's argument against radical emergence (post #14), then clearly pansychism has the upper hand.

Yeah, I just find that kind of argument, based on inverting the burden of proof (e.g. the lack of evidence of a negative), to be unconvincing. If we want to claim non-biological 'experientiality' (ouch), we should find evidence for it first. We have plenty of evidence that points to it being associated only with particular kinds of matter organised in particular ways, under particular circumstances, i.e. that it is not generalised but specific - that's how and why we developed the concept in the first place. Also, what the hell does it mean for matter in general to be 'experiential'? Experience involves intentionality, i.e. it's about events, which implies information and information processing... we're not talking the passive semantics of experience, in the sense that a river bank 'experiences' erosion.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Yup.

heh heh....

As I understand, we are all waiting for any interpretation beyond Copenhagen to get unique support/evidence.

Any.

heh heh

So, on the whole, I see the totally reasonable objections to consciousness causes collapse theories as...merely my own personal prejudice showing up in other people.

It only shows you are like me in that way, at least in part.

But, I don't dismiss it though. I'm quite ok to be able to consider such a far out idea along with ones I like a lot more, like the pilot wave one that seems not to have been reproduced (and I still hope that might turn out in some other setup somehow).

It didn't turn out yet though:
Famous Experiment Dooms Pilot-Wave Alternative to Quantum Weirdness | Quanta Magazine

So, see, my overall attitude towards your objections to consciousness causes collapse, is to only smile and say,

"Yup."

heh heh

My basic objection is to the idea of wavefunction collapse - it's not a concept that is physically coherent and it's not part of the formalism; it's an ad-hoc addition. Conscious collapse is just adding mystic anthropocentric bias to a problematic idea.

 

[Halbhh]

For a very readable history of the long neglect of the fundamentals of QM and why the Copenhagen interpretation has hung around so long without serious question and has only recently begun to fall out of favour, check out Adam Becker's 'What Is Real? - the unfinished quest for the meaning of quantum physics'.

Einstein certainly wasn't the only person feeling QM with Copenhagen was just unfinished, and I think many or most have seen it that way since, though speaking up to say so tends to elicit this kind of response: "most physicists have followed Niels Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation and dismissed questions about the reality underlying quantum physics as meaningless. " as I learned by hearing it from the professor during class in response to such questions. The easier thing for a prof in front of a class to do is saying something version like that -- ala Copenhagen is just how it is. There is an article I didn't get to about trying to rethink QM from the ground up, and I'll take a look sometime soon probably.

 

[public hermit]

Yeah, I just find that kind of argument, based on inverting the burden of proof (e.g. the lack of evidence of a negative), to be unconvincing. If we want to claim non-biological 'experientiality' (ouch), we should find evidence for it first. We have plenty of evidence that points to it being associated only with particular kinds of matter organised in particular ways, under particular circumstances, i.e. that it is not generalised but specific - that's how and why we developed the concept in the first place. Also, what the hell does it mean for matter in general to be 'experiential'? Experience involves intentionality, i.e. it's about events, which implies information and information processing... we're not talking the passive semantics of experience, in the sense that a river bank 'experiences' erosion.

I completely understand your critique. What you're saying makes sense. I remember when I first read about Leibniz's monads (a kind of pansychism) I thought, "Why in the world would he come up with that?" So, this resurgence of pansychism, not just among philosophers but among some scientists as well, is surprising. John Archibald Wheeler, Christof Koch, Roger Penrose, Gregory Matloff, Bernard Haisch, Giulio Tanini, all believe some type of pansychism makes sense. These aren't panentheists who are hankering for some way to justify their metaphysical predilections. These are scientists, often strict physicalists. How does one account for that? What do you think?

You probably don't need links, but just in case.
Why Some Scientists Believe the Universe Is Conscious
The universe may be conscious, say prominent scientists

 

[SelfSim]

... Also, what the hell does it mean for matter in general to be 'experiential'? Experience involves intentionality, i.e. it's about events, which implies information and information processing... we're not talking the passive semantics of experience, in the sense that a river bank 'experiences' erosion.

Interesting .. 'the passive semantics of experience' also gives rise to information then, and so do 'generalisations' in your view there?

 

[SelfSim]

... So, this resurgence of pansychism, not just among philosophers but among some scientists as well, is surprising. John Archibald Wheeler, Christof Koch, Roger Penrose, Gregory Matloff, Bernard Haisch, Giulio Tanini, all believe some type of pansychism makes sense. These aren't panentheists who are hankering for some way to justify their metaphysical predilections. These are scientists, often strict physicalists. How does one account for that? What do you think?

Well, why not? - They aren't relying on their philosophical beliefs when they're doing science (or theoretical physics).

Can't speak so much for the others, but Penrose appears to have become so tied up in the idealism of his models that in many aspects, he appears to almost have disconnected his own mind from what it has produced over his lifetime. Why that phenomena occurs, is somewhat of a major mystery to me .. but there again, if someone puts a spot on my cheek, I have no idea its there until I look in a mirror, (or someone else sees it and then informs me about it).

 

[public hermit]

Can't speak so much for the others, but Penrose appears to have become so tied up in the idealism of his models that in many aspects, he appears to almost have disconnected his own mind from what it has produced over his lifetime. Why that phenomena occurs, is somewhat of a major mystery to me .. but there again, if someone puts a spot on my cheek, I have no idea its there until I look in a mirror, (or someone else sees it and then informs me about it).

I can't say one way or another, in regards to Penrose. I really don't know. I was thinking that it must be something they think is missing in the current way of looking at things. But, truly, I have no idea that is why I defer to others who might know.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

I completely understand your critique. What you're saying makes sense. I remember when I first read about Leibniz's monads (a kind of pansychism) I thought, "Why in the world would he come up with that?" So, this resurgence of pansychism, not just among philosophers but among some scientists as well, is surprising. John Archibald Wheeler, Christof Koch, Roger Penrose, Gregory Matloff, Bernard Haisch, Giulio Tanini, all believe some type of pansychism makes sense. These aren't panentheists who are hankering for some way to justify their metaphysical predilections. These are scientists, often strict physicalists. How does one account for that? What do you think?

I don't know - I haven't heard of any discoveries that point in that direction, although it's sufficiently sweeping and ill-defined that it's not readily falsifiable. Perhaps it's just a meme that has caught on - if one or two high-profile figures have talked about it maybe it seems less exotic... or maybe they just want to sound like they're getting somewhere ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

I suspect that in the end it's probably just another way for man's ancient propensity to attribute agency and/or sentience when faced with the unexplained to manifest. Once it was animism, spirits, and gods; now it's variations of panpsychism with a sciency justification. I'm not holding my breath for evidence

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Well, why not? - They aren't relying on their philosophical beliefs when they're doing science (or theoretical physics).

Can't speak so much for the others, but Penrose appears to have become so tied up in the idealism of his models that in many aspects, he appears to almost have disconnected his own mind from what it has produced over his lifetime. Why that phenomena occurs, is somewhat of a major mystery to me .. but there again, if someone puts a spot on my cheek, I have no idea its there until I look in a mirror, (or someone else sees it and then informs me about it).

Penrose thinks that consciousness must be non-computational (because... Godel's theorems) and so something equally mysterious must be behind it - hence quantum... mind-stuff. There's a YouTube video where he basically admits this. My view is that he doesn't understand the neurological side well enough (for example, one can model understanding in terms of building models using association, abstraction, pattern-matching - and reward).