Freewill?

[timewerx]

I already gave up on that shrinking dimension hypothesis on speeds of significant % with respect to the speed of light.

I did an experiment once, I used a 2ft diameter metal bowl, that looked like the hemispherical barbeque grill cover.

I attached it to a 30kv, 60 watts pulsed source very low frequency probably just around 600 hz.

I attached a mechanical steel watch on the outside of the bowl. Being made of steel, I'm pretty sure the interior is completely isolated from the pulsating electric fields due to the Faraday Cage Effect.

After just a few minutes, it recorded several seconds of deviation. It would be quite significant.


However, my gift of prophecy is totally unrelated to my experimental studies that used pulsating electric fields to attempt to modify the rate of time. Even then, my goals are unrelated to actually making a time machine. My goal is actually to invent a working warp drive. The change of rate of the passage of time is only my cue that space is being warped.

I never got far. I realized it would require nanometer manufacturing process which is beyond my reach and gave up on that project. Did manage to "violate" Newton's 3rd Law but the forces produced is pathetic, not enough to lift even the very lightweight unit cell minus the weight of the power source.

I may not advice it though, not a good idea to mess with quantum fields. Somethings in there we might not supposed to mess.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Have you ever read this interview with Niels Bohr:

https://www.aip.org/history-programs/niels-bohr-library/oral-histories/4517-5

I read the session you linked to (session V), and it sounded like he had something interesting to say, but I couldn't make out what it was - I think a video might have helped...

For me, this explained everything. I kept asking myself, "why would the men that discovered Quantum Mechanics believe in zombie-cats, when there is a perfectly logical explanation?"

Zombie cats(!) was just Schrodinger's way of pointing out that measurement or observation in the Copenhagen interpretation was ill-defined (at that time). Now it's generally understood that an observation is any particle interaction. There's still no empirical evidence to prefer one interpretation over another, they all 'work' (conform to the quantum formalism) - it's a question of how comfortable you are with the way they get there, e.g. how much they add to it; Many Worlds is gaining popularity these days because it makes no additional requirements, it just has the universal wave function continuously evolving, nothing more. I found it interesting at first because it reminded me of the parallel dimensions of the science fiction I used to read, but then I discovered it's not really like that at all.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

I attached a mechanical steel watch on the outside of the bowl. Being made of steel, I'm pretty sure the interior is completely isolated from the pulsating electric fields due to the Faraday Cage Effect.

Not necessarily so - Faraday Cages are generally earthed, and many high-end steel cased watches (e.g. pilot watches) have a special soft iron inner shield to protect them from electromagnetic fields, and their escapements and springs may be made of non-magnetic or paramagnetic alloys.

 

[zippy2006]

I've yet to properly grasp how that's supposed to work.

If by "grasping how it's supposed to work," you mean "explain it in deterministic categories," then you're committing a form of question-begging. No one is asking you to grasp how it's supposed to work. There are certain facts that either cannot be explained or do not currently admit of explanation. That doesn't mean we can just deny them.

What I mean is that there's no way to get the results by any short-cut or approximation (I was basically using a restricted meaning of 'predict' - I can't think of a better word). You have to run the full program (or an exact logical equivalent - the hardware is irrelevant) to discover the result(s). In the real world, this would mean running an exact emulation with every particle, registered to infinite precision, for the required simulated time, to give you a certain knowledge of the outcome.

I can grant this for the sake of argument.

My point is that, at that time, they chose A rather than B for some reason involving their mental state (e.g. thought processes); if that reason hadn't held, i.e. if their mental circumstances had been different, they would have chosen B. In other words, their mental state, the thought processes that led them to choose A rather than B, are part of the circumstances of their choice.

We agree that they are part of the circumstances, but you seem to be saying that they are the whole. That is, you are claiming that the thought process is necessary in the sense that its absence would necessarily produce a different decision ("B"). Thought processes can be a part of the circumstances of a choice without being a necessary part or the whole part. Why think any particular thought process is necessary for some particular choice?

That's what I asked you to explain in the first place...

If you aren't begging the question, then I will ask you to produce criteria for explanation. Of course this criteria must not subordinate agent causation to event causation if the question is not being begged.

I'm saying that I don't see how to distinguish between them - it appears that determinism alone accounts perfectly well for the subjective sense of free choice and free will, and so is a simple parsimonious explanation. You've suggested there's something more, so I'm asking if you can give a way to tell that there really is something more, a reason to think that determinism alone is not sufficient.

We can argue about whether it is more parsimonious or not if you like, but I'm just looking at facts and theories. Determinism doesn't account for the fact of subjective experience in the way that Libertarian Free Will does, so why prefer Determinism? If LFW makes more sense of reality and our experience than Determinism, then why prefer Determinism? Especially if you claim that the difference is empirically non-existent?

I suspect that complexity masks the issue of necessity - an apparently simple, single causal event of one ball hitting the other is obviously necessary. The complex cascade of events resulting in Joe's movement is not so obvious, but it resolves to interacting sequences of simple causal events, each necessary (assuming determinism), most of them in the brain and unavailable for inspection.

Nah. I think your idea of "complexity" is just the result of arbitrarily delimiting a causal chain. If we limit the causal scope of Joe's action to his atomic decision--which is the initiation of the physical chain of events--then there is almost no neurological or muscular complexity to analyze and the same problem presents itself.

That is, we can compare the moment of Joe's decision to push the pool cue to the moment the cue-ball makes contact with the 3-ball. Both initiate the consequent causal chain, but apparently in a different way, and both are non-complex. While it shouldn't have been necessary to rephrase my argument so pedantically, the fact that it can be rephrased without reference to the complexities you introduced just goes to show that those complexities are not at all at the heart of the issue. The same problem arises when the causal chain is reduced to the atomic events noted.

Beyond that, we could inflate the complexity on the other side as well. Consider the variable friction of the felt and air densities in the room, the imperfections in the pool balls, the uneven application of chalk and the irregularities of the cue tip's surface, the friction between balls and the alternating spin transmitted, etc., etc. Nothing is as simple as meets the eye; so what?

It's not an illustration that clarifies the difference for me.

Why not? I think it would clarify the difference for most.

Yes and no (mainly yes). No, to the extent that quantum mechanics (even if possibly deterministic 'behind the scenes') allows us only a stochastic (probabilistic) view of the universe; yes to the extent that, at macro scales, quantum mechanics gives a very close approximation to determinism, and I see no evidence of any other non-deterministic influences.

Okay. But to be clear, your intellect tells you quite clearly that when you make a decision you were capable of making a contrary decision, yet you disregard this as evidence, no?

Because from the outside, I can see that one is artificial and one natural, so if offered the choice, my predilection for natural experience over artificial experience would influence my decision. From the inside, one would be unaware of the source of the experiences, and there is no choice to make.

Okay, good. But it seems to me that you are essentially choosing the Experience Machine when you commit to Determinism. That is, either in the absence of evidence or in spite of evidence, you choose to believe your life is "artifice" rather than "natural."

I'm saying that if there is no evidence for either hypothesis, or if there is evidence for LFW, we should choose LFW. Only if there is outweighing evidence in favor of Determinism should we choose Determinism. So where is this evidence in favor of Determinism?

Yes; I wanted to avoid potential equivocation of 'deceive' to invoke an external deceiver.

Okay.

What rational error - that he was truly self-moving, and his choices flowed authentically? I can't really answer for the people that do, but as I say, subjectively that's how it feels to them, they may not be aware of the alternative view, and broadly speaking, it probably wouldn't change their behaviour if they did know (although it might, in some respects).

The rational error is in discrepancy between our natural belief that we have the ATDO and Determinism's implication that we do not.

Frum: My head tells me I have the ATDO, but I deny that information because it clashes with my Determinism.
Zip: Oh. Why do you hold Determinism?​

Note that if no sufficient answer is given at this point, the rejection of LFW is clearly irrational.

Ockham's Razor - if his experience can be fully explained by determinism alone, why invoke additional explanatory entities?

I don't think you should. The problem is that we agree that Determinism cannot fully explain his experience. It makes no sense of his natural belief in the ATDO.

The other problem is one of precedence. What is the starting point? Which is more fundamental, our experience of event causation or agent causation? You continually assume the former, but on what basis? Every time we witness event causation it is through our own personal subject. I don't see pool balls collide unless I first look (and choose to look, choose to pay attention). There seems to be no event cause whatsoever that escapes this foundation of agent causation.

It seems to me that an agent whose choices are purely deterministic, but who has limited awareness of the detail of the deterministic influences on those choices, would feel that their choices (if unconstrained and uncoerced) were free.

Why think that?

If you think that, you've entirely missed my point - or I've completely failed to make it.
Only that I can't think how they might be distinguished - that's why I'm asking for input.

I see your point now: the two hypotheses are empirically indistinguishable and Determinism is therefore favored solely on the basis of parsimony. No?

I've responded to that at various points above. I guess the only other question I would ask is this: what could possibly distinguish them in your mind? It seems to me that you've established impossible criteria, and therefore are stating something vacuous when you say that they are indistinguishable. It's not that they are indistinguishable in practice, it's that they are indistinguishable in principle and no possible state of affairs could ever adjudicate the question.

Best,
Zip

 

[Justatruthseeker]

I read the session you linked to (session V), and it sounded like he had something interesting to say, but I couldn't make out what it was - I think a video might have helped...
Zombie cats(!) was just Schrodinger's way of pointing out that measurement or observation in the Copenhagen interpretation was ill-defined (at that time). Now it's generally understood that an observation is any particle interaction. There's still no empirical evidence to prefer one interpretation over another, they all 'work' (conform to the quantum formalism) - it's a question of how comfortable you are with the way they get there, e.g. how much they add to it; Many Worlds is gaining popularity these days because it makes no additional requirements, it just has the universal wave function continuously evolving, nothing more. I found it interesting at first because it reminded me of the parallel dimensions of the science fiction I used to read, but then I discovered it's not really like that at all.

The Copenhagen interpretation is pure fantasy.

It is the attempt to remove cause from effect, so one can claim anything one wants without having to have a cause. Can't account for all the variables - claim cause isn't important.

Heisenberg stated: "The law of causality is no longer applied in quantum theory."

Mermin states that the results of those absurd interpretations are enjoyable. "The EPR experiment is as close to magic as any physical phenomenon I know of, and magic should be enjoyed."

I guess if one can accept there can be an effect with no cause more power to them. But then why bother to do science at all - if one has already admitted there can be no cause for the event, why try so hard to find the cause for the event? Just have fun with the magic so you don't have to keep looking for the cause.

 

[Chriliman]

Hello everyone. I would like to discuss freewill, and whether such a thing is possible Scientifically, Logically, and according to Scripture. I will start with Logic.

I have a choice between A or B. God knows that I will choose A. By my freewill I choose B. Please explain. Thank you all and God bless you.

If God is truly free to do as he pleases then it's logical that he'd create beings who are free to do as they please, he just knows what they'll choose because he's God and we're not.

This is why we should be careful and thoughtful in the choices we make because it's good to fear God and desire to please Him and not anger Him.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

The Copenhagen interpretation is pure fantasy.

It is the attempt to remove cause from effect, so one can claim anything one wants without having to have a cause. Can't account for all the variables - claim cause isn't important.

I'm not really sure what you mean by removing cause from effect in this context; there are a number of different versions of the Copenhagen interpretation - the 'conscious collapse' version is widely held to be untenable, but 'collapse of the wavefunction' interpretations in general do fit observation, although they seem to be falling out of favour - presumably because the idea of wavefunction collapse isn't part of the quantum formalism and appears unjustifiably ad-hoc.

It's worth remembering that, in a sense, all QM interpretations are 'pure fantasy'; they're attempts to visualise, in familiar terms, a mathematical formalism that accurately, but counter-intuitively, models the result of experiment. Each interpretation should be prefixed with "It's as if...".

 

[zippy2006]

Ockham's Razor - if his experience can be fully explained by determinism alone, why invoke additional explanatory entities?

After responding I thought through this a bit more. I was going to include my thoughts in the next post, but seeing as there may not be one I will just put them here:

There seem to be two competing methodologies in arriving at an answer, call them the approach of parsimony (AoP) and the approach of evidence (AoE).

You favor AoP. You look at the problem of determinism and free will and wish to arrive at an answer while spending the least explanatory currency. You note that a world with
only event causation is more explanatorily streamlined than a world with both event causation and agent causation. You believe that even if agent causation brings with it some
level of explanatory power, this power is not sufficient to warrant the expenditure of a new kind of causation.

I favor AoE. I look at the problem of determinism and free will and wish to arrive at an answer that best fits the evidence. I note the strong intellectual belief in agent
causation, both with respect to our immediate action and also with respect to implications for truth and science. This evidence requires something other than event causation:
agent causation.

The AoE is something that we both hold in common (certainly you do not discount such an approach in reaching conclusions). Indeed perhaps you focus on evidence which highlights
event causation: hard sciences like physics, neurophysics, biology, computer science, and astrophysics. If these things fill your field of vision, then event causation seems
to account for the majority of what is seen. Perhaps I focus more on evidence which highlights agent causation: fields like philosophy, anthropology, phenomenology, and literature.
For me the hard sciences can never be divorced from the subject who studies them, and the truth that he acquires can never be divorced from the mind that knows it.

While we both accept the AoE in relatively equal ways, I do not think I accept AoP in the same way that you do. I believe parsimony to be a very tenuous concept. The principle
always existed prior to Occam, but in a more subdued (and more proper) way. It works well in hypothesis-heavy sciences that progress primarily according to new explanatory models,
but becomes strained when appeal is made to it in some kind of unqualified, absolute way. In all evidential reasoning the explanation should never be disproportionate to the
reality that it attempts to explain, and yet attempts to quantify this proportionality seem to get bogged down in the mud rather quickly. How much explanatory currency should
we spend? How stingy should we be? What realities need to be paid for? How far can a buck be stretched? In brief, I don't think parsimony should ever be the primary criterion
of assessing a fundamental philosophical problem. It is more useful in the back seat, guiding reasoning at each step, than when it takes the steering wheel and assumes sovereignty.

I'm not convinced you would disagree with much of that, because you seem to have a rather loose hold on Determinism. This makes sense if parsimony isn't given too much weight.

(The other topic that bears on our discussion is intellection. A truncated understanding of knowledge and syllogistic reasoning will be unable to comprehend the foundations of human reason and the legitimacy of non-syllogistic intellection.)

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

There seem to be two competing methodologies in arriving at an answer, call them the approach of parsimony (AoP) and the approach of evidence (AoE).

They're not competing approaches, they're complementary; given hypotheses of comparative explanatory and predictive power, the one with fewest assumptions should be preferred. In this case, I was ignoring the other problems with agent causation (out of parsimony ).

You believe that even if agent causation brings with it some level of explanatory power, this power is not sufficient to warrant the expenditure of a new kind of causation.

I don't think it brings any explanatory power; and it brings a raft of problems of its own.

I note the strong intellectual belief in agent causation, both with respect to our immediate action and also with respect to implications for truth and science. This evidence requires something other than event causation:
agent causation.

Strong belief in something is not evidence for it.

...Perhaps I focus more on evidence which highlights agent causation: fields like philosophy, anthropology, phenomenology, and literature.

The first three generally highlight the problems with agent causation (e.g. incoherence, appeal-to-mystery, the interaction problem, etc.). The last is evidence only that agent causation is a common belief or a useful literary device. Belief is only evidence of belief.

... In brief, I don't think parsimony should ever be the primary criterion of assessing a fundamental philosophical problem.

I certainly agree with that. See above.

I'm not convinced you would disagree with much of that, because you seem to have a rather loose hold on Determinism.

On the contrary, I'm a pretty hard determinist these days; quantum mechanics apart (even even that is arguable), I see the universe as deterministic at human scales FAPP (For All Practical Purposes); that is what makes it consistent enough to support the structured complexity of life (and technology).

 

[zippy2006]

They're not competing approaches, they're complementary;

Yeah. As I noted, the methodologies don't compete with each other, but insofar as we arrive at a different conclusion they compete.

I don't think it brings any explanatory power; and it brings a raft of problems of its own.

I'd say the same about Determinism while substituting "raft" for "ocean."

Strong belief in something is not evidence for it.
The first three generally highlight the problems with agent causation (e.g. incoherence, appeal-to-mystery, the interaction problem, etc.). The last is evidence only that agent causation is a common belief or a useful literary device. Belief is only evidence of belief.

Then I'd guess you don't have a great understanding of intellection or the basis of human reasoning and are excessively influenced by modern European philosophy.

On the contrary, I'm a pretty hard determinist these days; quantum mechanics apart (even even that is arguable), I see the universe as deterministic at human scales FAPP (For All Practical Purposes); that is what makes it consistent enough to support the structured complexity of life (and technology).

Okay.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

I'd say the same about Determinism while substituting "raft" for "ocean."

Problems such as?

Then I'd guess you don't have a great understanding of intellection or the basis of human reasoning and are excessively influenced by modern European philosophy.

Keep guessing

 

[zippy2006]

Problems such as?

Such as the inaccessibility of truth (or the untenable redefinition of truth).

Computers can't have knowledge; but for the determinist a human being is just a glorified computer; therefore human beings cannot have knowledge on determinism. Besides making determinism self-defeating, this leads to the abolition of the sciences and human knowledge generally.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Such as the inaccessibility of truth (or the untenable redefinition of truth).

I don't see the problem; truth is an abstraction - a correspondence to the facts or reality; certainty about the facts and reality is elusive - e.g. the problem of measurement, the problem of induction. Science explicitly acknowledges this.

Computers can't have knowledge

I don't agree; if we define knowledge as 'facts, information, and skills acquired through experience or education', some computers can - and do - have knowledge (by that definition, AlphaGo has knowledge of how to play Go). There's a good case for including 'understanding' for some computers too.

...for the determinist a human being is just a glorified computer; therefore human beings cannot have knowledge on determinism. Besides making determinism self-defeating, this leads to the abolition of the sciences and human knowledge generally.

No; apart from the definitional argument above, computers these days can learn from experience, and can formulate and test hypotheses to construct models of the world and establish provisional facts about it that they can use in planning their actions. That is doing science, albeit in restricted environments. AI has moved on since the 1980's.

E.T.A. Also bear in mind that the capabilities of today's computers do not reflect the potential, theoretical capabilities of computers; our most advanced computers have a computational complexity orders of magnitude less than that of the smallest mammalian brain, and deep learning technology is in its infancy.

 

[Chriliman]

I don't see the problem; truth is an abstraction - a correspondence to the facts or reality; certainty about the facts and reality is elusive - e.g. the problem of measurement, the problem of induction. Science explicitly acknowledges this.
I don't agree; if we define knowledge as 'facts, information, and skills acquired through experience or education', some computers can - and do - have knowledge (by that definition, AlphaGo has knowledge of how to play Go). There's a good case for including 'understanding' for some computers too.
No; apart from the definitional argument above, computers these days can learn from experience, and can formulate and test hypotheses to construct models of the world and establish provisional facts about it that they can use in planning their actions. That is doing science, albeit in restricted environments. AI has moved on since the 1980's.

E.T.A. Also bear in mind that the capabilities of today's computers do not reflect the potential, theoretical capabilities of computers; our most advanced computers have a computational complexity orders of magnitude less than that of the smallest mammalian brain, and deep learning technology is in its infancy.

I agree that computers can have knowledge and that they gain access to knowledge from higher intelligence, namely us. Question still remains: where do humans gain their knowledge from? Well I think the answer is obvious because of the fact that computers gain knowledge from higher intelligence, but not everyone thinks with this rational, even though it's very clear and simple rational.

 

[zippy2006]

First, I just want to emphasize that you have questioned only the first premise, "Computers can't have knowledge."

I don't see the problem; truth is an abstraction - a correspondence to the facts or reality;

It is an intentional correspondence, something that one knows oneself to hold. When the human comes to knowledge that "Socrates is a human being," he actually understands something about Socrates (and also the essence of human beings). When a computer 'says' "2 + 2 = 4" there is no real understanding present. It is just manipulating a representational system that has been programmed to have some semblance to reality in precisely the way it was told to manipulate it.

...certainty about the facts and reality is elusive - e.g. the problem of measurement, the problem of induction. Science explicitly acknowledges this.

The elusiveness of knowledge isn't the problem, but rather the inaccessibility (i.e. no access in principle).

I don't agree; if we define knowledge as 'facts, information, and skills acquired through experience or education', some computers can - and do - have knowledge (by that definition, AlphaGo has knowledge of how to play Go). There's a good case for including 'understanding' for some computers too.

There are several different ways to approach this topic. First I would approach it via truth where knowledge is a kind of possession of truth, in which case what I said above about proper intentionality comes into play.

Another angle of approach is that of meaning. Knowledge has intrinsic meaning, bits stored in a computer do not. A computer is just a tool, similar to written or spoken language. Written language has no intrinsic meaning--the meaning is imputed by an agent. A computer is able to manipulate the bits in a way desirable to human beings--for as a tool of human beings it is programmed by them and completely dependent on them insofar as its interactions with the world will have any value--but there is no intrinsic meaning.

No; apart from the definitional argument above, computers these days can learn from experience, and can formulate and test hypotheses to construct models of the world and establish provisional facts about it that they can use in planning their actions. That is doing science, albeit in restricted environments. AI has moved on since the 1980's.

Not in the way you suppose. Computers do science in the same qualitative way that a thermometer 'does science': by reporting back to human beings what they asked to be reported and created the instrument to report. The case of AI is merely different in degree. In that case the requested result is indicative of other data gathered by the computer/instrument and the physical consequences are more impressive.

E.T.A. Also bear in mind that the capabilities of today's computers do not reflect the potential, theoretical capabilities of computers; our most advanced computers have a computational complexity orders of magnitude less than that of the smallest mammalian brain, and deep learning technology is in its infancy.

The idea that it is only a question of degree is a strawman, and a common one at that. Add a billion orders of magnitude to the most advanced computer and it will still be incapable of truth and knowledge.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

I agree that computers can have knowledge and that they gain access to knowledge from higher intelligence, namely us. Question still remains: where do humans gain their knowledge from?

Learning from experience; exploration, experiment, trial and error.

Well I think the answer is obvious because of the fact that computers gain knowledge from higher intelligence, but not everyone thinks with this rational, even though it's very clear and simple rational.

It's simply not a compelling argument; it's a non-sequitur. Would you think it obvious that all holes must be dug by a higher intelligence because humans can dig holes? Are termite mounds built by a higher intelligence because humans can build skyscrapers?

Also, computers can gain knowledge for themselves.

 

[Chriliman]

Learning from experience; exploration, experiment, trial and error.

Exactly! Are you done learning in this life?

It's simply not a compelling argument; it's a non-sequitur. Would you think it obvious that all holes must be dug by a higher intelligence because humans can dig holes?

It requires intelligence to dig a hole. The question is: where does that intelligence come from?

Are termite mounds built by a higher intelligence because humans can build skyscrapers?

Still takes intelligence for termites to build mounds, where did that intelligence come from? Unintelligent nature? My human logic tells me it's impossible for intelligence to come from something unintelligent. Should I defy my human logic just because you say my logic is faulty? Where are you getting your intelligence from? Humans? Where did humans get their intelligence from?

Also, computers can gain knowledge for themselves.

Not if a higher intelligence didn't design them first to be capable of gaining knowledge for themselves.

 

[DogmaHunter]

I agree that computers can have knowledge and that they gain access to knowledge from higher intelligence, namely us.

That is only true for "dumb" computers that rely on input. It becomes a whole different ball game once we introduce machine learning / AI.

Question still remains: where do humans gain their knowledge from?

Investigation and study. We don't "receive" knowledge. We rather develop it ourselves, by observing reality, finding patterns, building explanatory models and then test those models.

Well I think the answer is obvious because of the fact that computers gain knowledge from higher intelligence

Humans are not computers.

, but not everyone thinks with this rational, even though it's very clear and simple rational.

It's "simple" allright.

 

[DogmaHunter]

Exactly! Are you done learning in this life?

You say "exactly", but it completely contradicts your claim........

It requires intelligence to dig a hole

Does it?

The question is: where does that intelligence come from?

Assuming you are talking about humans digging holes... then the intelligence comes from the physical brain.

Still takes intelligence for termites to build mounds, where did that intelligence come from?

Termites are "intelligent"?

At this point, it would be helpful if you could provide a definition of what you mean exactly with the word "intelligence".

Unintelligent nature?

To call nature "unintelligent" is not really intelligent...
The words "unintelligent" or "intelligent" aren't sensible/valid to describe nature, as nature is not a sentient being with attributes that can be described as such.

It's like trying to describe a color by using words like "bitter" and "sweet".

Where are you getting your intelligence from?

From my brain. Just like any other human.

Humans? Where did humans get their intelligence from?

From their brains.

Not if a higher intelligence didn't design them first to be capable of gaining knowledge for themselves.

Yea, that's why such computers are called artificial intelligence, since it isn't naturally occuring.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

First, I just want to emphasize that you have questioned only the first premise, "Computers can't have knowledge."

The rest follows. I suspect your argument resolves to a semantic one - that knowledge & understanding are human-only by definition - I hope not.

It is an intentional correspondence, something that one knows oneself to hold.

I take it you'd deny that when a computer is asked whether it has information about an object in it's data store, looks up the index to check, and finds that object, that it knows it has the requested information? If so, we need to agree on functional definitions of our terms; what functional definition or description are you using for 'knowledge'?

When the human comes to knowledge that "Socrates is a human being," he actually understands something about Socrates (and also the essence of human beings). When a computer 'says' "2 + 2 = 4" there is no real understanding present.

I'll grant you that a calculator has no need to understand the rules it applies, but "Socrates is a human being" is a simple categorization, set theory - the only thing it tells you about human beings is that Socrates is one; hardly the 'essence' of human beings, particularly if, as for many people, Socrates is just an odd name.

If you think it implies understanding, then computers have had understanding since the 1980s; I suggest that understanding is more than applied set theory. Just to clarify, what functional definition or description are you using for 'understanding'?

It is just manipulating a representational system that has been programmed to have some semblance to reality in precisely the way it was told to manipulate it.

Which echoes human manipulation of their representational models which they have learned to construct to have some semblance to reality, in the way they've learned to manipulate it...

The elusiveness of knowledge isn't the problem, but rather the inaccessibility (i.e. no access in principle).

I still don't see the problem. It isn't all-or-nothing, you don't need absolute certainty before you can proceed; your knowledge just has to be good enough to do the job. For example, Newtonian Mechanics is wrong - but it's a good enough approximation for all everyday human scale applications, and good enough for NASA to use it to send probes on tours of the planets. Similarly, evolutionary success means traits that are good enough to ensure production of viable offspring down the generations.

There are several different ways to approach this topic. First I would approach it via truth where knowledge is a kind of possession of truth, in which case what I said above about proper intentionality comes into play.

I think defining knowledge in terms of truth (ignoring analytic and tautological truth) will lead you into murky waters, not least because of the distinction between what you think is true, and the actual truth (i.e. correspondence to reality), which is uncertain. I suggest knowledge would be better defined in terms of possession of information (i.e. interpreted data).

Another angle of approach is that of meaning. Knowledge has intrinsic meaning, bits stored in a computer do not.

You're comparing different levels of abstraction. Knowledge is information stored in the brain as associative maps of synaptic connections; bits stored in a computer can have meaning if they can be interpreted on a representational level, e.g. as symbols, maps, or associations. If you add an intermediary layer of abstraction, knowledge can be be stored in a computer as emulations of associative maps of synaptic connections (artificial neural networks), similar to those in the brain. In terms of information processing, there is no significant difference.

A computer is able to manipulate the bits in a way desirable to human beings--for as a tool of human beings it is programmed by them and completely dependent on them insofar as its interactions with the world will have any value--but there is no intrinsic meaning.

If you define intrinsic meaning as something relevant only to humans, and knowledge as that which has intrinsic meaning, you'll inevitably end up thinking only humans can have knowledge.

I see no reason, in principle, why we couldn't eventually make a system (as an android or robot) that would be independent, learn from experience, and have basic drives related to its own long term function and development. The design goal (independence, development) would necessarily be of our devising, but such a system could generate and set its own intermediate goals, and go off to do its thing. IOW, if we give a system the drives and goals evolution has given us, there's no reason it couldn't do most of what we do (although not always in the same way, e.g. reproduction). Whether we'd want to do that is another matter, but space exploration might be one reason.

Not in the way you suppose. Computers do science in the same qualitative way that a thermometer 'does science': by reporting back to human beings what they asked to be reported and created the instrument to report. The case of AI is merely different in degree. In that case the requested result is indicative of other data gathered by the computer/instrument and the physical consequences are more impressive.

I don't see that as fundamentally different from what humans do given the structure and drives that resulted from evolution. In our case, the physical consequences are even more impressive.

The idea that it is only a question of degree is a strawman, and a common one at that. Add a billion orders of magnitude to the most advanced computer and it will still be incapable of truth and knowledge.

I disagree. Simple knowledge is done already; analytic truths are done already; synthetic truths will always be uncertain for both computers and us. If we want computers with the cognitive capacity to exceed what we can do, we can build them. Ever since the very first computers, pundits have been telling us what they could never do, and one by one those 'impossibles' have been achieved. We now have real-time text, voice, and image recognition, real-time text and speech language translation; laptop chess software that can beat a chess grand master; a Go system that can bet the best Go masters; a computer Jeopardy champion; self-driving cars; systems that can learn and teach themselves, etc. Each an achievement previously thought impossible. These are all limited-domain systems, but systems are becoming more flexible - the Jeopardy computer, IBM's Watson is being redirected for medical diagnosis, legal advice, and cookery advice. If generalised, multi-domain systems are required, we can build them.