Free Will

[quatona]

Appolonian, thanks for your response.

I think I can make it shorter this time, because things seem to become more clear. (edited: well, apparently I was mistaken in this prediction.)

Firstly, just this night I got aware of one reason why I am thinking so much about this term (instead of simply accepting it as meaningful because it exists, after all, as you have recommended several times): Although of course we have a word for „choice“ in my mother tongue (German), we seem to use it not as frequently and in a different way than it is used in your language. The often read and heard phrase „I/he/you chose to...“ can be expressed in German, but it sounds funny and pompous.
Then again we do have commonly used phrases that point to the existence of similar concepts, like:
„Ich habe mich entschieden.“ (better translated as „I have made a decision, I have made up my mind.“ – usually meant to imply a preceeding phase of long consideration that has now come to an end.) . Funnily enough grammatically this is a reflexive term („I decided myself to...&#8220.
or „Ich habe mir den grünen Teppich ausgesucht.“ (more like „I picked the green carpet.&#8220, but not said with the emphasis on „ausgesucht = picked“, but on „green“. More likely we will simply say „Ich habe den grünen Teppich genommen“ („I took the green carpet&#8220.
or „Das ist deine Entscheidung.“ („This is your decision to make“.). Meaning: „...not mine“.

In any case, the use of such phrases always seems to imply a concrete „as opposed to“ (I can´t make up my mind, there was only one sort of carpets, this is a decision that is not in my competence...) instead of trying to make a statement about the human condition.

You repeatedly criticize me for changing a first person statement into a third person statement, and rightly so. This brought to my attention the fact that it´s actually the second and third person use of „choose“ that I have problems with.
From what I understand your post to say, you point out that we perceive to have „choices“ (agreed), and therefore you naturally assume that we have them. I.e. „I have a choice“ actually is short for „I perceive options“. If „I choose“ means nothing but this, that´s ok with me. I do not really see a need for using this word excessively (except if wanting to emphasize something about the particular options that I perceive), but oh well. I can file that under redundancy in language, and that´s not really an issue that would cause me much concern or motivate to make long discussions.
But: If „choice“ actually merely refers to concrete cases of perceiving options, where does all the „you chose“, „he chose“, „belief (just to pick one example) is a choice“ stuff come from? Since when can we tell other persons what they perceive or did perceive in a particular situation?
„I chose...“ tells me something about the perception of the person. Often a valid and often useful information, indeed. So does „I had no choice...“. These are indiscussable statements, though, and – on what you and I seem to have for common ground – there is no basis whatsoever for contradicting such a statement. As far as I can see you have defined it into a completely subjective statement, and there it may or may not have its merits, but beyond that there cannot be any objective ground for assuming someone to have a choice in a particular matter.

Just a few remarks in response to your post:

Think of it as an axiom upon which other more important things are defined. At a certain point, unless we agree upon simple words that describe fundamental elements of human experience, we have no way of communicating regarding more abstract things. I was simply clarifying the obvious; there was nothing tricky about it.

I didn´t say nor mean that there was something tricky about it.
I see no problem with using this as an axiom about how we perceive/experience ourselves in certain instances (and don´t in others). I do see problems with the step from „We experience ourselves as...“ to „That´s how it is“. I find this difference important, particularly if this axiom is – as you say - used for the ground on which „other more important things are defined“.
The problem I observe is that usually, whenever this axiom is used to define important things, the two are confused or equivocated. Whilst what I am looking for are those supposedly important things that can be concluded from „I experience myself as having options“, and I don´t seem to see any.

I can't help but think you are taking "choice" to mean something entirely more complicated than it need be! Regardless of all the metaphysics, we observe people making choices ("choosing" one restaurant over another). The implications of that observation are another matter.

Maybe I take it for something more complicated than it need be. Whilst I perceive it as complicating things unnecessarily. I don´t observe people choosing a restaurant (how could I possibly – according to what we seem to agree upon it would be a statement about their perception), I for one simply observe them entering a restaurant.

I can't help but be frustrated when you ask "whether this being has 'choice' or not?" Do you seriously doubt whether you make choices about what to eat, let alone many other things? What is the point of the word "choice" then?

That´s my question.

You might as well ask what the definition of "is" is and whether we exist at all because the word "is" is meaningless.

The difference is that I can experience myself as being able to explain the world to me easily without ever using the word „choice“, whilst I experience myself to be unable to do so without the word „is“.

Will anything "do it for you"?

Depends on what you have in store.
I am doing all I can in evaluate your offers (you know, I don´t choose my convictions. There always needs to be a certain – unfortunately unpredictable - change in the determining factors in order for them to change. :chuckle: ) Sorry if I come across as bone-headed. I perceive myself as having no choice in these matters. If in doubt just assume stupidity and/or immaturity on my part. Or irrational fear, as Asimov couldn´t help assuming.

Understanding more about what drives us to certain choices over others does not eliminate choice. It simply gives us a better view as to what our limitations are for the future. In essense, that inhibition itself becomes one of the criteria upon which we choose our future actions. Many people can overcome even the most inexhorably habitual inhibitions or addictions once they recognize their existence.

This paragraph makes complete sense to me. It would make as much sense to me, though, had you said „actions“ instead of „choices“.

Since I am not a cockroach, and I don't know anyone who is (and I doubt you do either), we cannot know whether the cockroach chose the restaurant or just happened to wander into it. A neuro-entomologist would probably tell us that the cockroach does not have sufficient processing power to evaluate that he is even in an itallian restaurant, let alone to evaluate a set of options.

Agreed.
(Since I am not you... /since you are not me...)

This was a lot of obfuscation to talk about things already mentioned.

This is not a nice thing to say about the thoughts another person shares with you. Such remarks tend to frustrate me. (But I am determined to assume that you had no choice in making it ).

Indeed, but even if they ultimately exist are they knowable? Can we know that such factors exist? Talking about unconscious, undiscernable factors does not make them limitless.

Certainly not. But what keeps me from assuming them axiomatically (just like you assume choice axiomatically)? As opposed to choice the existence of cause-effect relations can at least be reliably and objectively observed, after all.
Here is something I´ll concede right away (just in case it wasn´t clear until now), something that is self-evident to me: When it comes to abstract concepts about the assumed unknowable, I will always hold the one that works best for me and helps my purposes and desires. Whether it is true or not can not be the criterium in view of its assumed unknowability, anyways.
I am doing quite fine with assuming that which is demonstrable to be limitless: cause-effects chains determining that which happens. Asserting an actually unexplained factor "choice" to be at work somewhere within me, does not really explain anything to me. It is merely a space-holder for "I can´t explain it." It gives me nothing to work from. Whilst analyzing the cause-effect chains at least gives me the chance to gain some more insight about the nature of the processes.
Even more so when it comes to third person observations. If I have problems with the way someone acts (but also in the opposite case when someone acts in a particularly admirable way), the statement "He chose so" leaves me stuck in my frustration. What however particularly interests me because it is likely to provide me with a usable explanation and better understanding is searching for what caused him to act that way.

"The choices I make are determined by all factors involved." This is a third person perspective stated through the first person. It fails to speak to your experience because you cannot know all of these factors. It fails to speak from the third person because no third person may predict the future with complete certainty (necessity).

I´m afraid I cannot follow here. I make a first person statement, and you criticize it for not being a third person statement, because as a third person statement it would be inaccurate?

I can track down a lot of determining factors. When I start to look deeper into things I always find more and more of them. Whenever I fail to track down a determining factor that explains my behaviour, I will search for it. When assuming the absence of determining factors for my behaviour I would have to perceive myself as acting randomly.

"I act the way I do" is a long winded way of saying "I choose".

Whilst „I chose to act“ is a long winded way of saying „I acted“.
Point being:
There is no practical difference between:
„I bought the green carpet, went home and put it in my living room“
„I chose to buy the green carpet, chose to go home and chose to put it in my living room“
„All factors involved determined me to buy the green carpet...“
except if my actual intention is to express my general view on the human condition.
Thus, if parsimonous language is the goal, I would prefer the first version.

Stupidity and/or imaturity.

Wouldn´t those be essentials of a person´s perspective?

Here we go. Now we are on to "will". Will seems to be the point at which our thoughts and our actions collide. I would say that "will" is the experience of the "choice" which we are making at the present moment. ie "will" is slightly more abstract than the more historical "choice". Though we may know what we chose, we may not know what we "willed".

Interestingly in my experience my „will“ seems to be self-evident rather than my „choice“.

Our "will" seems to extend into our preconscious and subconscious mind.
Would you agree? Or is "will" purely conscious?

I am fine with that description. It seems to collide with your above definition of will being the experience of choice, though. Experience, in my understanding, is always conscious.
I don´t think it´s reasonable to define will as the way our sub- or preconsciousness causes us to act, and at the same time as the experience of choice.

And yet, you are also in control of your will. If you will your "will" to change, it will do so over time.

And is this will to change my will itself subject to my will? How far would you take the infinite regression caused by entire self-reference you propose here?
(Whilst I seem to by and large agree with your analysis of the processes by which our preferences are changed, I find the terminlogy you propose highly confusing. If we arrive at a point at which we say that something influences (or determines) itself, it´s safe to say that something went wrong with the definitions. They are unusable.)



Greetings
quatona

 

[Apollonian]

Appolonian, thanks for your response.

First of all, could you please take the time to spell my name correctly.

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Apollonian

Second, let's cut this short. Unless you're interested in my thought process, let's skip ahead to Analysis of "WILL" as I've labelled below...

The point about the German is a good one. I did not know this and it makes sense regarding the trouble with "choice". I will continue to use quotations to indicate the version which we seem to agree upon.

This brought to my attention the fact that it´s actually the second and third person use of „choose“ that I have problems with.

Bingo.

But: If „choice“ actually merely refers to concrete cases of perceiving options, where does all the „you chose“, „he chose“, „belief (just to pick one example) is a choice“ stuff come from? Since when can we tell other persons what they perceive or did perceive in a particular situation?

It is based on the assumption that all humans share a certain commonality, and that the process of "choosing" is included in this. We observe people making the same actions as we have and infer that there was a "choice" preceding such actions.

Unless you believe in solipsism, this is a reasonable assumption to a point (ie we don't actually know what their options were, though we infer that there were some options which resulted in the action).

http://www.iep.utm.edu/s/solipsis.htm

„I chose...“ tells me something about the perception of the person. Often a valid and often useful information, indeed. So does „I had no choice...“.

The sentence "I had no choice." is often as truthful as "I didn't write this." (ie People say "I had no choice" even when they did and don't want to admit it to themselves).

If a man were to murder someone in self-defense and later say "I had no choice", this isn't saying "I didn't make a choice" but rather "The choice was obvious to me and if you were in my place it would have been obvious to you too". There is still an element of uncertainty, and it gets degraded through the second/third person.

The important question I ask is: Does there need to be objective ground for assuming other people make "choices"?

Rather, isn't it sufficient that we all have the same subjective ground for the assumption? (Namely, that we are all human and share traits).

I believe that humans are similar enough with each other to infer by induction (not deduction) that other people have the same process of "choice" as I do.
This is also where Kierkegaard's sign comes in. At a certain point, deductive reasoning falls pray to a lack of sufficient axioms needed to reach a useful conclusion.

Think of it this way... You observe someone "entering a restaurant". You did not, in fact, observe the choice itself. However, if you were to "place yourself in that person's shoes", could you imagine the process that they went through in deciding which to enter?

Thus, you can obtain a (degraded but useful) first person perspective from a second person account.

I am doing all I can in evaluate your offers (you know, I don´t choose my convictions. There always needs to be a certain – unfortunately unpredictable - change in the determining factors in order for them to change. :chuckle: )

Ok, so maybe you didn't "choose" your convictions (convictions being internal) but did you not "will" them to be as such?

Sorry if I come across as bone-headed. I perceive myself as having no choice in these matters. If in doubt just assume stupidity and/or immaturity on my part. Or irrational fear, as Asimov couldn´t help assuming.

I thought it was Asimov who wrote about how individuals can change the course of history despite otherwise deterministic effects? Have you read Foundation? The whole point about psychohistory was accounting for and influencing the unpredictable nature of history despite the obvious trends. I seriously doubt if Asimov had such a fatalistic view of our choices (or "freedom"). It is amazing how easily we can distort our reality through our will.

If you assume "choice" to exist at all, then I doubt you can so easily (choose to) say "I have no choice" and have it be true in the metaphysical sense. I think you are trying to think of yourself in the third person, which I don't believe to be possible. "I didn't write this."

In philosophy, one of the basic assumptions is that people are not lieing. However, due to the very psychologically narrow scope of this discussion, it becomes possible for people to lie and not realize it (conscious vs unconscious). This is the primary reason why I started ranting about the importance of proper language and perspective.

This is not a nice thing to say about the thoughts another person shares with you. Such remarks tend to frustrate me. (But I am determined to assume that you had no choice in making it ).

*laugh* Perhaps I "didn't have a choice". I was so struck with the irony of it, that I just had to ("choose to") make that statement instead of ignoring it.

You're right. It was not nice. Sorry. It is too easy in philosophy to become emotionally detached with text.

Certainly not. But what keeps me from assuming them [factors] axiomatically (just like you assume choice axiomatically)?

I have presented my reasoning via induction. I suppose, therefore that you may propose the same inductive reasoning to apply to causal factors.

So, I will preempt the burden of proof. What of quantum mechanics? Given that the brain's primary function lies through electro-chemical interactions, isn't it true that our thoughts would be effected by quantum mechanical factors just as much as classical ones? If so, and you wish to assume knowledge of these factors axiomatically, then how do you handle Heisenburg's principle?

(See below before responding. I think you may have already answered this)

As opposed to choice the existence of cause-effect relations can at least be reliably and objectively observed, after all.

This is not true when including quantum mechanics. I had made this argument earlier in the thread. Some cause-effect relations may be sufficiently correlated. However, they are not necessarily linear, and it is not possible in general to objectively observe all causes which produce a particular effect. e.g. The weather and human cognition.

Here is something I´ll concede right away (just in case it wasn´t clear until now), something that is self-evident to me: When it comes to abstract concepts about the assumed unknowable, I will always hold the one that works best for me and helps my purposes and desires. Whether it is true or not can not be the criterium in view of its assumed unknowability, anyways.

This is the basis of "faith". Agreed.

I am doing quite fine with assuming that which is demonstrable to be limitless: cause-effects chains determining that which happens.

Slippery Slope. Which came first, chicken or egg? Is it really limitless, or do we just approximate it as so? Perhaps the causal relationships are more of a network than a chain?

Asserting an actually unexplained factor "choice" to be at work somewhere within me, does not really explain anything to me. It is merely a space-holder for "I can´t explain it." It gives me nothing to work from. Whilst analyzing the cause-effect chains at least gives me the chance to gain some more insight about the nature of the processes.

Ok, so I am getting from this that you believe the following: Human will lies in the interaction between the past and the future. The present is unobservable, and therefore it is the motion and not the state that matters. Is this correct? If so, then you could possibly avoid the problem with Heisenburg (observability) but not yet with uncertainty (actual knowledge).

„I bought the green carpet, went home and put it in my living room“
„I chose to buy the green carpet, chose to go home and chose to put it in my living room“

These are first-person, as shown by the use of the reflexive pronoun "I". The difference between these two statements is that the first is transitive and the second intransitive. Linguistically speaking, that is a subtle but practical difference in meaning, and it is shown far less subtely in German.

„All factors involved determined me to buy the green carpet...“

This is third-person, as shown by the passive voice. The reflexive pronoun becomes the object instead of the subject. Again, this is an important difference in perspective, dealing with different realms of knowledge.

except if my actual intention is to express my general view on the human condition.
Thus, if parsimonous language is the goal, I would prefer the first version.

The goal is not "parsimonious" but "concise" language. The goal is to say what you mean in as simple a manner as possible without losing meaning. It is very difficult to do, but I try.

Even more so when it comes to third person observations. If I have problems with the way someone acts (but also in the opposite case when someone acts in a particularly admirable way), the statement "He chose so" leaves me stuck in my frustration. What however particularly interests me because it is likely to provide me with a usable explanation and better understanding is searching for what caused him to act that way.

Alright, you are right. We've beat "choice" to death, and I think I more or less agree. Let's analyze the causes therefor and the effects therefrom.

Analysis of "Will"

I can track down a lot of determining factors. When I start to look deeper into things I always find more and more of them. Whenever I fail to track down a determining factor that explains my behaviour, I will search for it. When assuming the absence of determining factors for my behaviour I would have to perceive myself as acting randomly.

Are you familiar with "pseudo-random" numbers? In computer science, there is no such thing as a truly random number generator. Supremely complex algorithms are created to produce seemingly random numbers, but the same seed-value will generate the same sequence deterministically. By varying the seed-value based on something constantly changing like CPU clock, we can get "random" numbers out of a computer.

I have to wonder whether this is an analogy of what you mean. However, I doubt if we will ever be capable of determining what the seed-value to the causal universe was. Therefore, things appear random and so we have little reason to assume otherwise.

However, the way in which humans experience this random process seems to have significance. Just because a person's actions are objectively pseudo-random does not change the fact that the person experiences a process described as decision-making ("choice") among several perceived options. As such, there is no contradiction between determinism and "free will"; it is a matter of perspective.

Yet, what is the depth, breadth, and extent of that human perception? Will we ever predict human behavior with high accuracy (e.g. as in Azimov's Foundation)? I think that is what interests you, and myself included.

Interestingly in my experience my „will“ seems to be self-evident rather than my „choice“.

Ok. I think I catch on now. Personally, I think that both are evident, but I agree that "will" is a much more useful term. Still, how do you define "will" with or without using decision/choice/option etc? Let's move on to "will" then.

I am fine with that description. It seems to collide with your above definition of will being the experience of choice, though. Experience, in my understanding, is always conscious.

You're right. I got them backward. It should be "choice" which is the conscious element while "will" encompasses the gestalt, the totality of one's internal process.

And is this will to change my will itself subject to my will? How far would you take the infinite regression caused by entire self-reference you propose here?

Cogito ergo sum. This is how Descartes proved his own existence. The proof relies on the slippery slope for its center, however. Still, there is significance to the ability people have to think about their own thoughts etc. I am still trying to discern that significance for myself (ironically).

(Whilst I seem to by and large agree with your analysis of the processes by which our preferences are changed, I find the terminlogy you propose highly confusing.

Sorry, I am just as guilty of obfuscation some times. Please call me on it, but also provide a question or clarification. These discussion help me a great deal in honing such terminology.

If we arrive at a point at which we say that something influences (or determines) itself, it´s safe to say that something went wrong with the definitions. They are unusable.)

This is not the case. A good example is that of a simple feedback control system like a cruise-control for a car. The car's acceleration is caused by the relative error in the car's speed, but the current speed of the car is determined by it's acceleration. There is nothing fundamentally wrong with this system. The human mind is a wonderful non-linear, chaotical feedback control system withoutwhich we would perish.

The property of feedback is not only valid, but also necessary for human survival. It is the properties (e.g. stability, transient behavior, etc) which are important.

"Thinking about thinking (about thinking...)" is an example of an infinite feedback loop. However, inevitably, there is some other process of feedback going on which informs us of this infinite loop and breaks it. Thus, the human brain exhibits control over otherwise unstable processes.

Out of curiosity, what is your academic background? Do you have a degree or specialty of some sort? As you can probably tell, I am an engineer by trade and philosopher by hobby.

 

[quatona]

First of all, could you please take the time to spell my name correctly.

Yes, certainly. It doesn´t even take me more time to spell it correctly. I understand that misspelling of the name can be perceived as lack of respect. Sorry if this was the case. I simply didn´t pay attention. Now that you have brought it to my attention, I think it won´t happen again.

It is based on the assumption that all humans share a certain commonality, and that the process of "choosing" is included in this. We observe people making the same actions as we have and infer that there was a "choice" preceding such actions.

The problem I have with that is that I often don´t perceive myself as making choices. Oftentimes I don´t see the alternative that I need, and sometimes in retrospective I notice how it was there. On another note I also observe myself to will something, and in pursuing this goal I am acting in great unawareness regarding the details of the things I do on the way to this goal. I do not even will them, I don´t think about them, I am acting almost mechanically in regards to these means.

We have an actual example at hand. I didn´t will or choose to misspell your name. I unconsciously felt I knew how to spell it, and I didn´t put any effort in the selection of letters.
What I „willed“ was to consider and discuss your statements, and I didn´t „ will“ to make all the misspellings and grammatical mistakes that my posts are probably full of. Just the opposite: My will is to write correct words and sentences. My will to make sense and write meaningful sentences seems to be greater, though, and sometimes gives allowance to making careless mistakes. This doesn´t mean I will or choose to make mistakes or a particular mistake. It is, at best, a (negative) byproduct of what I actually will.

In the restaurant example: Suppose this guy whom we observe entering an Italian restaurant is going to meet a business partner, who told him to come to the Baker St. 7. What he wills is meeting this guy, whereever he might wait for him. He has no interest in this Italian restaurant, he is not hungry, he doesn´t even know that Baker St. 7 is an Italian restaurant. Actually he hates Italian restaurants.
Now, we observe him and say „He chose to go to the Italian restaurant.“
The Italian restaurant, however, was not the subject of his choice. In fact he is completely indifferent in regards to this restaurant. Our statement does not at all do justice to what this guy willed or chose. Our axiomatic assumption that there is will causing his actions is most likely true, but - merely guessing from what we can observe - we are mistaken about the subject of his will.
What you further down praise as a „more concise“ way of saying it is just the opposite: Whilst „he entered the restaurant“ would be an accurate and concise statement „he chose to enter it“ induces noise. We don´t catch the important part (what he actually willed) and put that which we observed in the center of his assumed will.
This happens all the time, and it contributes a lot to misunderstandings, frustration and negative emotions in human interaction: mind reading.

The sentence "I had no choice." is often as truthful as "I didn't write this." (ie People say "I had no choice" even when they did and don't want to admit it to themselves).

I think this statement is clearly a transgression of your argumentation upon which we agreed that „choice“ can be meaningfully used in first person sentences. Remember: I have choice if I perceive there to be options.
Whilst I could see a reasonable point in making axioms based on self-observation like „humans observe that there are choices to make“ (we need something to start from, after all), you are now doing the same with very detailed observations about yourself, and make general third person statements based on your self-perception. You have added a couple of new axioms to the basic axiom. This is the sort of „building upon axioms“ that I am opposed to. Instead of logically building upon it, we just add some more mind reading to it.
If „choice“ is a first person reflexive perception, we have to accept „I had no choice“, and it is not up to you or me to insinuate things like „he doesn´t want to admit it to himself“.

If a man were to murder someone in self-defense and later say "I had no choice", this isn't saying "I didn't make a choice" but rather "The choice was obvious to me and if you were in my place it would have been obvious to you too". There is still an element of uncertainty, and it gets degraded through the second/third person.

This is where generalizing axioms based on self-observations shows their dangers.
I know quite some persons who do a lot of counterproductive stuff – actually they act that way all through the day limited to this one track they are running on. They suffer from it greatly, and they make everyone around them suffer. They are unhappy. Often they are even aware of it, but they have no choice to change it. (This, btw., is not mind reading, but what they told me in long conversations).
I tell you what: you and I don´t know s*h*i*t about the choices of other persons.
I used to stand clueless in front of such persons, until I experienced something similar myself – fortunately only in a very distinct situation. My mother was in a senior residence. I visited her on a regular basis, and whenever I entered the room I felt like being remote controlled. I observed myself acting in the most inappropriate manner. Whilst my will in visiting her was to give her joy, fun, nice company, confidence, comfort, nearness, in fact I did nothing for it. I didn´t show any interest, I didn´t ask questions, I was impatient, I had lost all my humour etc.
As soon as I had closed the door behind me to go home, I instantly knew what would have been the nice way to react, how I „could have“ acted differently, how irrational and counterproductive and hurting my behaviour had been. Next time the same thing again. And next time. She was suffering, so was I. I started preparing mentally for the visits, visualizing the standard situations and what to do. Things didn´t change.
I had no choice in this situation. (This is not meant to be an excuse or a justification. I still feel bad for all those visits.)
Ever had a friend who suffered from severe depressions? Do you think he chooses to be that unhappy? The alternative is clear to everyone but the person himself: „You just have to choose to be a bit more light hearted.“

The important question I ask is: Does there need to be objective ground for assuming other people make "choices"?

Well, you can do and assume what you want. I personally don´t see any benefit coming from assuming this.

Rather, isn't it sufficient that we all have the same subjective ground for the assumption? (Namely, that we are all human and share traits).

Sounds circular to me. Where do you get that we all have the same subjective ground?
And if, by all means, you want to make such assumptions, then please be precise. So far we have agreed on the axiom that humans perceive to have choices. We have not agreed that humans perceive choices all the time and in each and everything, we have not agreed that Joe perceives a choice just because I see an alternative, and we have not agreed that people perceive those very choices that we interprete their actions to be driven by.
You simply leave out a great deal of those traits that we share (if I accept for the sake of the argument the assumtion that we share all traits): I perceive having choices sometimes, and sometimes not. Sometimes I perceive choices where others perceive me as having no choice, and sometimes I perceive no alternative where others perceive me as having one.

You are moving much too fast for me, you are jumping to conclusions in my opinion, and you arrive exactly at those conclusions that – in my observation - people want to arrive at when putting great effort in establishing the idea of „choice“. Even though it is presented as an entirely subjective thing, a purely first person experience, in the end it´s about third person statements, about having a tool to deny others that which they explicitly describe as their perception.

Think of it this way... You observe someone "entering a restaurant". You did not, in fact, observe the choice itself. However, if you were to "place yourself in that person's shoes", could you imagine the process that they went through in deciding which to enter?

I think I have covered this above. The assumption that there was some sort of choice is useless, and the chances that I misinterprete that which would actually be relevant information is high.

Thus, you can obtain a (degraded but useful) first person perspective from a second person account.

My key question, I think: What would be useful about it? In my experience it´s pretty much useless (if not against my intentions) because that which would be useful to learn about his perspective is assumed without any basis whatsoever: What he willed.

Ok, so maybe you didn't "choose" your convictions (convictions being internal) but did you not "will" them to be as such?

I perceive myself as determined to avoid cognitive dissonance.

In philosophy, one of the basic assumptions is that people are not lieing. However, due to the very psychologically narrow scope of this discussion, it becomes possible for people to lie and not realize it (conscious vs unconscious). This is the primary reason why I started ranting about the importance of proper language and perspective.

I personally would find a term that distinguishes between conscious and unconscious processes much more useful and concise than one that distinguishes between choice and no choice. And if I am not entirely mistaken, in common language the term „choice“ is exactly used to describe a conscious process.

I have presented my reasoning via induction. I suppose, therefore that you may propose the same inductive reasoning to apply to causal factors.

Have you? As far as I can see you have simply made axiomatical assumptions:
a. the way I perceive myself allows to conclude that this is the human condition (particularly if others report to perceive themselves similarly)
b. I can conclude that all humans share my way of perceiving things.

So, I will preempt the burden of proof. What of quantum mechanics? Given that the brain's primary function lies through electro-chemical interactions, isn't it true that our thoughts would be effected by quantum mechanical factors just as much as classical ones? If so, and you wish to assume knowledge of these factors axiomatically, then how do you handle Heisenburg's principle?

This is not true when including quantum mechanics. I had made this argument earlier in the thread. Some cause-effect relations may be sufficiently correlated. However, they are not necessarily linear, and it is not possible in general to objectively observe all causes which produce a particular effect. e.g. The weather and human cognition.

Ah, burdon of proof. I have told you already my way of dealing with things unknowable. Concepts concerning this have to be useful. Whether they are true or not is irrelevant by virtue of their assumed unknowability.
I´m looking for concepts that help me explaining and dealing with my and the behaviour of others. Searching for causes has proven help- and useful to me, whilst saying „choice“ seems to help me with nothing.
As for quantum mechanics: I am not a scientist, and I have absolutely no clue about this particular field. Zero. Neither do I know about this principle.
Btw. wasn´t the name of that guy „Heisenberg“? quatona biting his tongue

Whatever, I have no doubt that cause-effect relations are extremely complex. I have no ambition to find out each and every of them and understand the exact way they function.
As you say it is impossible. So what? I am happy for every of them that I can get hold of.

This is the basis of "faith".

Whatever. As long as you don´t use it for a false equivocation, that´s fine with me.

Slippery Slope.

Have you confused some fallacies, by any chance? I don´t know how my statement could be considered a slippery slope by any stretch. Were you maybe thinking of „question begging“?

Which came first, chicken or egg? Is it really limitless, or do we just approximate it as so? Perhaps the causal relationships are more of a network than a chain?

When I see a chicken crawling out of an egg, I conclude that of these two the egg was first. When I see a hen pressing out an egg, I conclude that the chicken was the first of these two.
That´s all I need, for my pragmatic purposes.
The effect usually doesn´t come before the cause. (Axiomatic assumption based on experience shared by most every human ).

Ok, so I am getting from this that you believe the following: Human will lies in the interaction between the past and the future. The present is unobservable, and therefore it is the motion and not the state that matters.

I think I agree with this. Words like „matters“ tempt me to ask „What for?“, though. If it´s just meant to say that we can only observe motion but not states, agreed.

Is this correct? If so, then you could possibly avoid the problem with Heisenburg (observability) but not yet with uncertainty (actual knowledge).

To be honest, I have no clue what you are talking about.
And which problem do you want me to avoid, to begin with?

These are first-person,
<snip>
This is third-person,
<snip>
The goal is not "parsimonious" but "concise" language. The goal is to say what you mean in as simple a manner as possible without losing meaning. It is very difficult to do, but I try.

Long story short: The three versions simply display different intentions in what the speaker wants to express. None of them is per se more concise than the others or inaccurate.
I find the first version to be the most concise for that which I intend to express, in most every case. If telling a friend what carpet I bought, usually I don´t want to pass my worldview along with it (except when I do want to ).


Apollonian, it´s late and I am tired. Sorry, I haven´t even arrived at the more important part of your post. I don´t know when I will find the time. Tomorrow is pretty stuffed. Won´t be before Sunday, probably.
So far thanks for the inspiring conversation.
quatona

 

[Apollonian]

(Thanks for the discussion and please briefly skip to the bottom before reading)

This happens all the time, and it contributes a lot to misunderstandings, frustration and negative emotions in human interaction: mind reading.

It is true that mind reading can be problematic and at times contribute to cognitive distortion. At the same time, however, it is crucial in such realms as diplomacy and intimate relationships. Attempting to read someone's mind (to determine what he/she might do or think in a particular situation) is an important part of human relationships. This process forms one of the first foundations of our knowledge of the world as we begin to learn how to "read" our parents from their expressions and behavior.

Yes, it causes a lot of confusion and misunderstanding, but without it we would be at a loss as how to understand each other at all. Let's not throw the baby out with the bath water.

I think this statement is clearly a transgression of your argumentation upon which we agreed that &#8222;choice&#8220; can be meaningfully used in first person sentences. Remember: I have choice if I perceive there to be options.

Therefore, if you perceive no options then you have no choice. Alright, I will accept that logic. Still, there is the subconscious/preconscious element to contend with in determining whether you did in fact perceive no options. Is perception only a conscious process? I think that psychologists would indicate not so. We perceive much more than we are aware.

Instead of logically building upon it, we just add some more mind reading to it.

Did you miss the point about inductive logic?

If &#8222;choice&#8220; is a first person reflexive perception, we have to accept &#8222;I had no choice&#8220;, and it is not up to you or me to insinuate things like &#8222;he doesn´t want to admit it to himself&#8220;.

&#8220;The problem with unconscious conflicts is that you can&#8217;t cure someone just by telling him or her what&#8217;s happening unconsciously. An attempt to do this can have some dramatic and ironic effects. &#8230;
&#8230;&#8220;What do you mean I get angry and break off relationships when people say things I don&#8217;t like? I&#8217;m a loving, open person. And to think I wasted my money on an idiot therapist like you. Good riddance.&#8221; &#8230;&#8221; -- A Guide to Psychology and its Practice

I see it all the time. You cannot run from your subconscious.

This is where generalizing axioms based on self-observations shows their dangers.
I know quite some persons who do a lot of counterproductive stuff &#8211; actually they act that way all through the day limited to this one track they are running on. They suffer from it greatly, and they make everyone around them suffer. They are unhappy. Often they are even aware of it, but they have no choice to change it. (This, btw., is not mind reading, but what they told me in long conversations).

Huh?

I tell you what: you and I don´t know s*h*i*t about the choices of other persons.

The expletive is unnecessary, especially when you quite obviously know that there is a filter and seek to circumvent it. Plus, I disagree.

I didn´t show any interest, I didn´t ask questions, I was impatient, I had lost all my humour etc.

So then, you are saying our will is not completely free?

Next time the same thing again. And next time. She was suffering, so was I. I started preparing mentally for the visits, visualizing the standard situations and what to do. Things didn´t change.

*shrug* That doesn't mean they can't, though I can see how you could come to believe that.

I had no choice in this situation. (This is not meant to be an excuse or a justification. I still feel bad for all those visits.)

&#8220;Whatever you &#8220;think&#8221; you are is only a vague approximation of what you really are. And what you really are is contained in discrete moments of genuine encounter with your inner life.&#8221; &#8211;A Guide to Psychology and its Practice- &#8220;Identity and Loneliness&#8221;

Here is a question: who (or what) is it that is conducting your actions? In essense, who is it that is making the "choices" for you (since you "have no choice")?

Is there a subconscious script which you are acting out? Why do you act in such a way as to confound your own conscious will?

Ever had a friend who suffered from severe depressions?

Yes.

Do you think he chooses to be that unhappy?

Yes and no. He may choose to begin on the road to recovery, but it is difficult and he probably doesn't see the point of it. So, left to his own devices he will choose to self-destruct because it is the easiest path. But place him in community and there is just enough room for him to act upon the help that other people provide. Severe depression leaves people powerless to help themselves. But fortunately "no man is an island entire unto himself" - John Dunn

The alternative is clear to everyone but the person himself: &#8222;You just have to choose to be a bit more light hearted.&#8220;

Nope. That's not it. Such platitudes often serve to push people deeper into depression. Truth is the only thing which can bring people out of it, and Truth is very hard to find even when we are not delusional.

Sounds circular to me. Where do you get that we all have the same subjective ground?

Logically speaking, it isn't circular.
The ground comes from talking with many people about the way they view the world, including this discussion.

We have not agreed that humans perceive choices all the time and in each and everything, we have not agreed that Joe perceives a choice just because I see an alternative, and we have not agreed that people perceive those very choices that we interprete their actions to be driven by.

We have yet to cover the ground of psychology and the subconscious, which I think is important for this matter.

My key question, I think: What would be useful about it? In my experience it´s pretty much useless (if not against my intentions) because that which would be useful to learn about his perspective is assumed without any basis whatsoever: What he willed.

Huh? Any observation which illucidates the human condition is useful to me. By observing other people's options and their resulting actions, I can gain a greater understanding of what I might do in similar circumstances. If I have never seen nor touched a stove before, I might choose to touch it out of curiosity, but if I were to observe other people first I can learn about the consequences of choosing based on curiosity. Thereby, as a grow and learn, I have a greater understanding of how to make choices.

Essentially, we teach each other what options we do or do not have. One person may show another a previously unconsidered option.

I can see how it seems that I am "jumping to conclusions" here because I am presenting my conclusions for the purpose of seeing if you agree with them or not.

I perceive myself as determined to avoid cognitive dissonance.

*chuckle* I hope that you can laugh at the irony if you don't succeed.

I personally would find a term that distinguishes between conscious and unconscious processes much more useful and concise than one that distinguishes between choice and no choice. And if I am not entirely mistaken, in common language the term &#8222;choice&#8220; is exactly used to describe a conscious process.

Right. We agreed on that. Choice is conscious whereas "will" is both conscious, preconscious (memory), and subconscious.

Perhaps we could use the Freudian term "Ego" to refer to the conscious element of will and the Jungian term "Shadow" to refer to the subconscious element? As in "Ego-will" and "Shadow-will" ? Unless you have a better idea.

Have you? As far as I can see you have simply made axiomatical assumptions:
a. the way I perceive myself allows to conclude that this is the human condition (particularly if others report to perceive themselves similarly)
b. I can conclude that all humans share my way of perceiving things.

These aren't assumptions. I have defined "choice" as an axiom. I have an idea of the definition of what "human" is (as an axiom). Since I am one of many members of the set of all "humans", it stands to reason that share some (not all) traits with the others. Since I observe similar behavior with respect to choices, I infer (correlate) that others share a similar process of choice as I do.

This process is, however, more along the lines of what you say as "acting" rather than "choosing" as per the German. The point is the similarity with other humans, regardless of the semantics.

Ah, burdon of proof. I have told you already my way of dealing with things unknowable. Concepts concerning this have to be useful. Whether they are true or not is irrelevant by virtue of their assumed unknowability.

What are you assuming to be unknowable, and what basis do you have for such an assumption?

As for quantum mechanics: I am not a scientist, and I have absolutely no clue about this particular field. Zero. Neither do I know about this principle.
Btw. wasn´t the name of that guy &#8222;Heisenberg&#8220;?

Woops. You're right. Heisenberg. I was moving too quickly and didn't check it. The Heisenberg principle is simply this: The more we observe an object's state (position), the less we know about it's motion (velocity/wave-properties) and vice versa. In essense, by observing something, we fundamentally change it's nature. There is no comprehensive objectivity in the realm of the very small.

Whatever, I have no doubt that cause-effect relations are extremely complex. I have no ambition to find out each and every of them and understand the exact way they function.
As you say it is impossible. So what? I am happy for every of them that I can get hold of.

This is what I mean by induction as opposed to deduction. At a certain point, we have enough evidence to convince ourselves, but we can never be sure. It would have been a slippery slope if you insisted you could obtain all of them.

When I see a chicken crawling out of an egg, I conclude that of these two the egg was first. When I see a hen pressing out an egg, I conclude that the chicken was the first of these two.
That´s all I need, for my pragmatic purposes.
The effect usually doesn´t come before the cause. (Axiomatic assumption based on experience shared by most every human ).

Huh? What are you trying to say?

I think I agree with this. Words like &#8222;matters&#8220; tempt me to ask &#8222;What for?&#8220;, though. If it´s just meant to say that we can only observe motion but not states, agreed.

Agreed. "What for" - for the efficacy of this discussion.

It is the remaining uncertainty in that motion which leaves room for "free will" as we present more an more constraints to "will" in general.

Apollonian, it´s late and I am tired. Sorry, I haven´t even arrived at the more important part of your post. I don´t know when I will find the time. Tomorrow is pretty stuffed. Won´t be before Sunday, probably.
So far thanks for the inspiring conversation.
quatona

No problem. I don't blame you. This stuff is insightful, but takes a lot of time.

I think we've wrapped up a lot of loose ends by now.

Two remaining topics to grok
There are two remaining topics I would like to discuss: sub-conscious-will and the concept of the feedback loop ("meta-cognition").

A good example is that of a simple feedback control system like a cruise-control for a car. The car's acceleration is caused by the relative error in the car's speed, but the current speed of the car is determined by it's acceleration. There is nothing fundamentally wrong with this system. The human mind is a wonderful non-linear, chaotical feedback control system withoutwhich we would perish.

The property of feedback is not only valid, but also necessary for human survival. It is the properties (e.g. stability, transient behavior, etc) which are important.

"Thinking about thinking (about thinking...)" is an example of an infinite feedback loop. However, inevitably, there is some other process of feedback going on which informs us of this infinite loop and breaks it. Thus, the human brain exhibits control over otherwise unstable processes.

"Grok" is such a nice term in this context.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grok

 

[Opethian]

Sorry for not replying to all of this after I made the thread, but after I started it I got into quite a busy period and lost track of it.

I would assert that the developments of Quantum Mechanics (specifically Heisenburg's Uncertainty principle) most certainly have relevance in philosophy as well as science. If you wish your philosophy to be relevant to the reality in which we operate, it makes sense to avoid assumptions which take us outside that reality.

This is certainly true, philosophy aims towards explaining the what and the why, and knowledge of the how can be a great aid in trying to answer these questions. But the reason for the assumption is the sake of argument. Uncertainty means just that: un-certainty. Free will would imply an entity that can turn an uncertainty into a certainty, by choice. If we were to link the Heisenberg uncertainty to free will, there would have to be some kind of process, a mechanism to link the entity that makes the choice to the principle of uncertainty. But then, the uncertainty principle goes for all matter, not just living matter, and certainly not just human matter. If we were to link the unique characteristic of free will, to living matter with a certain form of consciousness (or if we think very narrowly, just to humans), then there would need to be a different aspect than just the Heisenberg uncertainty to explain it, since otherwise, dead matter would have free will too. What I would describe as free will is not an uncertainty of what will happen at a given time, caused by an uncertainty in our scientific description of matter and energy. What I mean by free will is that there is some sort of supernatural entity, that is part of being human, that can control what will happen, and at any given time, can make a controlled choice between different courses of action that the body can take, rather than the body being subject to an uncertainty that is not itself a subject of choice by another entity.

If you assume complete knowledge of all physical processes, you have made yourself a God-like observer. The troublesome part is that we cannot be sure how God (or a god even in the most general sense) thinks. How can we who have finite knowledge extrapolate to the infinite?

I fail to see how complete knowledge of something relates to a divine entity. A god implies the supernatural (as far as I know), while complete knowledge of everything natural certainly does not imply the supernatural. The very unlikely, the nearly impossible perhaps, but not the supernatural. The assumption is just what it is, an assumption. The question is not how can we gain complete knowledge, and thus realise the assumption, but if the assumption is true, would complete knowledge at any given time imply complete knowledge of any given future and earlier time.

Who is to say that the entire discussion is based around the philosophical proof or disproof of "free will"? In other words, how can you be sure that the discussion isn't just about you willing "free will" to exist or not to exist? How can you know that your philosophy (excluding science) is relevant?

I have nothing to gain or lose by whether free will exists or not exist. Reality won't change whether I think it exists or doesn't exist. My perception of reality will. My curiosity to find the perception that seems most accurate to me, is stronger than any prejudice I have towards wanting it to be one way or the other. I'm just interested in the philosophical arguments for and against it, and in learning by discussing the topic. I cannot be sure of anything, but I can be convinced, and I can build a rational foundation for my views. My philosophy is relevant to me, whether it is relevant to anyone else is up to them. But whether it is relevant is not the point. Having the discussion is the point.

The problem is that the Brain does very much operate at the quantum level, given its primary form of operation in millions of electro-chemical interactions. So then, if you are not making decisions with your brain, how then do you decide things? Or if you decide things without your brain, how then do you influence your brain (and body) to act upon that decision?

The way you see this seems a bit odd to me. The question is, what is 'you'? Is 'you' your body, "l'homme-machine"? Is 'you' a separate, supernatural entity, that is connected to your body, "le corps-machine"? Is 'you' the combination of your body and your self-consciousness, "le corps-sujet"? As far as I'm concerned, 'You' is just a way to be able to see something else as something else. It is a way to be self-conscious and to differentiate, but has no meaning of its own. 'I' don't 'influence' my brain, 'I', in my many forms, am the result of different processes going on in the brain, with many connections between all the layers that make up 'me', subdivisions, and controls, with perhaps the highest control level being the real consciousness, at which level, choices which most people would consider free will choices, are taken. This level of consciousness has an oversight of most other processes going on, gets information of all the other levels and subdivisions, and gets feedback from the information it sends. Because of all the connections, the feedback and information it receives, its information content is continually changing and thus it seems in our consciousness as though we are making a, sometimes very time-consuming "choice", while perhaps it is just retreiving information from various parts in the brain, receiving information from our senses, creating information of its own, and combining all this information in a very complex equation, to determine an action, and then getting feedback whilst taking the action to perhaps change it as new information comes in. The reason thoughts can often be so time-consuming, and seem like "free will" choices of the consciousness, might be because of the time it takes to retreive and receive information, and then process it, while new information is still coming in. Perhaps the calculations need to reach a certain level of stability before they can be executed.

Millions of people have no idea of what philosophy really is (let alone science). "Debating" the issue of whether God exists or not does not consist of millions of people contradicting each other, setting up straw-man arguments, ad-hominem arguments, and a variety of other falsifications. People are left to choose what they believe since God's existence may be (un)provable (since to my knowledge we cannot prove that proof of God's existence may not be available some time in the future). It is not a matter of philosophy but one of faith.

It can be a matter of both, as philosophy of religion and of gods is certainly philosophy. The approach of the debate and the arguments of course determine whether persons are arguing from faith or from philosophy, but even that can differ from person to person, as the question, what is philosophy?, is philosophy too.

Discussion topics are either inside or outside the universe of discourse. If the topic is outside the universe of discourse, it isn't philosophy but rather fantasy or pure speculation. Fantasy and fiction have their places, but they are not philosophy which attempts to speak to topics pertaining to reality. Speculation can be interesting but must lead somewhere other than a "slippery slope". If you cannot link your philosophy to reality, then you are no different than those who once thought the Earth to be the surface of a flat plane rather than an oblate spheroid.

But there is a difference between letting one aspect of reality out of the discussion, which has no bearing on answering the question you are trying to answer, and letting an aspect of reality out of the discussion which has an immediate effect on the answer to that question.

In short, there is a distinction between the rational process of philosophy and the belief resulting from philosophy (or the lack thereof).

Of course. Philosophy never results in a definite answer. It can provide insight however and it is a way to learn.

This is an assertion and not a proof. Free will may or may not be "an illusion" since we don't understand what the reality of free will actually is. The fact that the human consciousness functions is self-evident.

I agree here. I should have started the sentence off without the word 'illusion', but as you can see later on I made the distinction between illusion and real phenomenon, while at first I erroneously asserted that it was an illusion, without the distinction.

I'm afraid you may also have an odd idea about what "supernatural" means. Can you define it? I fear that the above argument is more superstitious than logical.

I would say that supernatural means: unexplainable by natural laws or phenomena. What I mean with it is that there must be some kind of entity that isn't included in our natural view of the world that allows for the existance of free will. The Heisenberg uncertainty is an uncertainty, but it is a natural, scientific uncertainty, that pertains to all matter.

Even if we (as God-like observers) were to have complete knowledge of a person's "state"... that person would still experience confusion over the sensory information available.

If we were to have complete information on all the environmental stimuli that person would receive, then we would be able to calculate the "confusion", or what I would call, refreshing of information and feedback.

That confusion would make it impossible to "calculate which is the optimal action".

But the confusion is only confusion to the "God-like observer" if he/she has no knowledge of the environment. That would make him/her an "un-God-like observer".

If you mean to say that a person will calculate the action that they will act out, this is a tautology.

If you believe in free will, it is not. A calculation with an optimal result implies a determined, (subjectively) optimal result, and if there is no free will, only the optimal result will be acted out. Free will implies, given the calculation and its result, that the person can and will still choose any action, regardless of its calculated result. The result has no bearing on the action, if free will exists.

I give you credit for an interesting take on the subject though.

Thank you, your view is very interesting too, and I hope we can continue the discussion.

 

[Opethian]

Or pseudo-random.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pseudorandomness

Many things may simply be sufficiently complex that they appear random to us, when they may in fact not be. There are other things besides genetics which determine a person's behavior. The gestalt is not the sum of the parts.

Isn't randomness just a way of saying that we don't have complete knowledge of all the factors influencing an event? For example, random point mutations in evolution may not be random at all, if we were to know the exact amount of environmental stimuli for mutation in time and space, along with all information of a certain organism and how it reacts to the environmental stimuli, along with the position of every nucleotid of its genome, its susceptibility to the different mutation causes, etc..., perhaps we would be able to say exactly which bases were going to change. If we then knew the exact way of folding of the coded proteins, and its actions in the body, we might be able to know in advance how the organism would change, and mutation would not be random at all.
Isn't saying that something is random just saying that you don't know all the forces involved?

 

[Apollonian]

How does the supernatural interact with the natural? If you claim "free-will" to be a supernatural entity, then what is the corresponding natural entity which it supposedly acts upon?

If the supernatural does not interact with the natural, then scientific inquiry is perfectly content with excluding the supernatural as irrelevant to the description of nature.

The trouble is that if the "supernatural" free-will you speak of does in fact interact with natural reality, then the scientific community has interest in determining the means by which this interaction takes place. Thus, they attempt to expand the set of the natural to include that which is presently considered supernatural. However, I think you mean "supernatural" in a different sense than "phenomenological" but I can't quite catch your meaning exactly.

My perception of reality will. My curiosity to find the perception that seems most accurate to me, is stronger than any prejudice I have towards wanting it to be one way or the other.

So, here you say (?):
I am driven to find the perception which is "most accurate" to me.
and
This is stronger than the prejudice induced by my "most accurate" perception vs someone elses "most accurate" perception

This does not make sense to me (contradiction). How is your perception of "most accurate" not prejudiced? Do you have objectivity or don't you? How do other people's "most accurate" (but different perceptions) influence your own? And, how do you determine what is "most accurate" in the first place?

I cannot be sure of anything, but I can be convinced, and I can build a rational foundation for my views.

Isn't to "be convinced of" the same as to "become sure of"? If you cannot be sure of anything, how can you ever be convinced of anything?

In philosophy, you have to be sure of something in order to get anywhere at all. Axioms are fundamental in human language and thought. So, the question is: what are you sure of now? (given that you may change your mind later)

My philosophy is relevant to me, whether it is relevant to anyone else is up to them.

In my personal opinion, this is ridiculously relativistic. What is the point of believing something if no one agrees with you and you never bother to convince them that you are right? You will still survive without philosophy; it is not a requirement for life. If your philosophy is not relevant to anyone else, why bother?

The reason thoughts can often be so time-consuming, and seem like "free will" choices of the consciousness, might be because of the time it takes to retreive and receive information, and then process it, while new information is still coming in. Perhaps the calculations need to reach a certain level of stability before they can be executed.

This is speculation without a factual basis in neurology that I can see. From what I understand, quite the opposite is possible: the highest level of consciousness is not aware of all of the information available to it at any given time. Moreover, it processes much of that information faster than we tend to realize (ie processed so quickly that it gets thrown out of our self-referential identity before we have a chance to form a memory about it).

I think who we are is more than "that which we cannot deny". In other words, our pre-conscious and sub-conscious minds are still an inextricable part of our decision making process. I cannot see how you can exclude them from considerations of free-will. (Otherwise, the claim "the Devil made me do it" may become too ridiculously accessible to people who are not particularly self-aware)

I would say that supernatural means: unexplainable by natural laws or phenomena. What I mean with it is that there must be some kind of entity that isn't included in our natural view of the world that allows for the existance of free will.

So...basically, something is "supernatural" if it needs to exist to prove your point when it would otherwise not exist in the realm of natural laws or observable phenomena? That sounds like circular reasoning to me.

Supernatural things may very well exist, but I highly doubt they exist because it "allows for the existence" of the object of the discussion. So, I still don't understand what you mean by "supernatural".

A calculation with an optimal result implies a determined, (subjectively) optimal result, and if there is no free will, only the optimal result will be acted out. Free will implies, given the calculation and its result, that the person can and will still choose any action, regardless of its calculated result.

The structure of your discourse is extremely difficult to follow here; you seem to be "beating around the bush" a lot.

You say that Free will implies something based on a result and then prove that because Free will is based on that result that a person makes a choice regardless of the result (?!?) Which is your premise and which is your conclusion?

So far I got the following:
- A (conscious?) calculation yields (not implies?) a subjective result.
- Free will implies that regardless of a person's calculations on how they think they should act ("optimal result") their actual act is irrespective of their calculation (??? This sort of makes sense, but I don't think this is what you are trying to say - it muddies things further by making it seem as if Free will implies the absense of solely conscious free will)

Isn't randomness just a way of saying that we don't have complete knowledge of all the factors influencing an event?

NO, rather that we cannot know them. Be careful of the distinction between "random" and "pseudorandom".

Isn't saying that something is random just saying that you don't know all the forces involved?

People often do not use "random" in a strict sense. Let us be clear here: something is random if the input (or stimuli) does not yield a deterministic solution (same every time). In modeling, "random" processes are often useful as mathematical heuristics (accurate more often than not). It is another thing to talk about the reality of the "thing in itself" (metaphysics).

 

[Opethian]

How does the supernatural interact with the natural? If you claim "free-will" to be a supernatural entity, then what is the corresponding natural entity which it supposedly acts upon?

That would have to be our body, and more specific our brains. Don't get me wrong, I don't believe in the supernatural and thus the free will I am describing. What I am positing is that the concept of free will as we have defined it here, can only exist as something supernatural, and not for example as a byproduct of Heisenberg uncertainty (which I would consider a natural uncertainty). The free will I do believe in, is an illusion that is useful in human reasoning and thus useful in our survival. It is necessary to be able to put 'yourself' in a perspective to make sure of 'your own' survival and what I believe is that it is the result of a sort of main controlling system in our brains, that allows all information to come together, and thus unites it as one entity, perceived to be our 'mind', our consciousness, or even 'ourselves'.

If the supernatural does not interact with the natural, then scientific inquiry is perfectly content with excluding the supernatural as irrelevant to the description of nature.

Yes, but what I am stating is that free will must have its basis in the supernatural. Or let us say, free will can't exist in a purely natural world. How the supernatural would exactly allow for free will is not what I want to argue. I want to argue that free will cannot exist in a world where there is only the natural, that free will can only be explained by invoking the supernatural, by leaving the realm of the rational. Thus I am trying to 'disprove' free will, as we defined it, to people who do not believe in the supernatural. If you want to debate this, you could point out how the natural can allow for free will. I hope this makes for a clearer discussion.

The trouble is that if the "supernatural" free-will you speak of does in fact interact with natural reality, then the scientific community has interest in determining the means by which this interaction takes place. Thus, they attempt to expand the set of the natural to include that which is presently considered supernatural. However, I think you mean "supernatural" in a different sense than "phenomenological" but I can't quite catch your meaning exactly.

Well, what I am arguing is, that free will cannot have a natural basis. Therefore it must have a supernatural basis, and for anyone who does not believe in the supernatural, this would mean that free will is an, although useful, illusion.

So, here you say (?):
I am driven to find the perception which is "most accurate" to me.
and
This is stronger than the prejudice induced by my "most accurate" perception vs someone elses "most accurate" perception

This does not make sense to me (contradiction). How is your perception of "most accurate" not prejudiced? Do you have objectivity or don't you? How do other people's "most accurate" (but different perceptions) influence your own? And, how do you determine what is "most accurate" in the first place?

I am definitely not saying that what I find most accurate is objective, as every judgment of accuracy from any human being is subjective. I am only saying that I base my thoughts on free will on rational, although subjective, arguments, rather than for example, emotional arguments. I seek what seems most rationally likely to me, not what seems nicest to me. By my own view of how decision making works, I would say that rationality has a higher value in the equation that determines my decision than any prejudices of how I want it to be. Of course, that doesn't change the fact that what is rational is different for each person. I don't think this really matters to the discussion though.

Isn't to "be convinced of" the same as to "become sure of"? If you cannot be sure of anything, how can you ever be convinced of anything?

I would think that to be sure of something, is to have no doubt whatsoever as to whether it is true, while to be convinced of something, is to have doubt, but to have taken a stance on the position that seems most likely (like for example my atheist position. I am not 100% certain that there is no god, but more like 99,9...9%, nevertheless I have taken a stance on it). That's just my definition though, but now you probably see what I meant.

In philosophy, you have to be sure of something in order to get anywhere at all. Axioms are fundamental in human language and thought. So, the question is: what are you sure of now? (given that you may change your mind later)

I am sure that I exist, and I am convinced that there is nothing supernatural. If starting from the axiom that there is nothing supernatural, I am trying to philosophically argue that there can be no free will as we have defined. It is not possible for me to prove that there is nothing supernatural, but I can argue the existance of free will for people that, like me, do not believe in the supernatural.

In my personal opinion, this is ridiculously relativistic. What is the point of believing something if no one agrees with you and you never bother to convince them that you are right? You will still survive without philosophy; it is not a requirement for life. If your philosophy is not relevant to anyone else, why bother?

Notice that I didn't state that my philosophy is not relevant to anyone else, what I implied is that for everyone that comes in contact with it, it depends on their own subjectivity as to whether it has any meaning or importance to them. And even so, if my philosophy were only relevant to me, I could still gain insight from it, which could be of value to me. From debating with others, who may or may not think my philosophy is relevant, I can learn.

This is speculation without a factual basis in neurology that I can see. From what I understand, quite the opposite is possible: the highest level of consciousness is not aware of all of the information available to it at any given time. Moreover, it processes much of that information faster than we tend to realize (ie processed so quickly that it gets thrown out of our self-referential identity before we have a chance to form a memory about it).

Well, it's true that it doesn't have any basis at all in neurology, as I am quite ignorant in that respect. I'm just trying to argue from my own experiences of what goes on in my consciousness, which of course leads to speculating. I should probably learn more about the actual scientific basis, I don't know if you have any good links for me? I am aware that we perform actions all the time that don't come directly from our consciousness. But when arguing about free will, I am talking about exactly the sort of 'decisions' which we seem to have 'complete conscious control' of. It seems to me that in these cases, the consciousness works as a way to centralise information, subconscious, sensory, memory etc... and to use all this combined information to come to one result.

I think who we are is more than "that which we cannot deny". In other words, our pre-conscious and sub-conscious minds are still an inextricable part of our decision making process. I cannot see how you can exclude them from considerations of free-will. (Otherwise, the claim "the Devil made me do it" may become too ridiculously accessible to people who are not particularly self-aware)

I don't deny them, I just see, for example information from the subconsciousness, used in our conscious decisions. Subconsciousness implies that we never get to 'see' the information in our 'mind's eye', but it doesn't mean that the information isn't used, unseen, in our conscious decisions. For example, the equation that is used to process the information that is seen by our mind's eye, might already contain information from the subconsciousness. Subconscious information could be used for example in the setting up of the equation itself, or the filling in of certain parameters. That way, we never get to see the information in an explicit form, but it is implicitly interweaved with our conscious decision making. By saying that all information is centralised by the consciousness, I am doing exactly the opposite of denying the subconsciousness. If the information would not be transferred in some way, how could it ever be used in the making of the conscious decision?

So...basically, something is "supernatural" if it needs to exist to prove your point when it would otherwise not exist in the realm of natural laws or observable phenomena? That sounds like circular reasoning to me.

I would limit my definition of the supernatural to: unexplainable by natural laws or phenomena. What I wrote behind it was just how I would use the supernatural in this argument about free will. My argument is that for free will to exist, the supernatural must exist. That it needs to exist for free will to be able to exist is not part of the definition, rather the point I am arguing.

Supernatural things may very well exist, but I highly doubt they exist because it "allows for the existence" of the object of the discussion. So, I still don't understand what you mean by "supernatural".

I hope what I wrote above makes that a bit clearer.

The structure of your discourse is extremely difficult to follow here; you seem to be "beating around the bush" a lot.

You say that Free will implies something based on a result and then prove that because Free will is based on that result that a person makes a choice regardless of the result (?!?) Which is your premise and which is your conclusion?

So far I got the following:
- A (conscious?) calculation yields (not implies?) a subjective result.
- Free will implies that regardless of a person's calculations on how they think they should act ("optimal result") their actual act is irrespective of their calculation (??? This sort of makes sense, but I don't think this is what you are trying to say - it muddies things further by making it seem as if Free will implies the absense of solely conscious free will)

What I am trying to argue here, is that if there is no free will, all conscious actions carried out by humans, are actions, that after calculation in the brain, yielded the 'optimal result', with the available information. If there is free will, there is another entity, that must be supernatural, that can pick any action, regardless of its calculated 'result'.
I don't really understand what you mean by saying that this makes it seem as if free will implies the absence of solely conscious free will.

NO, rather that we cannot know them. Be careful of the distinction between "random" and "pseudorandom".

So when Jacques Monod posited that mutations in evolution are random, he should have used the word pseudorandom instead? Or are mutations truly random, because of the Heisenberg uncertainty? In that case, wouldn't everything be random?

People often do not use "random" in a strict sense. Let us be clear here: something is random if the input (or stimuli) does not yield a deterministic solution (same every time). In modeling, "random" processes are often useful as mathematical heuristics (accurate more often than not). It is another thing to talk about the reality of the "thing in itself" (metaphysics).

So for example if there is a disturbance input of which the value cannot be known, in a state equation, it implies a random process?

Anyway, thanks for the reply, and sorry for my rather clumsy philosophy, but I'm here to learn, I find this very interesting.

 

[JGL53]

Do you believe in free will, defined as:

Free will: the belief that 2 persons, with the exact same body structure (everything, thus the same genes, the same injuries, the same memory, etc...), and receiving the exact same environmental stimuli (thus being in the exact same place and receiving the exact same sensory input) can perform 2 different actions. Thus that they have a real "choice".

A) Yes I believe in free will, because I believe in the supernatural, thus a soul allowing for free will, regardless of physical laws.

B) Yes I believe in free will, but I do not believe in the supernatural. (please explain why, since this would seem like a fallacious position to me)

C) No I don't believe in free will, but I do believe in the supernatural.

D) No I don't believe in free will, and I don't believe in the supernatural.

E) Other (explain).

Please explain your position and reasons behind it.

Wow, dude - I'm 57 years old and have been participating in debates on "free will vs. determinism" decades before you were born - and yet your use of the 2 person scenario is a brand new setting up of the question to me.

I congratulate you if you originated this. And I think this defined the question perfectly. I would have to say, no, I don't see how one person could act different from the other.

So, I am a (D) - a determinist and believe there is only the natural, not some two levels of reality, one impinging upon the other at unpredictable times and places. I think what most people mean by 'free will" is a type of supernatural belief - this seems problematic to me regarding atheists who claims to believe in free will.

I think the future is unpredictable, in terms of perfect prediction, but that says nothing about determinism, just the limits of consciousness and "knowing".

As a addendum, I think there is no reason why the multiverse theory can't be a fact, in which in each universe every possible permutation of reality will be played out, an innumerable or indefinite (infinite?) number of times. And each scenario would be deterministic.

 

[Apollonian]

Welcome to the discussion JGL53. Interesting, isn't it?

The thing about the multiverse is that, like belief in God, it is not immediately verifiable. So, it is a matter of agreement or disagreement in one's interpretation and the discussion ends there if it began at all.

Personally, I think it is another phantom developed from extraneous solutions in the mathematics of quantum mechanics. Just because a solution pops out of the math does not make it physical.

The free will I do believe in, is an illusion that is useful in human reasoning and thus useful in our survival.

Indeed. However, here we see "free-will" as a non-physical, "meta-physical" (or even "supernatural" if your worldview has that inclination) concept. The point is that determinism does not eliminate "free-will", though it is important to understand the role that "free-will" fills in that deterministic (or pseudo-deterministic) process.

Here, I think I understand what you mean by "supernatural". Except, where you say "supernatural" I would use the more precise philosophical term "metaphysical" (pertaining to something that exists as a "thing in itself" but may not be strictly "physical").

Using the term "supernatural" carries the connotation of phenomena explained through superstition (or "blind faith") rather than determinism.

Well, what I am arguing is, that free will cannot have a natural basis. Therefore it must have a supernatural basis, and for anyone who does not believe in the supernatural, this would mean that free will is an, although useful, illusion.

I still have trouble with "illusion". "Conception" maybe, "world view" maybe, but to say "illusion" indicates that it has no influence on reality which defies the definition of "free will" to begin with. If it exists at all (even non-physically) it still may influence reality by playing a role in the deterministic decision making process that people conduct. A person's awareness of this "illusion" denies the fact that it is an "illusion" if they act upon it. Free will is only an illusion if someone cannot act upon it. Since I observe myself to act upon what I perceive to be my past free will (via the choices I have made), this "illusion" of free will is quite real from my vantage point.

Again, the problem of perspective arises.

...what is rational is different for each person. I don't think this really matters to the discussion though.

It matters in that it asserts that a person (in isolation) has no objective basis to judge anything.

I am sure that I exist, and I am convinced that there is nothing supernatural....

?? Now I am confused again about supernatural. Every time I think I know what you mean, you use the word with a completely different connotation (hence why I firmly dislike the word "supernatural" in philosophical discussions).

Maybe I'm just overthinking it and you really do mean it in the superstitious sense???

Well, it's true that it doesn't have any basis at all in neurology, as I am quite ignorant in that respect. I'm just trying to argue from my own experiences of what goes on in my consciousness, which of course leads to speculating.

More than that: You end up with reasoning similar to Aristotle who reasoned that heavier objects fall faster (which is simply not true).

Try wikipedia. Their project is doing a very nice job of collecting relevant information and links. Regardless, there is a lot to learn.

Your further description of how you handle the "centrality" of the conscious mind seems accurate enough for our purposes.

What I am trying to argue here, is that if there is no free will, all conscious actions carried out by humans, are actions, that after calculation in the brain, yielded the 'optimal result', with the available information. If there is free will, there is another entity, that must be supernatural, that can pick any action, regardless of its calculated 'result'.

You mean the physical entity's calculated 'result'? i.e. The "soul" which carries the "free will" can pick any action regardless of the "mind's" calculated result (rather than the soul's calculated result)...?

It is confusing to the reader if you don't clearly identify your pronouns in a subtle philosophical discussion. Linguistic ambiguity is a killer in many discussions.

"The boy saw his friend with the telescope."

Did the boy use the telescope or does the telescope belong to his friend? The sentence is ambiguous regardless of what the speaker meant.

So when Jacques Monod posited that mutations in evolution are random, he should have used the word pseudorandom instead? Or are mutations truly random, because of the Heisenberg uncertainty? In that case, wouldn't everything be random?

It all depends on whether you believe we live in a deterministic universe or not. If you believe the universe is deterministic, then what he thinks of as "random" you think of as "pseudo-random". Heisenberg does not speak on Metaphysics, simply scientific observation.

There are some people who believe that everything is random (and that things appear to have order simply because of scale). I am not one of them.

So for example if there is a disturbance input of which the value cannot be known, in a state equation, it implies a random process?

Right. However, there are a couple of weird hitches in quantum mechanics (e.g. Schrodinger's Cat Experiment)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schr%C3%B6dinger's_cat
Random process triggers a mechanism which may kill the cat. Is the cat dead or alive? Answer: both.

It ends up that the result is not always as non-deterministic as you would think when considering quantum scales. Let's not discuss this - read the article.

Suffice it to say that it all depends on perspective and the availability of knowledge (not the present extent of knowledge). Plus, it also depends on scale (principles of quantum mechanics do not hold except at excruciatingly small scales, though we include those when talking about the "entire universe").

Anyway, thanks for the reply, and sorry for my rather clumsy philosophy, but I'm here to learn, I find this very interesting.

Certainly! I enjoy it too. If there was one thing useful about all this it is that it allows us to practice better communicating what we think and believe. If we never reach a satisfactory answer, we may at least apply our newfound eloquence to other matters.

Ultimately, this is all about taking small steps in semantics and discourse. You can't really prove/discuss anything without moving beyond vulgar, colloquial language into learning the way the other person thinks through words.

 

[Opethian]

Indeed. However, here we see "free-will" as a non-physical, "meta-physical" (or even "supernatural" if your worldview has that inclination) concept. The point is that determinism does not eliminate "free-will", though it is important to understand the role that "free-will" fills in that deterministic (or pseudo-deterministic) process.

Here, I think I understand what you mean by "supernatural". Except, where you say "supernatural" I would use the more precise philosophical term "metaphysical" (pertaining to something that exists as a "thing in itself" but may not be strictly "physical").

I think we may misunderstand each other here. I do not mean to say that free will itself is a supernatural concept. What I mean to say is that for free will to exists, not just as a metaphysical concept, but as a natural phenomenon, there is a need for a supernatural entity. The free will itself is not supernatural, but a supernatural entity is a requirement for natural free will. I would distinguish the free will, as it cannot be denied to exist, as metaphysical, thus the concept the human thinking process needs to be able to make rational decisions, and free will as a natural process. The concept exist, the phenomenon can exist only if there is a supernatural entity that allows for it. Whether the natural phenomenon of free will, as I defined it in my first post - which is different from the metaphysical concept, which I described as an illusion - exists, is something else entirely. The way I see it, it can only exist as the product of a supernatural entity.

Using the term "supernatural" carries the connotation of phenomena explained through superstition (or "blind faith") rather than determinism.

Yes, and that is my argument. That free will, as a concept in human reasoning, that has an effect on this reasoning, exists, cannot be denied. That it exists in the way I defined it in the first post, is another question.

I still have trouble with "illusion". "Conception" maybe, "world view" maybe, but to say "illusion" indicates that it has no influence on reality which defies the definition of "free will" to begin with.

I don't see how something being an illusion implicates it not being able to influence reality. The illusion itself exists, and that is how it is able to influence reality. But it is an illusion of something else, of a perceived natural phenomenon, as defined. Whether this free will exists, is a question separate from the question of the existance of the illusion.

If it exists at all (even non-physically) it still may influence reality by playing a role in the deterministic decision making process that people conduct. A person's awareness of this "illusion" denies the fact that it is an "illusion" if they act upon it.

Wouldn't this only be true if we assume that illusions cannot be acted upon? I don't see how being able to act upon an illusion changes anything about it being an illusion or not.

Free will is only an illusion if someone cannot act upon it. Since I observe myself to act upon what I perceive to be my past free will (via the choices I have made), this "illusion" of free will is quite real from my vantage point.
Again, the problem of perspective arises.

Again you make the assumption that for something to be an illusion means that it cannot be acted upon. An illusion is an erroneous perception, concept or belief. The perception, the concept, the belief all exist, but they are a perception, concept, belief of something else, a phenomenon. The question of whether it is erroneous - whether the 'something else' really exists - is something that can be analyzed by rational thought. A perception is just that, a perception, without critically analyzing about whether this perception is accurate.

It matters in that it asserts that a person (in isolation) has no objective basis to judge anything.

Fair enough.

?? Now I am confused again about supernatural. Every time I think I know what you mean, you use the word with a completely different connotation (hence why I firmly dislike the word "supernatural" in philosophical discussions).

Maybe I'm just overthinking it and you really do mean it in the superstitious sense???

I'm still using it as I defined it once, as unexplainable by natural laws and phenomena. When I say that I do not believe in the supernatural, I mean that I do not believe that there is anything that is ultimately unexplainable by natural laws and phenomena, and thus that it is not possible for an entity to exist, which is a requirement for free will, as a natural phenomenon, to exist. Our understanding of these laws and phenomena are not sufficient yet to be able to explain everything, but my belief is that if it was possible to ever to acquire a complete understanding, that there is nothing that goes beyond natural laws.

More than that: You end up with reasoning similar to Aristotle who reasoned that heavier objects fall faster (which is simply not true).

I do not really see how my reasoning is analogous to that, but I do see that my reasoning about human thinking does not have much factual, objective basis, rather than a basis in my own subjective experiences and my interpretation of them.

Try wikipedia. Their project is doing a very nice job of collecting relevant information and links. Regardless, there is a lot to learn.

Yes, the development of this universal encyclopedia is truly something that has made acquiring knowledge easier.

You mean the physical entity's calculated 'result'? i.e. The "soul" which carries the "free will" can pick any action regardless of the "mind's" calculated result (rather than the soul's calculated result)...?

Yes, of course. The physical entity is what 'calculates' results, and if there is only the physical, only the optimal result is chosen and acted out. For the possibility of all actions to be carried out, regardless of their results - thus for free will as defined, to exist - there would need to be a supernatural entity, for example a soul.

It is confusing to the reader if you don't clearly identify your pronouns in a subtle philosophical discussion. Linguistic ambiguity is a killer in many discussions.

Yes, I can see that. I'll try to avoid being overly ambiguous in my reasoning in the future.

It all depends on whether you believe we live in a deterministic universe or not. If you believe the universe is deterministic, then what he thinks of as "random" you think of as "pseudo-random". Heisenberg does not speak on Metaphysics, simply scientific observation.

Well, I believe in a determined universe. What I believe is that our understanding of this universe is just not sufficient enough to be able to see it as completely determined. The Heisenberg uncertainty is perhaps a flaw in our scientific description of the world, one that can be overcome with a new, unified theory.

There are some people who believe that everything is random (and that things appear to have order simply because of scale). I am not one of them.

And neither am I.

Suffice it to say that it all depends on perspective and the availability of knowledge (not the present extent of knowledge). Plus, it also depends on scale (principles of quantum mechanics do not hold except at excruciatingly small scales, though we include those when talking about the "entire universe").

Yes, which is also something to consider when discussing free will. Can this indeterminism at such a small scale, really have a noticeable effect on the scale of human decisions? Sure, on the scale of each tiny electrochemical process in the brain, it can play a significant role. But when all those processes are combined in one decision, what is the resulting uncertainty? My knowledge of quantum mechanics is far from sufficient to be able to even try to make rational judgment about that question, but intuitively, it doesn't make sense to me that Heisenberg uncertainty principle could result in the free will I defined. Intuition is of course not useful for rational discourse, but what is more important, as I've already mentioned, the uncertainty goes for all matter, dead or alive, chaotic or organised. Wouldn't a natural principle that allows for free will, have to be unique for living matter, and even more specific, organisms with a certain intelligence, a certain level of consciousness?

Certainly! I enjoy it too. If there was one thing useful about all this it is that it allows us to practice better communicating what we think and believe. If we never reach a satisfactory answer, we may at least apply our newfound eloquence to other matters.

It is definitely a way to learn to talk rationally about issues and to mature in way of thought and way of setting up arguments for a certain view and defending them. Convictions without foundation result in being unable to relay to other persons who may have convictions that are in conflict with yours, why exactly you hold that conviction and why they should respect it. Lack of proper communication results in emotional conflicts, which could be easily avoided by the use of rationality.

Ultimately, this is all about taking small steps in semantics and discourse. You can't really prove/discuss anything without moving beyond vulgar, colloquial language into learning the way the other person thinks through words.

Exactly.

 

[Opethian]

Wow, dude - I'm 57 years old and have been participating in debates on "free will vs. determinism" decades before you were born - and yet your use of the 2 person scenario is a brand new setting up of the question to me.

I congratulate you if you originated this. And I think this defined the question perfectly. I would have to say, no, I don't see how one person could act different from the other.

Hi! The way I defined it, to me, seemed like the most logical definition to answer the question of its existence to. I don't know how free will is usually defined, but I think that definitions are ultimately only useful in answering questions about the concept you are defining, and thus will vary in function of the question you are asking. Here, I think I asked the most radical question, the being in itself, the metaphysical question. Therefore the definition had to be concise and clear. 2 identical persons and one identical event seemed to me like a good way to eliminate the confusion that might arise from one (obviously identical) person and 2 identical events, as there is something intuitively strange and perhaps confusing about that (at least to me).

So, I am a (D) - a determinist and believe there is only the natural, not some two levels of reality, one impinging upon the other at unpredictable times and places. I think what most people mean by 'free will" is a type of supernatural belief - this seems problematic to me regarding atheists who claims to believe in free will.

Yes, that's also what I was most interested in. Sure, if you believe in the supernatural, free will is possible. But I am always surprised when I see atheists proclaim they believe in free will. There is always the possibility that they have a different definition of it than me, but I defined it in this thread and still get many people who do not believe in the supernatural but do believe in my definition of free will, which seems very contradictory to me.

I think the future is unpredictable, in terms of perfect prediction, but that says nothing about determinism, just the limits of consciousness and "knowing".

Exactly. The limits of our current science are also limits of our knowledge of reality. Therefore, as our science progresses, our reality (which is ultimately just a perception of an unknowable reality) changes.

As a addendum, I think there is no reason why the multiverse theory can't be a fact, in which in each universe every possible permutation of reality will be played out, an innumerable or indefinite (infinite?) number of times. And each scenario would be deterministic.

This also a view that appeals to me. Is it really a theory though, because it would seem to me that something as unverifiable as this would remain a hypothesis.

 

[JGL53]

&#8230;Yes, that's also what I was most interested in. Sure, if you believe in the supernatural, free will is possible. But I am always surprised when I see atheists proclaim they believe in free will. There is always the possibility that they have a different definition of it than me, but I defined it in this thread and still get many people who do not believe in the supernatural but do believe in my definition of free will, which seems very contradictory to me...

I think this will take us into the arenas of psychology, cognitive neurology and &#8211; in another sense - the pantheistic or monistic concepts defining Hinduism (Vedanta) and Buddhism.

I.e., many westerners are atheists but nearly all westerners agree that an &#8220;I&#8221; exists. Most atheists assume and say they "know" that the &#8220;I&#8221; exist&#8221; because they experience it as so &#8211; but this is the ultimate reason theists say they "know" there is a god &#8211; because they experience god as real. The &#8220;I&#8221; is a fiction. That is what the scientific facts point to now, beyond a reasonable doubt. Hardly anyone in the west, including atheists, care for this &#8220;fact&#8221; at all and will deny it until their dying breath. Hindus accept a Divine Self of which we are all a part, Buddhists talk about a very ill-defined NonDual ultimate reality with which the mundane world is coterminous, but western science gets it right, IMO &#8211; the &#8220;I&#8221; is just a necessary fiction. But it may be a fiction within a fiction, i.e., nothing (no-thing) is permanent except change, so then no(thing) we experience, including ourselves, has a real existence (permanent = real). To quote Einstein &#8220;Reality is merely an illusion, albeit a very persistent one."

&#8230;This also a view that appeals to me. Is it really a theory though, because it would seem to me that something as unverifiable as this would remain a hypothesis.

Of course, but the multiverse does not violate Ockham&#8217;s Razor like the theism hypothesis does, for one thing, and there are those who feel there is a logical basis to assume it&#8217;s necessity &#8211; see this website and click on the third underlined &#8220;here&#8221;.

http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/

Whether true or not, and whether such could ever be anything more than a hypothesis, it&#8217;s a heck of a lot more interesting than taking mythology literally (i.e., religion).

 

[belladonic-haze]

Odd poll. We have free will, but that doesn't mean we can do anything we want to do. We are bound to rules and laws, or just circumstances simple. Not only within a country or society, but also with in a family and even within ourselves. example, I would love to dive. No-one would stop me, except my physical condition. I can want it, I can do it, but I am not able to do it. My free will is bound by circumstances.

So, I believe in God and He gave us free will, but free will is limited.......always.....

Making a choice is something else. We make choices in life but they are all within the circumstances, the laws and rules and if you step outside this all you will be paying the price....

Free will is never 100% free......

 

[tvpro]

Free will does not exist. because everything we choose has been narrowed down and determined by our environment and personality. Free will is to be able to choose to levitate whenever i want.

 

[tarama]

Free will does not exist. because everything we choose has been narrowed down and determined by our environment and personality. Free will is to be able to choose to levitate whenever i want.

Hi tvpro ... what do you mean you can levitate whenever you want? Do you actually mean, levitate, lying on the floor and then lifting yourself off the ground?

 

[elman]

Free will does not exist. because everything we choose has been narrowed down and determined by our environment and personality. Free will is to be able to choose to levitate whenever i want.

No, in context, free will is having some inpact on what is happening around you. I does not mean you are free from all outside influences. You have the free will to not believe in free will if you wish.

 

[quatona]

No, in context, free will is having some inpact on what is happening around you. I does not mean you are free from all outside influences. You have the free will to not believe in free will if you wish.

And you are determined to believe in free-will.

 

[elman]

And you are determined to believe in free-will.

I have the free will to do that. Voting in the poll confirmed free will.

 

[quatona]

I have the free will to do that. Voting in the poll confirmed free will.

How so? It confirms nothing but that you did it. You could e.g. have been programmed to vote that way. Mere action makes no case for free will.