Free Will

[DailyBlessings]

Let´s, just hypothetically, assume that you merely think it is a decision (whilst in fact this is merely an illusion) - would that feel different from really having a decision, and how?

It wouldn't- which is why the debate is a bit pointless. What's the difference between genuine free will, and an illusion that resembles it in every respect?

 

[elman]

quatona;28882926

]What about an observed action indicates that it is a decision?
We know we have a brain, agreed. How do you know you can make decisions?

By experiencing it.

Well, it certainly makes a difference, but what makes you assume that this difference is "decision".

Because it is with the brain that we make decisions.

Let´s, just hypothetically, assume that you merely think it is a decision (whilst in fact this is merely an illusion) - would that feel different from really having a decision, and how?

Why would I assume that?

 

[Apollonian]

Quatona, you appear to be arguing against the existence of "decisions", "choices" and/or "freewill". However, I'd like to make a reality check here...

Given the fact that we have such things as "decisions" and "choices" in human language, what is it that these labels are describing? Moral responsibility in human society seems to be based on the idea of at least "free-agency" let alone the more abstract metaphysical concept of "free-will". Are you meaning to imply that thousands of years of human thought have been talking about complete fallacies in regard to human choice?

Please don't make an argument by saying that words in the english language are meaningless because abstract metaphysical constructs do or do not exist. Language describes reality, and such descriptions should not easily be thrown aside.

The point here is that the discussion has gone too far into semantics and I fear it is becoming meaningless. The fact is: people make choices and decisions all the time. The metaphysical nature of those decisions and choices is another matter entirely.

"What the philosophers say about Reality is often as disappointing as a sign you see in a shop window which reads: Pressing Done Here. If you brought your clothes to be pressed, you would be fooled; for only the sign is for sale." - Soren Kierkegaard, from Either/Or

Please endeavor to make sense.

I think that it must be the case that your metaphysics of the non-existence of free-will is reconcileable with the idea of "choice" and human decision making. In other words, just because a person "makes a choice" does not necessarily imply free-will (or even free-agency). Elman was talking about the legal system; the legal system exists to determine the extent of a person's moral responsibility based upon their free-agency (or in the case of mental incapacity, the lack thereof). Law is not synonimous with Morality/free-will.

I believe Elman was making the argument of functionality: free-will exists because it is useful in bringing order to society. This is not a correct correlation, however. The order of society is not contingent upon "free-will" but rather the existence of a system of law based upon the nature of humanity in whatever form. If robots ever become functional members of society, there will be laws associated with them. A robot which does not perform appropriately will be decommissioned just as a human which disobeys the law will be incarcerated.

There are many political philosophers, however, who have posed deceiving the public in order to maintain order. Just because something creates order doesn't make it real in the ultimate sense.

Can we really know any of this? Quatona, Elman, what makes you so sure that you understand the nature of free-will? How can you know?

 

[elman]

Quatona, you appear to be arguing against the existence of "decisions", "choices" and/or "freewill". However, I'd like to make a reality check here...

Given the fact that we have such things as "decisions" and "choices" in human language, what is it that these labels are describing? Moral responsibility in human society seems to be based on the idea of at least "free-agency" let alone the more abstract metaphysical concept of "free-will". Are you meaning to imply that thousands of years of human thought have been talking about complete fallacies in regard to human choice?

Please don't make an argument by saying that words in the english language are meaningless because abstract metaphysical constructs do or do not exist. Language describes reality, and such descriptions should not easily be thrown aside.

The point here is that the discussion has gone too far into semantics and I fear it is becoming meaningless. The fact is: people make choices and decisions all the time. The metaphysical nature of those decisions and choices is another matter entirely.

"What the philosophers say about Reality is often as disappointing as a sign you see in a shop window which reads: Pressing Done Here. If you brought your clothes to be pressed, you would be fooled; for only the sign is for sale." - Soren Kierkegaard, from Either/Or

Please endeavor to make sense.

I think that it must be the case that your metaphysics of the non-existence of free-will is reconcileable with the idea of "choice" and human decision making. In other words, just because a person "makes a choice" does not necessarily imply free-will (or even free-agency). Elman was talking about the legal system; the legal system exists to determine the extent of a person's moral responsibility based upon their free-agency (or in the case of mental incapacity, the lack thereof). Law is not synonimous with Morality/free-will.

I believe Elman was making the argument of functionality: free-will exists because it is useful in bringing order to society. This is not a correct correlation, however. The order of society is not contingent upon "free-will" but rather the existence of a system of law based upon the nature of humanity in whatever form. If robots ever become functional members of society, there will be laws associated with them. A robot which does not perform appropriately will be decommissioned just as a human which disobeys the law will be incarcerated.

There are many political philosophers, however, who have posed deceiving the public in order to maintain order. Just because something creates order doesn't make it real in the ultimate sense.

Can we really know any of this? Quatona, Elman, what makes you so sure that you understand the nature of free-will? How can you know?

I experience making choices and the consequences of those choices. I also experience making different choices under similar circumstances and experiencing different consequences. I don't experience being unable to make a choice or being forced to decide things one way or the other. Therefore I question why I should assume what I am experiencing is not reality.

 

[quatona]

Quatona, you appear to be arguing against the existence of "decisions", "choices" and/or "freewill". However, I'd like to make a reality check here...

Ok.

Given the fact that we have such things as "decisions" and "choices" in human language, what is it that these labels are describing?

They describe our immediate perception of ourselves. In everyday language, I occasionally use those words myself. Yet, there is a difference between our everyday talk and a philosophical construct or a supposedly objective description of the human condition.
People have been saying things like "the sun rises" for thousands of years, too. I do it myself occasionally. In a scientific discussion I wouldn´t defend it as accurate, though.

Moral responsibility in human society seems to be based on the idea of at least "free-agency" let alone the more abstract metaphysical concept of "free-will". Are you meaning to imply that thousands of years of human thought have been talking about complete fallacies in regard to human choice?

Yes, if you wish to put it that way. Actually, I am simply stating my opinion. I don´t mean to imply any statements about the past, but I agree that this would be a logical implication on your part.
Whatever - I don´t care much for appeals to popularity or bandwaggon fallacies.

Please don't make an argument by saying that words in the english language are meaningless because abstract metaphysical constructs do or do not exist.

Could we possibly come to an agreement, please, that everyone present their arguments themselves, and that there is no point in pre-emtively putting arguments in each others´ mouthes and then not even refuting them (which would at least be a strawman) but simply saying "Don´t make this argument!" (which is of no argumentative value whatsoever)? Please.

Language describes reality, and such descriptions should not easily be thrown aside.

I do not throw descriptions easily aside, I question them. If you want to discuss my points, please do so.
Language does not necessarily describe reality. Language describes our concepts. Just as much as language can describe reality, it can create our reality. If from the fact that something that can be and is said we would have to conclude that this describes reality humans there would be no need for discussions anymore. Everything that is said describes reality, after all.

The point here is that the discussion has gone too far into semantics and I fear it is becoming meaningless.

How could that possibly happen if language describes reality?

The fact is: people make choices and decisions all the time.

Last time I checked adding a "the fact is:" to a statement does not replace a supporting argument.

"What the philosophers say about Reality is often as disappointing as a sign you see in a shop window which reads: Pressing Done Here. If you brought your clothes to be pressed, you would be fooled; for only the sign is for sale." - Soren Kierkegaard, from Either/Or

Seems like Kierkegaard didn´t agree with a lot of traditional philosophy, either. How come you don´t use your bandwaggon fallacy against him?
Apart from that, please explain how you think this statement applies here.

Please endeavor to make sense.

Rest assured, that I put a lot of effort in trying to make sense.
I understand that I don´t make sense to you - there can be at least two reasons for that.

I think that it must be the case that your metaphysics of the non-existence of free-will is reconcileable with the idea of "choice" and human decision making.

Depends on the concept of "choice" you are thinking of. It is certainly not reconcilable with ideas like "free agency" etc., which you seemed to be in favour of in the beginning of your post.

In other words, just because a person "makes a choice" does not necessarily imply free-will (or even free-agency). Elman was talking about the legal system;

I have discussed a lot with Elman, and from all I know the concepts of choice and free will are closedly linked (if not congruent) in his view.
the legal system exists to determine the extent of a person's moral responsibility based upon their free-agency (or in the case of mental incapacity, the lack thereof). Law is not synonimous with Morality/free-will.

I believe Elman was making the argument of functionality: free-will exists because it is useful in bringing order to society.

"Free-will exists because it is useful for our purposes" - what kind of argument is this? I can spread my wings and fly because it is useful in getting from one place to another.

This is not a correct correlation, however. The order of society is not contingent upon "free-will" but rather the existence of a system of law based upon the nature of humanity in whatever form. If robots ever become functional members of society, there will be laws associated with them. A robot which does not perform appropriately will be decommissioned just as a human which disobeys the law will be incarcerated.

Exactly my point. Something doesn´t have to have "freewill", choice, decision or whatever to enable us to deal with it.
If an apple is rotten Elman throws it in the garbage, although he doesn´t think the apple has choice or "freewill".

There are many political philosophers, however, who have posed deceiving the public in order to maintain order. Just because something creates order doesn't make it real in the ultimate sense.

Agreed.

Can we really know any of this? Quatona, Elman, what makes you so sure that you understand the nature of free-will? How can you know?

I don´t claim to understand the nature of "freewill". I don´t think there is such a thing nor a nature of it. I observe that people use the term "freewill" to describe a couple of different concepts. I am questioning the validity of those concepts. I am trying to work from the way they describe their concepts.

 

[Apollonian]

They describe our immediate perception of ourselves. In everyday language, I occasionally use those words myself. Yet, there is a difference between our everyday talk and a philosophical construct or a supposedly objective description of the human condition.
People have been saying things like "the sun rises" for thousands of years, too. I do it myself occasionally. In a scientific discussion I wouldn´t defend it as accurate, though.

People say "the sun rises" because it increases its elevation in the sky each day. If this isn't "rising" then I don't know what is. Just because there is a different reference frame in which the sun translates around the rotational axis of the earth doesn't eliminate the meaning of "the sun rises"!

If you were to refute someone by saying "you know, the sun actually doesn't 'rise'", the ensueing argument would be ridiculous. The problem isn't in the philosophy but in the semantics. Rather than understanding the other person's perspective, you assert your own as the only correct viewpoint.

It is true that language can be miss-used, but most often it is used correctly. Assuming that everyone endeavors to use language correctly, it is then necessary to try to determine what someone means before saying that they are fundamentally wrong.

If I say "I am free in my choices", responding with "choices don't exist" fails to understand what I mean by "choices" since I obviously mean to refer to something which exists.

There is a lot of subtlety in this discussion and it is impossible to continue without understanding the subtle differences in meaning. Clear definitions are necessary and your definitions may not be precisely the same as mine.

Yes, if you wish to put it that way. Actually, I am simply stating my opinion. ...
Whatever - I don´t care much for appeals to popularity or bandwaggon fallacies.

Neither do I, and I apologize if it sounded that way. It was not an appeal to popularity, but rather an observation that people have had a very long time to hone the meanings of words to apply to things which make sense. Philosophers sometimes seem too eager to redefine many words simply to obfuscate or suit their particular argument.

Could we possibly come to an agreement, please, that everyone present their arguments themselves, and that there is no point in pre-emtively putting arguments in each others´ mouthes and then not even refuting them (which would at least be a strawman) but simply saying "Don´t make this argument!" (which is of no argumentative value whatsoever)? Please.

I don't know exactly what you're going for here, but if I can't understand what your argument is then I will most certainly stop to ask for clarification. I think it is important to stop and clarify the means of argument just as much as the arguments themselves, so long as it helps everyone to understand the discussion better rather than set up a straw man.

That said, I was not criticizing your arguments. I was simply asking you to clarify them.

I do not throw descriptions easily aside, I question them. If you want to discuss my points, please do so.
Language does not necessarily describe reality.

This is true. Language does not necessarily describe reality. For many of us who have been actively involved in Snipe hunting, this is a very poignant point.

Language describes our concepts. Just as much as language can describe reality, it can create our reality.

True. However, the commonality of language indicates that many people prefer to "compare notes" if you will regarding reality. It is this communication which allows language to move naturally toward the "appeal to popularity" which gives us a common lexicon.

The goal of language is to describe reality. The side effect of that pursuit is that language gets filled with the particular perspective of reality which we have.

An actual argument
This is an interesting point, though. If language can create our reality, then how can we ever obtain a truly objective vantage point? If I can always say "you may be creating your own reality when you say 'objectively there is no free-will'" then why should I believe you? My argument is this: Although I believe an objective reality does exist, I don't believe that we can apprehend it through philosophy and we have only a slightly better chance with science.

We cannot know whether our will is truly, objectively free or not because no human being can remove themselves of that free will in order to examine it. Many people talk circles around themselves trying to explain their "objective" view of free-will.

If from the fact that something that can be and is said we would have to conclude that this describes reality humans there would be no need for discussions anymore. Everything that is said describes reality, after all.

This is assuming one big thing: that people have perfect understanding of what each other mean. This is the fallacy. Each person describes what they see. Even if it is true to that person, another may misinterpret the first (The first person could also be flat-out-wrong, but that is another matter. The point is about understanding and not about absolute Truth).

How could that possibly happen if language describes reality?

I'm afraid that with the frailty of human understanding (i.e. the frequency of misunderstanding) it is very possible.

Last time I checked adding a "the fact is:" to a statement does not replace a supporting argument.

Do you contest that the fact that we all make choices and decisions is self-evident?

Seems like Kierkegaard didn´t agree with a lot of traditional philosophy, either. How come you don´t use your bandwaggon fallacy against him?

*sigh*

Apart from that, please explain how you think this statement applies here.

The point is that a lot of philosophy creates complex concepts by "defining terms" and taking them to their logical, rational conclusions. However, if those conclusions are not based upon realistic premises, then what use are they? Kierkegaard asks the question "what does it matter?" first rather than spending so much time reaching a useless or irrelevant conclusion.

Part of this is explaining things so that people will understand (rather than obfuscating). If the sign in the window were to have a sticker on it which indicated its sale, we would not make the same mistake. I'm looking for that sticker.

Rest assured, that I put a lot of effort in trying to make sense.
I understand that I don´t make sense to you - there can be at least two reasons for that.

First of all, please let me apologize if that sounded curt. In retrospect, it was a poor choice of words. Second, I think that understanding is recursive.

Depends on the concept of "choice" you are thinking of. It is certainly not reconcilable with ideas like "free agency" etc., which you seemed to be in favour of in the beginning of your post.

It would help if you define "choice" rather than saying it doesn't exist. As for "free agency", I would define that as the acceptance that an individual is morally responsible for his/her actions (in this case, regardless of objective reality).

I have discussed a lot with Elman, and from all I know the concepts of choice and free will are closedly linked (if not congruent) in his view.

I am challenging Elman just as much as yourself. Free-will and choice are not congruent, though they may be closely linked.

"Free-will exists because it is useful for our purposes" - what kind of argument is this? I can spread my wings and fly because it is useful in getting from one place to another.

Right. It is not a philosophical argument but rather a social one. Sometimes, people believe in things which are entirely irrational or unprovable simply because they help them bring comfort to their lives.

Seriously, believing that you can spread your wings and fly will not be very useful to you when you are falling off a cliff. I think you missed the point about what is useful and what is not.

Exactly my point.

See? I'm not trying to systematically attack your position.

I don´t claim to understand the nature of "freewill". I don´t think there is such a thing nor a nature of it. I observe that people use the term "freewill" to describe a couple of different concepts. I am questioning the validity of those concepts. I am trying to work from the way they describe their concepts.

I don't know what you just tried to say. If you don't understand the nature of "freewill" then what are you arguing? What concepts are you referring to?

If you mean to say that people use the term "freewill" to mean different things at different times, then it would help if you differentiate which concepts are which rather than labelling them all as "freewill" and explaining them differently.

The ultimate point I am making
Frankly, I think this whole discussion is moot given that no one really knows anything about objective reality. However, if we can agree on that point, then we can have an interesting discussion about the various guesses that people have, the consequences of those guesses, and how it may affect the way we view reality. In essence, it isn't determining the objective reality which matters, but rather agreeing upon the appropriate view of reality given our (humanity's) present knowledge coupled with the best way we should live given our ignorance.

 

[quatona]

People say "the sun rises" because it increases its elevation in the sky each day. If this isn't "rising" then I don't know what is. Just because there is a different reference frame in which the sun translates around the rotational axis of the earth doesn't eliminate the meaning of "the sun rises"!
If you were to refute someone by saying "you know, the sun actually doesn't 'rise'", the ensueing argument would be ridiculous. The problem isn't in the philosophy but in the semantics.

How accurate and precise this description is depends entirely on the context of the discussion, and the implications and conclusions the person speaking draws from it.

Rather than understanding the other person's perspective, you assert your own as the only correct viewpoint.

To a degree I understand the viewpoint. I understand it in the same way I understand that we are intuitively assuming the earth is the center of the universe.
Where do you get this knowledge about my assertions from?
I observe persons to use terms like „choice“ and „freewill“. The problems I have is that
a. they do not come with proper definitions
b. from the way they are used (the implications that are drawn from it) don´t point to a concept that´s meaningful to me.
I cannot exclude that some people have a consistent concept of „choice“. Currently I am discussing his „choice“ concept with Asimov, and I see a chance that I understand how it is meaningful.
But when discussing concepts I have to work from the concept and not from the question „does this [insert term for concept] exist?“ (This would be mere semantics).
Thus, if someone says „we have choice, therefore [insert conclusion]“, I will discuss this particular „choice“ concept (as further explained by the implications/conclusions) with this person.
As for semantics: I couldn´t care less whether someone uses the word „choice“ or not. But if he uses it to make a point, it is perfectly legitimate to question the concept based on the way the person uses it for an argument.

It is true that language can be miss-used, but most often it is used correctly. Assuming that everyone endeavors to use language correctly, it is then necessary to try to determine what someone means before saying that they are fundamentally wrong.

Actually, that´s what I am trying to do. My actual question is (and has always been in these discussions): What do you mean when saying „choice“? Usually I get a lot of circularity for a response.

If I say "I am free in my choices", responding with "choices don't exist" fails to understand what I mean by "choices" since I obviously mean to refer to something which exists.

I do not doubt that you mean to refer to something that exists. But that doesn´t necessarily mean it exists.
Thus, if you want me to discuss your concept of „choice“ meaningfully, please explain it to me.

There is a lot of subtlety in this discussion and it is impossible to continue without understanding the subtle differences in meaning. Clear definitions are necessary and your definitions may not be precisely the same as mine.

I am not the one to define your terms.
For clarification: My observation is that everything is a necessary consequence of all factors involved.
This is the point I am discussing from. If there is anything unclear about this statement, feel free to ask.

Neither do I, and I apologize if it sounded that way. It was not an appeal to popularity, but rather an observation that people have had a very long time to hone the meanings of words to apply to things which make sense.

They do not make sense to me. I am asking for an explanation that makes sense to me.

Philosophers sometimes seem too eager to redefine many words simply to obfuscate or suit their particular argument.

Then, by all means, go to those philosophers and complain. It´s not what I am doing. Before I could even attempt to redefine something I would have to be given a clear definition.

I don't know exactly what you're going for here, but if I can't understand what your argument is then I will most certainly stop to ask for clarification. I think it is important to stop and clarify the means of argument just as much as the arguments themselves, so long as it helps everyone to understand the discussion better rather than set up a straw man.

Then please clarify the concept of choice you want to see discussed. (Just for a reminder: You entered a discussion between elman and me. Elman and I have spent probably hundreds of posts investigating his concept of „choice“ and the implications and conclusions he draws from it, so I think I have a pretty good idea of his concept of choice. When discussing with elman, I am of course referring to his concept of „choice“, and not yours which I actually don´t even know.

True. However, the commonality of language indicates that many people prefer to "compare notes" if you will regarding reality. It is this communication which allows language to move naturally toward the "appeal to popularity" which gives us a common lexicon.

Unfortunately, although using the same terms, people can mean very different things when using this term (and unfortunately they often assume they do mean the same thing, because they use the same word). This is clearly the case with „choice“.
Thus, if you want me to contemplate on your „choice“ concept, please explain it to me, instead of assuming that when discussing elman´s choice concept I am discussing yours, as well.

The goal of language is to describe reality. The side effect of that pursuit is that language gets filled with the particular perspective of reality which we have.

I would first have to find out what exactly you mean when saying „reality“ in order to find out whether I agree with this or not.

An actual argument
This is an interesting point, though. If language can create our reality, then how can we ever obtain a truly objective vantage point? If I can always say "you may be creating your own reality when you say 'objectively there is no free-will'" then why should I believe you? My argument is this: Although I believe an objective reality does exist, I don't believe that we can apprehend it through philosophy and we have only a slightly better chance with science.

I do not believe in an objective reality. I am not trying to make truth claims. I am discussing the inner coherence and the usefulness of certain concepts.

We cannot know whether our will is truly, objectively free or not because no human being can remove themselves of that free will in order to examine it. Many people talk circles around themselves trying to explain their "objective" view of free-will.

Again: I am merely discussing concepts. I am not discussing objects and their existence.

This is assuming one big thing: that people have perfect understanding of what each other mean. This is the fallacy. Each person describes what they see. Even if it is true to that person, another may misinterpret the first (The first person could also be flat-out-wrong, but that is another matter. The point is about understanding and not about absolute Truth).

Agreed. That language describes reality was not my argument, but yours. I do not doubt that when using a term people describe something that´s meaningful to them. I am looking for a way to use the term „choice“ in a way that would be meaningful to me.

Do you contest that the fact that we all make choices and decisions is self-evident?

Please explain what you mean when saying „making choices and decisions“. If it´s anything beyond „acting while being self-aware“ chances are that I contest that this is self-evident.

The point is that a lot of philosophy creates complex concepts by "defining terms" and taking them to their logical, rational conclusions. However, if those conclusions are not based upon realistic premises, then what use are they? Kierkegaard asks the question "what does it matter?" first rather than spending so much time reaching a useless or irrelevant conclusion.

Funnily enough, Kierkegaard pretty well describes my concern with those complex concepts „free will“ and „choice“. In fact „what would it matter?“ is what I am trying to find out.

Part of this is explaining things so that people will understand (rather than obfuscating). If the sign in the window were to have a sticker on it which indicated its sale, we would not make the same mistake. I'm looking for that sticker.

Since you want to sell me your choice concept, I would like you to explain it first, so that I know what I will get. Please concentrate on a proper definition as well as a description how it would matter.

First of all, please let me apologize if that sounded curt. In retrospect, it was a poor choice of words.

No problem, I don´t take offence easily.

It would help if you define "choice" rather than saying it doesn't exist. As for "free agency", I would define that as the acceptance that an individual is morally responsible for his/her actions (in this case, regardless of objective reality).

Again, I do not have a meaningful concept of „choice“. Again, please keep in mind that I was discussing elman´s concept of choice and not yours. If you want me to understand yours, by all means go ahead and explain it to me.

I am challenging Elman just as much as yourself. Free-will and choice are not congruent, though they may be closely linked.

What do you mean when saying „choice“?

See? I'm not trying to systematically attack your position.

I have not been under that impression. My impression is that you mistook my statements about certain „choice“ concepts as implying that there can impossibly be a plausible concept of „choice“. That´s not my position. I would be happy to finally learn about such a concept.

I don't know what you just tried to say. If you don't understand the nature of "freewill" then what are you arguing? What concepts are you referring to?

In this particular case I was arguing elman´s concept of „choice“.

If you mean to say that people use the term "freewill" to mean different things at different times, then it would help if you differentiate which concepts are which rather than labelling them all as "freewill" and explaining them differently.

That´s what I am trying to do. I think you expect too much from me to have your unknown concept of „choice“ in mind when discussing those of other persons.

The ultimate point I am making
Frankly, I think this whole discussion is moot given that no one really knows anything about objective reality. However, if we can agree on that point, then we can have an interesting discussion about the various guesses that people have, the consequences of those guesses, and how it may affect the way we view reality. In essence, it isn't determining the objective reality which matters, but rather agreeing upon the appropriate view of reality given our (humanity's) present knowledge coupled with the best way we should live given our ignorance.

Completely agreed, and that´s what I am trying to do all the time.
Please explain your concept of „choice“ and how it is the appropriate view of reality given our present knowledge coupled with the best way we should live given our ignorance.

 

[elman]

Quote:
In other words, just because a person "makes a choice" does not necessarily imply free-will (or even free-agency). Elman was talking about the legal system;

If I have a choice, I fail to understand why that does not imply free will. What is a choice if it is not chosing between different possiblities? I was talking about the legal system being evidence of choice and responsibility, i.e. free will.

I have discussed a lot with Elman, and from all I know the concepts of choice and free will are closedly linked (if not congruent) in his view.

I agree, that is my view.

the legal system exists to determine the extent of a person's moral responsibility based upon their free-agency (or in the case of mental incapacity, the lack thereof). Law is not synonimous with Morality/free-will.

No it is not synonimous but it is based on the assumption that we have free will and can therefore be judged responsible for our actions.

Quote:
I believe Elman was making the argument of functionality: free-will exists because it is useful in bringing order to society.

No that is not what I was saying. I was saying free will exists and there fore society is able to bring order by holding people responsible for their actions.

"Free-will exists because it is useful for our purposes" - what kind of argument is this? I can spread my wings and fly because it is useful in getting from one place to another.

Not my argument.

Quote:
This is not a correct correlation, however. The order of society is not contingent upon "free-will" but rather the existence of a system of law based upon the nature of humanity in whatever form. If robots ever become functional members of society, there will be laws associated with them. A robot which does not perform appropriately will be decommissioned just as a human which disobeys the law will be incarcerated.

If a machine fails to operate as designed it is repaired or junked. If a human being fails to perform as designed, the human being can be held responsible, as long as he is not mentally defective. We cannot hold a machine responsible, since the machine was not acting out of choice. We can hold the human responsible since he was acting out of choice. That is how we are able to sometime get human beings to make better choices, by increasing the bad consequences of their choices. When we do that it is a choice on our part.

Exactly my point. Something doesn´t have to have "freewill", choice, decision or whatever to enable us to deal with it.

While correct you cannot get a tractor to fix itself by punishment, while you can sometime be successful in getting a human being to straighten up.

If an apple is rotten Elman throws it in the garbage, although he doesn´t think the apple has choice or "freewill".

No I don't think the apples choses to be rotten nor does it chose to be thrown into the garbage, but we do often chose to be rotten and we chose to throw each other in jail for that.

 

[quatona]

No I don't think the apples choses to be rotten nor does it chose to be thrown into the garbage, but we do often chose to be rotten and we chose to throw each other in jail for that.

So the choice part is not a necessary prerequisite for acting against something/someone. You can throw someone into jail even though he had no choice.

 

[elman]

So the choice part is not a necessary prerequisite for acting against something/someone. You can throw someone into jail even though he had no choice.

I did not say we should throw someone into jail even though they had no choice. Usually if someone is mentally incompetent and had no choice, they don't get thrown into jail, but they may be kept in a phyciatric facility. Being thrown into jail is usually based on the assumtion they did have a choice and are therefore responsible for that choice.

 

[quatona]

I did not say we should throw someone into jail even though they had no choice.

I did not say nor mean to imply that you said it. I was refuting your argument that without believing in "freewill" we couldn´t have sanctions.

Usually if someone is mentally incompetent and had no choice, they don't get thrown into jail, but they may be kept in a phyciatric facility. Being thrown into jail is usually based on the assumtion they did have a choice and are therefore responsible for that choice.

The statement of yours which caused this part of the discussion was that society could not function without "freewill", because else you couldn´t inflict punishment on people. This is wrong. You can let people pay, put them into jail or even put them to death without them having "freewill". It is possible just like we inflict negative actions on all those other things that don´t have "freewill". It is possible, so your point is moot.

 

[elman]

I did not say nor mean to imply that you said it. I was refuting your argument that without believing in "freewill" we couldn´t have sanctions.

The statement of yours which caused this part of the discussion was that society could not function without "freewill", because else you couldn´t inflict punishment on people. This is wrong. You can let people pay, put them into jail or even put them to death without them having "freewill". It is possible just like we inflict negative actions on all those other things that don´t have "freewill". It is possible, so your point is moot.

It is not possible to do that and be just. You can be a tyrant and put people in jail for no reason, but the soicety I want to live in would not function in such a scenario. For a society to function properly the people who are punished must be responsible for the crime for which they are punished. Responsiblility is very much a part of an organized and non chaotic society. How do we chose to inflict these nagative actions if we have no choice and no free will to do so?

 

[quatona]

It is not possible to do that and be just.

Sure it would be. You are just not accepting the hypothetical scenario. We inflict negative actions on things and beings without "freewill" all the time; and there is no problem of injustice coming from that. Is trashing a rotten apple and keeping a fresh one unjust, in your opinion? Is hugging a calm dog and putting a bity one into a kennels unjust, in your opinion?
What you seem to be discussing is treating people who actually have "freewill" as if they had none. Keep in mind that in our hypothetical noone has "freewill".

You can be a tyrant and put people in jail for no reason, but the soicety I want to live in would not function in such a scenario.

You are shifting the goalposts. Whether you would like this society or not was not the point of discussion. The point of discussion was whether it could function.

For a society to function properly the people who are punished must be responsible for the crime for which they are punished.

No, you can punish people simply for doing something that is against the law. Since in our hypothetical noone has "freewill", anyways, there is no justice problem whatsoever coming with this.

Responsiblility is very much a part of an organized and non chaotic society. How do we chose to inflict these nagative actions if we have no choice and no free will to do so?

You simply do it. Just like you do it now. PersonX has speeded? He gets a ticket. PersonY is dangerous to society? He gets incarcarated in order to protect society from him.
There wouldn´t have to be any change whatsoever in societal practices with or without "freewill".

 

[elman]

Originally Posted by elman
It is not possible to do that and be just.

Sure it would be. You are just not accepting the hypothetical scenario. We inflict negative actions on things and beings without "freewill" all the time; and there is no problem of injustice coming from that. Is trashing a rotten apple and keeping a fresh one unjust, in your opinion? Is hugging a calm dog and putting a bity one into a kennels unjust, in your opinion?
What you seem to be discussing is treating people who actually have "freewill" as if they had none. Keep in mind that in our hypothetical noone has "freewill".

I cannot understand what you are saying. What is your defintion again of free will? We must not be talking about the same thing when we say free will.
Quote:
You can be a tyrant and put people in jail for no reason, but the soicety I want to live in would not function in such a scenario.

You are shifting the goalposts. Whether you would like this society or not was not the point of discussion. The point of discussion was whether it could function.

And I said it would not function so no shift of any goalposts.

For a society to function properly the people who are punished must be responsible for the crime for which they are punished.

No, you can punish people simply for doing something that is against the law. Since in our hypothetical noone has "freewill", anyways, there is no justice problem whatsoever coming with this.

Again we must not be talking about the same thing when we say free will. We also must not be using the same defintion of justice. Why would you punish someone for doing something against the law when they could not have obeyed the law? What is the point? What is the hope for them to not obey the law the next time since it is beyond their control.
Quote:
Responsiblility is very much a part of an organized and non chaotic society. How do we chose to inflict these nagative actions if we have no choice and no free will to do so?

You simply do it.

How do you do something without chosing to do it?

Just like you do it now.

I do it now by chosing to do it.

PersonX has speeded? He gets a ticket. PersonY is dangerous to society? He gets incarcarated in order to protect society from him.

Who decides Person X has speeded? Who decides he gets a ticket? Who decides how much the ticket is? Who decides Person y is dangerous? Who decides to incarcarate him? Who decides society needs protecting?

There wouldn´t have to be any change whatsoever in societal practices with or without "freewill".

This makes no sense. I can only assume you are not talking about the same thing I am when we discuss freewill.

 

[quatona]

I cannot understand what you are saying. What is your defintion again of free will? We must not be talking about the same thing when we say free will.

I´m trying my best to follow your definition.
Does an apple have "freewill" in your opinion? I guess no. Can we inflict negative actions upon it without being unjust?
Does an dog have "freewill" in your opinion? I guess no. Can we inflict negative actions upon it without being unjust?
Does humans without freewill have freewill? No, by definition. Can we inflict negative actions upon them without being unjust?

And I said it would not function so no shift of any goalposts.

But when I told you how it would function, you merely argued that you wouldn´t like it that way.

For a society to function properly the people who are punished must be responsible for the crime for which they are punished.

Again (and for the last time, because - sorry - I am getting tired of this): Hypothetical scenario: People without freewill. They get all the punishments they would get with "freewill". Please explain how and why this society would not function.

Again we must not be talking about the same thing when we say free will. We also must not be using the same defintion of justice. Why would you punish someone for doing something against the law when they could not have obeyed the law?

Because the majority disapproves of this behaviour, feels threatened, wants to be protected. Just like it is now.

What is the point? What is the hope for them to not obey the law the next time since it is beyond their control.

The hope is that the factors that determine their actions will have changed by this additional stimulus as a strong factor.

How do you do something without chosing to do it?

I just do it. Where´s the problem?

I do it now by chosing to do it.

I was talking about the practical inflictions.

Who decides Person X has speeded? Who decides he gets a ticket? Who decides how much the ticket is? Who decides Person y is dangerous? Who decides to incarcarate him? Who decides society needs protecting?

These laws are the results of the actions of persons without "freewill" who are determined to do what they do.

 

[Apollonian]

Elman, I took a while figuring out Quatona's reasoning and now I have to take issue with yours. It seems that every time someone makes an argument about "freewill" which you don't like you come out and say "you must not have the same definition as I do". This is a scapegoat or straw-man, since we are all now trying to figure out what your definition is.

Elman, I think you are missing the distinction between "free-will" and "free-agency". The legal system does not deal with metaphysics. As you yourself point out, the legal system deals with creating laws which yield the best form of society. This does not necessarily have anything to do with metaphysical concepts so long as it works. Then, you make the argument that in order to "work" we must believe in moral responsibility ergo "free-will". This last part is the problem.

Legal responsibility and Moral responsibility are not equivalent. The point about mental incapacity reveals this. Since I don't truly have any way of knowing whether someone is mentally incapacitated (they could be lieing or acting) then how am I to know whether they are "morally responsible" or not? In an ordered society, even mentally insane people are "punished" (removed into a mental institution). "Free-agency" assumes only that people (and some animals) make choices about the world around them and can be held responsible for the consequences of those choices regardless whether they are "free". "Moral responsibility" is something which is added on top of "free-agency" to determine what the consequences of those choices should be beyond the law. ie If someone murders another, and there is no evidence in a court of law, legally speaking the person is not held responsible. However, I believe the person is ultimately still Morally responsible for their actions, regardless of law. Law is not a good example of what we are talking about: is our will free?

But I'm getting ahead of myself. What is "choice"? To be clear, I think the definition of "choice" should be self-evident and I will illustrate it.

If I need something to eat at lunchtime and I am not at home, I have many options: Subway, Qdoba, PitaPit, the itallian place on the corner, McDonalds, etc. I need to make a 'choice' as to what to eat or I will starve.

I believe Quatona is arguing that the choice is determined by criteria such as diet, expense, opportunity, etc. ie I make a choice, but the choice is not "free". Even if the choice is based entirely on circumstance rather than "will", I still have to live with the consequences of my choice.

There is a pardox called Buridan's donkey or Catch-22. Given a completely rational donkey set perfectly equidistant between two identical bales of hay, the donkey would not have any rational basis upon which to deside which to eat and would therefore starve. This is a straw-man fallacy since it fails to understand the real (irrational) nature of choice. Ultimately, the donkey chooses one at random (maybe the sun was shining slightly better on one than the other) rather than starve. Another important point is to note the metaphorical nature of the illustration as applying just as well to humans as to donkeys.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buridan's_ass

This indicates something of what is meant by "choice" in reference to "free-will". However, though I believe it illustrates "choice" it does not illustrate "free-will" sufficiently. In other words, it illustrates "will" but not "free-will". We have no way of knowing whether there was some hidden criteria which inexhorably drove the donkey to one bale over the other.

I think the ultimate question we are tripping over is one of perspective.

Elman, you have shown the existence of "will" in humans and shown the necessary moral responsibility we have for that will. But how can you show that will to be "free"? How can you show that people aren't driven by past experience and present circumstance? The fact that we have to take responsibility for our actions does not imply freedom in those actions (more to the point, it does not imply freedom). Of course, first of all, what do you mean by "freedom" in "will" ?

Quatona, to disambiguate terms, let's make a distinction between "apparent free-will" which people say they experience and "supernatural free-will" which some people assert as a metaphysical concept. So, Elman, to which are you referring? Do you mean to say "supernatural free-will" for which people are "morally responsible"? Or is it the "Apparent free-will" which is used in the non-metaphysical legal system (the donkey's choice to not starve)?

My stance
Personally, I believe that "freedom" in human "will" is a matter of the uncertainty of choice in the present. In other words, it is easy to see choices when they are laid out in narrative over periods of time, but as time is shrunk to a single point choice becomes uncertain. It is possible to predict what other people will choose if we know them well (we understand the way they think). However, I do not believe it is possible to completely predict their choices. In that respect (by virtue of the inability to predict someone's choice deterministically) I call a person's will (the assertion of their choice) "free".

However, in an ultimate metaphysical sense (an objective sense), I can conceptualize a universe in which we will inexhorably follow a single path through time. However, such an omniscient perspective has to do with visualizing human will but nothing to do with human viewpoints. Therefore it has nothing to do with "freedom" because we cannot know the future.

In short:
- Unless we can deterministically predict the future absolutely, then we cannot constrain choice beyond a nominal level of uncertainty.
- Humans are "free" to choose within that uncertainty (so no flapping of arms to fly), though we are not "free" in that God knows the future.
- Yet, since we don't know what God knows, there is no problem with that in our definition of "free" (or God doesn't exist and there is no problem).

Thus, there is no paradox between determinism and free-will in this formulation. They can coexist. (Both have limitations which reconcile them; neither is absolute). Of course, this rests on the assumption that there is no absolute determinism. I happen to believe that quantum mechanics limits determinism by the Heisenburg principle, and much of human understanding resembles the principle even on macroscopic scales.

 

[elman]

Originally Posted by elman
I cannot understand what you are saying. What is your defintion again of free will? We must not be talking about the same thing when we say free will.

I´m trying my best to follow your definition.

My defintion is the ability to be loving or to be unloving.

Does an apple have "freewill" in your opinion? I guess no. Can we inflict negative actions upon it without being unjust?

No an apple has no ability to be loving so you cannot be unjust in your treatment of an apple or a stone or anything without a brain.

Does an dog have "freewill" in your opinion? I guess no. Can we inflict negative actions upon it without being unjust?

A dog does have some ability to love or not love, but not the same ability as a human being. Yes you can be unjust in your treatment of a dog.

Does humans without freewill have freewill? No, by definition. Can we inflict negative actions upon them without being unjust?

If a human has no freewill and you punish them for not doing what they are unable to do, you are being unjust.

Quote:
And I said it would not function so no shift of any goalposts.

But when I told you how it would function, you merely argued that you wouldn´t like it that way.

No I continued to point out that removing free will from society would cause it to not function because society and its laws are based on the assumtion of free will.


Quote:
For a society to function properly the people who are punished must be responsible for the crime for which they are punished.

Again (and for the last time, because - sorry - I am getting tired of this): Hypothetical scenario: People without freewill. They get all the punishments they would get with "freewill". Please explain how and why this society would not function.

If a person has no free will they are being punished for doing something or not doing something when they had no choice and could not have done different. That is unjust and it would fail to produce an individual who would make better choices in the future since they would still not have free will and could not chose.



Quote:
Again we must not be talking about the same thing when we say free will. We also must not be using the same defintion of justice. Why would you punish someone for doing something against the law when they could not have obeyed the law?

Because the majority disapproves of this behaviour, feels threatened, wants to be protected. Just like it is now.

Now the majority recognizes the person who disobey could have chosen to not disobey and therefore is responsible for their disobediance and the majority further recognizes that if that person is punished for their disobediance, they might refrain from such disobediance in the future.

Quote:
What is the point? What is the hope for them to not obey the law the next time since it is beyond their control.

The hope is that the factors that determine their actions will have changed by this additional stimulus as a strong factor.

But it is still not there choice. We just have to hope the factor is effective by some means other than choice by the person we are tying to modify behaviour on.



Quote:
How do you do something without chosing to do it?

I just do it. Where´s the problem?

The problem is you could have just not done it. Why did you just do it?


Quote:
I do it now by chosing to do it.

I was talking about the practical inflictions.

I don't understand this. Can you explain?


Quote:
Who decides Person X has speeded? Who decides he gets a ticket? Who decides how much the ticket is? Who decides Person y is dangerous? Who decides to incarcarate him? Who decides society needs protecting?

These laws are the results of the actions of persons without "freewill" who are determined to do what they do.

Why do you think the laws are the results of People without freewill? If the laws did not come from these people since they did not have freewill, where did the laws come from?

 

[elman]

Apollonian;28973746]Elman, I took a while figuring out Quatona's reasoning and now I have to take issue with yours. It seems that every time someone makes an argument about "freewill" which you don't like you come out and say "you must not have the same definition as I do". This is a scapegoat or straw-man, since we are all now trying to figure out what your definition is.

My defintion is the abililty to love or be unloving.

Elman, I think you are missing the distinction between "free-will" and "free-agency". The legal system does not deal with metaphysics. As you yourself point out, the legal system deals with creating laws which yield the best form of society. This does not necessarily have anything to do with metaphysical concepts so long as it works. Then, you make the argument that in order to "work" we must believe in moral responsibility ergo "free-will". This last part is the problem.

Our laws did not come from nothing. They came from the metaphysical reality in which we llive. But explain the distinction between free will and free agency.

Legal responsibility and Moral responsibility are not equivalent. The point about mental incapacity reveals this. Since I don't truly have any way of knowing whether someone is mentally incapacitated (they could be lieing or acting) then how am I to know whether they are "morally responsible" or not? In an ordered society, even mentally insane people are "punished" (removed into a mental institution). "Free-agency" assumes only that people (and some animals) make choices about the world around them and can be held responsible for the consequences of those choices regardless whether they are "free".

That is where I lose you. How were the choices they were able to make, not free?

"Moral responsibility" is something which is added on top of "free-agency" to determine what the consequences of those choices should be beyond the law. ie If someone murders another, and there is no evidence in a court of law, legally speaking the person is not held responsible. However, I believe the person is ultimately still Morally responsible for their actions, regardless of law. Law is not a good example of what we are talking about: is our will free?

I follow up until you ask "is our will free". What are you asking?

But I'm getting ahead of myself. What is "choice"? To be clear, I think the definition of "choice" should be self-evident and I will illustrate it.

If I need something to eat at lunchtime and I am not at home, I have many options: Subway, Qdoba, PitaPit, the itallian place on the corner, McDonalds, etc. I need to make a 'choice' as to what to eat or I will starve.

I believe Quatona is arguing that the choice is determined by criteria such as diet, expense, opportunity, etc. ie I make a choice, but the choice is not "free". Even if the choice is based entirely on circumstance rather than "will", I still have to live with the consequences of my choice.

I understand we do not have free will in the sense that we are limited in our ability and influnced in our decisions. I simply do not believe our choices are ever based entirly on circumstances rather than will. Even if a gun is pointed at my head and I am threatened with death I still have the free will to die rather than comply although I admit in that scenerio by free will has been almost completly taken away. I have said many times I do not argue for one cause, but I do argue that one of the causes of our choices is us.

There is a pardox called Buridan's donkey or Catch-22. Given a completely rational donkey set perfectly equidistant between two identical bales of hay, the donkey would not have any rational basis upon which to deside which to eat and would therefore starve. This is a straw-man fallacy since it fails to understand the real (irrational) nature of choice. Ultimately, the donkey chooses one at random (maybe the sun was shining slightly better on one than the other) rather than starve. Another important point is to note the metaphorical nature of the illustration as applying just as well to humans as to donkeys.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buridan's_ass

This indicates something of what is meant by "choice" in reference to "free-will". However, though I believe it illustrates "choice" it does not illustrate "free-will" sufficiently. In other words, it illustrates "will" but not "free-will". We have no way of knowing whether there was some hidden criteria which inexhorably drove the donkey to one bale over the other.

We also have no reason to assume anything drove the donkey to one bale over the other and it remains probable reality is what it appears and the donkey chose which bale at random or for reasons we are unaware of but the donkey having a reason to chose one bale over the other does not remove free will from the equation.

I think the ultimate question we are tripping over is one of perspective.

Elman, you have shown the existence of "will" in humans and shown the necessary moral responsibility we have for that will. But how can you show that will to be "free"? How can you show that people aren't driven by past experience and present circumstance?

I think they are driven by past experience and present circustance and yet they still had the power to act differently. That they do not is not proof they could not.

The fact that we have to take responsibility for our actions does not imply freedom in those actions (more to the point, it does not imply freedom). Of course, first of all, what do you mean by "freedom" in "will" ?

Responsiblity does imply freedom as in the ability to have done differently than they did. If they did not have that ability they would not be responsible.

Quatona, to disambiguate terms, let's make a distinction between "apparent free-will" which people say they experience and "supernatural free-will" which some people assert as a metaphysical concept. So, Elman, to which are you referring? Do you mean to say "supernatural free-will" for which people are "morally responsible"? Or is it the "Apparent free-will" which is used in the non-metaphysical legal system (the donkey's choice to not starve)?

I am talking about the apparent free will I believe. I am not clear on what supernatural free will would be.

My stance
Personally, I believe that "freedom" in human "will" is a matter of the uncertainty of choice in the present. In other words, it is easy to see choices when they are laid out in narrative over periods of time, but as time is shrunk to a single point choice becomes uncertain. It is possible to predict what other people will choose if we know them well (we understand the way they think). However, I do not believe it is possible to completely predict their choices. In that respect (by virtue of the inability to predict someone's choice deterministically) I call a person's will (the assertion of their choice) "free".

I agree with this. If we are aware of all the influences and the person and their individual characteristices, we could probably predict some choices with a better and even chance of accuracy, but there will aways be surprises.

However, in an ultimate metaphysical sense (an objective sense), I can conceptualize a universe in which we will inexhorably follow a single path through time. However, such an omniscient perspective has to do with visualizing human will but nothing to do with human viewpoints. Therefore it has nothing to do with "freedom" because we cannot know the future.

I think God can know the future but I don't believe that knowledge removes our ability to chose and effect our destiny.

In short:
- Unless we can deterministically predict the future absolutely, then we cannot constrain choice beyond a nominal level of uncertainty.
- Humans are "free" to choose within that uncertainty (so no flapping of arms to fly), though we are not "free" in that God knows the future.

I agree except that God knowing what I am going to chose to do does not make it a non choice.
-

Yet, since we don't know what God knows, there is no problem with that in our definition of "free" (or God doesn't exist and there is no problem).

I agree

Thus, there is no paradox between determinism and free-will in this formulation. They can coexist. (Both have limitations which reconcile them; neither is absolute). Of course, this rests on the assumption that there is no absolute determinism. I happen to believe that quantum mechanics limits determinism by the Heisenburg principle, and much of human understanding resembles the principle even on macroscopic scales.

I don't understand all of this but I think I agree.

 

[quatona]

Appollonian, I am hesitating to respond to this post, because it seems to be directed towards elman in particular. However, you mention me and seem to adress me, as well. I´m not sure it´s a good idea for you to be discussing two entirely different stances at the same time – so if you prefer to clear things up with elman first, just let me know.

But I'm getting ahead of myself. What is "choice"? To be clear, I think the definition of "choice" should be self-evident and I will illustrate it.

If I need something to eat at lunchtime and I am not at home, I have many options: Subway, Qdoba, PitaPit, the itallian place on the corner, McDonalds, etc. I need to make a 'choice' as to what to eat or I will starve.

I believe Quatona is arguing that the choice is determined by criteria such as diet, expense, opportunity, etc. ie I make a choice, but the choice is not "free". Even if the choice is based entirely on circumstance rather than "will", I still have to live with the consequences of my choice.

If I may interject here for clarfication:
1. To me your example is not self-evident. The problem with argueing with „self-evidence“ is that it does nothing for a person to whom it is not self-evident.

2. Next: you have not given a definition, but an example. Not that there´s necessarily anything wrong with an example – just saying.

3.What I am looking for (rather than an example or a definition) is an explanation as to how and when the concept of choice allows a meaningful, relevant and useful distinction. This could be done in several ways: You could explain how things would be different if man had no choice, or you could tell me which implications the acknowledgement of „choice“ comes with, you could give me an example in which the wording „he did“ and „he chose to do“ makes a difference and which. (For example, there is a societal/legal definition of „unchosen action“ that I find practically useful: Along the lines of „Under immediate direct constraint of another person“. Saying that if someone binds me to a stool and forcefully leads my hand with a pen, I did not choose to write the resulting letter. I doubt, though, that this is the way you want to use the distinction choice/no-choice).
For the example of the restaurants: We observe there to be several restaurants, and we observe a being entering one of them and eating there. How would the scenery be different if this being has „choice“ and if it has not? Could we tell the difference? What would it be relevant for whether this being has „choice“ or not?

4. Unfortunately (and I see your dilemma and empathize) explaining „choice“ with „options“ doesn´t do it for me. My question: When is something an option, or better: How and when can we determine whether someone has this option? (There are a lot of things to ponder. Is it enough for someone to have an option, if I see this option? Does he have to see it himself? Must this option be accessible/realistic? What exactly makes it accesible/realistic? Do only factors external (a term that would require a long discussion on its own, btw.) to the person count here, or do internal factors (like, say, an inhibition) count as making this option unavailable? etc.etc. You get the idea.).
Would you, by any chance, say that a choice only and always exists if the person in question perceives a choice?

5. A cockroach resides in the Italian restaurant. All the other restaurants exist, they are available options for the cockroach to reside in. Yet, we observed the cockroach entering the Italian restaurant, of all. Did it choose so? Why? Why not? If not, how does „available options“ allow to discern or constitute „choice“?

6. Another way the term „choice“ would be usable for me is this: „I did not choose which restaurant to eat in. I was so hungry that I took the first I came across regardlessly.“ Meaning: I did not put any effort in such considerations.

7. What would probably help me a great deal in understanding your concept would be an explanation of the significant difference (in regards to implications) of saying: „The man entered the Chinese restaurant, of all the restaurants in town.“ and „The man chose to enter the Chinese restaurant, of all the restaurants in town.“

Or, in other words, what motivates us to emphasize „he chose to act“ in certain instances rather than simply saying „he acted“? Does this distinction really have to do with describing a human condition, or doesn´t it rather serve to distinguish those cases in which we acknowledge an immediate external causing factor of great dominance from those cases in which we don´t acknowledge such?

8. I believe Quatona is arguing that the choice is determined by criteria such as diet, expense, opportunity, etc. ie I make a choice, but the choice is not "free"

Just for clarifying further: These listed criteria are, in the way I see it, merely the last (cumulated, themselves being determined by countless other factors), most obvious and discernable factors. I just say this because your list contains only factors that are, at least to a degree, subject to consciousness and considerations. In fact I think of billions of other, for themselves pretty insignificant, unconscious and undiscernable factors.
And again my request for your help: I don´t see any use in the statement „I make a choice, but the choice is not free“. My version would be: „I act the way all determining factors involved necessitate me to.“ Basically the same way apples, cockroaches and dogs do (with the probable difference that I have a different sort of self-awareness). If a choice is not free, what is the difference between a mere action and a choice, and what does this differenciation help me with?

9. I still have to live with the consequences of my choice.
I´m not sure I understand what this does to the matter. I have to live with the consequences of my actions, no matter whether they are my choice or not. I even have to live with the consequences of the actions (chosen or not) of others, and consequences of things that not by any stretch I have been involved in.

Ultimately, the donkey chooses one at random (maybe the sun was shining slightly better on one than the other) rather than starve.

Another clarification of my point and proposed terminology: What you call „chosing at random“ here I would call „acting as determined by all factors involved“

Another important point is to note the metaphorical nature of the illustration as applying just as well to humans as to donkeys.

To be honest, you find me surprised. I wouldn´t have thought that you´d expand your concept of „choice“ on donkeys. That changes things quite a bit.
First question: If you consider animals to have „choice“, does that mean all animals? If not, which do „choose“ in your concept of the term, and which don´t? How do you draw the line? (Answers to these questions might help me a lot with understanding your concept).
Are there other things besides animals that choose, too?

This indicates something of what is meant by "choice" in reference to "free-will". However, though I believe it illustrates "choice" it does not illustrate "free-will" sufficiently. In other words, it illustrates "will" but not "free-will". We have no way of knowing whether there was some hidden criteria which inexhorably drove the donkey to one bale over the other.

Please allow me to add: In many cases we can discern or exclude such criteria. That´s what science is occupied with all the time. If however we don´t succeed in extracting such a dominant factor, I think the first reasonalbe conclusion would be that the action is determined by the complex system of those uncountable known and unknown factors that are undoubtably part of the equation.

I think the ultimate question we are tripping over is one of perspective.

Oh, definitely. What else could it be?

Quatona, to disambiguate terms, let's make a distinction between "apparent free-will" which people say they experience and "supernatural free-will" which some people assert as a metaphysical concept.

Very good. I think this distinction is of benefit for the discussion.

As for the first and what about it is apparent to me: I perceive possibilities. Sometimes I perceive options that are available, sometimes I observe such that turn out not to have been available. I perceive the option of winning a badminton match on a regular basis, and almost as regularly I learn that it was not available.
Sometimes I observe options that are theoretically available, but not for me. E.g. I am too much of a coward to do them. I see the option of understanding a concept, but for the life of me I don´t understand it.
I do perceive will. I do want to do certain things. Sometimes I want to do something and I do it, and sometimes I want to do something and I won´t do it.
I have no idea why I would assume that this will is free. Free of what, to begin with?
I can track down many, many factors determining my will.
And, even more important, I perceive my will to be in control of me.

I will have to think about your paragraph „My stance“ a little more. Later!

 

[Apollonian]

Elman, since when is our will constrained solely to love? Surely there is more to the set of all our choices than whether or not to love.

Appollonian, I am hesitating to respond to this post, because it seems to be directed towards elman in particular. However, you mention me and seem to adress me, as well. I´m not sure it´s a good idea for you to be discussing two entirely different stances at the same time – so if you prefer to clear things up with elman first, just let me know.

I'm just joining in between you two in attempt to help the discussion along and add my own thoughts. I appreciate your help to clarify them.

If I may interject here for clarfication:
1. To me your example is not self-evident. The problem with argueing with „self-evidence“ is that it does nothing for a person to whom it is not self-evident.

Please explain what isn't self-evident about "choice". Otherwise, I will let my illustration stand as it is.

(See below. I think you got my point and are just making it overly complicated)

2. Next: you have not given a definition, but an example. Not that there´s necessarily anything wrong with an example – just saying.

Think of it as an axiom upon which other more important things are defined. At a certain point, unless we agree upon simple words that describe fundamental elements of human experience, we have no way of communicating regarding more abstract things. I was simply clarifying the obvious; there was nothing tricky about it.

3.What I am looking for (rather than an example or a definition) is an explanation as to how and when the concept of choice allows a meaningful, relevant and useful distinction.

This isn't a definition that your after, but rather a result or necessary consequence of "choice". Fair enough, but please don't jump ahead and miss the simplicity of my illustration.

This could be done in several ways: You could explain how things would be different if man had no choice, or you could tell me which implications the acknowledgement of „choice“ comes with, you could give me an example in which the wording „he did“ and „he chose to do“ makes a difference and which.

If man had no choice, then he would experience no choice (as I illustrated in first-person). We define "choice" in such a way as to explain that first-person process which we observe ourselves to have, and then we go so far as to assume other people (being human like us) experience a similar thing.

The difference between "he did" and "he chose to do" is semantics. "he did" is a historical fact. "he chose to do" is a second-person account of the first-person occurance of that historical fact. The distinction might be seen by asking "If this person did this one thing, what will he do next?" The second person is observing the action (so to be another "he did") while the first person is "choosing" the next action ("I will do").

(For example, there is a societal/legal definition of „unchosen action“ that I find practically useful: Along the lines of „Under immediate direct constraint of another person“. Saying that if someone binds me to a stool and forcefully leads my hand with a pen, I did not choose to write the resulting letter. I doubt, though, that this is the way you want to use the distinction choice/no-choice).

The choice here is whether to resist or not. If you choose not to resist, even in the presence of direct constraint there is an element of choice. The point here is not about choice itself, but rather the constraints which are placed about a person's choices.

This is the same argument as saying that a person may not choose to flap their arms and fly. (They may choose to flap their arms, but they will not fly).

For the example of the restaurants: We observe there to be several restaurants, and we observe a being entering one of them and eating there. How would the scenery be different if this being has „choice“ and if it has not? Could we tell the difference? What would it be relevant for whether this being has „choice“ or not?

Why did you switch to the third person? Do you understand that switching to the third person deconstructs the meaning of the illustration?

I can't help but think you are taking "choice" to mean something entirely more complicated than it need be! Regardless of all the metaphysics, we observe people making choices ("choosing" one restaurant over another). The implications of that observation are another matter.

I can't help but be frustrated when you ask "whether this being has 'choice' or not?" Do you seriously doubt whether you make choices about what to eat, let alone many other things? What is the point of the word "choice" then? You might as well ask what the definition of "is" is and whether we exist at all because the word "is" is meaningless.

Let's talk about "free-will", but let's agree that people make choices everyday, if only as an axiom.

4. Unfortunately (and I see your dilemma and empathize) explaining „choice“ with „options“ doesn´t do it for me.

Will anything "do it for you"?

(see below)

My question: When is something an option, or better: How and when can we determine whether someone has this option?

You are convoluting the issue by insisting on the third-person perspective to analyze terms which are defined by the first-person.

(There are a lot of things to ponder. Is it enough for someone to have an option, if I see this option? Does he have to see it himself? Must this option be accessible/realistic? What exactly makes it accesible/realistic?

Choice deals with the options which the chooser sees. Other options which a third party sees but the chooser does not do not enter into the choice. Also, a third party may not see all the options which the chooser sees and as such may not be fully accurate in analysis of the choice.

It is the first-person perspective which matters when determining choice. It is the third-person perspective which matters when determining legal matters. Only a truly omniscient perspective may understand whether the chooser could have or would have made a different choice given another opportunity.

Do only factors external (a term that would require a long discussion on its own, btw.) to the person count here, or do internal factors (like, say, an inhibition) count as making this option unavailable? etc.etc. You get the idea.).

This is a good point. In the realm of metaphysics, there is no distinction between "internal" and "external" (in my view). However, the distinction regarding choice lies in the knowledge of those factors. If I am unaware of my own inhibitions etc, then I still appear (to myself) to make a choice between many options (even if I may later understand otherwise).

Understanding more about what drives us to certain choices over others does not eliminate choice. It simply gives us a better view as to what our limitations are for the future. In essense, that inhibition itself becomes one of the criteria upon which we choose our future actions. Many people can overcome even the most inexhorably habitual inhibitions or addictions once they recognize their existence.

This point is one of the strongest arguments for Moral Responsibility: If humans had no knowledge of their options (a la a certain tree of "Good and Evil" but that's another discussion) then there would be no experience of choice. But it becomes a slippery slope since we cannot undo our knowledge. We can only seek to have a better understanding of the choices we do (and will) make.

Would you, by any chance, say that a choice only and always exists if the person in question perceives a choice?

This is the simplicity of what "choice" means. "free-will" is the complicated concept which deals with the relationship between the third person ("free") and the first person ("will" or "choice").

5. A cockroach resides in the Italian restaurant. All the other restaurants exist, they are available options for the cockroach to reside in. Yet, we observed the cockroach entering the Italian restaurant, of all. Did it choose so? Why? Why not? If not, how does „available options“ allow to discern or constitute „choice“?

Since I am not a cockroach, and I don't know anyone who is (and I doubt you do either), we cannot know whether the cockroach chose the restaurant or just happened to wander into it. A neuro-entomologist would probably tell us that the cockroach does not have sufficient processing power to evaluate that he is even in an itallian restaurant, let alone to evaluate a set of options.

This illustrates that one of the major components of "choice" and more importantly "will" is a matter of complexity. This is what people call "emergent intelligence".

6. Another way the term „choice“ would be usable for me is this: „I did not choose which restaurant to eat in. I was so hungry that I took the first I came across regardlessly.“ Meaning: I did not put any effort in such considerations.

No. You chose to enter the first one you came across because you were "so hungry". This process does not invalidate "choice" but simply changes the basis upon which the choice was made. You could have just as easily said "I was so hungry, but also so poor that I chose the second, cheaper restaurant".

That's like writing "I didn't write this" (note the fallacy). "I didn't choose to choose the way I did, it just happened to happen that way".

7.

This was a lot of obfuscation to talk about things already mentioned.

8. diet, expense, opportunity, etc.

Just for clarifying further: These listed criteria are, in the way I see it, merely the last (cumulated, themselves being determined by countless other factors), most obvious and discernable factors. ...In fact I think of billions of other, for themselves pretty insignificant, unconscious and undiscernable factors.

Indeed, but even if they ultimately exist are they knowable? Can we know that such factors exist? Talking about unconscious, undiscernable factors does not make them limitless.

And again my request for your help: I don´t see any use in the statement „I make a choice, but the choice is not free“. My version would be: „I act the way all determining factors involved necessitate me to.“

i.e. "The choices I make are determined by all factors involved." This is a third person perspective stated through the first person. It fails to speak to your experience because you cannot know all of these factors. It fails to speak from the third person because no third person may predict the future with complete certainty (necessity).

"I act the way I do" is a long winded way of saying "I choose".

9. I still have to live with the consequences of my choice.
I´m not sure I understand what this does to the matter. I have to live with the consequences of my actions, no matter whether they are my choice or not.

*sigh* Again with confusing the word "choice". The difference between "My actions" and "My choices" is only a matter of perspective. "actions" is purely historical while "choices" is both historical and personal.

First question: If you consider animals to have „choice“, does that mean all animals? If not, which do „choose“ in your concept of the term, and which don´t?

As I mentioned, it is a metaphor. The point isn't to speak about donkeys but rather to attempt to eliminate for a moment the bias which we have with our own experience. The fact that we may talk about a donkey "choosing" is purely anthropomorphic.

Oh, definitely. What else could it be?

Stupidity and/or imaturity.

As for the first and what about it is apparent to me: I perceive possibilities. Sometimes I perceive options that are available, sometimes I observe such that turn out not to have been available. ...
Sometimes I observe options that are theoretically available, but not for me.

There is an important distinction between "choice" which involves an action and "imagination" which involves only thought. You may imagine options which are not available for you to choose (like levitating or winning at badmitton).

I do perceive will. I do want to do certain things.

Here we go. Now we are on to "will". Will seems to be the point at which our thoughts and our actions collide. I would say that "will" is the experience of the "choice" which we are making at the present moment. ie "will" is slightly more abstract than the more historical "choice". Though we may know what we chose, we may not know what we "willed".

Sometimes I want to do something and I do it, and sometimes I want to do something and I won´t do it.

Our "will" seems to extend into our preconscious and subconscious mind.

Would you agree? Or is "will" purely conscious?

I have no idea why I would assume that this will is free. Free of what, to begin with?
I can track down many, many factors determining my will.
And, even more important, I perceive my will to be in control of me.

And yet, you are also in control of your will. If you will your "will" to change, it will do so over time. Thus, seemingly predetermined habits may be broken and new ones formed. Just as will seems to be influenced by the unconscious, it is also influenced by the conscious mind.

I will have to think about your paragraph „My stance“ a little more. Later!

I think we are honing in on it with this last part.

*sigh* Now for sleep.