Free will in heaven?

[2PhiloVoid]

I actually think this is a fantastic starting point for a discussion on Old Testament morality (which I think is atrocious if not allegorized), though I suspect that there's going to be considerable disagreement over what constitutes flourishing in the first place. You're more materialistically oriented and I would assume more likely to focus upon pleasure and comfort in the utilitarian sense, which is obviously not going to fly with everyone.

I am not sure if you could defend the morality of the Old Testament with flourishing used as a starting place, but it would be interesting to see if it can be done.

...and it might be a terrific starting point for a parallel appraisal of the modern Human Rights Regime (which I think is a bit pretentious if not deconstructed first) before going on to thoroughly evaluate the actual muddy sediments of O.T. morality. As they say, "What's sauce for the goose..............................."

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Great! It took some doing, so I'm glad it's all cleared up and we (mostly) agree on the vocabulary side of things.
Oh, butter me up, why don't you?

...I'm just pointing out potential where I see it.

You are of course under no obligation to defend a theistic moral system to me, especially if the one I'm attacking isn't even the one you believe in. I'm primarily interested in seeing if I can get you to see things from my perspective, but I wouldn't bother doing this if I didn't think you could offer some interesting rebuttals.

Of course.

Alright, before we get into the "how" of holding values, I should pin down what I mean by that. When I say I hold a value, it's another way of saying I value something. To value something is to believe in its importance to your own personal needs and/or desires. So when I say that we both hold certain values, I'm saying we both find certain things important to our own personal needs and desires.

...hermeneutically speaking, is it enough to simply cite that we have similar patterns of "human need" when our actual values and goal sets may be quite different? Personally, and analytically speaking, I think much more minute attention needs to be paid attention to various inherent properties which reside in each of our respective views. It's not enough to say, "We both desire our own human flourishing!" and stop there.

As far as I can tell, there are a handful of things that are universally valued. These things would correspond with Maslow's hierarchy of needs, and it's here that moral axioms are implicitly captured. Human flourishing is used as the axiomatic goal of moral systems because as humans, we all value flourishing over suffering, and it is easier to flourish as a cooperative group with a code of conduct than alone in the anarchical wilderness.

That will depend on the people and the society with which you discuss these things since value sets are not necessarily cloned throughout all societies.

At this point, either you agree that the goal of morality is to facilitate human flourishing and we can proceed to evaluate God's ways accordingly, or your moral system is grounded in something else, which as you said, adds another level of complication to our discussion. If your moral system is grounded in something else, I don't know how it helps me obtain the things I need or desire, so I don't know of what value it is to me.

And that, my friend, is the conundrum. We not only have different values sets and moral goals, we also have different conceptual networks floating in our heads which in turn affect 'how' we each think all of this stuff works out and to what actually constitutes 'human flourishing.' If all of these details can't be fleshed out, or are otherwise ignored, then we're just conflating and confusing various moral platitudes and principles, even if all the while we're using much of the same ethical vocabulary and jargon.

 

[Silmarien]

...and it might be a terrific starting point for a parallel appraisal of the modern Human Rights Regime (which I think is a bit pretentious if not deconstructed first) before going onto to thoroughly evaluate the actual muddy sediments of O.T. morality. As they say, "What's sauce for the goose..............................."

Well, that's assuming that every critique of the Old Testament is going to come from a modernist angle. But yeah, if you guys want to move things over to a new thread, this might be a good moment. (Though as you already know, I won't be around in September. )

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Well, that's assuming that every critique of the Old Testament is going to come from a modernist angle. But yeah, if you guys want to move things over to a new thread, this might be a good moment. (Though as you already know, I won't be around in September. )

At the moment, I'm not actually in the most advantageous position since most of my books are packed away, so we can wait till later or for some future thread.

 

[Nihilist Virus]

Good point, but an infinitude of existence with no loving immortal conscious beings is infinitely more pointless than an infinitude of existence with loving immortal conscious beings.

Time can be measured, so I can say "three times as long" or even "infinitely longer."

Purpose cannot be measured. Purpose is not objective. Can X be three times as pointless as Y? If you can't show how this works, then "infinitely more pointless" is meaningless.

 

[Chriliman]

Time can be measured, so I can say "three times as long" or even "infinitely longer."

Purpose cannot be measured. Purpose is not objective. Can X be three times as pointless as Y? If you can't show how this works, then "infinitely more pointless" is meaningless.

The ratio of finite to infinite is zero, as you said. So unless meaning lasts forever in some immortal way, then the meaning we do experience is just a vanishing illusion in the infinite meaningless void that is existence without conscious beings.

 

[Silmarien]

I would agree that bad habits have negative effects, but what constitutes a negative effect? You could point to shortened lifespans, diseases, social consequences, etc. and those would be very compelling arguments, but I would find it very difficult to establish those as objectively “bad” things. They’re things we don’t want, that contribute to other things we don’t want, but that’s all subjective preference.

Oh, I am a values realist. I do think that it is an objective fact of reality that things can be good or bad--this automatically comes into play in the biological realm, since there would be no possibility of natural selection for beneficial traits if there were no objective distinction between what was harmful or beneficial to the organism. Can we equate "subjective" values like good and bad with this sort of objective fact of nature? I think that if we couldn't, then lifeforms would never have developed preferences for certain sensory phenomena over others in the first place--subjective judgments do not float about in the ether detached from objective facts. Someone could subjectively value the wrong things, but this doesn't make those things subjectively correct for them.

So this would tie into how I look at morality as well, since I don't see it as constructing the best system based on self-interest and cooperation. At least not in the utilitarian sense. I do think that morality is to a certain extent a social construct, but I reject the sort of sharp divide between objectivity and subjectivity which results in the latter being detached from reality. Things can be objectively good and bad for the individual and for the society, and we attempt to build moral systems from that, either consciously or unconsciously.

 

[Nihilist Virus]

The ratio of finite to infinite is zero, as you said. So unless meaning lasts forever in some immortal way, then the meaning we do experience is just a vanishing illusion in the infinite meaningless void that is existence without conscious beings.

You completely ignored what I said. Why bother to respond in that case?

 

[Chriliman]

You completely ignored what I said. Why bother to respond in that case?

Sorry, didn't mean to ignore what you said.

I disagree that purpose is not measurable or objective. If you recognize purpose or meaning in what someone else says, then you've just measured it from an objectively existing source that isn't yourself. It's not unlike measuring anything else that exists objectively. I'd even say its important to be able to measure the meaning of what other people say in order to determine if its actually true or not.

Maybe a subject for another time as this has nothing to do with my earlier point or to the question of free will in heaven.

 

[Nihilist Virus]

Sorry, didn't mean to ignore what you said.

I disagree that purpose is not measurable or objective. If you recognize purpose or meaning in what someone else says, then you've just measured it from an objectively existing source that isn't yourself. It's not unlike measuring anything else that exists objectively. I'd even say its important to be able to measure the meaning of what other people say in order to determine if its actually true or not.

Maybe a subject for another time as this has nothing to do with my earlier point or to the question of free will in heaven.

Time is objective because it does not require a subject. Time will keep ticking no matter who is there to comment. But purpose requires a subject, so it is subjective by definition. And if you think it is measurable, then perhaps you could tell me what your units of measurement are and supplement that with an example.

 

[Chriliman]

Time is objective because it does not require a subject. Time will keep ticking no matter who is there to comment. But purpose requires a subject, so it is subjective by definition.

Yes, and as long as subjects exist objectively, their purpose also exists objectively.

And if you think it is measurable, then perhaps you could tell me what your units of measurement are and supplement that with an example.

Can logic be a unit of measurement? Sorry, I'm not sure how to fulfill this request.

 

[gaara4158]

Oh, I am a values realist. I do think that it is an objective fact of reality that things can be good or bad--this automatically comes into play in the biological realm, since there would be no possibility of natural selection for beneficial traits if there were no objective distinction between what was harmful or beneficial to the organism. Can we equate "subjective" values like good and bad with this sort of objective fact of nature? I think that if we couldn't, then lifeforms would never have developed preferences for certain sensory phenomena over others in the first place--subjective judgments do not float about in the ether detached from objective facts. Someone could subjectively value the wrong things, but this doesn't make those things subjectively correct for them.

I think that's a useful perspective, and your identification as a values realist shows you already know this, but you're still operating under the fundamental presupposition that survival and reproduction are objectively better than their opposites. I agree in the sense that I prefer those things, but you lose me when you equate the connection between subjective preferences and objective facts with an ultimately objective basis for morality. Yes, a subjective preference for survival will correlate with efforts to perform tasks objectively beneficial to survival. When we talk about beneficial traits, good behavior, and having the right values, we are specifically indicating their value to survival, successful reproduction, and subjective feelings of well-being. While some of these are objectively measurable, I cannot make the leap and say that they are objectively right. Moral evaluations must be qualified with "for the purpose of survival, reproduction, and well-being." I'm OK with doing that, but I can't call it objective because purposes are subjective. Maybe I'm being pedantic?

So this would tie into how I look at morality as well, since I don't see it as constructing the best system based on self-interest and cooperation. At least not in the utilitarian sense. I do think that morality is to a certain extent a social construct, but I reject the sort of sharp divide between objectivity and subjectivity which results in the latter being detached from reality. Things can be objectively good and bad for the individual and for the society, and we attempt to build moral systems from that, either consciously or unconsciously.

I can accept that, for the most part. Don't mistake my hard line against an objective morality for a hard line against morality being real at all. There are plenty of real things we can't quantify or measure objectively. I've used this Dumbledore quote a few times here before, but it's a favorite of mine: "Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on Earth should that mean it is not real?"

 

[gaara4158]

...hermeneutically speaking, is it enough to simply cite that we have similar patterns of "human need" when our actual values and goal sets may be quite different? Personally, and analytically speaking, I think much more minute attention needs to be paid attention to various inherent properties which reside in each of our respective views. It's not enough to say, "We both desire our own human flourishing!" and stop there.

Well, that's very interesting, because I find human needs to be at the very base of all motivations. If you'd like to dig deeper, I'll go there with you, but where would we begin?

And that, my friend, is the conundrum. We not only have different values sets and moral goals, we also have different conceptual networks floating in our heads which in turn affect 'how' we each think all of this stuff works out and to what actually constitutes 'human flourishing.' If all of these details can't be fleshed out, or are otherwise ignored, then we're just conflating and confusing various moral platitudes and principles, even if all the while we're using much of the same ethical vocabulary and jargon.

Yup. So where do we even go from here? Do we agree to disagree, or do we go down the rabbit hole and see if there's any base assumption we both share?

 

[Nihilist Virus]

Yes, and as long as subjects exist objectively, their purpose also exists objectively.

That does not follow. Can you please explain the logical connection between existence and purpose?

Can logic be a unit of measurement? Sorry, I'm not sure how to fulfill this request.

I don't recall saying that logic can be measured.

By definition, if something is measurable then it has units of measurement. What are the units of measurement for purpose?

 

[Chriliman]

That does not follow. Can you please explain the logical connection between existence and purpose?

If you believe people can have purpose and that they exist objectively, then it logically follows that purpose exists objectively through people. To not accept this, you either have to not accept that people exist objectively or not accept that they can have purpose, or both.

I don't recall saying that logic can be measured.

By definition, if something is measurable then it has units of measurement. What are the units of measurement for purpose?

A person is the unit of measurement for purpose.

 

[Silmarien]

I think that's a useful perspective, and your identification as a values realist shows you already know this, but you're still operating under the fundamental presupposition that survival and reproduction are objectively better than their opposites.

I'm not, actually. I reject that presupposition and am more interested in what the reality of evolution and what it can accomplish says about reality. Basically, I don't think it can account for the reality of pain and pleasure as negative and positive feedback mechanisms if value isn't somehow built into reality--there is an unbridgeable abyss between a value-neutral objective reality and a value-laden subjective reality.

It isn't specifically about reproduction, though. Keep in mind: natural selection isn't goal oriented; it's just a somewhat reliable guide to what works and what doesn't. So I look at it the other way around--things aren't good because they provide better chances for reproduction. They provide better chances for reproduction because they are good for the organism. When we saw natural selection as a competitive fight to the death, this cast a dark light upon traditional morality, but now that we see the role that things like cooperation play, matters are very different.

I can accept that, for the most part. Don't mistake my hard line against an objective morality for a hard line against morality being real at all. There are plenty of real things we can't quantify or measure objectively. I've used this Dumbledore quote a few times here before, but it's a favorite of mine: "Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on Earth should that mean it is not real?"

I love that quote.

 

[Nihilist Virus]

If you believe people can have purpose and that they exist objectively, then it logically follows that purpose exists objectively through people. To not accept this, you either have to not accept that people exist objectively or not accept that they can have purpose, or both.

Again your argument is invalid. Granting all premises, the conclusion does not follow. The fact that X can happen doesn't mean that X will happen. If I flip a coin, heads can be the result but that does not mean that heads must be the result. So even if we can have purpose, it doesn't follow that we do have purpose.

A person is the unit of measurement for purpose.

So then God, Satan, angels, demons, and all the nonhuman animals on earth have no purpose...? The purpose of three Nazis is triple the magnitude of the purpose of Albert Einstein? It doesn't matter that three people in this instance have one singular purpose, or that their purpose is contrary to the good health of humanity?

 

[zippy2006]

Don't mistake my hard line against an objective morality for a hard line against morality being real at all. There are plenty of real things we can't quantify or measure objectively. I've used this Dumbledore quote a few times here before, but it's a favorite of mine: "Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on Earth should that mean it is not real?"

Right. When someone who has a casual acquaintance with objective moral systems encounters a more robust (and subtle) theory the initial categories and definitions tend to come under scrutiny. Silmarien seems to be a lightning rod for this sort of thing.

For example, you may approach the idea of objective morality as something which claims that morality is able to be easily quantified and measured with scientific precision. That impression may legitimately come from certain fideist Christians who, say, point to the 10 commandments as a black-and-white example of objective morality. And it is. ...But it's not the only approach to objective morality!

"Objective" doesn't mean "easily measured." "Objective" means that something has existence in itself, apart from the human mind. By that definition interstellar distances are objective. Today we are capable of measuring those distances with impressive precision. 2500 years ago we weren't able to easily or accurately measure those distances at all. At both times the distances were considered objective.

Of course epistemology relates to ontology: no one would reasonably claim that morality is objective and purely unknowable. But that doesn't mean the Southern Bible-thumper is the only moral objectivist. In fact you could be a rather skeptical moral objectivist who claims to know very few (objective) truths about morality. Perhaps a zealous moral relativist begins studying psychology and becomes convinced that prolonged periods of strict isolation are detrimental to human health (e.g. solitary confinement). At that point they would come to believe at least one objective moral truth, namely the one which relates to solitary confinement. Objective morality doesn't need to be simple, easy, or pervasive.

There was actually an interesting debate between various Judeo-Christian religious thinkers on Public Discourse in 2013 which relates a lot to this topic. It can be found here.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Well, that's very interesting, because I find human needs to be at the very base of all motivations. If you'd like to dig deeper, I'll go there with you, but where would we begin?


Yup. So where do we even go from here? Do we agree to disagree, or do we go down the rabbit hole and see if there's any base assumption we both share?

I tell you what. Since I have some important family business to attend to that's pretty much going to take me away from CF until Labor Day weekend, let me get back to you at that time and we can move further in this discussion. You've had some great things to say so far, and while I'm gone, maybe you can anticipate some of the ways in which I will definitely try to counter your assertions about "human flourishing."

Peace,
2PhiloVoid

 

[Chriliman]

Again your argument is invalid. Granting all premises, the conclusion does not follow. The fact that X can happen doesn't mean that X will happen. If I flip a coin, heads can be the result but that does not mean that heads must be the result. So even if we can have purpose, it doesn't follow that we do have purpose.

The coin has landed and it shows purpose. But anyone can object if they feel the need. Why would they do that though?

So then God, Satan, angels, demons, and all the nonhuman animals on earth have no purpose...? The purpose of three Nazis is triple the magnitude of the purpose of Albert Einstein? It doesn't matter that three people in this instance have one singular purpose, or that their purpose is contrary to the good health of humanity?

Anything that has at least a human level of sentience can have purpose. Non-human animals don't have purpose like we do, however they are still motivated by certain natural instincts which drive them to survive.

At this point if you still have objections, I don't think we're going to come to an agreement about what's actually true, although I hope at some point we do.