Free will and determinism

[partinobodycular]

If you define it to match what you think it is, then you'll win the argument every time.

 

[DennisF]

That's correct.

Are you missing something there? What follows 'His definition of free will is...' is not a definition of free will. It's an argument. Which I think you believe leads to a conclusion that decisions aren't determined. The prediction itself is one of the antecedent conditions. Whether it is true or not or whether it is believed or not is somewhat irrelevant.

I could have worded it a little more explicitly as a definition, but MacKay's definition is that the given conditions on a prediction define (in this particular way) free will. It is only an assertion, not an argument, defining free will for MacKay. Then it is an exercise in logic (the argument) to show that it is logically correct.

Keep in mind that this argument of MacKay (not my argument) assumes free will, and to be specific enough for a logical argument, MacKay gives it this definition. If you find that this definition of free will captures the essence of it and that you wonder how it is in life that we can go around behaving as though we are free, then MacKay's argument shows that no deterministic prediction of our future exercise of free will (in this particular sense) would be deterministic for us if offered to us. It remains deterministic as long as the prediction remains isolated from us, but given to us, it invalidates itself. This means that what is true for an isolated Predictor and what is true for us to whom the prediction is disclosed is not the same. And all that proves is that a deterministic prediction offered to you holds no logical demand to your assent. You are free to not believe it and you would necessarily be correct in doing so.

My argument (Determinism & Semi-Decidability) begins with determinism and in a similar logical way works through the consequences. The arguments are a little different, but the end result of either gives the same conclusion.

 

[DennisF]

I reread what you'd posted to make sure I was understanding it correctly. And I want to go over this portion again.

The usual hypothetical that's sometimes used to indicate no free will is to point out that if circumstances were repeated exactly the same then a person would always make the same choice. So Michael always kills Freddo.

What remains unsaid is the assumption that the prediction is not disclosed to Michael and the deterministic prediction remains true every time. However, what if the prediction were offered to Michael (before he kills Freddo)? It might affect his decision-making in a way that would have a different outcome. To Michael, he is correct to not believe the prediction, and if the prediction had also taken into account his contrary nature when it is revealed to him, he would not be incorrect to disbelieve it. In other words, for him, it is not a deterministic prediction.

In your scenario we have Joe making a decision. Say to walk to work. There'd be antecedent conditions that would determine that choice. And something like Laplace's Demon, knowing all those conditions, would be able to correctly predict his choice. No problem there. Joe always walks to work if the exact conditions are repeated. Even if the demon knows what it is. However...if Joe is told what his decision is going to be, then then the conditions are not exactly the same. Obviously. So he might decide to be ornery and take the bus, just to prove the demon wrong. And being told what he would have done is the antecedent condition that determined what he did do.

Maybe not determined it but, in the general case, affected it so that the deterministic prediction might not occur; the conditions are different than what was assumed in making the prediction.

At which point the hypothetical logically fails because whatever the demon tells Joe what he will decide, he chooses the other option.

Sure; if Joe is of a contrarian mind, then he does just the opposite of the prediction. My argument is closer in following that strand of thought than MacKay's. In not believing a deterministic prediction, the logical state of the situation is indeterminate. It is like trying to decide whether "This statement is false." is true or false. It is logically indeterminate, or what in computerology is semi-decidable. In contrast, "This statement is true." has no such self-referencing conundrum.

I think you "'ve got" (have) it. (The verb got has taken over have and become. English is becoming ("getting to be") gibberish, but that is a different application of free will.)

So what good are these kinds of self-referencing logic arguments? They show the need to 1) define free will in a way that can be argued about rationally (with some logic), and 2) they demonstrate something interesting going on with self-reflective beings in that what is true in isolation from the agent (a being with free will) is not necessarily true of the agent if offered to him. It is somewhat like complementarity in quantum physics or different reference frames in special relativity.

 

[Fervent]

I actually have no objections to the idea of determinism. My disagreement is with the notion that determinism negates free will. To my way of thinking free will is simply a being's ability to consciously select one course of action over another.

Determinism, strictly, invalidates that idea because your experience of conscious selection must be an illusion if there is some set of conditions that determine your choice before you make the conscious decision.

So the relevant question is... can I do that? If I can, then I have free will. Can a rock do that? If it can't, then it doesn't have free will. Pretty simple.

Yes, antecedent conditions are ultimately responsible for creating consciousness ... but that doesn't diminish the fact that it's consciousness that recognizes and considers the preferability of any potential outcomes, so I don't care where that consciousness came from, I just know that by golly I have it, and I intend to use it.

Seems to me that what is responsible for creating consciousness isn't understood well enough to make such a statement.

God made rocks... lots and lots of rocks. But He didn't make a whole lot of things that can argue back and forth on an internet forum about whether or not they have free will. That's a whole 'nother level of stuff. It's stuff that can do things simply because it wants to.

So God was sitting around thinking about all the marvelous things that He could create, and He thought to Himself... you know what would be really cool, is if I made something that could do things simply because it wanted to. Let's see OpenAI do that.

I wouldn't rule out OpenAI being driven by genuinely conscious beings...but then, I don't limit the possibility of consciousness to corporeal beings or believe the world is fundamentally physical.

 

[Reneep]

Joe 3 :14 every minute you all make hundred choices by your free will based on right or wrong information Father can help that process or ..... But by pride is what makes you fight for choices you know are wrong.

 

[Bradskii]

I could have worded it a little more explicitly as a definition, but MacKay's definition is that the given conditions on a prediction define (in this particular way) free will. It is only an assertion, not an argument, defining free will for MacKay. Then it is an exercise in logic (the argument) to show that it is logically correct.

Keep in mind that this argument of MacKay (not my argument) assumes free will, and to be specific enough for a logical argument, MacKay gives it this definition. If you find that this definition of free will captures the essence of it and that you wonder how it is in life that we can go around behaving as though we are free, then MacKay's argument shows that no deterministic prediction of our future exercise of free will (in this particular sense) would be deterministic for us if offered to us. It remains deterministic as long as the prediction remains isolated from us, but given to us, it invalidates itself. This means that what is true for an isolated Predictor and what is true for us to whom the prediction is disclosed is not the same. And all that proves is that a deterministic prediction offered to you holds no logical demand to your assent. You are free to not believe it and you would necessarily be correct in doing so.

My argument (Determinism & Semi-Decidability) begins with determinism and in a similar logical way works through the consequences. The arguments are a little different, but the end result of either gives the same conclusion.

What I said still stands. If it were possible to predict a decision then that prediction would not be one of the antecedent conditions that determined the decision if it was not made known to anyone. No problem there. But...If the prediction is given to the person making the choice then we have a different set of antecedent conditions which determine that choice.

Either way, the choice is determined. And there is no free will.

 

[Bradskii]

What remains unsaid is the assumption that the prediction is not disclosed to Michael and the deterministic prediction remains true every time. However, what if the prediction were offered to Michael (before he kills Freddo)? It might affect his decision-making in a way that would have a different outcome. To Michael, he is correct to not believe the prediction, and if the prediction had also taken into account his contrary nature when it is revealed to him, he would not be incorrect to disbelieve it. In other words, for him, it is not a deterministic prediction.

It might not be. It still might be. But either way you are describing two situations. One where Michael doesn't know the prediction and one where he does. So we have two sets of antecedent conditions. In either case his decision will be determined by one of, or a combination of those antecedent conditions.

In not believing a deterministic prediction, the logical state of the situation is indeterminate. It is like trying to decide whether "This statement is false." is true or false. It is logically indeterminate, or what in computerology is semi-decidable. In contrast, "This statement is true." has no such self-referencing conundrum.

Yes, it's not logically coherent. So...as interesting as it might be, it says nothing about proving or disproving free will.

So what good are these kinds of self-referencing logic arguments?

Not much at all.

They show the need to 1) define free will in a way that can be argued about rationally (with some logic)...

Free will was defined in the very first post and has been repeated many times. As was said only yesterday, if you redefine it to suit an argument you'll likely win that argument each time.

The definition remains. And you need to argue from that point.

 

[Fervent]

Here is a question
Ok, say I want to rent a house. I have $100 dollars.
There are three houses listed for rent
1) $200 rent
2) $50 rent but rat trap
3) $100 rent close work
Do I have a free will choice?

What if there are no houses for rent?
You can't create opportunity.

So it is determined by circumstances.
There is an illusion of choice but the choices are always limited by circumstances.
And to choose limits your choices
The choices are determined by providence
It is only a question of whether the choice is 100% illusion or there some small percentage of free will remaining that isn't constrained by determined circumstances.

I may have a conversation with myself, stating, the $50 could be fixed up, or I could budget for the $200 and perhaps I could choose to do that, so it would be free will but in real life, choice is usually so contrained as to be determined down to a stream like toothpaste squeezed out a tube

This is simple so maybe I am missing something in the OP. Feel free to correct my perception of the OP.

There is no middle ground, either we genuinely make choices or our experience of making choices is completely illusory. Circumstantial limits don't really factor into the question, it's simply a question of whether our choices are predetermined by something other than our own will or if we are in the driver's seat. A lack of free will implies that the only reason we believe ourselves to have free will is because we are not aware of what is really making the decisions on our behalf. But proposing that free will is an illusion requires us to continually deny what we experience in making choices and instead gas-lighting ourselves into believing that we are carried along by something besides our own agency. Either providence or irrational physical laws. The real issue is, that the reasoning that goes into claiming that free will is an illusion is completely undermined by the claim that free will is an illusion because whatever the case may be the choice to regard free will as illusion is predetermined by something outside of the chain of reasoning.

 

[Bradskii]

Determinism, strictly, invalidates that idea because your experience of conscious selection must be an illusion if there is some set of conditions that determine your choice before you make the conscious decision.

You dislike peppermint ice cream intently. You absolutely love chocolate icecream. When you need to choose between the two your likes and dislikes will determine your decision. Would you say that your choice is an illusion?

And what QvQ said is quite reasonable. But he seems to have now deleted the post so I won't comment further.

 

[Fervent]

You dislike peppermint ice cream intently. You absolutely love chocolate icecream. When you need to choose between the two your likes and dislikes will determine your decision. Would you say that your choice is an illusion?

Who are you addressing your question to? Where does the decision to act come from? Is it "me" as in my conscious deliberation or some illusion cast by physical structures governed purely by deterministic physical laws? Your question needs far more unpacking to provide an adequate answer.

 

[Bradskii]

There is no middle ground, either we genuinely make choices or our experience of making choices is completely illusory.

You are confusing the ability to make choices with free will. I've pointed this out before. You are free to decide on peppermint or chocolate. You are not being coerced. But your choice will be determined by something. In this case almost certainly by your taste preferences. So there is therefore, by definition, no free will. If you have a sense of it, then that is therefore an illusion.

 

[Fervent]

You are confusing the ability to make choices with free will. I've pointed this out before. You are free to decide on peppermint or chocolate. You are not being coerced. But your choice will be determined by something. In this case almost certainly by your taste preferences. So there is therefore, by definition, no free will. If you have a sense of it, then that is therefore an illusion.

What is the difference? If we are free to make choices, how is that not free will? You are using "determined" far too loosely, because simply because choices are informed and influenced does not mean they are pre-determined in the sense that determinism requires. Free will only requires what is said on the tin, freedom to choose and a will. You are free to gas-light yourself into being an automaton or computational machine, but so long as I have the option I will choose free will and in that act of freely choosing I have my evidence. You simply choose to deny your basic experience as being genuine for whatever reason.

 

[QvQ]

Circumstantial limits don't really factor into the question, it's simply a question of whether our choices are predetermined by something other than our own will or if we are in the driver's seat.

Ok I am walking around here doing supper and making choices.
I had 4 cans of soup, 2 chicken, 2 beef. I decided on chicken but I grabbed the beef can by mistake.
1) choice determined by placement of can on shelf.


1 bowl, 1 spoon. Wash or leave till later?
2) Now this is a real choice because it doesn't matter which one I choose.
There is nothing to determine a decision,
I could wash the bowl and spoon
Or I could leave it till later.

There is the fact that there is a bowl and spoon. That is determined by prior dinner. And washing those items will occur sooner or later of necessity so the washing is determined. "Not right now" is a choice?

Will leaving those dishes until later make any meaningful change in the cause and effect chain (change the determination of the later choices?)

Trying to do this in real time, there is a feeling that there is some component to the free will/determinism argument that we are missing.
I have thought "the totality of circumstances" that is slowly changing all at once but it is hard to put into words.
We would be part of the totality so "we" as a component would be part of the determination rather than the agent of determined and determining.
Hard to eplain.

 

[Bradskii]

Who are you addressing your question to?

Well, you. You said that making a decision must be an illusion. So I asked if you thought that choosing chocolate was an illusion.

Where does the decision to act come from?

In the case of the icecream it's your preference for one over the other that determines it.

Is it "me" as in my conscious deliberation...

Yes. Nobody else makes it.

...or some illusion cast by physical structures governed purely by deterministic physical laws?

The decision making process is not an illusion. Rather obviously because you actually do make the decision. What determines that decision are any number of facts about the world that can be reduced to basic physical laws.

 

[Bradskii]

What is the difference? If we are free to make choices, how is that not free will? You are using "determined" far too loosely, because simply because choices are informed and influenced does not mean they are pre-determined in the sense that determinism requires. Free will only requires what is said on the tin, freedom to choose and a will.

You may need to go back to the op or check any number of the posts I have addressed to you where free will has been defined. You're wasting your time, and more importantly mine, in trying to redefine it.

 

[Bradskii]

There is the fact that there is a bowl and spoon. That is determined by prior dinner. And washing those items will occur sooner or later of necessity so the washing is determined. "Not right now" is a choice?

Of course. And the choice you make will be truly arbitrary or there's be a reason for it. Something will have determined your choice. Either way, there's no free will.

Will leaving those dishes until later. Will that make any meaningful change in the cause and effect chain (change the determination of the later choices?)

Everything single thing that is happening or has ever happened will make a change. Some changes get lost in the noise, others are monstrously important.

 

[Fervent]

Ok I am walking around here doing supper and making choices.
I had 4 cans of soup, 2 chicken, 2 beef. I decided on chicken but I grabbed the beef can by mistake.
1) choice determined by placement of can on shelf.


1 bowl, 1 spoon. Wash or leave till later?
2) Now this is a real choice because it doesn't matter which one I choose.
There is nothing to determine a decision,
I could wash the bowl and spoon
Or I could leave it till later.

There is the fact that there is a bowl and spoon. That is determined by prior dinner. And washing those items will occur sooner or later of necessity so the washing is determined. "Not right now" is a choice?

Simply because choice is not unlimited, doesn't negate free will. All free will means is that the choices we make are of our own volition, when we come to a fork it is not simply a lack of knowledge that gives us the idea that we are making a choice.

Well, you. You said that making a decision must be an illusion. So I asked if you thought that choosing chocolate was an illusion.

But what do you mean "you"? My conscious self, or a physical object?

In the case of the icecream it's your preference for one over the other that determines it.

Or I could choose not to have ice cream at all. But the choice is mine to make, not the end result of a process that I am unaware of.

Yes. Nobody else makes it.

So then it is a free will decision?

The decision making process is not an illusion. Rather obviously because you actually do make the decision. What determines that decision are any number of facts about the world that can be reduced to basic physical laws.

Here's the crux of the issue, you believe yourself to be running physical scripts that cannot be diverted...just an automata computational machine running scripts that nobody wrote but somehow miraculously lead to rational thought. Except the link between the rational operations, meaning and purpose and freedom of will, is completely missing in your account. You can only reduce them to illusion, because to admit that we are not just complex machines resulting from happenstance laws might collapse your whole worldview.

 

[Fervent]

You may need to go back to the op or check any number of the posts I have addressed to you where free will has been defined. You're wasting your time, and more importantly mine, in trying to redefine it.

I'm more or less working with the typical philosophical definition of free will, which accepts choices as genuinely existing and not simply being a matter of a lack in our knowledge. So if you are to affirm that we make choices, then that requires that before the choice is made we genuinely have open to us the opposite choice. Otherwise in order to be consistent you must assert that the experience of making choices is an illusion, otherwise we have free will by definition.

 

[Bradskii]

All free will means is that the choices we make are of our own volition...

This might again be a short conversation if you keep redefining what was expressed clearly in the first post.

But what do you mean "you"? My conscious self, or a physical object?

You. As a conscious agent.

Or I could choose not to have ice cream at all. But the choice is mine to make, not the end result of a process that I am unaware of.

Can you give us a reason why you might decide neither?

 

[Bradskii]

I'm more or less working with the typical philosophical definition of free will, which accepts choices as genuinely existing and not simply being a matter of a lack in our knowledge.

Then you should start a thread about free will, using that definition and present all your arguments based on that definition.