Free will and determinism

[Bradskii]

So, are you bringing anything new to the discussion that hasn't already been gone over ad infinitum by philosophers of metaphysics for decades or even centuries?

No. It's just been a gradual rejection of the alternatives.

 

[Bradskii]

I didn't ask why are you trying to convince me, I asked why are you willing to accept a conclusion that you yourself admit you want to reject?

I haven't said that I want to reject it. I said that it's all but impossible to believe that we don't have it. We live our lives as if it exists. Which is not evidence that it does, of course.

And you keep missing the point that we still make decisions. The fact that there are reasons which determine our decisions shouldn't concern anyone. All I am doing is asking 'why?' at every stage. Why am I deciding to write these words? What has determined that I am sitting here typing? What was the reason for me starting up the laptop? Why did I get up just when I did? Even if I don't know the answers doesn't mean that there aren't any.

There are reasons for everything we do. And the fact is that if we re-lived it all there it's nonsensical to believe that we'd make different decisions. Unless they were truly random.

 

[Bradskii]

Sure, but if my conscious experience is an illusion...

Who said it's an illusion?

If the hypothesis that my experience of agency is an illusion were actually true...

Your agency is you making conscious decisions. You have agency whether there is free will or not.

 

[Bradskii]

Those who freely will to believe there is no free will are likely more often feelers rather than thinkers. To put the best light on the matter, often ruled by their passions instead of their intellect, feelers unconsciously desire to be irresponsible moral agents. Denying free will it seems to them, gives them that false feeling of blamelessness.

Well, welcome back to the thread.

So 'Free will good! No free will bad! Therefore free will!' It's not an argument I've seen used much.

It would be nice to live a guilt free life, but I'm afraid that's hard wired into us. Knowing why you did something doesn't change one's opinion on whether it was the right thing or the wrong thing to do.

 

[Fervent]

Who said it's an illusion?

It's a natural conclusion from materialist presuppositions, because it must be an illusion cast by a physical world if materialist presuppositons are true. Unless you believe there is a material mind? Are you a substance dualist?

Your agency is you making conscious decisions. You have agency whether there is free will or not.

Agency requires free will, you claim we have the illusion of agency. Free will is effective agency, a lack of free will is a lack of agency.

But of course you'd try to have it both ways.

 

[Fervent]

I haven't said that I want to reject it. I said that it's all but impossible to believe that we don't have it. We live our lives as if it exists. Which is not evidence that it does, of course.

Depends what we're classifying as evidence, because it seems to me there ultimately exist only two kinds, direct experience and testimonial. You are saying that a fundamental aspect of our experience, which you can't honestly deny, might somehow be illusion. Which is preposterous, and undermines any "evidence" that follows from those experiences. Because if something that fundamental might be illusion, everything could be illusion. Including the "evidence" you rationalized your conclusions off of.

And you keep missing the point that we still make decisions. The fact that there are reasons which determine our decisions shouldn't concern anyone. All I am doing is asking 'why?' at every stage. Why am I deciding to write these words? What has determined that I am sitting here typing? What was the reason for me starting up the laptop? Why did I get up just when I did? Even if I don't know the answers doesn't mean that there aren't any.

Do we make decisions, or have the illusion of making decisions? Because there is an important difference, and you can't have it both ways. So is free will real, and we make decisions. Or is free will an illusion, and we simply have the illusion of making decisions?

There are reasons for everything we do. And the fact is that if we re-lived it all there it's nonsensical to believe that we'd make different decisions. Unless they were truly random.

No one hypothesized the ridiculous theoretical definition of free will as "the ability to do otherwise" here. Simply that our experience of being causatively involved in our decisions as active agents is a genuine experience, which can't be the case if free will is an illusion.

 

[Bradskii]

If I have any genuine choice, then it demonstrates that the hypothesis that my agency is an illusion is a false conclusion. And if I don't, it really doesn't matter because the prior conditions are such that I'm going to believe I have agency no matter what. In either case, it makes no sense to argue that I don't.

Agency doesn't equate to free will. From here: Agency (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

'In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and ‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity.'

So that means you have the capacity to make decisions. No-one has ever denied that.

If I don't have free will, I will believe whatever the prior states dictate. So my making the choice to believe is sufficient grounds for me to believe, because there's no reason to consider the alternative as a serious possibility.

You are again confusing a lack of free will with an inability to change. Someone might think free will exists and then spend some time investigating the matter and find that she has changed her mind. It's nonsensical to say that as she now thinks it doesn't exist she's stuck with believing that it does.

The question isn't whether it actually exists, the question is what is more reasonable to believe. As you seem to have indicated, the hypothesis is on the same order as brains in jars.

It's a logical deduction from the premise that the universe is determinate. All you've done is say 'Oh no it's not'. In which case you can reject the argument...but you then must claim the libertarian position. Which you haven't supported. Anyone who accepts that it's determinate but still thinks free will exists needs to explain the compatibilist position.

 

[Fervent]

Agency doesn't equate to free will. From here: Agency (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

'In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and ‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity.'

So that means you have the capacity to make decisions. No-one has ever denied that.

If you deny free will, you must deny the capacity to act. Because without free will, we have an illusion of the capacity to act but since our actions are determined by prior conditions that sense of agency is a falsehood. We are acted upon by forces outside of our control, unless we have free will.

You are again confusing a lack of free will with an inability to change. Someone might think free will exists and then spend some time investigating the matter and find that she has changed her mind. It's nonsensical to say that as she now thinks it doesn't exist she's stuck with believing that it does.

Nope, if by "free will is an illusion" you only mean to deny a wonky philosophical definition then the statement is rather meaningless. And it's quite clear because you keep waffling on whether you actually believe it, I don't think it's nonsensical to say that someone who claims it is an illusion is still stuck believing that it does exist. Because you don't just carry on as a victim of causal forces, but as if you have some say in what you think and do.

Not once have I asserted the ability to do differently as being a genuine expression of what it means to have free will, because such a definition doesn't really seem to be semantically significant. We only know what we have done in actuality, and never in potential. So any discussion of what was truly available in potential involves assuming things that we simply cannot know.

It's a logical deduction from the premise that the universe is determinate. All you've done is say 'Oh no it's not'. In which case you can reject the argument...but you then must claim the libertarian position. Which you haven't supported. Anyone who accepts that it's determinate but still thinks free will exists needs to explain the compatibilist position.

The compatibilist position isn't that free will exists alongside determinism, as I've already pointed out. It's the assertion that human responsibility is not violated by determinism. And as you are the one presenting an argument, it's up to you to defend it not up to me to prove it false. And the only reason to take determinism as you seem to be taking it is to adopt materialist presuppositions, a position you admitted is the true underlying reason for your rejection of free will. So I don't share your materialist presuppositons, your argument goes no where and I am left laughing at what passes for rationality in your mind.

 

[Bradskii]

If you deny free will, you must deny the capacity to act. Because without free will, we have an illusion of the capacity to act but since our actions are determined by prior conditions that sense of agency is a falsehood. We are acted upon by forces outside of our control, unless we have free will.

So if you point out to the vast number of people who have been debating free will for the last two or three thousand years that 'I have the capacity to act, therefore free will' then do you expect to hear them all slapping their foreheads in unison, muttering 'Gee, if only I'd known it was that simple'?

Not once have I asserted the ability to do differently as being a genuine expression of what it means to have free will...

You did. You said this:
'If I can choose to believe in free will, then that choice alone is evidence that I have free will.
If free will does not exist, than my beliefs are not in my power to change and so I will believe free will because of prior states.'

The first statement is coming up all the time and I have to keep correcting you. Making decisions does not equate to free will. I'll add another post to this one because I need to put this to bed. The second statement suggests that you cannot change your position. But if you receive enough convincing information then that's exactly what you'll do.

The compatibilist position isn't that free will exists alongside determinism, as I've already pointed out.

From Stanford: Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

'Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism.'

That really couldn't be clearer. You can't make up definitions to match your position.

So I don't share your materialist presuppositons, your argument goes no where and I am left laughing at what passes for rationality in your mind.

I was hoping to keep the thread on an even keel. I don't think that the latter part of that sentence is required. Nevertheless, you are clear that you don't think my position is justified. Fair enough. You are free to reject it. But as I've said before, your position is then one of the two other positions, and you've discounted compatibilism. So you are left with libertarian free will.

As this is a forum discussion where ideas are brought to the table and discussed, could you explain your position so we can contrast it to mine?

 

[Bradskii]

Now, the posts are all over the place at the moment. I feel like I'm putting out spot fires. So I want to clear up two important points.

Firstly, that simply making decisions does not equate to free will. If I decide to go to the gym instead of the pub, that in itself is not an example of free will. Do you agree with that?

Secondly, that simply changing your mind does not equate to free will. So if I decide to go to the gym when I wake up this morning and then change my mind later and go to the pub, that in itself is not an example of free will.

 

[Fervent]

So if you point out to the vast number of people who have been debating free will for the last two or three thousand years that 'I have the capacity to act, therefore free will' then do you expect to hear them all slapping their foreheads in unison, muttering 'Gee, if only I'd known it was that simple'?

People will debate all sorts of irrational things, but you still don't seem to understand I'm not debating the ontological status of free will but the epistemic implications of the belief that something as fundamental to our experiences as being in control of our actions might be illusion. It undermines any epistemic framework to do so, so should serve to raise suspicion for any philosophy it follows from.

You did. You said this:
'If I can choose to believe in free will, then that choice alone is evidence that I have free will.
If free will does not exist, than my beliefs are not in my power to change and so I will believe free will because of prior states.'

Yes, because if I have the freedom to choose then the act of choosing is proof that I have the power to choose. And if I don't, that "choice" is simply the result of prior states that determined I would believe in free will. My argument is purely epistemic, rather than ontological.

The first statement is coming up all the time and I have to keep correcting you. Making decisions does not equate to free will. I'll add another post to this one because I need to put this to bed. The second statement suggests that you cannot change your position. But if you receive enough convincing information then that's exactly what you'll do.

Genuine decision making, that is to say having deliberate control of my thoughts and actions, is free will. You claim that that deliberative process is illusion, so I'm trying to point out to you that postulating as much requires undermining epistemology completely because it renders all phenomenal perception suspect.

From Stanford: Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

'Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism.'

That really couldn't be clearer. You can't make up definitions to match your position.

Why didn't you quote what immediately follows, that clarifies what the position actually consists of?

"Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed as a thesis about the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism."

It's not about an ontological reality of making deliberative choices, it's about whether or not humans are responsible for their actions.

I was hoping to keep the thread on an even keel. I don't think that the latter part of that sentence is required. Nevertheless, you are clear that you don't think my position is justified. Fair enough. You are free to reject it. But as I've said before, your position is then one of the two other positions, and you've discounted compatibilism. So you are left with libertarian free will.

Not just not justified, but entirely irrational to hold. And would be treated as much if it weren't for prioritizing metaphysical commitments that demand it be true.

As this is a forum discussion where ideas are brought to the table and discussed, could you explain your position so we can contrast it to mine?

I already have, which is that our fundamental experiences are basically trustworthy so we can take at face value the sense of deliberative control we have over our actions. That metaphysics should not dictate our position on the matter, but we should strive to employ metaphysics that make sense of the reality of it rather than try to explain it away.

 

[Bradskii]

People will debate all sorts of irrational things, but you still don't seem to understand I'm not debating the ontological status of free will but the epistemic implications of the belief that something as fundamental to our experiences as being in control of our actions might be illusion. It undermines any epistemic framework to do so, so should serve to raise suspicion for any philosophy it follows from.

The fact that we think it exists is the illusion. The fact that it doesn't isn't. We aren't discussing the illusion - although it was discussed way upstream and I suggested that it's necessary for societies to form. Second level thinking is fine: He did wrong, he must be punished'. Taking it a step further: 'He did wrong, but we need to consider everything that resulted in him doing wrong and incorporate that into out reaction to it' is pretty much useless in the times when societies were just forming. Notwithstanding that foetal development, amygdala, hormone secretion etc weren't terms that lightly tripped of the lips of our distant ancestors.

That we feel that it exists on an emotional level has nothing whatsoever to do with whether it exists or not. I can't stress that enough.

Yes, because if I have the freedom to choose then the act of choosing is proof that I have the power to choose.

I hope you can expand and clarify that in reply to the specific question I asked, otherwise this really has nowhere to go. As it is, it's nothing more than 'Look, I can raise my arm. I have free will!' That's not an argument. That's not even treating the subject seriously.

Why didn't you quote what immediately follows, that clarifies what the position actually consists of?

"Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed as a thesis about the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism."

It's not about an ontological reality of making deliberative choices, it's about whether or not humans are responsible for their actions.

I didn't quote it because it didn't contradict what I did quote. Rather than moving the goalposts over the moral playing field, I would have expected you to at least admit that you were wrong. The fact that free will discussions and compatibilism will turn to thoughts of moral responsibility is a given. But the nonsensical 'We are morally responsible, therefore we have free will' is using a conclusion about free will to decide whether it exists.

I already have, which is that our fundamental experiences are basically trustworthy so we can take at face value the sense of deliberative control we have over our actions.

That's no more than saying 'Hey, I have free will because it feels like it'. Is that really all you have that you're going offer?

 

[Fervent]

The fact that we think it exists is the illusion. The fact that it doesn't isn't. We aren't discussing the illusion - although it was discussed way upstream and I suggested that it's necessary for societies to form. Second level thinking is fine: He did wrong, he must be punished'. Taking it a step further: 'He did wrong, but we need to consider everything that resulted in him doing wrong and incorporate that into out reaction to it' is pretty much useless in the times when societies were just forming. Notwithstanding that foetal development, amygdala, hormone secretion etc weren't terms that lightly tripped of the lips of our distant ancestors.

Again, if something so fundamental to our experience could be mistaken then we can't trust any of our perceptions. So any philosophy or inference that implies that it doesn't is suspect, not free will. Because the tools used to reach that inference or build that philosophy come from trusting that our perceptions are basically trustworthy.

That we feel that it exists on an emotional level has nothing whatsoever to do with whether it exists or not. I can't stress that enough.

I'm not simply talking about "emotional" level, but on a basic epistemic level. If I could be so wildly mistaken about something so basic in my perceptions, then I simply can't trust any information at all because every perception I have becomes suspect.

I hope you can expand and clarify that in reply to the specific question I asked, otherwise this really has nowhere to go. As it is, it's nothing more than 'Look, I can raise my arm. I have free will!' That's not an argument. That's not even treating the subject seriously.

That's not what I've said at all, because I'm not making an argument about the ontological status of free will. I am disputing the underlying assumptions that have led you to your belief about its non-existence, because it requires both trusting and distrusting our basic experiences. You seem to think the physical world is somehow more real than the internal worlds we inhabit, but when we run down the epistemic rabbit holes our experiences of the external world depend on the trustworthiness of our internal experiences.

I didn't quote it because it didn't contradict what I did quote. Rather than moving the goalposts over the moral playing field, I would have expected you to at least admit that you were wrong. The fact that free will discussions and compatibilism will turn to thoughts of moral responsibility is a given. But the nonsensical 'We are morally responsible, therefore we have free will' is using a conclusion about free will to decide whether it exists.

It informs what you did quote, because it shows what the position is really all about. Which is not about the ontological status of free will, but about humans still being responsible even if they aren't in control of their actions.

That's no more than saying 'Hey, I have free will because it feels like it'. Is that really all you have that you're going offer?

Again, I'm not making an argument for its ontological status anymore than I would argue that I'm not a brain in a vat. Any epistemology that suggests the contrary is automatically chucked in the garbage, because it must hold that our experiences aren't trustworthy while defending its conclusions on the basis of our experiences. If our perception of free will isn't accurate, we have no reason to believe that our perceptions related to the external world are trustworthy. If one part of our conscious experience can be illusion, than all of it becomes suspect. So the philosophies that require us be skeptical of all of our perceptions, but special plead that we should only be skeptical of those perceptions that involve a purported physical world. I need not offer more than the assumption that my phenomenal experiences are trustworthy, because I experience free will as a phenomenon.

 

[Bradskii]

Again, if something so fundamental to our experience could be mistaken then we can't trust any of our perceptions. So any philosophy or inference that implies that it doesn't is suspect, not free will. Because the tools used to reach that inference or build that philosophy come from trusting that our perceptions are basically trustworthy.

So if you are mistaken about this, you could be mistaken about anything. You don't want to be mistaken about anything, so you can't be mistaken about this. Therefore free will.

Now you can answer the two simple questions in #1070. And if the answers are as facile as the one above, then we're done.

 

[Fervent]

So if you are mistaken about this, you could be mistaken about anything. You don't want to be mistaken about anything, so you can't be mistaken about this. Therefore free will.

Not what I've said, not even close. My basic experience is that I have free will, and I see no reason to question that. It is as evident as the solid nature of the chair I am sitting in, which I only know of because of my conscious experience of touching it. So if I cannot trust my conscious experience enough to trust that the basic experience of exercising free will involves a genuine capacity, then I cannot trust that what I see with my eyes is genuinely there, or what I hear with my ears is genuinely there, or that what I touch with my skin is genuinely there. All of those experiences may simply be illusion of some sort, if I cannot trust my experience as reliable. So any skepticism towards the existence of free will must also result in a radical sort of skepticism where I am uncertain about everything that I believe to be true.

Does that mean I am not mistaken about free will? No, but it does mean that it would be irrational for me to believe that I was mistaken about free will based on supposedly empirical information. Because there is no foundation on which I can trust the empirical information, unless I accept my experiences as involving genuine capacities.

Now you can answer the two simple questions in #1070. And if the answers are as facile as the one above, then we're done.

No, I don't agree with it. Because if you truly decided to go to the gym instead of the pub, then you have exercised free will in making that decision.

We can keep going round and round, but as I said your position is as ridiculous to me as someone believing they were a brain in a jar. And for the same reason, because it takes denying basic experiences and instead taking half of our body/conscious experience as being more significant than the whole experience. If we think our conscious experience is more real than the experiences of the physical world, we end up denying the reality of the world external to our conscious selves. But if we take the physical world as more real than our conscious experience, as materialism must, then it inevitably leads to skepticism over our cognition. Both are ridiculous, though IMO skepticism over our cognition is more ridiculous because it ends up giving us no basis to say "cogito ergo sum."

 

[IceJad]

The question is then not whether we make decisions that affect the trajectory of future events - I obviously decided to do this rather than something else. But if free will is defined as the ability to make decisions that are not determined by prior events and we could rerun the last hour exactly as it happened and make a different decision, then something actually needs to be different. But rerunning it exactly as it happened means that nothing is different.

So free will cannot be compatible with determinism. And if existence is deterministic then free will is an illusion.

Your premise is incorrect to begin with free will is not defined as the ability to make decision independent of prior events. It is simply the ability to make decision independent of a present external forces. Take for example your broken guitar string. From the point you are aware of the situation you have the ability to select multiple actions such as buy a new string, just not bother or borrow a friend's guitar instead. Determinism would be regardless you wanted to buy a new string an external force controls you to borrow from a friend even at your protest.

When people say they had no choice they meant they had no beneficial choices. You have to go grab lunch because you're hungry. You always have a choice to not grab lunch and continue to be hungry. Your hunger might be a determinant of a prior event but doesn't mean your reaction is determinism.

Exitance is not deterministic. Deterministic is always a hindsight conclusion. After you have acted independently to reach a determined point. Events will always happen that will shift the choices people will make. That doesn't made the choices made deterministic.

Also the fact that you can reason that free will is an illusion is prove that free will is not an illusion. Determinism will ensure you are not aware of the free will itself. Like a machine you will follow a preordained instruction to its logical end. Unless you're fully aware with certainty of a future point and all actions that lead to it without variations then and only then you can say all are determinism.

 

[Bradskii]

No, I don't agree with it. Because if you truly decided to go to the gym instead of the pub, then you have exercised free will in making that decision.

Then we're done. You don't have any real comprehension of what free will entails. You think that simple acts as an agent proves it exists and that no free will means you cannot make a decision. And even when you do make a decision, you cannot change it. I can't waste any more of my time in trying to explain it to you. I'm tempted to close the thread, but someone else may have something constructive to add.

 

[BeyondET]

But rerunning it exactly as it happened means that nothing is different.

So free will cannot be compatible with determinism. And if existence is deterministic then free will is an illusion.

Life will never be exactly the same like it was an hour ago and rerun it to now.

It's never been done and it's a illusion if anyone thinks it can.

 

[BeyondET]

It was determined that humans can't regrow teeth but because of free will that might not be the case one day. The Japanese have begun human test trails on the drug called Toregem Biopharma. It works on rodents and other animals in clinical trails. Interesting stuff happening these days.

 

[Bradskii]

Your premise is incorrect to begin with free will is not defined as the ability to make decision independent of prior events. It is simply the ability to make decision independent of a present external forces.

So prior events, our now very familiar antecedent conditions, play no part in your decision making? I can point out some very obvious ones if you like. Your age, your upbringing, your education, your culture, your diet, your sex, your IQ, your health, your mood, your marital status...do I need to go on? Are you saying that they don't, in some way, determine the decisions you make?

Take for example your broken guitar string. From the point you are aware of the situation you have the ability to select multiple actions such as buy a new string, just not bother or borrow a friend's guitar instead. Determinism would be regardless you wanted to buy a new string an external force controls you to borrow from a friend even at your protest.

We're not considering anything that forces you to make a decision. This was discussed very early on. Being constrained to do something is the very opposite of doing it as a result of a free will decision. Yes, I had choices when the string broke. But making choices doesn't equate to free will. Decision making doesn't mean that free will therefore exists. So I made a choice and it determined what happened from that point on. If I hadn't broken it then I wouldn't have driven to the next suburb to buy another, so the fact that it broke was one of the antecedent conditions which determined my breakfast.

When people say they had no choice they meant they had no beneficial choices. You have to go grab lunch because you're hungry. You always have a choice to not grab lunch and continue to be hungry. Your hunger might be a determinant of a prior event but doesn't mean your reaction is determinism.

And no free will doesn't equate to having no choices. Beneficial or not. You can have multiple choices and you'll choose one with or without free will.

If you are hungry that is most definitely one of the determinants for what you might decide to do. But there'll be a monstrous number of others. Are you unwell? Is food available? Do you have something more important to do? Are you trying to lose weight? Should the only food available go to your children? Is the food something you don't like? Is it affordable? Out of those conditions pne will determine your choice. That is plainly obvious. Something has to determine it. Else it will be a random decision.

Exitance is not deterministic.

Then give me an effect without a cause.

Deterministic is always a hindsight conclusion.

This has been covered. You can always tell in hindsight what some of the conditions which determined your choice were. But you'll never know what they all were. The number is virtually infinite. So you can rarely take one in advance and predict a decision. How would I know that breaking a string one evening would be one of the antecedent conditions that determined my breakfast the following day? But it obviously and undeniably was.

Events will always happen that will shift the choices people will make. That doesn't made the choices made deterministic.

That really doesn't make any sense as an argument against free will. When you say that 'events will always happen that will shift the choices people will make', that is exactly the point I am making. That events will determine the choices you make.

Also the fact that you can reason that free will is an illusion is prove that free will is not an illusion. Determinism will ensure you are not aware of the free will itself.

Determinism has ensured that antecedent conditions (me reading umpteen authors and reams of literature on free will over very many years) have determined that I know it doesn't exist. I know it feels like I have free will. So those two premises can only lead to the conclusion that it's an illusion.

Like a machine you will follow a preordained instruction to its logical end. Unless you're fully aware with certainty of a future point and all actions that lead to it without variations then and only then you can say all are determinism.

Prediction of future events is not possible. Breaking that string (and that is a monstrously simple example) couldn't possibly predict what I would have for breakfast. And the lack of an ability to predict an outcome does not mean that a system is indeterminate.