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Perhaps if we're talking about extrinsic conditioning, but in context the discussion was an intrinsic encouragement. So perhaps I should have made it clearer that I was specifically addressing the "you'll use that as an encouragement" rather than a more general understanding of behavior modification.
There seems to be a mental block with this.
If you have an intrinsic desire to improve (that's the type of person that you are) then it'll likely happen whether there is free will or not.
Only because the concept you're expressing is incoherent.
I don't think we could evaluate the moral character of mechanical processes, so it matters a lot when we're talking about what it means to be a "good" person. There is no moral or immoral character to the nitrogen cycle, or the diesel cycle, or whatever other mechanical process we decide to look at. It's only when a moral agent is involved that morality becomes a question, which if we don't have free will there is no agent involved. Just a machine, and the fact that you keep talking about an active role in these things shows that deep down you don't really believe the nonsense you claim to believe...so why do you persist in it?
It's rather strange you seem to think there's some superiority in coming to this conclusion, but there's no way to arrive at it without compromising the entire process of rational thought. You choke on a gnat, but swallow camels.
No free will doesn't prevent us from labelling an act as good or bad. Why would it? If the universe has determined that you are the person who steals wallets then you are a bad person. Stealing wallets is a bad thing. There's no other way to describe it. And we'll stop you from doing it because it's a bad thing. We'll imprison you as a discouragement to both you and others. If you keep going it we'll keep locking you up. Hopefully we can rehabilitate you so you won't do it again.
These things are value-statements, and such judgments can only belong to a moral agent.
So now the universe is making value judgments, in addition to "deciding" your life and making all of your decisions for you?
Oh? Some call it taxation.
All of these active agent nouns and verbs. Why aren't you describing it as if these are just mechanistic happenings of a material universe, but a deliberate course of action by a thinking public?
I don't care whether you believe or not. It's a conclusion that I've come to. It only affects me. No-one else. There's no changes I'm demanding you make. And you won't notice any changes in me either. Don't worry about it.
How does "it makes me feel good/bad" differ from external en/dis-couragement? Again both are stimuli.
This is precisely why I have thought about objecting to the term "determinism" for awhile. (I held back because it is apparently the standard term in philosophy.) It leads people to think that determinism requires a determinizer. It does not. As far as I can tell, it is nothing more than the events of now are "determined" by the prior state of things, i.e., contingent and causal, including any randomness that arises from the indeterminancy of physical systems. So no, your belief in free will in a universe without free will of the kind you think you have does not need to be the result of some being or entity deciding anything about you.
You seem to misunderstand, because what I have stated doesn't require a determinizer. The notion that my choices are pre-determined, whether or not that includes random chance, rather than being an act of my agency, is enough for my objection to stand. Because either I have no say in what I believe, and so will believe I have free will purely because of prior states in the universe, or I have the choice to reject an understanding of causality that purports I make no genuine choices.
I didn't ask why are you trying to convince me, I asked why are you willing to accept a conclusion that you yourself admit you want to reject? Especially since the only thing it takes to reject it is making the choice to reject it, since making that choice demonstrates you do in fact have free will.
Sure, but if my conscious experience is an illusion cast by the physical object of my brain then there can be no causal link between my feelings and my actions. It's only when my feelings cause me, as an agent, to act differently that such encouragement/discouragement matters. If the hypothesis that my experience of agency is an illusion were actually true, my feelings would be ephemeral to the whole experience. Since my choices aren't playing any causal part in the drama, intrinsic motivation is simply irrelevant.
It would help if you didn't name the preported determinizer then.
I renew my objection to "pre-determined" for the prior reasons implying agency in determination.
Now you're going to will free will into existence. LOL.
I'm making any of those arguments, not against free will or for brains in jars.
That's more of a matter of convenience, rather than to imply that those things were actually active in decision-making.
If my decisions are purely the result of prior states, the term we use to describe the situation makes no difference. No matter how we describe it, it's functionally equivalent.
If I have any genuine choice, then it demonstrates that the hypothesis that my agency is an illusion is a false conclusion. And if I don't, it really doesn't matter because the prior conditions are such that I'm going to believe I have agency no matter what. In either case, it makes no sense to argue that I don't.
Didn't say it does, simply that it's absurd to argue that I don't. Because arguing that I don't implies I have the power to make decisions about what is most reasonable to conclude, rather than my choices being causally fixed by prior states of my brain.
Neither indeterminancy, nor determinancy is sufficient to explain the phenomenon of deliberate choice. Though if I understand what you're saying here, I see no reason to object to the statement as presented. Simply because people have convinced themselves that free will does not exist, is not a reason to accept that it doesn't.
Except in the one case we're involved in its operation when we dispute it. So while it certainly could be the case that free will somehow doesn't exist, the implication of that conclusion is that my foundation for engagement in the question is undermined. If I don't have free will, I will believe whatever the prior states dictate. So my making the choice to believe is sufficient grounds for me to believe, because there's no reason to consider the alternative as a serious possibility.
The question isn't whether it actually exists, the question is what is more reasonable to believe. As you seem to have indicated, the hypothesis is on the same order as brains in jars. Which, while possible, is a ludicrous conclusion to come to. So any metaphysical commitments that result in such belief are suspect. Though the statement of that orator is self defeating, since he claims not to know but then seems to imply that it doesn't by denying the reality of choice in the matter. As is clear from this thread, people choose to believe that free will does not exist and people choose to believe that free will does exist. The question is, why would someone defend something that is functionally equivalent to believing they were a brain in a jar? Why is one treated as philosophical garbage, and the other as a serious proposition when they are on the same order as each other?
But that's the problem, demonstration of genuine choice about anything. It's my understanding that the genuine debate is if the perception of free will is genuine or not and it remains undecided.
Your arguments and mine are based on the the various things that have been fed into our minds and how we process them with our brains. Making arguments is not evidence for free choice of argument.
A couple more statements that being able to make an argument on one side of something is evidence you made a free choice. It doesn't make it so.
That is weird. The title of the thread is "free will and determinism". It sure sounds like the existence of free will is a question of importance to someone.
Woah there pal. I have not. "Brains in jars" is a silly fantasy of an idea, right down there with "the Universe is a simulation". It has zero evidence behind it. Just dumb fantasy. The existence of free will not only seems possible, but we certainly *think* we have free will. I just don't know how natural causality works to make it possible in minds generated by brains.
I find all "metaphysics' suspect. P)
No, it isn't. I think you might misunderstand. It is just the same statement I just made in a more pithy form. It says nothing more than that the reality of the existence/non-existence of free will (or in the same vein, a god) is not affected by what you or I believe to be the case. It either is or isn't independent of what our current opinion is.
They certainly *think* they have that choice. It is the unanswered question, perception, or reality?
Oh, come on! Even if we take "brains in jars" seriously for a second, it only involves tricking the sensory inputs and motor feedback of the central nervous system. It doesn't change whether the mind created by that brain has free will or not.
Because brains with active minds come inside skulls, not jars. (Are "brains in jars" a philosophical argument? I thought it was some sort of sci-fi based fantasy. I kind of hope that is the philosophical garbage of which you speak, the alternative is not a good look.)
If the debate were ontological, then it's bound to result in a stalemate. But the debate is epistemological, and it boils down to the question of whether our experiences are trustworthy. If they are trustworthy, than we can have confidence that free will exists and the problem becomes explaining how that could be so. If they are not, then any epistemological conclusions we make are suspect.
It is completely irrational to argue that the arguments themselves are irrelevant to our conclusions. Which is the case if it is purely a matter of prior conditions, rather than our agency. And there's more at stake then just free will because the questions boil down to basic epistemology and metaphysics. It seems abundantly clear that there is no material mind, and so if we adopt materialist/physicalist metaphysical commitments we must reduce the mind to the physical operations of the brain either directly or indirectly. Which means the content of the arguments must be irrelevant, since they belong to the mind. What we ate for breakfast would have a larger causal influence than the abstract content of our thoughts, because it may alter the physical constitution of our thinking organ.
No, you're right. Our experience of choice could be completely illusion. But it is irrational to believe such a thing, just as even though it could be that our experience of the physical world is completely illusion but it is irrational to believe such a thing. Our experience of agency is fundamental to our experience of self, so if it is illusion than so must be our experience of self.
Which we must first flesh out the metaphysical and epistemological commitments in order to decide. It's not that it is not an end goal, but we haven't done the leg work necessary to make any kind of inferences. We must first work out the epistemics, then the metaphysics.
What makes it a silly fantasy idea? How did you make that determination?
We all have metaphysical commitments, if we haven't examined them then we have simply adopted a metaphysical position uncritically.
Nope, it implies that there is no choice in what we believe on the matter. It isn't "my belief has no effect" but equivalent to not having any input on the belief.
And how can we move from perception to reality, if not to take our perceptions as essentially trustworthy? If we must be suspicious of our perceptions, we simply can't determine anything is true. So why is external world skepticism less rational than internal world skepticism?
When did we establish that the mind was created by the brain? Seems to be a metaphysical statement, which you claimed you found all such things suspect.
Again, why is external world skepticism less rational than internal world skepticism when the only basis we have for certainty of our own existence is our internal sense, not our external sense?
I'm not debating you about free will. I'm debating your assertions that choosing free will demonstrates free choice. (And apparently about brains in jars.)
Arguments are pointless without evidence to back them up. I need data. The data on free will is inconclusive.
If the experience of choice could be an illusion why would it be *irrational* to come to that conclusion (believe it)?
Brain jars don't exist.
No, I don't think you're getting the logic correctly.
Are you going to invoke an unsupported concept, the disembrained mind, in support of free will? If you are, just say so, and this will be over, because then we're not talking about the possibility of free will in humans, but some religious concepts instead.
'cause we looked and there aren't any brains in jars except at the Head Museum.
I made no such assertion, perhaps you should take the time to actually understand my argument.
The "data" is our sense experience directly. Because if our sense perceptions are untrustworthy, then we can't make any a posteriori conclusions.
Because the so-called illusion is required in coming to a conclusion at all. If our conclusions are the result of being swayed by reasoning, we must have some form of agency for that reasoning to mean anything at all.
Oh? And how did you come to that conclusion? How did you determine the external world existed and wasn't an illusion?
I can only go by what is stated, which is that we "don't have a choice." Now, if you want to read that as affirming that we have a choice, but that choice is simply irrelevant then that's your prerogative, but it seems a rather tortured read.
Yes, but that doesn't make the conclusion a rational conclusion. Someone may believe that they have free will, but that belief is inherently irrational. Just as someone may believe that the external world is an illusion, but such a belief is irrational. And both because they are unliveable.
"the mind?" Why the mind-brain dichotomy if ultimately the mind is just a by-product of the brain?
No, but there is a reason to believe that a belief that requires denying the basic trustworthiness of our experiences is self-defeating. Which is what I am arguing, not that free will categorically exists but that the rational belief is that it does exist based purely on our sense perceptions. It's a ground-level belief, and denying it renders any epistemology suspect because it raises the queston that all of our perceptions are ultimately untrustworthy.
I am more holistic in the matter, in that it appears clear to me that there is some immaterial aspect of our cognitive capacities but they are tied to our physical bodies in some way. But someone who adopts materialist/physicalist metaphysical commitments must deny that any such thing is possible, and deny the one statement that is essentially entirely undoubtable in our own existence. If the mind is an illusion cast by a physical brain, and has no existence of its own in some fashion then "I think, therefore I am" becomes "I have the illusion of thinking, therefore I imagine I am." Which I hope we both agree is an irrational thought.
Looked where? How'd you determine that the physical world existed, and wasn't an illusion created in your thoughts?
