Free will and determinism

[Fervent]

Free will can't be 'proved'. I've given you my reasons why I think it doesn't exist. You haven't given me any reasons to doubt that.

I agree it can't be proved, and you haven't given me reasons, at least none that aren't circular.

Sure. But you don't seem able to give me an example.

I don't need to, because I'm not presenting an argument. At least not one that requires metaphysical commitments. I'm simply not adopting the metaphysical commitments necessary for your argument to proceed, and giving the bones for an epistemic argument.

There isn't a difference. None whatsoever. Except that you don't know what the cause is. You said that if you don't know then it might not exist. Well, give me an example. Because I have no idea, literally no idea whatsoever, what an effect without a cause is. I don't know what you are talking about. Explain yourself - give me an example.

So then there's no basis for making an inductive inference, since our observations are exactly the same as they would be if the assumption had been falsified. I don't need to give you an example, because I'm not claiming that there genuinely is one I'm trying to show you why induction is illigitimate. We can't move from observation-conclusion if there is no observable difference between what we are presented with and the case in which the assumption has been proven false. So unless you can provide some observable way we could distinguish between a cause without an effect, and a cause without a known effect your inference is dead in the water. Want to try abduction next?

 

[Bradskii]

Fervent, I agree with all that you've said, but I think the problem here is that there are epistemological assumptions being imported into the thread which haven't actually been vetted out, and those assumptions are specifically those inhering within Robert Sapolsky's thesis in his new book. Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will.

To really close down the proponents of this thread, we'd have to do what so many don't want to do: read, analyze and dismantle Sapolsky's new book, because that is mainly what is informing Bradskii's conceptual thrust in his OP and provides the context for this thread. I don't like it, but it is what it is.

I don't agree. Sapolski's view (and others) can be summed up by stating that the world is determinate (all events have causes) therefore free will doesn't exist. He goes into a lot of detail regarding neurology and dismantling dualism etc - there's no need to examine any of that. All you need to do for his position to collapse is to show that effects can happen without a cause. That you can make a decision that is not based on antecedent conditions.

I've been pointing that out from Post #1 and asking for any example from whenever or wherever. None has been forthcoming.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I don't agree. Sapolski's view (and others) can be summed up by stating that the world is determinate (all events have causes) therefore free will doesn't exist. He goes into a lot of detail regarding neurology and dismantling dualism etc - there's no need to examine any of that. All you need to do for his position to collapse is to show that effects can happen without a cause. That you can make a decision that is not based on antecedent conditions.

I've been pointing that out from Post #1 and asking for any example from whenever or wherever. None has been forthcoming.

That's not Sapolsky's overall thesis, or yours, is it? I think there's more at stake here conceptually since we know that his thesis is the bridge between his praxis in science and advocating a particular view of moral culpability. We're not just talking generally, or deductively, about Determinism here. This is an ethics thread to boot ..................................................... so until the epistemology is locked down, and it so far hasn't been, then no one is going home a winner.

Moreover, get his name right for once.

 

[Fervent]

Fervent, I agree with all that you've said, but I think the problem here is that there are epistemological assumptions being imported into the thread which haven't actually been vetted out, and those assumptions are specifically those inhering within Robert Sapolsky's thesis in his new book. Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will.

Not only epistemological assumptions, but also metaphysical ones regarding the nature of causation.

To really close down the proponents of this thread, we'd have to do what so many don't want to do: read, analyze and dismantle Sapolsky's new book, because that is mainly what is informing Bradskii's conceptual thrust in his OP and provides the context for this thread. I don't like it, but it is what it is.

Perhaps, though I'm not sure it's possible to "close down" the proponents of this thread because it's clear there are different worldviews in operation that give rise to the different epistemological and metaphysical commitments that can only be "closed down" if the participants would take the time to apply critical analysis to their own worldviews rather than attempting to thrust their worldview assumptions onto others.

That the only alternative to determinism they can seemingly imagine is indeterminism says all that needs to be said about their worldview assumptions.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I don't agree. Sapolski's view (and others) can be summed up by stating that the world is determinate (all events have causes) therefore free will doesn't exist. He goes into a lot of detail regarding neurology and dismantling dualism etc - there's no need to examine any of that. All you need to do for his position to collapse is to show that effects can happen without a cause. That you can make a decision that is not based on antecedent conditions.

I've been pointing that out from Post #1 and asking for any example from whenever or wherever. None has been forthcoming.

Oh, one more thing. I already gave my exception clauses about this earlier on in this thread. I don't agree with the praxis here.

End of story. Carry on.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Not only epistemological assumptions, but also metaphysical ones regarding the nature of causation.

Perhaps, though I'm not sure it's possible to "close down" the proponents of this thread because it's clear there are different worldviews in operation that give rise to the different epistemological and metaphysical commitments that can only be "closed down" if the participants would take the time to apply critical analysis to their own worldviews rather than attempting to thrust their worldview assumptions onto others.

That the only alternative to determinism they can seemingly imagine is indeterminism says all that needs to be said about their worldview assumptions.

Right, but Sapolsky has given 500+/- pages of "evidences" that he thinks support his particular view on Determinism as an antidote to current social injustices and misevaluations he thinks are present in our society and it's these that inform this thread. Hence, the reason this thread is in the "ethics" section.

 

[Fervent]

Right, but Sapolsky has given 500+/- pages of "evidences" that he thinks support his particular view on Determinism as an antidote to current social injustices and misevaluations he thinks are present in our society and it's these that inform this thread. Hence, the reason this thread is in the "ethics" section.

Fair enough, but more than likely attempting to address such "evidences" would simply result in being gish galloped. I have no illusions that those defending the thesis of this thread may change their mind on it, since we're dealing with deeply entrenched biases. I'm just hoping those who may read the thread will see that the emperor has no clothes. Especially since it seems the primary defendant already compromised the deductive form of his argument by discarding the premise of incompatibility, which is crucial to the original argument.

 

[Bradskii]

I don't need to, because I'm not presenting an argument.

If I say 'All swans are black, therefore X' then you might disagree. You'll say 'That's inductive reasoning, so you can't prove it. There may be white swans'. And I say 'Yeah, I know that. I've no problem with that. But if you want to prove me wrong then show me a white swan'.

At which point you say 'I don't have to. There just might be'.

And I say 'Yes, I know that. I can't prove that they're all black but you can disprove it. By showing me a white swan'.

At which point you say 'I don't have to. There just might be'.

And I say 'Yes, I know that...

Rinse and repeat.

Tell me, have you ever made a decision for no reason at all?

 

[Bradskii]

That's not Sapolsky's overall thesis, or yours, is it? I think there's more at stake here conceptually since we know that his thesis is the bridge between his praxis in science and advocating a particular view of moral culpability. We're not just talking generally, or deductively, about Determinism here. This is an ethics thread to boot ..................................................... so until the epistemology is locked down, and it so far hasn't been, then no one is going home a winner.

Moreover, get his name right for once.

Yeah, you'd think I'd be able to spell his name correctly after quoting him enough...

And indeed, the guy's book heads off into the moral landscape as free will obviously has a huge impact on it. And I don't expect to swing anyone's belief about free will by banging out a few posts. It's simply an interesting subject for a thread. But I didn't really expect to get to a point where the statement that all effects have causes could be challenged without at least giving some examples. I've got an infinite number of examples of cause and effect. But it would only take one where it doesn't occur for the whole enterprise to come crashing down.

 

[Fervent]

If I say 'All swans are black, therefore X' then you might disagree. You'll say 'That's inductive reasoning, so you can't prove it. There may be white swans'. And I say 'Yeah, I know that. I've no problem with that. But if you want to prove me wrong then show me a white swan'.

My objection is not to the use of inductive reasoning in general, but to the inappropriate use of inductive reasoning in this instance. The observable difference between a white swan and a black swan is obvious, so the case in which "all swans are black" is falsified is also obvious. That's not satisfied here, because the body of evidence present to us and the body of evidence that would be present to us if the assumption was falsified are observationally identical.

There's also the small detail of burden shifting, since YOU ARE THE ONE MAKING THE ARGUMENT. I put that in bold because you seem to be missing that fact. Let me say it again. THERE IS NO BURDEN OF DISPROOF. ONLY A BURDEN OF PROOF. Do I need to make it bold, too?

At which point you say 'I don't have to. There just might be'.

Which is not what I've said, how many fallacies are we up to from you now?

And I say 'Yes, I know that. I can't prove that they're all black but you can disprove it. By showing me a white swan'.

Except, as I have stated, your claim that I can disprove it is factually incorrect. Because you've given no observable characteristics of the falsifying case, or at least not given a way in which it would differ from what our current observations are.

At which point you say 'I don't have to. There just might be'.

Again, not my argument.

And I say 'Yes, I know that...

Rinse and repeat.

Except, that hasn't been the argument. You claim your assumption can be falsified based on observations, so I'll ask again: How would the falsifying case look different from our current observations?

Tell me, have you ever made a decision for no reason at all?

Depends, is "I felt like it" a reason or no?

 

[Bradskii]

...the deductive form of his argument...

It's an inductive argument. It can't be proved. But you can disprove it. But hey, only if you want to.

 

[Fervent]

It's an inductive argument. It can't be proved. But you can disprove it. But hey, only if you want to.

You've presented two forms of the argument so far in this thread, an inductive one and a deductive one. And as I've pointed out several times, inducton can only be used in cases in which we are able to make direct observations and the falsifying case is unambiguous. If the observations in the falsifying case cannot be distinguished from our current observations, the inference is invalid because we cannot determine it has not already been falsified. So let me once again challenge your claim "you can disprove it" by asking how would our observations differ in the case that it was falsified from what our current observations are?

 

[Tinker Grey]

It's an inductive argument. It can't be proved. But you can disprove it. But hey, only if you want to.

Just to quibble a bit: the rephrasing of your argument by Fervent is, indeed, deductive.

But the support for the premises is inductive. And, that's ok. That the sun will "rise" tomorrow is inductive, but it certainly is justified by the 100,000 years of (more-or-less) human history x 365 observations. Sure a comet could hit the earth with the right mass and angle to stop the earth's rotation, but with 99.9999999% certainty (number made up) be sure that the earth will continue to spin.

Tinker's axiom: All axioms are support via induction including this one. (Let's make it a thing.)

 

[Bradskii]

My objection is not to the use of inductive reasoning in general, but to the inappropriate use of inductive reasoning in this instance. The observable difference between a white swan and a black swan is obvious, so the case in which "all swans are black" is falsified is also obvious.

All swans are black. Disproved by showing me a white swan.
All effects have cause. Disproved by showing me an effect without a cause.

I mean...c'mon. It's that easy.

Which is not what I've said...

Me: At which point you say 'I don't have to. There just might be'.
What you said: 'If I can't identify a cause, it very well may not exist.'

It's exactly what you said.

Except, as I have stated, your claim that I can disprove it is factually incorrect. Because you've given no observable characteristics of the falsifying case, or at least not given a way in which it would differ from what our current observations are.

Yes I have. The falsifying case is an effect with no cause whatsoever. Just show me one. As in 'Look, X happened and nothing caused it'.

Except, that hasn't been the argument. You claim your assumption can be falsified based on observations, so I'll ask again: How would the falsifying case look different from our current observations?

Our current observations show that every effect has a cause. See above for the falsifying case. If you can't find one, then all them swans will remain black until you do.

Depends, is "I felt like it" a reason or no?

If I ask 'Why did you do that?' And the answer is 'Because I wanted to' then that is the reason. I'd like an example of a decision with no reason.

 

[Fervent]

Just to quibble a bit: the rephrasing of your argument by Fervent is, indeed, deductive.

Not just my rephrasing, but an argument he presented prior to that.

But the support for the premises is inductive. And, that's ok. That the sun will "rise" tomorrow is inductive, but it certainly is justified by the 100,000 years of (more-or-less) human history x 365 observations. Sure a comet could hit the earth with the right mass and angle to stop the earth's rotation, but with 99.9999999% certainty (number made up) be sure that the earth will continue to spin.

You seem to be of the impression that my objection is the existence of the induction problem. It's not, it's that induction is only appropriate for things we can observe directly. If our "induction" relies on accumulating inferences, it's not actually inductive. But perhaps you can help brad out and articulate how the falsifying case of the assumption would differ from our current set of observations.

Tinker's axiom: All axioms are support via induction including this one. (Let's make it a thing.)

An axiom can only be taken because it is self-evident, if something requires support from something else it is not axiomatic. So is it supported by induction, or is it self-evident?

 

[Bradskii]

Just to quibble a bit: the rephrasing of your argument by Fervent is, indeed, deductive.

Yeah, he presents it that way. But I can't prove that all effects have causes, it's only by observation that we know this. There may be an effect without a cause. Which will disprove the premise. But no-one wants to suggest one. So the premise will hold until someone does.

 

[Bradskii]

...how would our observations differ in the case that it was falsified from what our current observations are?

What are your current observations? That all effects seem to have causes? That something must have broken the window even though you don't know what? Or are some observations different to that?

 

[Fervent]

All swans are black. Disproved by showing me a white swan.
All effects have cause. Disproved by showing me an effect without a cause.

How would our observations differ from our current observations?

I mean...c'mon. It's that easy.

So why haven't you answered my question? How would our observations differ from our current observations?

Me: At which point you say 'I don't have to. There just might be'.
What you said: 'If I can't identify a cause, it very well may not exist.'

How would our observations differ from our current observations?

It's exactly what you said.

Yes I have. The falsifying case is an effect with no cause whatsoever. Just show me one. As in 'Look, X happened and nothing caused it'.

What observable difference would exist between an effect with no cause and an effect we don't know the cause of?

Our current observations show that every effect has a cause. See above for the falsifying case. If you can't find one, then all them swans will remain black until you do.

Oh? So every effect that has been observed's cause has been identified? What observations were made for the ones that didn't have an identifiable cause that showed that there was in fact a cause?

If I ask 'Why did you do that?' And the answer is 'Because I wanted to' then that is the reason. I'd like an example of a decision with no reason.

Ok, then I have no decisions meeting that criteria. Though let me stop you here, because if your premise is simply "there is a cause for everything" then it's not strong enough to establish determinism is true, since there are also the possibility of random causes and agency which are both types of causes but don't support the premise that determinism is true.

 

[Fervent]

What are your current observations?

I've observed effects with highly probable causes, improbable but possible causes, to no identifiable cause.

That all effects seem to have causes?

Considering I've witnessed things for which I have no clue what could have possibly caused it, no I wouldn't say that my observations have been that all effects seem to have causes. Have you never been completely baffled at what could have possibly caused something to happen?

That something must have broken the window even though you don't know what?

An inference is not an observation.

Or are some observations different to that?

Some observations are different to that, in that I can't even begin to fathom what could have caused it.

So why, instead of giving me an answer to my question, do you turn around and interrogate me? If your inductive inference is indeed falsifiable by observations, how would our observations of the falsifying case be different than observing something for which we simply don't have a candidate for what the cause is?

 

[Bradskii]

Oh? So every effect that has been observed's cause has been identified? What observations were made for the ones that didn't have an identifiable cause that showed that there was in fact a cause?

I'll repeat what I said earlier. What are your current observations? That all effects seem to have causes? That something must have broken the window even though you don't know what? You can give me an example of any effect that you think didn't have a cause and we'll examine it. Anything at all. You have the whole history of the entire universe to show me something that just might not have had a cause.

Maybe, at some point in your life, somewhere you came across an effect that you felt for sure had no cause. Tell me what that was. If you don't have one then you have nothing to offer. You always assume cause and effect.

Ok, then I have no decisions meeting that criteria. Though let me stop you here, because if your premise is simply "there is a cause for everything" then it's not strong enough to establish determinism is true, since there are also the possibility of random causes...

This was a direct question regarding free will. And you have no examples of any decisions made without a reason. And the reasons why you made a decision are the antecedent conditions (random decision made without those are not applicable to free will).

Maybe we didn't need to talk about determinism to get to where we needed.