Free will and determinism

[Bradskii]

It's not a matter of what is thought the conclusion is going to be. When we reverse the argument, it's structure remains valid. Such:

Free will exists, determinism is not compatible with free will, determinism is false

That's not a valid argument. If you are a compatibilist then free will is compatible (by definition) with free will. It doesn't work in reverse. I already explained that. Twice.

That's not how arguments work. It's up to you to prove your premises are true premises...

I gave my premise and you denied it was true. And then you gave a reason for it not being true. You've already crossed that bridge. This is where the rubber hits the road. If you can justify your reason then you win. Otherwise I'll ignore it. Otherwise I'll stick with my premise (because all effects have causes, which no-one has contradicted) and the conclusion.

You can still believe that free will exists. You won't have given a reason for that belief, but that's no big deal. I haven't asked for one.

 

[Fervent]

That's not a valid argument. If you are a compatibilist then free will is compatible (by definition) with free will. It doesn't work in reverse. I already explained that. Twice.

You stated it, but it's not true. The structure of the argument is valid, because the conclusion flows from the premises. Now, you dispute the second premise so you deny that it is sound but that's neither here nor there. If we instead look at the definitions, it becomes clear that "free will does not exist" is just a subset of the premise that the world is deterministic. Because, put simply, determinism is the thesis that every effect is determined by an antecedent cause. Free will, on the other hand, is the thesis that our wills are not entirely determined by antecedent causes. So the premise contains the conclusion, because the premise is that everything without exception is determined by antecedent causes.

I gave my premise and you denied it was true. And then you gave a reason for it not being true. You've already crossed that bridge. This is where the rubber hits the road. If you can justify your reason then you win. Otherwise I'll ignore it. Otherwise I'll stick with my premise (because all effects have causes, which no-one has contradicted) and the conclusion.

You're right, i should have never given any reason because none is necessary. You're free to stick with your premise, just as I'm free to stick with my rejection of your premise. But if all you can do to defend your premise is burden shift, you offer no compelling reason to accept it.

You can still believe that free will exists. You won't have given a reason for that belief, but that's no big deal. I haven't asked for one.

I've given a reason for the belief that it exists, I've experienced it in operation. In fact, its existence is fundamental to my experience of the world. On the other hand, you've given no reason to accept your claim that that experience is an illusion other than an asserting a premise and then attempting to defend that premise by burden shifting.

 

[Bradskii]

You stated it, but it's not true. The structure of the argument is valid, because the conclusion flows from the premises.

No, you're missing the point. If you think that free will exists then it doesn't necessarily lead to indeterminism. You can't say free will...therefore indeterminism. Because there are also arguments for free will and determinism. You can't get to one from the other. And you are using the conclusion - free will exists, as a premise. That's logically nonsensical.

You're right, i should have never given any reason...

Well, you have. And there's nothing wrong with that. Because you obviously have to have a reason. You wanted to justify your belief. Just saying 'I reject it, just because I want to' is not exactly a great argument. So now I'm asking you to justify your reason. If you can't then so be it. You are left with 'I reject it, because I want to'. We'll leave it at that.

I've given a reason for the belief that it exists, I've experienced it in operation.

Well, me too. And I've experienced the sun rising every morning. But that experience is not enough to determine whether it's orbiting the earth. I don't experience a sense of motion, but the world is spinning about 1,000 mph. But then again, if you think that feeling like you have free will means that you have it, then...so be it.

 

[Fervent]

No, you're missing the point. If you think that free will exists then it doesn't necessarily lead to indeterminism. You can't say free will...therefore indeterminism. Because there are also arguments for free will and determinism. You can't get to one from the other. And you are using the conclusion - free will exists, as a premise. That's logically nonsensical.

The "arguments" that free will exists and is compatible with determinism re-define free will in a way that it no longer makes sense to call it free will, since compatibilism still accepts that our decisions are the result of antecedent causes. Compatibilism is a misnomer, rather than an accurate description of the position, since it is an argument about human responsibility being consistent with determinism rather than an argument that genuine free will exists. Which is why it is more accurately refered to as soft determinism than compatibilism. In taking determinism as a premise, you subsume the conclusion because determinism demands that everything be the result of antecedent causes which is the exact same logical error you think I am engaged in. I am not attempting to make a deductive argument for free will, I am taking it to be axiomatic that free will exists.

Well, you have. And there's nothing wrong with that. Because you obviously have to have a reason. You wanted to justify your belief. Just saying 'I reject it, just because I want to' is not exactly a great argument. So now I'm asking you to justify your reason. If you can't then so be it. You are left with 'I reject it, because I want to'. We'll leave it at that.

No, I didn't want to justify my belief. You asked me for a reason, I gave you my reason. It appears to be self-evidently true to me, to such an extent that the denial of it is an absurd conclusion. You are the one who came in here attempting to make the argument that it doesn't exist, and have attempted to justify it through a confused attempt at using inductive reasoning. I've given you one reason that an inductive argument fails, which is that it can never reach the threshold necessary to justify a universal declaration. There's a second failure of induction in this case, in that cause is not something we observe but something we infer so the criteria necessary for building an inductive argument are not satisfied.

Well, me too. And I've experienced the sun rising every morning. But that experience is not enough to determine whether it's orbiting the earth. I don't experience a sense of motion, but the world is spinning about 1,000 mph. But then again, if you think that feeling like you have free will means that you have it, then...so be it.

Are you sure you experienced the sun rising every morning? How do you know that your experience of the external world is not an illusion and that the reality isn't that no physical world exists outside of your own mind?

 

[Bradskii]

The "arguments" that free will exists and is compatible with determinism re-define free will in a way that it no longer makes sense to call it free will, since compatibilism still accepts that our decisions are the result of antecedent causes. Compatibilism is a misnomer, rather than an accurate description of the position, since it is an argument about human responsibility being consistent with determinism rather than an argument that genuine free will exists. Which is why it is more accurately refered to as soft determinism than compatibilism.

Free will, therefore indeterminism is not a valid argument. Period. If I say that the world is determinate, because all causes have effects, and you disagree, then 'I disagree' doesn't do the trick. What you need to do is say 'I disagree because...'. I want you to tell me why you think effects don't always have causes. Forget free will - we'll get to that once the first premise has been accepted or rejected.

No, I didn't want to justify my belief. You asked me for a reason, I gave you my reason. It appears to be self-evidently true to me...

To me as well. That is hardly an argument for free will: 'It appears to be...'

I've given you one reason that an inductive argument fails, which is that it can never reach the threshold necessary to justify a universal declaration.

OK, let's do some bending over backwards. 'On the assumption that the world appears to be determinate in that we can't find any effects that don't have a cause...'

Will that do? Pick the bones out of that if you can.

Are you sure you experienced the sun rising every morning? How do you know that your experience of the external world is not an illusion and that the reality isn't that no physical world exists outside of your own mind?

It might be. But I act as if it's real. I can do no other. I also act as if free will exists. It's incredibly difficult not to do so. But 'it appears very real to me' is not an argument for its existence.

 

[Fervent]

Free will, therefore indeterminism is not a valid argument. Period. If I say that the world is determinate, because all causes have effects, and you disagree, then 'I disagree' doesn't do the trick. What you need to do is say 'I disagree because...'. I want you to tell me why you think effects don't always have causes. Forget free will - we'll get to that once the first premise has been accepted or rejected.

Skepticism towards your premise requires no justification on my part. I don't need a reason to reject your premise, you need to give me a compelling reason to accept it.

To me as well. That is hardly an argument for free will: 'It appears to be...'

Not meant to be an argument, because no argument is necessary when something is self-evident.

OK, let's do some bending over backwards. 'On the assumption that the world appears to be determinate in that we can't find any effects that don't have a cause...'

I don't agree with the statement "we can't find any effects that don't have a cause" since I've never observed cause and effect relationships, so I can't evaluate whether it truly is the case that I've never observed an effect without a cause. I've seen plenty of things that I have no idea how they happened, for which I am not able to identify a cause. But in either case, it bears repeating that you're attempting to employ inductive reasoning which can never provide sufficient justification for something being universally true even if the qualifications for employing one are satisfied, which they're not for questions of cause and effect because cause and effect relationships are not things we observe directly.

Will that do? Pick the bones out of that if you can.

Simple enough, adding "on the assumption" doesn't make your premise of determinism any more compelling of a premise or any less question begging.

It might be. But I act as if it's real. I can do no other. I also act as if free will exists. It's incredibly difficult not to do so. But 'it appears very real to me' is not an argument for its existence.

Good thing that was never presented as an argument for its existence. As I have stated, I don't see any reason to present an argument for the existence of free will. Just like I don't see any reason to present an argument for the existence of a world external to my mind. And for much the same reasons. Both are basic beliefs, because the reality of them arises directly from my experience rather than as a result of deliberation. So when you say "hey, free will is an illusion" I take it as seriously as I take solipsism.

 

[Bradskii]

Skepticism towards your premise requires no justification on my part. I don't need a reason to reject your premise, you need to give me a compelling reason to accept it.

So you're skeptical. I think we'll have to leave it there. If you're not going to dismantle any part of the argument or offer a better one then I'm not sure why you been posting so much. 'I don't think you're right' doesn't take that long to type.

I don't agree with the statement "we can't find any effects that don't have a cause" since I've never observed cause and effect relationships, so I can't evaluate whether it truly is the case that I've never observed an effect without a cause. I've seen plenty of things that I have no idea how they happened, for which I am not able to identify a cause.

If you want to say that me throwing a brick through the window wasn't the cause of it breaking, then I think we're done.

And I didn't say that every event has an identifiable cause. But your comment implies that you know there's a cause, you just don't know what it was. Now if you had said that you knew of events that definitely didn't have a cause (not just 'I wonder how that happened') then we'd be on to something. Let me know if you can think of one.

 

[Fervent]

So you're skeptical. I think we'll have to leave it there. If you're not going to dismantle any part of the argument or offer a better one then I'm not sure why you been posting so much. 'I don't think you're right' doesn't take that long to type.

I don't need to dismantle your argument if you're not going to present a compelling reason to accept its premises. And I've simply been responding to your posts in which you've attempted to "argue" by assertion and burden shifting. Without the premise that determinism is true, your argument is a non-starter. But we can't simply take determinism as a given.

If you want to say that me throwing a brick through the window wasn't the cause of it breaking, then I think we're done.

Ok. No skin off my back.

And I didn't say that every event has an identifiable cause. But your comment implies that you know there's a cause, you just don't know what it was. Now if you had said that you knew of events that definitely didn't have a cause (not just 'I wonder how that happened') then we'd be on to something. Let me know if you can think of one.

My comment implies no such thing, I may assume there is a cause but that doesn't constitute knowledge. If I can't identify a cause, it very well may not exist. It's ambiguous. Maybe you could tell me how I might distinguish between an effect without a cause, and an effect without an identifiable cause to remove the ambiguity? How would they appear different to me?

 

[Bradskii]

I don't need to dismantle your argument if you're not going to present a compelling reason to accept its premises.

The premise is that all events have a cause. If you don't accept it, then you need to give a reason. If you don't then there's nothing for you to discuss.

My comment implies no such thing, I may assume there is a cause but that doesn't constitute knowledge. If I can't identify a cause, it very well may not exist. It's ambiguous. Maybe you could tell me how I might distinguish between an effect without a cause, and an effect without an identifiable cause to remove the ambiguity? How would they appear different to me?

Why you need an example is beyond me. But...if you see me throwing a brick through a window then you know what caused the window to break. If you didn't see me do it then you have no identifiable cause. But the fact that you have no idea what it was doesn't lead to the ridiculous 'Well, there can't have been a cause'.

If something happens and you don't know why, it's stretching my patience with this conversation very thinly indeed to suggest that it happened for absolutely no reason at all. Please tell me that that is not the point you are making. Because 'If I can't identify a cause, it very well may not exist.' sounds an awful lot like it to me.

 

[Fervent]

The premise is that all events have a cause. If you don't accept it, then you need to give a reason. If you don't then there's nothing for you to discuss.

No, I don't need to give a reason. Because I'm not the one making the argument, you are. And the burden of proof lies on the person making the argument.

Why you need an example is beyond me. But...if you see me throwing a brick through a window then you know what caused the window to break. If you didn't see me do it then you have no identifiable cause. But the fact that you have no idea what it was doesn't lead to the ridiculous 'Well, there can't have been a cause'.

Never said it lead to concluding "Well, there can't have been a cause." But if I don't have an identifiable cause, the possibility is open that I may have witnessed an event with no prior cause.

If something happens and you don't know why, it's stretching my patience with this conversation very thinly indeed to suggest that it happened for absolutely no reason at all. Please tell me that that is not the point you are making. Because 'If I can't identify a cause, it very well may not exist.' sounds an awful lot like it to me.

If somethine happens and you don't know why, what? What would be the observable difference between an effect without a cause and an effect without an identifiable cause?

 

[Fervent]

The premise is that all events have a cause. If you don't accept it, then you need to give a reason. If you don't then there's nothing for you to discuss.

Now that you're no longer using the term "determinism" it's worth pointing out that the question begging can be even more clearly seen. Let's also dispose of the term "free will" by putting it in terms of causation, as in free will means that our decisions are not the result of prior causes. So the negation of free will is the statement that our decisions are the result of prior causes. Which means your argument goes something like the following:

P:All events are the result of prior causes
P: Our decisions are events
C: Our decisions are the result of prior causes

Which is a trivial conclusion, because it's included in the first premise so all we've done is begged the question if we simply assume the first premise to be true. Which means in order to justify the argument, we have to establish the legitimacy of the first premise from some other assumption. Which so far you have refused to do.

 

[Tinker Grey]

P1: If P then Q
P2: P
C: Therefore Q

NOT question-begging.

@Fervent, your options are to deny P1 or to deny P2.

 

[Fervent]

P1: If P then Q
P2: P
C: Therefore Q

NOT question-begging.

@Fervent, your options are to deny P1 or to deny P2.

Or simply require a justification for P1 besides assuming it to be the case. Because the burden lies on the one making the argument, not the one asking for justification. I don't need to refute P1 unless an argument for P1 has been presented, but if no argument for P1 is presented there is nothing to refute.

 

[Fervent]

P1: If P then Q
P2: P
C: Therefore Q

NOT question-begging.

@Fervent, your options are to deny P1 or to deny P2.

Also, I would like to point out I had to re-formulate the argument in order to produce a valid structure. Because if we simply take the premise given, then the conclusion doesn't follow: Such:

P1: All effects have cause
P2:?
C: Free will is an illusion

It is only by first strengthening the premise by supplying the qualifier "prior," and then defining "free will" explicitly in terms of prior causes that it becomes formally valid. But simply being valid is not sufficient because the truth of the premise must be justified, which it hasn't been.

 

[Bones49]

P1: If P then Q
P2: P
C: Therefore Q

NOT question-begging.

@Fervent, your options are to deny P1 or to deny P2.

Does this work out in reality.
Given the existence of chaos theory (actually not the theory, but the reality that the theory describes), that is to say, that it is possible that a mathematical equation moves into a phase where the current answer to that equation (for x = n), cannot be predicted by previous answers to that equation (where x = n - m). So it seems that reality is not deterministic, in the sense that you cannot always determine the reality that is now, based upon the reality that was previously.

 

[Tinker Grey]

Does this work out in reality.
Given the existence of chaos theory (actually not the theory, but the reality that the theory describes), that is to say, that it is possible that a mathematical equation moves into a phase where the current answer to that equation (for x = n), cannot be predicted by previous answers to that equation (where x = n - m). So it seems that reality is not deterministic, in the sense that you cannot always determine the reality that is now, based upon the reality that was previously.

Are you responding to the right post? Cuz what you wrote has nothing to do with what I wrote.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

P1: If P then Q
P2: P
C: Therefore Q

NOT question-begging.

@Fervent, your options are to deny P1 or to deny P2.

Those are the only options for those who think they have to color between the deductive lines given.

 

[Bradskii]

No, I don't need to give a reason. Because I'm not the one making the argument, you are. And the burden of proof lies on the person making the argument.

Free will can't be 'proved'. I've given you my reasons why I think it doesn't exist. You haven't given me any reasons to doubt that.

Never said it lead to concluding "Well, there can't have been a cause." But if I don't have an identifiable cause, the possibility is open that I may have witnessed an event with no prior cause.

Sure. But you don't seem able to give me an example.

If somethine happens and you don't know why, what? What would be the observable difference between an effect without a cause and an effect without an identifiable cause?

There isn't a difference. None whatsoever. Except that you don't know what the cause is. You said that if you don't know then it might not exist. Well, give me an example. Because I have no idea, literally no idea whatsoever, what an effect without a cause is. I don't know what you are talking about. Explain yourself - give me an example.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Also, I would like to point out I had to re-formulate the argument in order to produce a valid structure. Because if we simply take the premise given, then the conclusion doesn't follow: Such:

P1: All effects have cause
P2:?
C: Free will is an illusion

It is only by first strengthening the premise by supplying the qualifier "prior," and then defining "free will" explicitly in terms of prior causes that it becomes formally valid. But simply being valid is not sufficient because the truth of the premise must be justified, which it hasn't been.

Fervent, I agree with all that you've said, but I think the problem here is that there are epistemological assumptions being imported into the thread which haven't actually been vetted out, and those assumptions are specifically those inhering within Robert Sapolsky's thesis in his new book. Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will.

To really close down the proponents of this thread, we'd have to do what so many don't want to do: read, analyze and dismantle Sapolsky's new book, because that is mainly what is informing Bradskii's conceptual thrust in his OP and provides the context for this thread. I don't like it, but it is what it is.

 

[Bradskii]

Does this work out in reality.
Given the existence of chaos theory (actually not the theory, but the reality that the theory describes), that is to say, that it is possible that a mathematical equation moves into a phase where the current answer to that equation (for x = n), cannot be predicted by previous answers to that equation (where x = n - m). So it seems that reality is not deterministic, in the sense that you cannot always determine the reality that is now, based upon the reality that was previously.

That something is determined doesn't mean that it's predictable. Unpredictable doesn't equate to indeterminate.