Euthyphro's Dilemma (for atheists)

[Ana the Ist]

That quote from Orel is a wonderfully succinct explanation of why your approach makes no sense,

What part isn't making sense?

and it is precisely why I disagree with you regarding A4.

I'm not going back to look at your construction of it logically. It looked correct at a glance and I'm at least 15 years from a logic class.

I simply pointed out the parameters of his position as he set them.

Moral values and preference values for behavior correlate.

He seemed to want to exclude non-behavioral preferences. He seemed to want to exclude things like (liking how vanilla tastes).

Apparently not. Apparently any preferences, whether they are regarding behavior or not, or exist as real options to the actor or not (slave example) are all a part of his position, right?

So without any actual parameters for the "preferences" since they don't need to relate to the behavior (trash example) or even exist as possible choices to the actor (slave example)...

We can summarize his position as "I can imagine a preference that leads to a moral judgement".

If you think anything beyond that is what is going on here....feel free to explain.

At the very least, moral judgments must generate preferences.

No I don't see that they must.

For example, if I say that murder is evil then I must also prefer that murder not take place. Your assertion that the preference does not follow upon the moral judgment is absurd, and every time someone asks why you believe such an absurd thing you outright refuse to give a reason.

Am I arguing against 1 and 2 now?

Or are you admitting I'm correct about 2?

 

[zippy2006]

I simply pointed out the parameters of his position as he set them.

Moral values and preference values for behavior correlate.

His position does not stop at mere correlation, but it entails correlation. For example, note the word "because" in poll option #2. Orel thinks preferences are the reason for moral judgments.

He seemed to want to exclude non-behavioral preferences. He seemed to want to exclude things like (liking how vanilla tastes).

I told Orel that A2 would be interesting to discuss, but I don't actually know what he thinks about ice cream (or whether he believes that the eating or tasting of ice cream is a behavior).

Apparently not. Apparently any preferences, whether they are regarding behavior or not, or exist as real options to the actor or not (slave example) are all a part of his position, right?

So without any actual parameters for the "preferences" since they don't need to relate to the behavior (trash example) or even exist as possible choices to the actor (slave example)...

We can summarize his position as "I can imagine a preference that leads to a moral judgement".

If you think anything beyond that is what is going on here....feel free to explain.

In some ways this comes down to the burden of proof, but since you are offering a critique of Orel's position you are required to provide the argument against it. The only argument you have given resides in your trash example, but no one in the conversation thinks your argument works (Orel, Chriliman, and myself).

No I don't see that they must.

Right, and therefore you think that it is rational to both say that murder is evil, and to have no preference as to whether or not murder generally take place. That's crazy. Everyone else in the conversation believes that if someone says that murder is evil then they have a preference that murder not take place. This question about correlation is, as Orel said, uncontroversial. We prefer that evil things not occur. That's inherent in the definition of 'evil'.

 

[Moral Orel]

The trash is to be taken out.

Who is taking out the trash in the sentence above?

Who is taking out the trash is ambiguous, and that's fine because who is taking out the trash is also ambiguous in your phrasing:

"Taking out the trash is good"

And in Zippy's phrasing:

"You prefer that the trash be taken out."

Zippy changed tenses, and maintained the subject/object relationship you think is altered by changing tenses. You were wrong. Red herring.

It doesn't require anyone actually doing the behavior.

Oooh! He's learning a little bit more! So you can compare two options in which the subject is ambiguous.

Oh?? Where was that option in the survey??

???? In what way does the survey eliminate complications? Preferences are either in your premises for your moral arguments or they are not. I've never said you were limited to a one premise argument.

Spaghetti is good based on biological taste, Democracy can't be tasted. Different.

So no significant difference. Roses smell good based on our sense of smell. We all just have different ways of experiencing these things, and then deciding what we like. Democracy, roses, spaghetti, music, etc.

You claimed you could prove it without using "I like it". Dodging proof of your claims again. Classic Ana schtick.

 

[FireDragon76]

Even without acknowledging God, "morality," by definition, can only exist in a universe that contains Natural Law.

Nope. There are lots of alternatives.

 

[Moral Orel]

He seemed to want to exclude non-behavioral preferences. He seemed to want to exclude things like (liking how vanilla tastes).

A preference for a non-behavioral thing is by definition not a preference for a moral. That in no way states that a preference for a non-behavioral thing is impossible, nor does it state that a non-behavioral preference cannot be in the premises for any moral argument you might make. In fact, I expect most moral arguments to contain them. You want to call them values, but If you tell me "I value X" then I know that you prefer X over ~X.

You're either going to have admit that he chooses prefers a life of slavery over death or you'll have to say that he prefers something you imagined. A life outside of slavery. I'll point out that he cannot prefer that which he hasn't had. It may be that a life outside slavery is harder and crueler than he knew. He's just imagining a preference...and so are you....to avoid constructing odd sentences about his preferences and morals because you refuse to recognize need.

For starters, of course you can actually prefer things you imagine. It isn't an imagined preference, it's a preference for an imagined thing. There's a difference. Just like when you said, "I can think of things that I prefer no one had to do". You haven't experienced these things being not needed, yet you still prefer them. Preferences are feelings. Your feelings are real even if they're about imagined things.

Secondly, I do admit he chooses a life of slavery over death, and he prefers a life of slavery over death. What I do not agree to is that he must call that life "good". There is no requirement that he call slavery "morally good" because he chose it over death. Preferences =/= morality. Everyone is free to have whatever additional criteria they choose when deciding whether something is "moral" or not. All (2) says is that they will necessarily insert their own preferences into the reasoning somewhere.

But we haven't even gotten into (2) at all because you keep wanting to argue that "good/bad" have no relation to "better/worse". Which is inane.

We're both on the subjective side of this.

I'm not sure what you mean by this. If you think morality is subjective, and you didn't vote for (2), then you have no clue what Moral Subjectivity is.

We can summarize his position as "I can imagine a preference that leads to a moral judgement".

Wrong. I already explained that if you say "X is good" I can deduce that you prefer X over ~X. I in no way stated that I know what reasons you put in your argument for the belief that "X is good". There are some safe bets, but I wouldn't claim to know them for a fact.

Now, I can demonstrate rationally and conclusively that any argument you have for any thing you believe "is good" will never work. You're too scared to prove your claims though. Once I show that you have no rational reason for your beliefs, it isn't much of a jump to conclude you're operating on an emotional level.

Am I arguing against 1 and 2 now?

lol You always have been! You didn't even know what you were arguing against? hahahaha

 

[Moral Orel]

I told Orel that A2 would be interesting to discuss, but I don't actually know what he thinks about ice cream (or whether he believes that the eating or tasting of ice cream is a behavior).

Wait, wait, wait... You don't know what I think about ice cream? You don't know what I think about chocolate ice cream?!! Have you read nothing that I've written, Zippy?!

 

[Ana the Ist]

His position does not stop at mere correlation, but it entails correlation. For example, note the word "because" in poll option #2. Orel thinks preferences are the reason for moral judgments.

I got that. I realized we wouldn't just be talking about the moral behavior once you two started adding presuppositions to my statements.

I told Orel that A2 would be interesting to discuss, but I don't actually know what he thinks about ice cream (or whether he believes that the eating or tasting of ice cream is a behavior).

I don't see why any of it would be interesting to discuss. Again...

I can imagine presuppositions that explain a moral statement as well.

If my preferences don't match your preferences....

What exactly is the truth value of these preferences?

In some ways this comes down to the burden of proof, but since you are offering a critique of Orel's position you are required to provide the argument against it. The only argument you have given resides in your trash example, but no one in the conversation thinks your argument works (Orel, Chriliman, and myself).

The trash example doesn't work....because there's an almost endless list of possible preferences both real and non real, optional and non optional, related to the moral behavior or not....as long as the only limit is one's imagination (and that is the only limitation I can see).

My critique is....so what? It's got zero relation to truth. Pointing out that you're capable of imagining preferences doesn't explain morality in any meaningful way. Each possible preference (even impossible ones) has the same relationship to truth.

Right, and therefore you think that it is rational to both say that murder is evil, and to have no preference as to whether or not murder generally take place. That's crazy.

Is it someone I'd like dead?

Everyone else in the conversation believes that if someone says that murder is evil then they have a preference that murder not take place.

Yeah? Is that what they're doing?

Do you think you have a mind full of moral values or preferences?

Are you going around saying "this is good...that's bad....these are ok" in your mind?

This question about correlation is, as Orel said, uncontroversial. We prefer that evil things not occur. That's inherent in the definition of 'evil'.

No offense but when you generalize the term that much...it doesn't mean anything.

We make moral judgments about behavior. Just behaviors. We can end up accidentally using morals to describe a non behavior....like "Democracy is a morally good social system"....but we don't really mean that. It's just that the word good is very broad and easily used in multiple contexts.

It could be used to describe something that functions well....a good car.

It could be used to describe something that meets certain criteria....a good survey.

Something desirable....a good price.

These are simply all too ambiguous. I can prefer a good car at a good price but still see it as immoral if I use deception to do so....right? I can see using deception as preferable to being deceived. Try making a moral statement out of that.

The point here is that this has no real ability to explain anything about morality.

Go ask a salesman if he sells more if he presents a lot of choices and the customer chooses their preference....or if he just tells them what they want.

As for a counter argument....sure, I can make one. It won't have any explanatory power either but hey....it will supercede preferences, and make morality objective. That feels rather like showing off though.

 

[Ana the Ist]

A preference for a non-behavioral thing is by definition not a preference for a moral. That in no way states that a preference for a non-behavioral thing is impossible, nor does it state that a non-behavioral preference cannot be in the premises for any moral argument you might make. In fact, I expect most moral arguments to contain them. You want to call them values, but If you tell me "I value X" then I know that you prefer X over ~X.

It's weird to me to say that liking vanilla is the same as preferring vanilla. If all you've tasted is vanilla...what do you prefer it to?

It doesn't mean that you cannot like it. You aren't choosing though.

For starters, of course you can actually prefer things you imagine.

How would you know you aren't just imagining you prefer them?

Can I prefer surfing over swimming if I've never surfed? Or do I just imagine I do?

It isn't an imagined preference, it's a preference for an imagined thing. There's a difference.

There definitely is.

Just like when you said, "I can think of things that I prefer no one had to do". You haven't experienced these things being not needed, yet you still prefer them.

No...I can use real examples there.

Preferences are feelings. Your feelings are real even if they're about imagined things.

And if you actually do them...you might realize you don't prefer them.

Secondly, I do admit he chooses a life of slavery over death, and he prefers a life of slavery over death. What I do not agree to is that he must call that life "good". There is no requirement that he call slavery "morally good" because he chose it over death.

Well it is his preference.

How would he describe slavery morally? Opposite to the preference he chooses continually?

If you say yes...there's no relationship between behavior and preferences and morals at all. To hold this together, you'll need to argue he sees slavery as morally good....it's the preference he chooses.

Preferences =/= morality. Everyone is free to have whatever additional criteria they choose when deciding whether something is "moral" or not.

This is your insertion of imaginary preferences.

But we haven't even gotten into (2) at all because you keep wanting to argue that "good/bad" have no relation to "better/worse". Which is inane.

I'm curious how you get to good and bad moral judgments of slavery in the example above. Imagination?

I'm not sure what you mean by this. If you think morality is subjective, and you didn't vote for (2), then you have no clue what Moral Subjectivity is.

The generalized concept that gets argued on here? Or did you want a big philosophy book definition?

Wrong. I already explained that if you say "X is good" I can deduce that you prefer X over ~X. I in no way stated that I know what reasons you put in your argument for the belief that "X is good". There are some safe bets, but I wouldn't claim to know them for a fact.

None of this has any strong potential for truth.

Now, I can demonstrate rationally and conclusively that any argument you have for any thing you believe "is good" will never work.

I believe that a microscope is good for seeing small things.

Go.

 

[Chriliman]

I got that. I realized we wouldn't just be talking about the moral behavior once you two started adding presuppositions to my statements.




I don't see why any of it would be interesting to discuss. Again...

I can imagine presuppositions that explain a moral statement as well.

If my preferences don't match your preferences....

What exactly is the truth value of these preferences?



The trash example doesn't work....because there's an almost endless list of possible preferences both real and non real, optional and non optional, related to the moral behavior or not....as long as the only limit is one's imagination (and that is the only limitation I can see).

My critique is....so what? It's got zero relation to truth. Pointing out that you're capable of imagining preferences doesn't explain morality in any meaningful way. Each possible preference (even impossible ones) has the same relationship to truth.



Is it someone I'd like dead?



Yeah? Is that what they're doing?

Do you think you have a mind full of moral values or preferences?

Are you going around saying "this is good...that's bad....these are ok" in your mind?



No offense but when you generalize the term that much...it doesn't mean anything.

We make moral judgments about behavior. Just behaviors. We can end up accidentally using morals to describe a non behavior....like "Democracy is a morally good social system"....but we don't really mean that. It's just that the word good is very broad and easily used in multiple contexts.

It could be used to describe something that functions well....a good car.

It could be used to describe something that meets certain criteria....a good survey.

Something desirable....a good price.

These are simply all too ambiguous. I can prefer a good car at a good price but still see it as immoral if I use deception to do so....right? I can see using deception as preferable to being deceived. Try making a moral statement out of that.

The point here is that this has no real ability to explain anything about morality.

Go ask a salesman if he sells more if he presents a lot of choices and the customer chooses their preference....or if he just tells them what they want.

As for a counter argument....sure, I can make one. It won't have any explanatory power either but hey....it will supercede preferences, and make morality objective. That feels rather like showing off though.

Your point about preferring someone dead even though you think murder is evil does show that preference can go against moral goodness. But it’s likely that before you preferred the person dead, you preferred they not make you feel negatively(bad), which is inline with moral goodness.

 

[Moral Orel]

It's weird to me to say that liking vanilla is the same as preferring vanilla. If all you've tasted is vanilla...what do you prefer it to?

If you like vanilla, then you prefer vanilla to not eating vanilla. When you choose to eat vanilla ice cream, you are choosing between eating it and not eating it.

How would you know you aren't just imagining you prefer them?

Preferences are feelings. You don't know your own feelings? You don't know what you want?

And if you actually do them...you might realize you don't prefer them.

If you do them, you might stop preferring them. Your feelings being different in the future don't make your feelings in the past stop existing. That's ridiculous.

Well it is his preference.

How would he describe slavery morally? Opposite to the preference he chooses continually?

If you say yes...there's no relationship between behavior and preferences and morals at all. To hold this together, you'll need to argue he sees slavery as morally good....it's the preference he chooses.

Better =/= good. Preferences =/= morals.

I'm curious how you get to good and bad moral judgments of slavery in the example above. Imagination?

How do I personally make moral judgements as to which behaviors are "good" or "bad"?

None of this has any strong potential for truth.

What "truth" are you looking for? If you say "X is good" then "Ana prefers X over ~X" is true.

I believe that a microscope is good for seeing small things.

Go.

You still haven't learned the difference between an argument and a claim.

Provide a formal argument for some thing that you think "is good". At least semi-formal formatting. I'm not going to sift and sort through some stream of consciousness list of reasons either.

 

[Ana the Ist]

If you like vanilla, then you prefer vanilla to not eating vanilla. When you choose to eat vanilla ice cream, you are choosing between eating it and not eating it.

And if all I have is vanilla ice cream to eat....

It's I prefer eating vanilla ice cream to dying.

Prefences are feelings.

No I don't think they are.

If you do them, you might stop preferring them.

In which case you imagined you preferred them. In reality, you never did. Regardless it must be a choice one can make. Miriam Webster doesn't have any definition for preference = feelings. It's all about choice.

Remember when I said you were conflating preferences with needs? You're also conflating them with feelings. Nobody chooses their feelings. Apparently this is just because all three things can be described as good.

Better =/= good. Preferences =/= morals.

How do I personally make moral judgements as to which behaviors are "good" or "bad"?

What "truth" are you looking for? If you say "X is good" then "Ana prefers X over ~X" is true.

You still haven't learned the difference between an argument and a claim.

What is the slave's morality on slavery? He likes slavery more than death. He sees slavery as morally....

Provide a formal argument for some thing that you think "is good". At least semi-formal formatting. I'm not going to sift and sort through some stream of consciousness list of reasons either.

I really have to break that into a formal argument for you?

Ok...

Premise- because some objects are smaller than the naked eye can see.
Conclusion-I believe a microscope is good for seeing very small things.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Your point about preferring someone dead even though you think murder is evil does show that preference can go against moral goodness.

Of course it can.

But it’s likely that before you preferred the person dead, you preferred they not make you feel negatively(bad), which is inline with moral goodness.

This is the insertion of an imagined preference. Why would you assume they make me feel bad?

 

[Ana the Ist]

How do I personally make moral judgements as to which behaviors are "good" or "bad"?

What "truth" are you looking for?

What is the relationship that you believe exists between preferences and morals?

 

[Moral Orel]

And if all I have is vanilla ice cream to eat....

It's I prefer eating vanilla ice cream to dying.

Ok.

In which case you imagined you preferred them. In reality, you never did. Regardless it must be a choice one can make. Miriam Webster doesn't have any definition for preference = feelings. It's all about choice.

Remember when I said you were conflating preferences with needs? You're also conflating them with feelings. Nobody chooses their feelings. Apparently this is just because all three things can be described as good.

I checked your source. Here is the definition for Prefer

To like better or best.

Liking something isn't a feeling?

What is the slave's morality on slavery? He likes slavery more than death. He sees slavery as morally....

I don't know. Knowing a preference is insufficient information to tell us what a person calls "moral".

I really have to break that into a formal argument for you?

Ok...

Premise- because some objects are smaller than the naked eye can see.
Conclusion-I believe a microscope is good for seeing very small things.

lol Invalid argument.

My argument is kind of technical and it requires you to understand things like validity and soundness. It is going to point out premises that your argument is missing to make it valid, and then show that you can't prove those premises, therefore you can't prove your argument is sound even when you add them.

On top of all that, you're changing the context from morality to other stuff. Which is fine, I can debunk that too. But you at least need to conclude "X is good" just like you would conclude "Murder is bad" so that the analogy still works. If you stretch the analogy too far, you're going to say "Muh, but morality is different than stuff". Whatever you think a thing is good for belongs in your premises.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Ok.

I checked your source. Here is the definition for Prefer

To like better or best.

Liking something isn't a feeling?

I like vanilla better than chocolate or strawberry ice cream. I've never tasted rocky road but I imagine it's good...maybe better than vanilla. I like chocolate and strawberry the same.

I walk into an ice cream shop and my options are between strawberry, chocolate, and rocky road.

What's my preferred ice cream?

This ought to help me understand whether you think the preference exists before choosing or after, between options or non-options, or if imaginary preferences are actual preferences.

I don't know. Knowing a preference is insufficient information to tell us what a person calls "moral".

Then why does this thread exist???

lol Invalid argument.

What's invalid about it?

Conclusion follows premise. You can stick a "therefore" at the front of the conclusion.

My argument is kind of technical and it requires you to understand things like validity and soundness. It is going to point out premises that your argument is missing to make it valid

Go ahead.

On top of all that, you're changing the context from morality to other stuff.

Like feelings and preferences?

Which is fine, I can debunk that too. But you at least need to conclude "X is good" just like you would conclude "Murder is bad" so that the analogy still works.

No.

You said anything I believe is good.

It was a dumb mistake...but you made it.

Are we finally at the point that I made originally with zippy2006 when I said that we have to narrow down the definition of good to moral behaviors and only moral behaviors??? That good as it relates to things like biological taste isn't necessarily relevant because we don't make moral statements about ice cream preference???

 

[zippy2006]

Who is taking out the trash is ambiguous, and that's fine because who is taking out the trash is also ambiguous in your phrasing:

"Taking out the trash is good"

And in Zippy's phrasing:

"You prefer that the trash be taken out."

Zippy changed tenses, and maintained the subject/object relationship you think is altered by changing tenses. You were wrong. Red herring.

I honestly haven't been following the tense discussion at all because I don't think it matters, but in my opinion the infinitive is being used in both propositions, and I intentionally matched the usage of the infinitive (with the verb "be taken"). For example, if we rephrase Ana's statement with equivalent tense, it would read, "It is good that the trash be taken out."* So I don't think there is even a change of tense (or a change regarding the subject, as you also pointed out). There is only a subtle difference in that the object is less directly an action. I have no idea what alternative formulation Ana would have preferred.

* "Be taken" is somewhat ambiguous in English between future tense and infinitive, but there is no unambiguous alternative.

 

[zippy2006]

Right, and therefore you think that it is rational to both say that murder is evil, and to have no preference as to whether or not murder generally take place.

Is it someone I'd like dead?

Your point about preferring someone dead even though you think murder is evil does show that preference can go against moral goodness. But it’s likely that before you preferred the person dead, you preferred they not make you feel negatively(bad), which is inline with moral goodness.

The most basic problem is that Ana ignored the crucial word, "generally." He immediately made it personal and moved away from murder considered in itself, or generally (as moral reasoning requires). One can wish for another's death while still preferring that murder not take place generally (because it is evil).

 

[Ana the Ist]

The most basic problem is that Ana ignored the crucial word, "generally."

That's because you implied there are exceptions.

At which point it becomes entirely conditional.

Which explains my reply.

He immediately made it personal and moved away from murder considered in itself, or generally (as moral reasoning requires).

Golly....zippy....are you starting to agree that my original point about positionality is both important and correct? That most moral judgments and arguments and claims are made from position 3?

 

[Ana the Ist]

I honestly haven't been following the tense discussion at all because I don't think it matters, but in my opinion the infinitive is being used in both propositions, and I intentionally matched the usage of the infinitive (with the verb "be taken"). For example, if we rephrase Ana's statement with equivalent tense, it would read, "It is good that the trash be taken out."* So I don't think there is even a change of tense (or a change regarding the subject, as you also pointed out). There is only a subtle difference in that the object is less directly an action. I have no idea what alternative formulation Ana would have preferred.

* "Be taken" is somewhat ambiguous in English between future tense and infinitive, but there is no unambiguous alternative.

You're right zippy...I understood it was a statement of my tolerance for trash, not about a moral behavior. It's like saying "vanilla is good"...it's not a moral statement or claim.

As you said, should be rejected outright.

Verb tense only came up afterwards when Orel claimed I misunderstood the statement.

 

[zippy2006]

You're right zippy...I understood it was a statement of my tolerance for trash, not about a moral behavior. It's like saying "vanilla is good"...it's not a moral statement or claim.

Already addressed here:

...Note, though, that this whole topic of verb tenses is just another of Ana's sophistic red herrings. On your theory there is no need for moral judgments and preferences to be isomorphic, or to have identical objects. Preferences generally don't relate to behavior in the exact same way that moral judgments do, and that's just fine. Earlier in the conversation I alluded this fact at various points: ...

---------------

...it's not a moral statement or claim.

This topic was already addressed in detail in another thread, beginning with <this post>.