Well when are you going to do that?
Just as soon as he pins down his position.
I disagree with Orel's position, but I honestly haven't seen you present a critique of his position that sticks. What is this argument that you believe devastates his theory?
Yeah go back and read... we never got that far. I suspect that he doesn't want to.
That's what you did before you accused him of conflating necessity with preference,
We can agree that a need isn't a preference can't we?
and it is what led up to that accusation. As I already noted, "Orel's responses to that claim are conclusive..."
I don't recall what this is in response to.
These are invalid inferences. When a slave chooses to try to escape at the risk of death, he does not "therefore prefer slavery to freedom or death." That makes no sense. The truth is the opposite of what you say. He prefers freedom or death to slavery.
Freedom isn't an option...he'll die if he tries to escape. I thought that was clear. Those are his choices.
Are you saying he has no moral choice? If he can't have what he prefers....you can't think of any reason why one choice or the other could be a moral good?
Let's consider your equivocation between <preferring that something that needs to be done, be done> and <preferring that something need not be done>.
Again, this is about morals arising from need. What he prefers isn't relevant.
If the slavery example is too dramatic....how about this?
I hate taking out the trash and prefer when someone else does it.
I see taking out the trash as morally good behavior.
Are you saying that I can't possibly make both of those statements honestly?
Now your rejoinder is apparently, "But I would prefer that the slave never need to escape slavery. I would prefer that slavery never exist at all." As Orel already noted, this new preference is irrelevant to the question. Orel said that preferences attend moral judgments, and we already saw that a preference attends the moral judgment regarding escaping slavery. The separate preferences of "Preferring that slavery exist," or "Preferring that a person be faced with the prospect of escaping slavery," do not need to be present in order for Orel's theory to stand.
No offense, but I don't see how you can possibly get to a moral position with a non-possibility.
Can we say every cop shooting is immoral because they could have used magical pixie dust to render the subject asleep?
No we don't. Moral behavior is described as options available unless you're abstracting it to the point of deliberate vagueness.
Note, too, that your tangential preferences are also moral in nature.
Try not to presume too much. I don't know what you expect me to be honest about regarding my preferences.