Euthyphro's Dilemma (for atheists)

[Astrid]

Tell me what tense it is lol. I wouldn't even make a point of this if it wasn't so ironic after you telling me to learn to read so many times.

What tense is it? Do you know? Can you look it up?

"Weren't"

 

[Ana the Ist]

You prefer that the trash was taken out.
You prefer that the trash be taken out.
You prefer that the trash will be taken out.

Thanks for making my point.

You can also have written I don't prefer that I take out the trash.
You can write it as I'd rather never touch the trash than take out the trash.
Or I'd prefer the trash pile up to the ceiling than take it out.

Tense has nothing to do with the relation between subject and object.

And what do you think the relationship is between subject and object in the three sentences you wrote? How about the three sentences I wrote?

What's the relationship between me and the trash?

Clearly it's about my tolerance for it's presence. We don't know who is taking it out. We aren't going to leave it ambiguous....and then continue on later like it's me taking out the trash.

I gave you a preference and a moral stance toward that preference. They don't agree.

There's really no semantic wordplay that you'll get me to agree to that changes the preference or the moral.

You can't change my two statements in any way without special pleading.

And if I sit here till the end of time you'll never have any explanation for why these two statements cannot both be true. Not without refuting your morals = preferences tautology.

Because obviously they can. Obviously you're feelings and morals can conflict. Duh.

Derp.

This happens all the time, in all sorts of everyday situations of little consequence and sometimes they have huge consequences and the homosexual kid at the "pray the gay away" camp kills himself. As bad as that is, I'm sure I can spend the rest of this forum pointing other examples of emotional based preferences conflicting with a moral judgement. You're wrong.

You're obviously wrong.

You're so obviously wrong it's hard to imagine that you can't see it.

 

[Ana the Ist]

"Weren't"

Were not so ironic?

 

[Astrid]

Were not so ironic?

Ifn it wasnt about the subjunctive

 

[Astrid]

Thanks for making my point.

You can also have written I don't prefer that I take out the trash.
You can write it as I'd rather never touch the trash than take out the trash.
Or I'd prefer the trash pile up to the ceiling than take it out.




And what do you think the relationship is between subject and object in the three sentences you wrote? How about the three sentences I wrote?

What's the relationship between me and the trash?

Clearly it's about my tolerance for it's presence. We don't know who is taking it out. We aren't going to leave it ambiguous....and then continue on later like it's me taking out the trash.

I gave you a preference and a moral stance toward that preference. They don't agree.

There's really no semantic wordplay that you'll get me to agree to that changes the preference or the moral.

You can't change my two statements in any way without special pleading.

And if I sit here till the end of time you'll never have any explanation for why these two statements cannot both be true. Not without refuting your morals = preferences tautology.

Because obviously they can. Obviously you're feelings and morals can conflict. Duh.

Derp.

This happens all the time, in all sorts of everyday situations of little consequence and sometimes they have huge consequences and the homosexual kid at the "pray the gay away" camp kills himself. As bad as that is, I'm sure I can spend the rest of this forum pointing other examples of emotional based preferences conflicting with a moral judgement. You're wrong.

You're obviously wrong.

You're so obviously wrong it's hard to imagine that you can't see it.

Ya gotta lotta tolerance for nonsense!

 

[zippy2006]

No. I said all I need to in order to make a statement of preference about a behavior and then a moral statement about the same behavior...

This isn't statement of preference for a behavior...

And another thing...

Three independent replies to #368? Keep meditating on that koan.

This isn't statement of preference for a behavior.

This is a statement of preference for the presence of garbage/trash.

You prefer that the trash was taken out.
You prefer that the trash be taken out.
You prefer that the trash will be taken out.

Tense has nothing to do with the relation between subject and object. Still a red herring.

Note, though, that this whole topic of verb tenses is just another of Ana's sophistic red herrings. On your theory there is no need for moral judgments and preferences to be isomorphic, or to have identical objects. Preferences generally don't relate to behavior in the exact same way that moral judgments do, and that's just fine. Earlier in the conversation I alluded this fact at various points (emphasis added):

M: "A moral claim is being made."
P: "A preference is being appealed to."

A1. M -> P
A2. P -> M
A3. M <=> P
​

If we grant A1 and A2 then A3 follows, and A3 signifies a kind of logical equivalence (similar to "="). Nevertheless, I think A1 is the most important and interesting claim. It may be better represented by the idea that morality is reducible to preferences, or that all moral claims are reducible to preference-claims.

Orel: If you make a moral claim then there is a preference underlying it.

(A preference underlies the moral claim, or the moral claim is reducible to preference-claims, or an appeal to a preference accompanies moral claims. No one, other than Ana, has claimed that preferences and moral judgments are identical, or that their objects are identical)

In my original draft of #366 I made the explicit claim that the preference can ground the moral judgment without sharing the exact same object, but I simplified that post because Ana is having so much difficulty keeping up. In any case, the general point is that, on Orel's theory, the things which ground moral judgments need not be <statements of preference for behaviors>; they need only be preferences. For example, there is no reason why my preference for short grass can't ground my behavioral judgment that my neighbor should mow his yard.

With all of this in mind, in the present case we are free to make the preference explicitly non-behavioral:

• p1: "I really dislike smelly garbage sitting in my house."
• p2: "I hate taking out the trash and prefer when someone else does it" (Ana's quote, #362)
• m1: "I see taking out the trash as morally good behavior" (Ana's quote, #362)

As <everyone knows>, p1 can ground m1 even in the presence of p2. When Ana claims that p2 is somehow decisive in precluding grounding preferences such as p1, he is <clearly wrong>. To repeat myself:

In #285 you claim that you describe some things as morally good which you do not prefer. But Orel's responses to that claim are conclusive. Preferences always attend moral judgments. (The relevant question is whether the preferences are antecedent or consequent to the moral judgment)

 

[zippy2006]

As bad as that is, I'm sure I can spend the rest of this forum pointing other examples of emotional based preferences conflicting with a moral judgement.

This is just another strawman. Nothing about Orel's position requires him to commit to the view that says we have zero preferences which are contrary to our moral judgments, or that carrying out moral acts is always easy and ideal.

You can also have written I don't prefer that I take out the trash.
You can write it as I'd rather never touch the trash than take out the trash.
Or I'd prefer the trash pile up to the ceiling than take it out.

If you actually wanted to contradict Orel's theory in the manner you are attempting, you would have to assert that there is some moral judgment with zero accompanying preferences that could be thought to ground it. For example, you might say:

• p3: "I prefer that no one ever take out any trash, anywhere"
• m1: "I see taking out the trash as morally good behavior"

Do you really want to say that? Are p3 and m1 even compatible?

When you said, "I hate taking out the trash and prefer when someone else does it," you were already making qualifications in order to preserve the truth that you prefer the trash be taken out. We could make this more clear with the statement, "I am willing to take out the trash, but I hate doing so and prefer when someone else does it."

 

[Ana the Ist]

Ifn it wasnt about the subjunctive

Thanks. I know grammar but I don't pretend to be an expert.

As far as I can tell, his verb tense was "future conditional" and the subject ambiguous.

He could have done that on purpose, or on accident, but making the subject unambiguous could be accomplished by the addition of "by subject" at the end of his sentence.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Three independent replies to #368? Keep meditating on that koan.

zippy, I promise you, I tried to limit the number of responses.

I'm trying my hardest to consider your viewpoint. Forget the special pleading for a moment. Let's just focus on preferences since you are doing so below...

Note, though, that this whole topic of verb tenses is just another of Ana's sophistic red herrings.

No...it's not. I don't know if you made the subject ambiguous because you think it helps your argument. It doesn't.

I can concede that regardless of my previous two statements....I take out the trash twice daily.

(This is all hypothetical, I don't actually discuss myself in moral arguments)

Is there some reason why all three statements cannot be true? No.

The behavior here is taking out trash....and only taking out trash. I hate this. That is my preference. I prefer not to do it.

All preferences are relational. There must be at least one other option. In this option....the choice is between taking out the trash and not taking out the trash. It's not anything else.

My moral judgment of taking out the trash? Good behavior.

My personal preference is to not take out the trash. It's the only other option, and that's the one I strongly prefer. You don't seem to understand that you aren't just simply choosing something, you're simultaneously not choosing something else.

Haven't you ever heard people complain about their vote? Haven't you heard people say they don't like the person they voted for? They simply dislike the other person less? That they prefer someone else who they couldn't vote for?

Preferences are relational.

In this case, my choice is one of only two. It doesn't matter if my actions follow my moral position or my personal preference....both statements can be true.

I don't see how you can possibly show they cannot be true....and any attempt to attribute any position I didn't take to this argument is special pleading.

On your theory there is no need for moral judgments and preferences to be isomorphic, or to have identical objects.

No. I'm saying that they need not have identical values. I can see something I don't prefer as morally good and prefer something that I see as morally bad. I'm pretty sure everyone can and frequently does. It's easier to admit when it's benign....harder to admit when significantly consequential.

Preferences generally don't relate to behavior in the exact same way that moral judgments do, and that's just fine. Earlier in the conversation I alluded this fact at various points (emphasis added):

I've got no problem agreeing with that.

(A preference underlies the moral claim,

Or it doesn't.

or the moral claim is reducible to preference-claims,

Or it isn't.

or an appeal to a preference accompanies moral claims.

Or it doesn't.

No one, other than Ana, has claimed that preferences and moral judgments are identical, or that their objects are identical)

I added three corrections above. If you can agree to those, then you understand why the survey looks goofy. There's no option for the corrections I've added to your position.

And I'm not here to teach secondary logic. It doesn't really matter if you understand the tautology here. I'm not saying preferences and morals are identical. I'm simply pointing out that they need not be related at all....and can even have opposite values on the exact same behavior.

Does that make sense to you or not?

In my original draft of #366 I made the explicit claim that the preference can ground the moral judgment without sharing the exact same object,

If it doesn't share the same behavior then why do you think they are related at all???

but I simplified that post because Ana is having so much difficulty keeping up. In any case, the general point is that, on Orel's theory, the things which ground moral judgments need not be <statements of preference for behaviors>; they need only be preferences.

Or not.

We can switch to outcomes and I can point out my preference for not dying if you like and show the many many ways that will conflict with a moral judgement.

We don't have to ground the preference in behavior at all. Take your pick. I promise this argument only gets easier for me if we make it about anything but behavior.

For example, there is no reason why my preference for short grass can't ground my behavioral judgment that my neighbor should mow his yard.

Yup. And this can directly conflict with your moral view of property ownership and how you believe everyone has a right to do what they want with what they own.

It's almost as if morals and preferences aren't really related at all. I'd say at best there's a weak correlation. My guess is that if everyone in your neighborhood but you grew their grass long....and hassled you about keeping yours short, as the only person cutting his grass, you might have a vastly different view.

In fact, I'm pretty sure of it. I doubt that is a view you'd fight to hold. It's grass after all.

With all of this in mind, in the present case we are free to make the preference explicitly non-behavioral:

• p1: "I really dislike smelly garbage sitting in my house."
• p2: "I hate taking out the trash and prefer when someone else does it" (Ana's quote, #362)
• m1: "I see taking out the trash as morally good behavior" (Ana's quote, #362)

As <everyone knows>, p1 can ground m1 even in the presence of p2.

I never made p1 and you don't get to assume it.

Remember when you just tried to cram in my tolerance for trash in a future tense statement with an ambiguous subject?

And you accused me of sophistry lol? I'm sure you thought I wouldn't notice and since p1 is the same thing I'm rejecting it outright as not a part of my argument. My tolerance for trash is unrelated.

For all you know I'm a hoarder who stacks garbage to the ceiling. This is where you are trying to cram presuppositions into my argument to square the circle. It's not just bad argumentation....it's terrible argumentation. A logic 101 professor would reject this argument immediately.

I made two statements. One about a positive moral judgement of a behavior, one of a negative personal preference for the same exact behavior. You can either admit they can both be true....or tell me why one or both cannot be true.

That's how hard your argument is.

It's not a position to defend.

When Ana claims that p2 is somehow decisive in precluding grounding preferences such as p1, he is <clearly wrong>. To repeat myself:

No...I'm simply rejecting p1 because it isn't part of my argument.

At all.

Do you see it now???

You literally have to make stuff up to keep this "theory" of morality afloat.

 

[Astrid]

Thanks. I know grammar but I don't pretend to be an expert.

As far as I can tell, his verb tense was "future conditional" and the subject ambiguous.

He could have done that on purpose, or on accident, but making the subject unambiguous could be accomplished by the addition of "by subject" at the end of his sentence.

When I left for Uni in USA Mom was very adamant
that I not pick up any bad English usage from those
Americans.

 

[zippy2006]

zippy, I promise you, I tried to limit the number of responses.

I'm trying my hardest to consider your viewpoint.

Okay, let's keep it simple. What is your argument for why Orel's theory is incorrect? Feel free to define Orel's theory according to option (2) in the poll, or according to A1 from <this post>.

The argument you've been trying is based on the idea that you prefer to not take out the garbage, and you still think it is moral to take out the garbage, but I am going to let you give the argument in your own words, lest you start with these strange claims that I am "putting words in your mouth."

No...it's not. I don't know if you made the subject ambiguous because you think it helps your argument. It doesn't.

I can concede that regardless of my previous two statements....I take out the trash twice daily.

(This is all hypothetical, I don't actually discuss myself in moral arguments)

Is there some reason why all three statements cannot be true? No.

And you seem to be assuming that if Orel is right then all three statements cannot be true. I want to hear your argument.

With all of this in mind, in the present case we are free to make the preference explicitly non-behavioral:

• p1: "I really dislike smelly garbage sitting in my house."
• p2: "I hate taking out the trash and prefer when someone else does it" (Ana's quote, #362)
• m1: "I see taking out the trash as morally good behavior" (Ana's quote, #362)

I never made p1 and you don't get to assume it.

I never said you claimed p1. You're not following. Your whole tangent with Orel was based on your claim that the preferences in our discussion must be a "statement of preference for a behavior." I explained why you are wrong and then gave p1 as an example of an "explicitly non-behavioral" preference.

 

[Ana the Ist]

This is just another strawman. Nothing about Orel's position requires him to commit to the view that says we have zero preferences which are contrary to our moral judgments, or that carrying out moral acts is always easy and ideal.

Where's that option on the survey then?

The one where preferences and morals aren't connected at all?

I only see two options.

You're telling me that you don't need to connect preferences to morals in any way for this "theory"?

Or did you just toss out an argument that has nothing to do with mine....and accuse me of strawmanning first in hopes that I don't point it out.

To be clear, you're agreeing now that a preference for a behavior and a moral judgement of the behavior can have opposite values?

If you actually wanted to contradict Orel's theory in the manner you are attempting, you would have to assert that there is some moral judgment with zero accompanying preferences that could be thought to ground it. For example, you might say:

• p3: "I prefer that no one ever take out any trash, anywhere"

That's a completely different judgment. It's not even remotely similar to the one I made.

It's disambiguated to everyone in every possible circumstance. Nobody makes moral judgements that way unless they writing religious doctrines. This was presented to atheists.

Do you want to play that game though? Fine.

Let's imagine I'm the last person alive.

Fill in that scenario with your statement above and proceed with that as my argument. I'll hold that position.

• m1: "I see taking out the trash as morally good behavior"

Do you really want to say that? Are p3 and m1 even compatible?

No. But apparently you're trying to insist a moral judgement is axiomatic. I would imagine then you'll appeal to some horrific behavior which can never be admitted approval of and claim victory.

When you said, "I hate taking out the trash and prefer when someone else does it," you were already making qualifications in order to preserve the truth that you prefer the trash be taken out.

Nope. I simply prefer that if someone is taking out the trash, it is not me.

You can't magically get around this with ambiguity about who does it. It's included in the preference statement.

We could make this more clear with the statement, "I am willing to take out the trash, but I hate doing so and prefer when someone else does it."

No....not my argument.

 

[Chriliman]

Where's that option on the survey then?

The one where preferences and morals aren't connected at all?

I only see two options.

You're telling me that you don't need to connect preferences to morals in any way for this "theory"?

Or did you just toss out an argument that has nothing to do with mine....and accuse me of strawmanning first in hopes that I don't point it out.

To be clear, you're agreeing now that a preference for a behavior and a moral judgement of the behavior can have opposite values?


That's a completely different judgment. It's not even remotely similar to the one I made.

It's disambiguated to everyone in every possible circumstance. Nobody makes moral judgements that way unless they writing religious doctrines. This was presented to atheists.

Do you want to play that game though? Fine.

Let's imagine I'm the last person alive.

Fill in that scenario with your statement above and proceed with that as my argument. I'll hold that position.


No. But apparently you're trying to insist a moral judgement is axiomatic. I would imagine then you'll appeal to some horrific behavior which can never be admitted approval of and claim victory.



Nope. I simply prefer that if someone is taking out the trash, it is not me.

You can't magically get around this with ambiguity about who does it. It's included in the preference statement.



No....not my argument.

I think we can boil it down to you prefer the trash be taken out regardless of who does it, so long as it’s not you. That’s still a preference for the trash to be taken out, if not only to remove the stench lol.

 

[zippy2006]

Where's that option on the survey then?

I don't really understand your difficulty with the word "preference" in option #1.

To be clear, you're agreeing now that a preference for a behavior and a moral judgement of the behavior can have opposite values?

What are you talking about, man? Go back and read post #366. No, actually read it this time. In that post I explained in detail why one can have conflicting desires and preferences. Heck, everything I've said to you in the last two days is premised on the idea that your contrary preference does not invalidate the moral claim (and therefore both can be true). It feels as if you're not following the conversation at all.

These strawmen you are presenting are just so absurd. Do you actually think that Orel or I hold the position that moral acts are always perfectly easy to carry out, and that there is never any internal reason we might struggle to carry out such acts? Where are you getting this stuff!?

If you actually wanted to contradict Orel's theory in the manner you are attempting, you would have to assert that there is some moral judgment with zero accompanying preferences that could be thought to ground it. For example, you might say:

• p3: "I prefer that no one ever take out any trash, anywhere"
• m1: "I see taking out the trash as morally good behavior"

Do you really want to say that? Are p3 and m1 even compatible?

That's a completely different judgment. It's not even remotely similar to the one I made.

And that's a good thing, because the preference you presented is absolutely irrelevant to the topic.

Riddle me this: If preferences have nothing to do with morals, then how could the preferences contained in p3 make the moral claim m1 impossible?

 

[Ana the Ist]

I think we can boil it down to you prefer the trash be taken out regardless of who does it, so long as it’s not you. That’s still a preference for the trash to be taken out, if not only to remove the stench lol.

Sorry....that's a different preference.

You're saying that I prefer the trash being taken out like you've never seen the house of some slob who doesn't.

I don't know why you believe that you can safely assume such things based on my statement alone.

Would it be simpler if I was the only possible person in the equation?

I'm alone in the home, i hate taking out the trash, and prefer to not do it.

I think taking out the trash is morally good.

Is that easier? Probably not, right?

You're gonna ask if I take out the trash then depending upon my answer, tell me which statement is false....and I'm going to point out that would make actions far more relevant than preferences, but since that isn't the case either, you can imagine me either taking out the trash or not....and there's still no reason why both statements can't be true.

 

[Ana the Ist]

I don't really understand your difficulty with the word "preference" in option #1.

The difficulty is it's still part of the equation in option one.

What are you talking about, man? Go back and read post #366. No, actually read it this time. In that post I explained in detail why one can have conflicting desires and preferences.

I'm not going back. You clearly haven't gone back to my statements at the point we started talking. Do you remember what I said about position?

How are you going to argue with me about position 1 when I'm occupying position 1 and 3? It's not really possible. You're lucky this is a good faith argument because frankly, I could have picked the most ridiculous behavior I can imagine and you still can't argue against it. Not like this.

I'm being extremely generous here.

Heck, everything I've said to you in the last two days is premised on the idea that your contrary preference does not invalidate the moral claim (and therefore both can be true). It feels as if you're not following the conversation at all.

If preference and moral statements about the same behavior need not correlate then what in the world are you talking about?

Are you offering up a theory with absolutely zero explanatory power?

Are you simply taking wild guesses at motives and calling them preferences that....aren't related to morals? Or are you saying they are?

What is this theory then? I'm pretty sure it's simple so write it as simply as possible. Please.

These strawmen you are presenting are just so absurd. Do you actually think that Orel or I hold the position that moral acts are always perfectly easy to carry out,

I didn't say anything about ease. It's about preference. I picked taking out the trash. It's pretty easy.

and that there is never any internal reason we might struggle to carry out such acts? Where are you getting this stuff!?

Why would you struggle to do it if you prefer it? What's the struggle there? Can't stand doing and achieving what you want? Where's the conflict?

And that's a good thing, because the preference you presented is absolutely irrelevant to the topic.

How? It's about a behavior we can make moral statements about.

Riddle me this: If preferences have nothing to do with morals, then how could the preferences contained in p3 make the moral claim m1 impossible?

Why would I make moral statements about others if they are based on my personal preferences of my behavior.

I'm saying I don't care if someone else takes out the trash. I think it's a morally good thing they did, particularly if they have children. If it's some 20yo bachelor living alone? Morally nuetral. If it's some old person taking care of a loved one? Morally good.

I can't possibly go over every single situation or possible circumstance....I'm not a moral objectivist and that wasn't required for me to answer.

I don't make morally objective assumptions about reality.

 

[Ana the Ist]

I don't really understand your difficulty with the word "preference" in option #1.



What are you talking about, man? Go back and read post #366. No, actually read it this time. In that post I explained in detail why one can have conflicting desires and preferences. Heck, everything I've said to you in the last two days is premised on the idea that your contrary preference does not invalidate the moral claim (and therefore both can be true). It feels as if you're not following the conversation at all.

These strawmen you are presenting are just so absurd. Do you actually think that Orel or I hold the position that moral acts are always perfectly easy to carry out, and that there is never any internal reason we might struggle to carry out such acts? Where are you getting this stuff!?



And that's a good thing, because the preference you presented is absolutely irrelevant to the topic.

Riddle me this: If preferences have nothing to do with morals, then how could the preferences contained in p3 make the moral claim m1 impossible?

I went back and read post #366.

That's the liar liar pants on fire defense.

It doesn't matter if I take out the trash. My preference doesn't magically change. I still hate taking out the trash.

Anything else....like my tolerance to trash and preference for a clean house....

Those are assumptions that you have to add to my position to cram it through this tautology. That's not a theory....it's just an implicit rejection of every possible explanation and the assumption of a hidden preference.

Does that make sense?

Edit- Also you haven't explained the relationship with the moral. You're literally inventing an explanation of the behavior. What's the relationship between the preference and the moral? Can we run this through with just the preference and moral on a third person who we describe as having a preference and moral position towards a behavior?

You'll fill in what part exactly? The hidden preferences?

 

[zippy2006]

Those are assumptions that you have to add to my position...

You haven't given your position, you haven't given a valid argument against Orel's, and you haven't explained what is wrong with the poll apart from the opaque assertion that "preferences have nothing to do with morals." Really, you haven't done much at all in this thread. So again I will ask:

What is your argument for why Orel's theory is incorrect? Feel free to define Orel's theory according to option (2) in the poll, or according to A1 from <this post>.

 

[Moral Orel]

Tense has nothing to do with the relation between subject and object. Still a red herring.

And...

Thanks for confirming that was a red herring all along.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Thanks for confirming that was a red herring all along.

Nope.

I pointed out he wasn't referring to the behavior in my argument.

He was referring to my tolerance for trash.

He's made the exact same appeal at least twice since then. It's not a red herring, I'm not teaching you logical fallacies or grammar. I was dead on the nose, he proved it, I can quote him if you're struggling with the reading.

And I'm definitely reevaluating your capacity for rational thinking.