I haven't followed this entire conversation, but it seems to me that you are attributing
A1 to Orel, and possibly
A2 (and therefore
A3).
M: "A moral claim is being made."
P: "A preference is being appealed to."
A1. M -> P
A2. P -> M
A3. M <=> P
If we grant
A1 and
A2 then
A3 follows, and
A3 signifies a kind of logical equivalence (similar to "="). Nevertheless, I think
A1 is the most important and interesting claim. It may be better represented by the idea that morality is reducible to preferences, or that all moral claims are reducible to preference-claims.
You more or less have it. I can't say exactly what
@Moral Orel means without him elaborating....which he isn't going to do.
There's not much there to elaborate.
He could claim morals are a subset of preferences....which might be what he's been going on about and the basis of most of his accusations towards me.
The thing is...I thought it was obvious we were only talking about preferences in regards to behavior....because moral statements are made in judgement of behavior.
We aren't talking about your favorite flavor of ice cream.
Or favorite color.
Or any of those things.
It's behavior, just behavior. This is obvious (or should be) but because I didn't state it off the bat....he's been clinging to it hoping to find some way out of his own position in the meantime.
First, I don't know why it would be impossible to rationally justify intrinsic properties, including goodness (which
@durangodawood also tried to argue in
#151 and elsewhere).
Second, (1) strictly implies that some moral judgments are not dependent on preferences. Your claim that (1) implies that there are things which are "intrinsically good" would require further premises and argumentation, as well as a definition of what intrinsic goodness is.
If it's objectively intrinsic it is so without your judgement. It's not really apparent why you would bother to make a moral statement in this scenario.
Furthermore, this is exactly why I insisted on good only being used in the context of a positive moral value. A cow is good like this? In what way? I can just as easily say a good cow is one that patiently and quietly waits it's turn to be slaughtered.
Third, I think it would be more accurate to call preferences morally arbitrary.
I see little relational value between morals and preferences. They might align....they might not. It doesn't seem to depend upon much....certainly not to each other.
Total arbitrariness would apparently be something entirely random or entirely based on whim, and it isn't altogether clear that human preferences are entirely random or entirely based on whim.
There's a different definition that applies in this context I think.
The key here is that the reason we take issue with (2) is rooted in our positive conception of morality, not merely the uncontroversial premise that 'morality is not pure arbitrariness.' Of course it is true that morality is not pure arbitrariness, but the rejection of (2) is rooted in something more than that.
I've completely abandoned my former concept of morality. I describe it phenomenologically. I have to now, that's what it appears to be.
...Of course, in
#282 I pointed out that Ana's position is also incredibly vague and noncommittal. In general it is easier to criticize other positions than to set out your own.
Yeah, that's fair. In honesty, I'd be describing a concept of morality I haven't seen before and, as far as I know, is my own. Pretty arrogant, not likely to be well received. I'd like to bounce it off someone but I don't know who or who would care to listen.
Then there's the quandary itself of explaining the basic framework (aka the necessary constituents of any moral statement) and the variables which might be important (those which can dramatically change one's moral position).
People generally don't think of how this stuff can play out long term. It's a pretty commonly disregarded question. Too many variables.
But in retrospect they could have game theorized how nukes would play out....even if we can forgive them for not understanding where antibiotics would lead. Make sense?
So the thing is....even if any of my conception is true, that describing it the way I can think of it, makes it inherently useful. I can think of many things it might help understand.
In the very same way, it could be used for one's own ends, in very cruel and disturbing ways. Horrific even.
So even though what I think I have is the basic framework (it's useful by itself) and maybe 4-5 important variables (probably not what you think) that's still not a great proposition if I am right about any of it.
I would still land on the side of subjective morality in that dynamic....but I used to imagine the problem with describing morality as a problem of infinite variation. That's not really the problem. The problem is why do we agree on anything moral at all?
If you start tangling with that...while holding onto a subjective conception...you might understand why I abandoned the conception and started from scratch.