Do we have free will?

[Washington]

Bald assertion.

In a sense, yes. But it's one I have yet to see seriously challenged. And in as much as you apparently deny it, please show me how you could freely do otherwise. What operation, other than causality determines what you do (think)? Are all your thoughts utterly random? If not, then . . . . . . . .

Anyone who would regard a completely natural event as inherently meaningful would be a fool.

Bald assertion. But seriously, ?????

 

[Chesterton]

In a sense, yes. But it's one I have yet to see seriously challenged. And in as much as you apparently deny it, please show me how you could freely do otherwise. What operation, other than causality determines what you do (think)? Are all your thoughts utterly random? If not, then . . . . . . . .

All the operational antecedents are currently in place. Yet, I can choose to read and think about your next post or not. It's that simple.

Bald assertion. But seriously, ?????

Do you think ocean waves have inherent meaning? Or galaxy collisions? Or volcanic eruptions, etc?

 

[Washington]

All the operational antecedents are currently in place. Yet, I can choose to read and think about your next post or not.

And how does this choosing occur? Is it an absolut random event or is it caused? If it was a random event then no choosing brought it into existence. If it's caused then it was determined by all the relevant events that preceded it. Your so-called "choosing" could not have been otherwise.

 

[Taure]

On the contrary, he wasn't discussing a particular understanding of free will, he was semantically dissecting the phrase 'free will' to conclude that it's meaningless

Wiccan_Child: you're still not understanding my argument. It is not solely a semantic argument, it is a conceptual one.

The concept "free will", where this phrase refers to the concept "completely con constrained or uncaused act of will" is a nonsense concept.

I'm not arguing against just the label, I'm arguing against the thing the label supposedly denotes. Not that it's false, but that it's nonsense (and thus cannot be true or false).

My response was that he was overthinking things, because it's obviously not meaningless

That you can use a term does not indicate that it is meaningful, only that the user thinks that it holds meaning. My argument is that if you think beyond the label and think about the concept that you think you're talking about, you will find that you actually cannot talk about such a concept. It is impossible to talk sensibly about an uncaused caused thing, because such a thing is nonsense. Whenever anyone says that free will exists or it does not, their statement holds the same status as a proclamation of "white blackness" existing. We have no clear idea of what white blackness is, so we cannot affirm or deny its existence, because it is nothing.

So too with free will. We have no idea what free will would mean were it true or false. We think we do in casual conversation, but philosophical analysis of the concept shows that it is nonsense, and you cannot mean nonsense.

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I don't know that it follows, that if it is conscious it has a will.

It is not consciousness -> will. It is consciousness ^ ability to perform action -> will. I take "will" to simply mean the ability to consciously and deliberately attempt to enact something. The conscious adding machine consciously and deliberately attempts to add. Whether it does so by mechanical principles or "freely" (ignoring my qualms with the phrase for the moment, to take part in this nonsense) is a different matter.

But it is not doing the adding, the adding is being done via it. (By a willful being, mind you. I mean some intelligence has to decide to drop the balls in.)

I take this to be trivial. You're just saying that the machine needs input to act. Humans need input to act too. A person in a void is incapable of action. An conscious adding machine without number input can't add (though, depending on how much consciousness you give it, maybe it can add mentally).

But why do you suppose it would incorrectly think it's doing the deciding when it's not?

#

Because from an objective view, for example the view of the engineer who build the machine, it will be known that all the adding it does does not result from the mysterious metaphysical "it" but from the mechanical principles of addition that constitute the "it", but the "it" is unaware of. It is the principles which do the addition, not the consciousness.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

All the operational antecedents are currently in place. Yet, I can choose to read and think about your next post or not. It's that simple.

You may think you could freely choose between the options, but you will only do one thing, whether you have free will or not.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Since you are so sure about us having sufficient common ground in the way we all use this term (and since I am not at all sure we have), would you be willing to do me the favour of telling me what this common ground is?

Nope .

Believe me, this is a sincere request. It would help me greatly if you´d do me the favour. Even if it turned out that what you assume to be common ground is actually not common ground between you and me, I still could manage to get an idea on what ground you´d like to discuss (and fro purposes of a meaningful discussion I would be willing to remain on this ground even though I might not call it "freewill").
IOW: I would be willing to igore semantics altogether once I get an idea what concept you would like to discuss.
Whilst in your OP you have just thrown out a term.

That's more or less the point. I don't want to turn this into a discussion about my definition of free will. Rather, your definitions. By posing the question 'do we have free will?' people will define it, and then do something with that definition.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

It's irrelevant exactly where in the body the unconscious or conscious movements originate. The question is "do they entirely originate from physical causes"? I think the question of free will is really the question "do we have a soul?" or, "is there anything beyond physical nature that can influence us?"

I tentatively agree. As you know, I believe in uncaused, but wholly natural, events, so it's not beyond the realms of possibility that, if we have free will, it's a completely natural phenomenon (and not, say, an ineffable and non-physical gift from God).

 

[Taure]

I tentatively agree. As you know, I believe in uncaused, but wholly natural, events, so it's not beyond the realms of possibility that, if we have free will, it's a completely natural phenomenon (and not, say, an ineffable and non-physical gift from God).

Yet such natural events would be random, and so it's hard to see how the random generation of decisions could be thought of as will. Which was my argument before.

If you have will, you must deliberately perform the act of will (a reflex isn't an act of will, because it is automatic), thus you must have reasons for action, which means causes and constraints.

If you have freedom, you have no causes and constraints, which means no reason for action, which means action "ex nihilo", which is random action, and thus not will.

Thus freedom of action and deliberate action are mutually exclusive (where "action" is a thin term, subject to the qualifications I said before). If you have one then you cannot have the other.

 

[tanzanos]

..........

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Wiccan_Child: you're still not understanding my argument. It is not solely a semantic argument, it is a conceptual one.

The concept "free will", where this phrase refers to the concept "completely con constrained or uncaused act of will" is a nonsense concept.

I'm not arguing against just the label, I'm arguing against the thing the label supposedly denotes. Not that it's false, but that it's nonsense (and thus cannot be true or false).

That you can use a term does not indicate that it is meaningful, only that the user thinks that it holds meaning. My argument is that if you think beyond the label and think about the concept that you think you're talking about, you will find that you actually cannot talk about such a concept. It is impossible to talk sensibly about an uncaused caused thing, because such a thing is nonsense. Whenever anyone says that free will exists or it does not, their statement holds the same status as a proclamation of "white blackness" existing. We have no clear idea of what white blackness is, so we cannot affirm or deny its existence, because it is nothing.

So too with free will. We have no idea what free will would mean were it true or false. We think we do in casual conversation, but philosophical analysis of the concept shows that it is nonsense, and you cannot mean nonsense.

If I have misunderstood your argument, I'm sorry. I still think it's semantics , but let's plough on.

You say the phrase 'free will' refers to a nonsense concept, I disagree. OK. You say 'free will' means 'the ability of an agent to act without absolutely any cause or constraints'. Though I'll assume that a car accident which 'causes' you to wilfully choose to call an ambulance (or just stop and gawk) doesn't count. What we choose to do may be heavily weighted to one option or the other, but so long as we can conciously choose the other option (even if we don't), we can say we have free will: we can (though may not) choose to act in a particular without being forced or constrained to do otherwise.

(In hindsight, this assumption may have been premature)

This paragraph from your article seems the crux of our disagreement (it's a long article, I may have missed some other bits), so I'll dismantle that.

Armed with this conception of will, we can move forwards and look at what kind of willing libertarians (and consequently determinists) speak of when they discuss freedom of will. Recall the libertarian usage of free will mentioned above. Under this lose definition, a freely willed choice was one which was not constrained by anything which was itself not a free choice made by that individual. This is a way of saying that a freely willed action is one that is uncaused, except by the individual's will. If my decision to pick the orange is caused by my taste then it is no longer my free choice: it is, as it were, my taste's choice.

The 'free' in 'free will' doesn't mean 'not statistically weighted'. There can be a reason behind what we decide to do, but that doesn't mean it's not a free choice: the 'free' means we can freely choose between the various options; even if option p is the logical, rational, and preferable choice, I could chose option q.

Thus, for the choice to be mine, there cannot be any other cause to "steal" it from me. Freedom comes to mean a lack of causality. Yet what is something uncaused? Something without a causal chain behind it is something random, and not even the randomness of a hypothetical fair die, which is governed by probability.

Randomness does not mean it's not governed by probability. The idealised roll of a dice is random, even though there are statistical rules describing its behaviour.

The random nature of a free choice would be more akin to the randomness of a spontaneously existing universe. To use the religious terminology, free choice is choice ex nihilo.

And the freedom of choice is resolved by the will: the will makes the free decision between the various options. The 'free' part implies the will is not constrained to only one option, but rather could, in principle, pick any option. That some options are preferable doesn't take away from this fact. Even if you put a gun to my head and say "eat that orange", I could freely choose to refuse and have you shoot me: that's not the preferable outcome, but I could do it.

If I had free will.

If I have understood your argument correctly (which, let's face it, is a big 'if'), you're arguing that what we will is causally determined, while a free choice is not causally determined. Thus, free will is both causally and non-causally determined, which is indeed a logical paradox. However, first, this doesn't mean the concept of 'free will' is nonsense ('free will' could simply refer to spontaneous and non-causal decisions, an exception to the regular, causally determined 'will'), and second, I disagree that 'will' is necessarily causally determined: the whole point of one's 'will' is that it's your will, your choice. If the decision is forced by something else, it's not your will.

That's enough writing for now!

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Yet such natural events would be random, and so it's hard to see how the random generation of decisions could be thought of as will. Which was my argument before.

'Uncaused' means 'random'. If will is uncaused, it is random.

If you have will, you must deliberately perform the act of will (a reflex isn't an act of will, because it is automatic), thus you must have reasons for action, which means causes and constraints.

I disagree. Rationalising your decision doesn't mean you couldn't, potentially, choose otherwise. The roll of a dice isn't random (it's determined by mechanics), but it could, potentially, be otherwise: either through internal stimuli, or external stimuli, or simply random quantum hoohah.

If you have freedom, you have no causes and constraints, which means no reason for action, which means action "ex nihilo", which is random action, and thus not will.

I disagree. If you have freedom, you can choose between the options. There may be statistical weight making some preferable, but that doesn't negate the fact that you can still pick between them.

 

[tanzanos]

..........

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Actually there is no such thing as random. We may think a sequence or occurrence is random but in actual fact many things come to play that govern the outcome. Throwing an object is governed by the laws of mechanics and physics, and thus if one had an understanding of all the parameters then one could calculate beforehand the total outcome of the objects flight and point of impact and damage caused.

Only in a deterministic universe with a complete understanding of the natural laws. It is at the very least possible that we do not live in a deterministic universe.

Probability is what governs the course of things including our minds. Randomness has nothing to do with it. Free will is also governed by the myriad of effects that eventually causes one to make a choice.

Nonetheless, spontaneity may exist. A complex system may look spontaneous but really be deterministic, but it's also possible that the system may actually be spontaneous.

Consider this: If Adam and Eve had no knowledge of evil then they should not have been punished for disobeying God! Even though he forbade them from eating the fruit of knowledge; They had no way of understanding that going contrary to God's commands was an evil thing worthy of punishment.

But they nonetheless knew that they would be punished if they ate the fruit. Moreover, it is a common misconception that the fruit imbued them with moral wisdom, and that they thus lacked a sense of right and wrong beforehand. The Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil is poorly named: the Hebrew refers to a tree that contains all knowledge, both good and evil. The OT is full of redundancies like this ("dying they will die", etc), which point its poetic and metaphorical nature.

So not only did they have a moral sense, they are still culpable even if they didn't. A lack of a sense of morality would mean they can't be held responsible for deciding on their own that eating the fruit is immoral. Since God said "Don't eat this fruit or this bad thing will happen to you", they knew what the consequences were of their actions.

 

[Texan40]

Only in a deterministic universe with a complete understanding of the natural laws. It is at the very least possible that we do not live in a deterministic universe.

There is no such thing as a non-deterministic universe. There is a clear path behind every action or incidence. A clear explanation of path from past to present. We certainly can't understand it, but it's there. Random is just a word we use because we can't see the clear determination.

 

[Taure]

'Uncaused' means 'random'. If will is uncaused, it is random.

Yes, that's what I said.

Rationalising your decision doesn't mean you couldn't, potentially, choose otherwise. The roll of a dice isn't random (it's determined by mechanics), but it could, potentially, be otherwise: either through internal stimuli, or external stimuli, or simply random quantum hoohah.

It's got nothing to do with the ability to choose otherwise. The point is that whatever you do end up choosing, you will have done so for a reason (conscious or subconscious). If there was no reason, then there was no choice, but rather the roll of a dice.

I disagree. If you have freedom, you can choose between the options. There may be statistical weight making some preferable, but that doesn't negate the fact that you can still pick between them.

Look at what you said above. That which is uncaused is random. Free will is uncaused will. Thus free will must be random. Yet if it is random, then it's not an act of choice, nor can it even be considered as originating with me.

There is no such thing as a non-deterministic universe. There is a clear path behind every action or incidence. A clear explanation of path from past to present. We certainly can't understand it, but it's there. Random is just a word we use because we can't see the clear determination.

Quantum physics says otherwise. And the "hidden variables" idea of interpreting Quantum physics has been trashed by experimental results many times.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

There is no such thing as a non-deterministic universe. There is a clear path behind every action or incidence. A clear explanation of path from past to present. We certainly can't understand it, but it's there. Random is just a word we use because we can't see the clear determination.

I disagree. Quantum mechanics shows us that true spontaneity does indeed exist in the universe: quantum tunnelling, radioactive decay, etc. These are very real phenomena which, while obey statistical rules, are truly random. Universal causality is an intuitive and naïve concept, and the universe, as far as we can tell, does not back it up. While causality exists, it is not universal to all events.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

It's got nothing to do with the ability to choose otherwise. The point is that whatever you do end up choosing, you will have done so for a reason (conscious or subconscious). If there was no reason, then there was no choice, but rather the roll of a dice.

Whether you have rationale or not doesn't change the fact that it's your choice. If you logically conclude that p is the right option, you have chosen to do p. If you decide to do p without any reason whatsoever, you've still decided to do p. That there is not reason behind your choice doesn't change the fact that it's your choice.

Look at what you said above. That which is uncaused is random. Free will is uncaused will. Thus free will must be random. Yet if it is random, then it's not an act of choice, nor can it even be considered as originating with me.

I disagree that free will is necessarily uncaused will.

Quantum physics says otherwise. And the "hidden variables" idea of interpreting Quantum physics has been trashed by experimental results many times.

Well, local hidden variable theories are incompatible with quantum mechanics. More general hidden variable theories aren't without merit, though, like you said, they don't stand up to experimentation.

 

[Chesterton]

It is not consciousness -> will. It is consciousness ^ ability to perform action -> will. I take "will" to simply mean the ability to consciously and deliberately attempt to enact something. The conscious adding machine consciously and deliberately attempts to add. Whether it does so by mechanical principles or "freely" (ignoring my qualms with the phrase for the moment, to take part in this nonsense) is a different matter.

Adding the ability to perform action doesn't help. I've already tried to show that I am conscious and can perform actions which I don't delude myself into thinking are willfull. I can digest food, I can sneeze, if I suddenly stub my toe or bump my head my hands will automatically go to the painful area to apply pressure without me "deciding" to do it.

I take this to be trivial. You're just saying that the machine needs input to act. Humans need input to act too. A person in a void is incapable of action. An conscious adding machine without number input can't add (though, depending on how much consciousness you give it, maybe it can add mentally).

I'm not just saying it needs input. I'm disputing what you say in the above paragraph, where you say "the conscious adding machine consciously and deliberately attempts to add". It does not do so any more than I consciously and deliberately attempt to digest food.

Because from an objective view, for example the view of the engineer who build the machine, it will be known that all the adding it does does not result from the mysterious metaphysical "it" but from the mechanical principles of addition that constitute the "it", but the "it" is unaware of. It is the principles which do the addition, not the consciousness.

But we're talking about the machine's view, not the engineer's. I don't attribute my actions which I know to be purely physical/chemical workings to a metphysical "it", so I see no reason to assume any other conscious being would.

 

[Chesterton]

You may think you could freely choose between the options, but you will only do one thing, whether you have free will or not.

Agreed, I'll only do one thing. But as you say, it has to be that way regardless. The limits of having to live in spacetime, I suppose.

I tentatively agree. As you know, I believe in uncaused, but wholly natural, events, so it's not beyond the realms of possibility that, if we have free will, it's a completely natural phenomenon (and not, say, an ineffable and non-physical gift from God).

Do you mean gradually evolved will, or a spontaneous quantum event happening from out of nowhere?

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Do you mean gradually evolved will, or a spontaneous quantum event happening from out of nowhere?

It could be a mixture of both. It could be that we genuinely have free will, and that it evolved for some purpose, and that peculiar quantum randomness is implemented in some very complex algorithm in the brain, and that algorithm is, effectively, 'free will'.