Causal exclusion problem

[SelfSim]

The analysis I performed is language-independent, it removes the linguistic component of the concepts at play and focuses purely on their conceptual referent. Ask 100 physicalists/naturalists what they mean and you'll get 100 different answers. But it's clear that there is a conceptual difference between physical causes and natural causes that requires a re-definition of physical to a degree that it is unrecognizable from the common sense definition of the word. I didn't engage in any philosophical speculation, I engaged in analytic philosophy which necessarily has an empirical referrent. This is purely about word-concept relationships, but it does create a lot of epistemic questions.

No comment.

 

[Fervent]

Dunno .. but you have done irreparable damage/violence by introducing heavy dollops of philosophy in a physical sciences forum, (IMO).

Who draws the lines? How do we know what is science without philosophy? And where are the boundaries?

Its sort of like starting a fight between two people in pub .. and then running away, no(?)

There are two types of philosophy, speculative philosohy and analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy is roughly speaking scientific because it deals with empirical referrents and seeks to clarify what the terms we use mean.

Groan!

 

[SelfSim]

One last question:
How many angels can dance on the head of a pin?

 

[Ana the Ist]

Sure it makes sense, especially because it reflects the sort of things I've already been saying here for years, Ana. I'm glad you are familiar enough with Philosophy to have your feet wet on these issues.

Well I'm glad someone understands what I'm saying lol. That's a very human desire isn't it? To be understood.

Of course there are paradoxes; but a mere paradox such as Russell's doesn't excuse any discernible informal errors we may make in our thinking in the everyday discourses we have with other people, and it's those everyday errors (and sometimes those political ideologies) that ruin the application of Critical Thinking that I'm more concerned with.

I had no intention of explaining what I meant had someone else asked @2PhiloVoid. It would have been a long waste of time.

Critical thinking is inherently difficult...because easy answers are easy. Pressing yourself to reconsider something that you think you understand seems a waste....and I can't count how many times I've simply set something aside for lack of any new means of consideration. I think we needed sophistry to begin to consider logic....and we needed both to create rhetoric. While most philosophers understand logic, and try hard to avoid sophistry, one might consider the successful ones are those who employed and understood rhetoric.

I consider Hegel to be the best example of a sophist logically employing rhetoric in hopes of avoiding a problem Nietszche would later try to tackle....and fail imo.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Well I'm glad someone understands what I'm saying lol. That's a very human desire isn't it? To be understood.

Oh, it very much is.

I had no intention of explaining what I meant had someone else asked @2PhiloVoid. It would have been a long waste of time.

Critical thinking is inherently difficult...because easy answers are easy. Pressing yourself to reconsider something that you think you understand seems a waste....

... in the field of hermenueutics, we call the recursive academic action the "Hermeneutic Spiral." I just call it ongoing research ................... befitting the mindset of one (such as myself) who values education as a lifetime endeavor. It's sad to know that many people don't value human knowledge in this way.

and I can't count how many times I've simply set something aside for lack of any new means of consideration. I think we needed sophistry to begin to consider logic....and we needed both to create rhetoric. While most philosophers understand logic, and try hard to avoid sophistry, one might consider the successful ones are those who employed and understood rhetoric.

I'll take the approach of Copernicus and Galileo, whether people think it's needed or not and whether I have consensus from Christians or Secularlists when doing so, or not ............thank you very much.

I consider Hegel to be the best example of a sophist logically employing rhetoric in hopes of avoiding a problem Nietszche would later try to tackle....and fail imo.

I think both Hegel and Nietszche are a pain in the ass, and folks would be wise to let loose of what they read from those kinds of views. Not that reading them isn't useful for something ...........................................

 

[Fervent]

Well I'm glad someone understands what I'm saying lol. That's a very human desire isn't it? To be understood.




I had no intention of explaining what I meant had someone else asked @2PhiloVoid. It would have been a long waste of time.

Critical thinking is inherently difficult...because easy answers are easy. Pressing yourself to reconsider something that you think you understand seems a waste....and I can't count how many times I've simply set something aside for lack of any new means of consideration. I think we needed sophistry to begin to consider logic....and we needed both to create rhetoric. While most philosophers understand logic, and try hard to avoid sophistry, one might consider the successful ones are those who employed and understood rhetoric.

Yes, critical thinking is exceedingly difficult. As God's word says, the heart is deceitful above all things. It's easy for our emotions to get the better of our thoughts and to convince ourselves that we have all the answers. If we dig long enough, I think we all would eventually admit that knowledge from impersonal first principles is beyond our grasp. The lines between science and philosophy blur at the edges, especially when we try to get at the foundational assumptions.

I consider Hegel to be the best example of a sophist logically employing rhetoric in hopes of avoiding a problem Nietszche would later try to tackle....and fail imo.

I think Qoheleth pretty much demolishes philosophy and science. The writing of books is endless.

 

[Hans Blaster]

For what is worth .. (groan) ..

I'm going to reply to this post first, because it is the closest we have come to a differentiation between physical and natural, so that my other reply can focus on the "premises and problem"

.In philosophy:
Physicalism:

manually requoted:

In philosophy, physicalism is the view that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical,[1] or that everything supervenes on the physical.[2] It is opposed to idealism, according to which the world arises from mind. Physicalism is a form of ontological monism—a "one substance" view of the nature of reality, unlike "two-substance" (mind–body dualism) or "many-substance" (pluralism) views. Both the definition of "physical" and the meaning of physicalism have been debated.

Naturalism:

again manually requoted

In philosophy, naturalism is the idea that only natural laws and forces (as opposed to supernatural ones) operate in the universe.[1] In its primary sense,[2] it is also known as ontological naturalism, metaphysical naturalism, pure naturalism, philosophical naturalism and antisupernaturalism. "Ontological" refers to ontology, the philosophical study of what exists. Philosophers often treat naturalism as equivalent to materialism, but there are important distinctions between the philosophies.

I see two definitions that are similar, but start from different places:

Naturalism breaks every thing in to "natural" and "supernatural" and excludes the latter, whether through operational naturalism (proceeding as if the alleged supernatural does not exist) or the belief naturalism (believing it does not exist). Most humans function primarily under a form of operational naturalism, science formalizes the process.

Physicalism starts from what is physically present and the forces that act upon it as can be detected and excludes all other things or actions, or at least categorizes them as physical and seeks to know what yet undetected physical things or forces exist. The intersection of "physicalism" and the methodological naturalism makes us go look for causes for effects that haven't been found. Sometimes these are with known physical entities, other times what we call "new physics". The neutrino was "invented" under the assumption that energy, momentum, and spin conservation still held in beta decays -- it was found. The Higgs field was "invented" to interact and thus give mass to certain fundamental particles -- it was found. Today searches continue for the observed effects called "dark energy" and "dark matter" under these assumptions that some new or unknown physical property is the cause.

The OP talks of mental things and I have been well aware of the supernatural notions of mind and soul, which are neither natural or physical. If we did find a "mental field" it would become physical and we could potentially create the "sci fi" technologies of mind transference/storage, telekinesis, ESP, etc. Then the mind would switch from a presumed effect of EM interactions in brains to the mental field interacting with brains/bodies, but would remain assumed to be physical under the physicalist approach.

That's enough for me .. I ain't a goin'down this rabbit hole!
None of this is a scientific viewpoint .. there are no absolutes in science .. Science makes use of inferences drawn from test results and does not commence from fixed, absolute untestable assumptions (like philosophers do).

Cheers!

 

[Hans Blaster]

If it isn't meaningful, why does the conflict go away? You assume natural and physical are one and the same, it's onto you to show what violence I have done to the closure principle or how they are the same.

It is your claim that the conflict goes away. I'm not sure what the conflict was in the original formulation even if they were different. It must have something to do with the mental, but what I cannot descern.

I did, I uncoupled 1)an empirically supported proposition and 2) a metaphysical hypothesis. Which is why this analysis is significant, because removing that metaphysical hypothesis dissolves an apparent conflict.

I'm not sure what this empirically supported position is that is now decoupled, that causation has physical/natural cause? And you've replaced metaphysical hypothesis with another (natural rather than physical causation).

You're focusing on irrelevant details. The only question is if I did violence to the causal principle by removing a metaphysical presumption.

Well then I am truly confused by your claims. The one possible interpretation I had considered, but was uncertain that might have worked was:

1. events require causes
2. mental can be a cause
3. mental is not physical

So if you make the causes of events "natural" rather than "physical" and consider the mental to be natural but non-physical, then the "natural mental" could be the sufficient "natural cause" of the first premise, where the "non-physical mental" couldn't be the sufficient "physical cause", but...

you tell the mental is an irrelevant detail, so I guess that wasn't the right "solution". (It also doesn't tell me anything about what makes mental "natural" but not "physical" or how to distinguish between these two concepts meaningfully.)

It's onto the person who claims that there is no distinction to show that physical and natural are one and the same.

And an apparent conflict dissolved, so what does that say about the hypothesis that the nature of nature is physical? If you wish to maintain that proposition it's on to you to either demonstrate how my uncoupling did violence to the causal principle or provide a definition of physical that isn't presumptive.

If you think I am making a claim about their being no difference between natural/physical then you are mistaken. I have only stated that I don't know what the distinction could be and after reading the philosophical definitions, I'm still not clear. As such the distinction you make appears to be meaningless as does your solution.

Because you are blind to your metaphysics.

Metaphysics is unavoidable, you just seem to refuse to critically inquire into yours by denying that you have any.

I like to keep the "meta" out of my physics.

 

[Fervent]

It is your claim that the conflict goes away. I'm not sure what the conflict was in the original formulation even if they were different. It must have something to do with the mental, but what I cannot descern.

It's more than just my claim, it's the logical conclusion. The semantics are no longer in conflict when we change our understanding of the closure principle. You are just hung up on your preconceived notions and refuse to recognize evidence when it is presented to you.

I'm not sure what this empirically supported position is that is now decoupled, that causation has physical/natural cause? And you've replaced metaphysical hypothesis with another (natural rather than physical causation).

Nope, I've supplied no metaphysical hypothesis. Nature being nature is a tautological fact. It is an identity, and identities can't be false.

Well then I am truly confused by your claims. The one possible interpretation I had considered, but was uncertain that might have worked was:

I make no specific claims, I removed one without replacing it.

1. events require causes
2. mental can be a cause
3. mental is not physical

So if you make the causes of events "natural" rather than "physical" and consider the mental to be natural but non-physical, then the "natural mental" could be the sufficient "natural cause" of the first premise, where the "non-physical mental" couldn't be the sufficient "physical cause", but...

Calling mental causes mental causes sufficies. You're simply trying to re-assert closure on the physical rather than accepting that the metaphysical imposition is what is getting in the way of simple explanation. Nature is nature, there's no need to name it. If you want to say that physical and natural are the same thing, you are the one who needs to give an explicit definition of physical. But doing so requires us to make elaborate theories that don't seem to stand up to scrutiny.

you tell the mental is an irrelevant detail, so I guess that wasn't the right "solution". (It also doesn't tell me anything about what makes mental "natural" but not "physical" or how to distinguish between these two concepts meaningfully.)

Mental is mental, what more detail is needed? If you want to claim that nature is physical you have to provide a testable definition of physical that fits the observations. My procedures don't depend on the definitions we use, they depend only on the interrelationships between the words we use. I am just using ordinary rules of epistemics like logical analysis and heuristics like Occam's razor. So if you want to claim that natural and physical are indistinguishable, you need to explain where my analysis goes wrong or provide the definition of what you mean by physical that it doesn't require us to develop over-elaborate theories of mind that serve only to explain it away rather than explain its function.

If you think I am making a claim about their being no difference between natural/physical then you are mistaken. I have only stated that I don't know what the distinction could be and after reading the philosophical definitions, I'm still not clear. As such the distinction you make appears to be meaningless as does your solution.

I don't know what the distinction might be either, but it seems clear that there are at least one type of cause that is best explained in terms other than our common sense understanding of physical that merges it with materialism. We either need to define physical so that it is completely unrecognizeable, or give up the physicalist hypothesis and leave nature defined in terms of itself.

I like to keep the "meta" out of my physics.

All you do when you do that is remove it from critical inquiry. The metaphysics don't go away, you just end up refusing to question them.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Where did the condition of falsifiability enter the discussion?

I'm pretty sure it was the same moment you claimed your definition to be tautological.

It's an ill-defined definition because as far as we can discover there is only one universe that has been observed.

Unless your god requires something to make universes from it seems unnecessary to limit it to one.

There are numerous existent problems, causal exclusion being one of them.

You keep saying that....

Generally the association problem is taken to be the most challenging, but there is very little by way of actual explanation of consciousness currently in science.

A cart before the horse problem.

It is one that has numerous very robust theories that attempt to explain it away. I think it's a serious challenge for any physicalist conception of reality, to the point of falsifying physicalist metaphysics.

The association problem?

Essentially, if the only causes that are natural causes are physical then mental causation(that is thoughts having causal efficacy on the body) leads to overdetermination.

It's hard to see how that becomes a problem. Show me a hard determinist who rejects all notion of compatibalism and I'll show you someone who acts as if free will exists.

The problem was articulated as an argument against supervenience and non-reductiionest physicalism(that is to say strong emergence) and is generally accepted as a serious challenge to any mind-body theory though the 'hard problem" of association tends to get more attention

All of this is based on metaphysical presuppositions. There's no reason to believe that mind is just a manifestation of a special arrangement of matter unless we presume that at base the world is physical. And that is nothing more than an unjustified assumption

Ok....there's some phenomena which you'd struggle to explain without a concept of "mind" arising from the physical development of the brain.

Babies aren't born understanding object permanence, for example. Language has a built in cut-off time....if never learned, it seems impossible to do so. Then there's the split brain experiments demonstrating spontaneous insertion of false memories for logical consistency.

The physical development of the brain seems necessary to account for these phenomena.

My ontology is best described as a neutral monism, where neither mind nor body reduce or depend on the other but both depend on a more fundamental third which integrates the two.

Well then the split brain experiments will really disappoint you.

Simply pointing out that the metaphysical presumption of materialism/physicalism leads to a conflict in our observations.

You can't touch my thoughts.

It seems that there is a real distinction between the two, which is the point of this analysis. Based on the causal exclusion problem, it seems that physical is not a sufficient word to circumscribe natural phenomenon.

I swore you weren't going to insist on some distinction there.

I agree the physical and natural are different.

In fact, I gave examples of how they are.

I don't think you understand what I have done here, because I'm not arguing anything I have simply performed semantic analysis.

You seem proud of that.

I've taken something that is accepted as a challenge for scientific theories of mind and has a robust amount of literature attempting to explain it and removed the conflict among the four propositons by examining the terms.

What would be the most current literature on the topic?

It's semantic analysis and boils down to word-concept relationships. This isn't a problem I created or made up for this exercise. So it's not me making the distinction, it's the analytic process.

Something I'm sure was necessary when phrenology was still a science.

Yes, because I am addressing a single category which is causation.

Uh huh.

I took a problem that is generally accepted as a real problem for scientific theories of mind and has a robust literature of responses and by re-arranging the terms resolved the conflict in the propositions.

Again, I didn't see any conflict.

It's semantic analysiis and nothing more, I haven't proposed any sort of alternative(though I do of course have my own ideas) I have simply proferred the suggestion that the problem lies in our terms.

Presumptions aren't problems.

I have already, I'm not going to repeat myself. If you want the full description, you can read the argument as it was suggested by Jaegwan Kim

If I do this, and don't see what your claim is there....

You're going to explain it?

Not at all, I've done nothing more than a bit of semantic analysis on a generally accepted challenge to scientific theories of mind which has a robust amount of literature trying to explain away the problem.

You mean the presumption.

A problem would belong to a different category.

The only thing I've done is examine the terms of the problem to suggest that the problem lies not in the observations but in the terms that we are using. It's all about word-concept relationships and nothing more.

I've made no metaphysical presumption, I've simply performed a semantic analysis. I've suggested a solution to a problem that is widely regarded as a genuine challenge to any scientific theory of mind second only to the association problem.

You've suggested a presumption is a problem without reason.

Certainly not, but the words that it has produced are surely a product of your mind, are they not?

I definitely did not create the English language.

Or are you suggesting that you are nothing more than a wind-up toy of mindless physical action-reaction procedures?

It doesn't seem like a relevant question....nor one of any consequence.

Did your intentions move your fingers along the keyboard, or are you simply aping conscious activity?

I honestly don't think hard enough to engage in "intention". When typing....an inner monologue gets expressed visually on the screen in almost real time.

Uh huh...so there is no mental activity involved in them?

Involved in? Their conceptualization?

They're just chemical and electrical noise with no real semantic significance?

Post conceptualization that's a way you can describe them....until expressed.

"domain of subjective reality"?

Right.

And down the road of madness you go.

Is it?

I'm certain you accept that you have your perspective and I have mine.

Not at all, I'm merely suggesting that there is an empirical case against physicalist metaphysical presumptions.

Whenever you want to make it, feel free....you have repeatedly insisted upon a semantic analysis, that's all.

I'm making no suggestion of my own for what or how reality exists

Well then this thread seems like a waste.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Not so: Detection of dark Matter particles.

From your link...

"Currently there has been no well-established claim of dark matter detection from a direct detection experiment, leading instead to strong upper limits on the mass and interaction cross section with nucleons of such dark matter particles"

It's probably less embarrassing if you read a link first.

You have no idea of what I understand.

I have an idea of what you don't.

You have presented no evidence

What would you consider evidence if you don't believe in an objective reality?

Welcome to the Mind (model) Dependent Reality (MDR) Hypothesis.
PS: More here

Uh....that links back to a previous post of yours. I think we can sufficiently say that science doesn't have any evidence of it.

Atheism and nihilism

I'll just assume I'm banned from this.

No. that notion appears to result from a tightly held belief in Realism.

Just a basic understanding of science.

There are other ways to think about reality, which often return surprising results.

Most of those ways will be wrong.

None of those ways are necessary preconditions to the scientific method.

It's increasingly unlikely that you understand what the scientific method is.

See the MDR hypothesis link above. Also see Model Dependent Realism.

Does this link to another post of yours?

'What it sounds like', usually signifies that what follows,

Is an opportunity for you to clarify. You missed it.

I should clarify by offering the following operational test one may apply, in order to distinguish 'beliefs':

Beliefs from? What are you trying to distinguish beliefs from?

'A belief is any notion held as being true out of preference, that does not follow from objective tests, and is not beholden to the rules of logic. (Objective tests followed by the application of logic rules is a necessary condition).

That's not a great definition.

See operational definition of a belief.
Science distinguishes beliefs by attempting to test them

Test them against what?

Objective reality?

Oh .. and science never tests 'the thing itself'. Science tests its models.

Tests the models against what lol? Objective reality?

 

[SelfSim]

.. Nature is nature, there's no need to name it ...

Not quite.
It appears 'Nature' has more than one meaning, with the alternate one including causes:

Nature (Philosophy):

Nature has two inter-related meanings in philosophy and natural philosophy. On the one hand, it means the set of all things which are natural, or subject to the normal working of the laws of nature. On the other hand, it means the essential properties and causes of individual things.

 

[Ana the Ist]

I concur with the notion of examining closely, how word meanings directly impact our collective understanding of 'what reality is'.

Collective understanding....

We're here discussing the necessity of objective reality and possibility of mind dependent reality....

I think we can say that no collective understanding exists.

You may find the link I posted in my previous response to @Ana the Ist of some interest(?):
Ie: Model Dependent Realism and Mind (model) Dependent Reality (MDR) Hypothesis.

You probably won't.

PS: Namely because, .. well hey .., this is a physical sciences forum where evidence/references count .. and not a philosophy forum, no(?)

Was there evidence in the post you linked?

And if so....please tell me it's not another misunderstanding of the double slit experiment?

 

[Ana the Ist]

No, what I understand makes no difference in the analytic process. You just fail to understand the procedures that I have employed which are independent of how I might define the word. This is an "objective" process.

Didn't you just claim I was beginning a descent into madness?

You're the one thinking you have some objective process.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Who draws the lines? How do we know what is science without philosophy? And where are the boundaries?

There are two types of philosophy, speculative philosohy and analytic philosophy.

Wow. Just two huh?

Analytic philosophy is roughly speaking scientific because it deals with empirical referrents and seeks to clarify what the terms we use mean.

We can clarify terms without science.

 

[SelfSim]

... If you want to claim that nature is physical you have to provide a testable definition of physical that fits the observations.

Huh?
Perceptional models, (which include tactile, visual/observation, auditory, etc inputs), once described using language and tested, inform us on what 'physical' means .. and not the other way around ..(?)

 

[Fervent]

I'm pretty sure it was the same moment you claimed your definition to be tautological.

Tautologies can't be falsified, they can only be defined. And it's not simply a claim that I am making, but how the Bible defines God in the one place He gives His "name". Ehyeh asher Ehyah. What will be will be, I am that I am. I can only work with Biblical definitions of God when considering the Biblical God.

Unless your god requires something to make universes from it seems unnecessary to limit it to one.

Our observations limit us to one, it is quite possible God has created infinite universes. But such metaphysical speculation isn't very productive and is more...well, I don't think the word for it would pass the filters so I'll leave you to fill it in.

You keep saying that....

If you don't believe me, you are free to look over a bit of the literature among theorists of mind. There are many theoretical constructs that attempt to answer the causal exclusion problem. It is only second in attention to the association problem(the so-called "hard problem")

A cart before the horse problem.

Not at all, it draws on nothing but "seemngs" or direct experience.

The association problem?

The so-called hard problem of how an individuals mind can associate with a particular body. It's the so-called "hard problem".

It's hard to see how that becomes a problem. Show me a hard determinist who rejects all notion of compatibalism and I'll show you someone who acts as if free will exists.

Yes, but these kinds of denials become necessary if physicalist metaphysics are taken consistently. The notion that free will and consciousness are illusory is taken as a serious proposition among "scientific" thinkers and it ultimately comes down to clinging tightlly to a metaphysical construct that they can't reconsider.

Ok....there's some phenomena which you'd struggle to explain without a concept of "mind" arising from the physical development of the brain.

Not really, people are only convinced as much because they have been taught not to question supervenience on the physical. There are other metaphysical constructs that untie many of the Gordian knots that consciousness creates for physicalist explanations. We don't have to tie ourselves into pretzels denying what should be plain to everyone with a mind.

Babies aren't born understanding object permanence, for example. Language has a built in cut-off time....if never learned, it seems impossible to do so. Then there's the split brain experiments demonstrating spontaneous insertion of false memories for logical consistency.

I don't really know what babies are born understanding, though we can describe their behaviors. I don't know what understanding without language means, as the whole of my understanding is limited to my ability to articulate it.

The physical development of the brain seems necessary to account for these phenomena.

I'm not suggesting the two are totally independent phenomena, just that the presumption that the mind is dependent on and fully explainable in terms of the physical structures doesn't seem warranted and seems to create conflicts that are easily solved by changiing the terms we use.

Well then the split brain experiments will really disappoint you.

Not really.

You can't touch my thoughts.

And that's a problem because? You speak your thoughts, I assume that you have them and that they provide an explanaton for your actions. I presume you aren't just a wind-up toy marching along to the beat of irrational laws.

I swore you weren't going to insist on some distinction there.

My suggestion is simply procedural, the causal exclusion problem is something drawn from debates within theories of mind. All I've done is suggested that it is the terms themselves and how they are defined that is the culprit and we don't need fanciful explanations to explain away mental phenomena as causally effective in their own right.

I agree the physical and natural are different.

In fact, I gave examples of how they are.

You are so close, yet so far.

You seem proud of that.

No pride, more baffled at how such a simple epistemic move is so readily ignored by so many who think themselves knowledgeable.

What would be the most current literature on the topic?

Doesn't really matter, all that matters here is whether I've made a procedural error.

Something I'm sure was necessary when phrenology was still a science.

Neuroscience seems to still be struggling with several problems that has created a diverse body of robust theoretical explanations that seem more attempts to explain away mental effectiveness than explain the phenomena as they present themselves.

Uh huh.




Again, I didn't see any conflict.

I didn't make the problem up, this is part of a current debate in theories of mind with multiple robust and complex theories to explain how mental phenomena are really just expressions of physical phenomena and not their own category of causal effectiveness. Mind is explained away rather than explained.

Presumptions aren't problems.

Presumptions can create problems, you're more than welcome to read the various responses to the causal exclusion problem in theories of mind but this isn't a problem I made up.

If I do this, and don't see what your claim is there....

I make no claims of my own here, though I do have a metaphysical understanding of my own. I've performed a procedural analysis and removed a hidden claim that is taken as an assumption and then defended as empirical because of its insertion into the closure principle.

You're going to explain it?

I've explained it enough in this thread already. If you don't understand the procedures I've used, that's a comprehension issue on your part. There's nothing speculative or argumentative about what I've done, just logical procedures.

You mean the presumption.

A problem would belong to a different category.

The problem is taken from literature on theories of mind, it's not a problem that I have identified on my own but is one that has a vast amount of literature trying to address it.

You've suggested a presumption is a problem without reason.

I've taken a recognized problem from the literature surrounding theories of mind and dissolved the conflict by uncoupling a metaphysical presumption from an epistemically defensible proposition. I didn't create the problem, I merely performed logical analysis on it.

I definitely did not create the English language.

The language is a repository, but what value are the thoughts that you are conveying if they do not originate within your thinking in some form or fashion? Do your arguments simply happen automatically and are actually empty of any real meaning?

It doesn't seem like a relevant question....nor one of any consequence.

It's a very relevant question, because explaining away mind destroys epistemics. If you are merely expressing computations then there is no semantic value to any of the words you use. They're just hot air. I assume you thnk the words you use hold significance, and are not just mathematical equations being solved by some kind of organic counting machine.

I honestly don't think hard enough to engage in "intention". When typing....an inner monologue gets expressed visually on the screen in almost real time.

So you're just marching along spewing out nonsense? No intention or meaning to the words you use? Your thoughts are just things that happen to you, and not something within your conscious control?

Involved in? Their conceptualization?

Answering this moves us into waters too deep for me.

Post conceptualization that's a way you can describe them....until expressed.

Come again?

Right.




Is it?

I'm certain you accept that you have your perspective and I have mine.

To an extent, but perspectives don't matter to the procedures I've implemented. If I am in error, then identify the procedural error I made. If not, we must consider the epistemic and metaphysical implications of the logical resolution to such a problem.

Whenever you want to make it, feel free....you have repeatedly insisted upon a semantic analysis, that's all.

Yes, I am standing on a logical procedure that presents an empirical case against notions of supervenience upon the physical. Because none of the people looking to dispute it have addressed the procedures and instead are clinging to presumptions that the procedure exposes.

Well then this thread seems like a waste.

Depends on how it's looked at, because it seems to me that it's gotten a fair bit of mileage.

 

[Fervent]

Huh?
Perceptional models, (which include tactile, visual/observation, auditory, etc inputs), once described using language and tested, inform us on what 'physical' means .. and not the other way around ..(?)

So "physical" is just a meaningless catch-all? What purpose does it serve, then?

 

[Ana the Ist]

One last question:
How many angels can dance on the head of a pin?

I dunno.

Can you science up an answer and if not....what makes science more useful than an explanation that does?

Oh, it very much is.

... in the field of hermenueutics, we call the recursive academic action the "Hermeneutic Spiral." I just call it ongoing research ................... befitting the mindset of one (such as myself) who values education as a lifetime endeavor. It's sad to know that many people don't value human knowledge in this way.

Truth is a ugly road....it's indifferent to our concerns....and it's acceptance doesn't lead to happiness or acclaim.

I'll take the approach of Copernicus and Galileo, whether people think it's needed or not and whether I have consensus from Christians or Secularlists when doing so, or not ............thank you very much.

Ok.

I think both Hegel and Nietszche are a pain in the ass, and folks would be wise to let loose of what they read from those kinds of views. Not that reading them isn't useful for something ...........................................

Hegel, I think, didn't want to trouble himself with the nasty conclusions of Nietszche would grapple with.

It's more than just my claim, it's the logical conclusion. The semantics are no longer in conflict when we change our understanding of the closure principle. You are just hung up on your preconceived notions and refuse to recognize evidence when it is presented to you.

Nope, I've supplied no metaphysical hypothesis. Nature being nature is a tautological fact. It is an identity, and identities can't be false.

Oh ok...now I'm starting to see where this gobbledegook comes from.

Of course identities can be false.

Calling mental causes mental causes sufficies. You're simply trying to re-assert closure on the physical rather than accepting that the metaphysical imposition is what is getting in the way of simple explanation.

This is a gambit at a group created reality. Unfortunately, it doesn't appear possible.

There's simply no way of knowing your perception is in any way similar to mine.

Nature is nature, there's no need to name it.

Says the guy who named it twice.

Mental is mental, what more detail is needed? If you want to claim that nature is physical you have to provide a testable definition of physical that fits the observations.

I did that....you didn't like it for some reason.

I think I understand what the reason is.

My procedures don't depend on the definitions we use, they depend only on the interrelationships between the words we use.

The words we use have a purpose....to communicate.

To communicate.....they must share meaning. I must understand what you mean by a certain word....you must understand what I mean. If we don't....communication fails.

So when I say "woman" you understand what I mean.....right?

 

[Fervent]

Wow. Just two huh?

Yes, just two. The two can be subdivided, but all philosophy can be categorized into one of those two groups or some blending of the two.

We can clarify terms without science.

This is an interesting statement. Can we clarify terms without connecting them to their external referrent? And what and who decides what qualifies as science and what doesn't? Who has the final say so?