It seems to me if we aren't committed to physicalism, the causal exclusion problem beomes a non-issue if we separate the ontological assumption that nature is physical from the causal closure principle. The causal exclusion problem states that we have good reason to believe four propositions:
Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient physical cause at t
Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective
Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.
No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause
Any 3 of these can be taken together, but when we add the 4th an inconsistency occurs. Now, there are various solutions but most attempt to preserve physicaliism because to give it up would be to give up closure which would be bad for science for what should be obvious reasons. But if we remove the metaphysical presupposition that nature is fundamentally physical from closure so that physicalism stands on its own, the problem seems to dissolve until we add physicalism back into the mix. What I mean by this is if instead of defining closure on the phyical, we define it on the natural and then leave the natural without specification there is no inconsistency. In other words:
Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient natural cause at t
Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective
Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.
No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause
All four of these can be true with no inconsistency. So do we have enough evidence for non-physical causes yet, or do we still want to insist that the natural iis physical?
It seems to me if we aren't committed to physicalism, the causal exclusion problem beomes a non-issue if we separate the ontological assumption that nature is physical from the causal closure principle. The causal exclusion problem states that we have good reason to believe four propositions:
Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient physical cause at t
Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective
Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.
No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause
Any 3 of these can be taken together, but when we add the 4th an inconsistency occurs. Now, there are various solutions but most attempt to preserve physicaliism because to give it up would be to give up closure which would be bad for science for what should be obvious reasons. But if we remove the metaphysical presupposition that nature is fundamentally physical from closure so that physicalism stands on its own, the problem seems to dissolve until we add physicalism back into the mix. What I mean by this is if instead of defining closure on the phyical, we define it on the natural and then leave the natural without specification there is no inconsistency. In other words:
Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient natural cause at t
Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective
Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.
No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause
All four of these can be true with no inconsistency. So do we have enough evidence for non-physical causes yet, or do we still want to insist that the natural iis physical?
The direction of cause and effect was brought into question for quantum objects more than a decade ago, but new calculations may offer a way to restore it
www.newscientist.com
...For more than a decade, physicists have been grappling with the idea of indefinite causal order –instances where it is impossible to tell whether cause came before effect or vice versa, because the two scenarios are in a quantum superposition where both and neither are true at the same time. Strikingly, a
2017 experiment showed that a particle of light can pass through two gates such that it is impossible to tell which it went through first. This further established indefinite causal order as an
unavoidable oddity of quantum theory.
“Causality is central to how we explain how things work. We observe things around us and want to ask, ‘Why does that happen?’,” says
V. Vilasini at the National Institute for Research in Digital Science and Technology in France.
To investigate causality further, she and
Renato Renner at ETH Zürich in Switzerland were informed by two foundational theories. The first is
quantum information theory, in which cause and effect are connected by the flow of information. The second is Albert Einstein’s theory of special relativity, which suggests all causal influence must be slower than
the speed of light.
This second constraint describes the space-time we live in and bakes into its structure a clear notion of before and after. Experiments that feature indefinite causality happen in that same space-time, yet seem to contradict this structure, says
Christina Giarmatzi at Macquarie University in Australia...
...
Arrighi says that staking a definite position on the plausibility of indefinite casual order in any particular experiment may come down to how a researcher interprets quantum theory itself. For Giarmatzi, the issue may only be resolved with more experiments.
However, Arrighi says that the two theorems invite examinations of how relativity and quantum theory can combine. Specifically, the work doesn’t explore what could happen if space-time itself were quantum. This opens the tantalising possibility that within a fully fledged
theory of quantum gravity – which physicists have been seeking for decades – causality could once again be in peril.