Causal exclusion problem

[2PhiloVoid]

It was just an example of a philosophical position that can be changed by simply adding or taking away things and/or redefining terms. It can be done with any philosophical position like you seem to be doing here. It's literally nothing but semantics. Which is why I find philosophy, while interesting, kind of pointless.

Actually, people need to start realizing that "Philosophy" is the application of 4 or 5 distinct, but still interdependent fields. One of those fields is claimed by atheist nearly everywhere to be of absolute value. Being that this is the case, I so often wonder why atheists eschew "philosophy" when, at every waking moment, at least one field of philosophy is what they're always engaged in: i.e. LOGIC.

Yes, LOGIC is part and parcel of the overall discipline of Philosophy, and being that Philosophy is a multifaceted, interdisciplinary discipline, resulting ultimately not in speculation but in the application of analysis, I'd think people would wake up to this fact.

 

[Fervent]

You changed one word to a near synonym in a set of premises that were not that promising. I don't see anything "solved" here.

If they're synonyms, why does the inconsistency go away?

Those aren't "premises" they're experiential appearances. Again, I didn't invent the causal exclusion problem. It's a discrepancy in observations. Changing the word resolves the conflict. The question is, why?

 

[Fervent]

It seems to me that whether reality is 'fundamentally' physical or not is totally irrelevant. It's just that modelling it as such produces a highly accurate representation of reality's behavior, with no demonstrable need to invoke anything outside of that physical model.

You might as well invoke pixies... but why?

Why are so many more willng to deny the reality of their mind than accept that nature and physical nature are not the same thing?

 

[Hans Blaster]

If they're synonyms, why does the inconsistency go away?

Those aren't "premises" they're experiential appearances. Again, I didn't invent the causal exclusion problem. It's a discrepancy in observations. Changing the word resolves the conflict. The question is, why?

All that is physical is natural. What of natural is not physical?

 

[Fervent]

All that is physical is natural. What of natural is not physical?

You pretend to know what nature is. But what is your reason for thinking it is physical? Just an unjustified assumption. Why do you stop asking questions before you get to the bottom?

 

[Hans Blaster]

You pretend to know what nature is. But what is your reason for thinking it is physical? Just an unjustified assumption. Why do you stop asking questions before you get to the bottom?

I don't know of any scientific distinction between "natural" and "physical". You seem to think there is one, so what is it?

 

[Fervent]

I don't know of any scientific distinction between "natural" and "physical". You seem to think there is one, so what is it?

Ah yes, circular reasoning. Sorted, I suppose.

 

[Hans Blaster]

Ah yes, circular reasoning. Sorted, I suppose.

No, I'm asking you to define what about "physical" is not "natural" or vice versa in you interpretation of things. It does not carry in any understanding I have ever had.

 

[Fervent]

No, I'm asking you to define what about "physical" is not "natural" or vice versa in you interpretation of things. It does not carry in any understanding I have ever had.

It's a synthetic proposition. If by physical you mean the exact same thing as natural, then what are you trying to distinguish by your specification? Why not leave natural defined tautologically? What are you afraid of?

 

[Hans Blaster]

It's a synthetic proposition. If by physical you mean the exact same thing as natural, then what are you trying to distinguish by your specification? Why not leave natural defined tautologically? What are you afraid of?

I'm not afraid of anything. I'm just trying to figure out if there is anything to your "substitution". You seem to think there is some major difference in your "problem" that changes when one rather than the other is used. The issue is not what *I* think the difference between "physical" and "natural" is but what you do. Otherwise your whole thread is meaningless.

 

[Gregory Thompson]

It seems to me if we aren't committed to physicalism, the causal exclusion problem beomes a non-issue if we separate the ontological assumption that nature is physical from the causal closure principle. The causal exclusion problem states that we have good reason to believe four propositions:

Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient physical cause at t
Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective
Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.
No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause

Any 3 of these can be taken together, but when we add the 4th an inconsistency occurs. Now, there are various solutions but most attempt to preserve physicaliism because to give it up would be to give up closure which would be bad for science for what should be obvious reasons. But if we remove the metaphysical presupposition that nature is fundamentally physical from closure so that physicalism stands on its own, the problem seems to dissolve until we add physicalism back into the mix. What I mean by this is if instead of defining closure on the phyical, we define it on the natural and then leave the natural without specification there is no inconsistency. In other words:
Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient natural cause at t
Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective
Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.
No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause

All four of these can be true with no inconsistency. So do we have enough evidence for non-physical causes yet, or do we still want to insist that the natural iis physical?

However, what is psychological is generated from the physical body.

Proving paranormal leaves spiritual in an argument of silence.

 

[Fervent]

I'm not afraid of anything. I'm just trying to figure out if there is anything to your "substitution". You seem to think there is some major difference in your "problem" that changes when one rather than the other is used. The issue is not what *I* think the difference between "physical" and "natural" is but what you do. Otherwise your whole thread is meaningless.

Isn't it though? Why use two different words if they mean the same thing? What is the word "physical" supposed to add to our understanding? And if it isn't adding anything, why do you need it?

 

[Hans Blaster]

Isn't it though? Why use two different words if they mean the same thing? What is the word "physical" supposed to add to our understanding? And if it isn't adding anything, why do you need it?

So why did you use two different words in your OP? What do you think is "different" about them?

 

[partinobodycular]

FYI, epistemological solipsist -------->

Why are so many more willng to deny the reality of their mind than accept that nature and physical nature are not the same thing?

Because building a physical model of reality from the ground up is so gosh darn much easier than building a mental one. It explains who I am and where I came from, unlike a mental construct alone, which from the very git go is simply left with... What am I, and where did I come from?

So the mental needs the physical in order to exist... if not for it's very being, then at least to give context to the concept of 'I Am'... but it's not readily apparent that the opposite is true, that the physical needs the mental. Thus the most likely scenario is that the mental is simply an emergent property of the physical. That's not necessarily true, but as a working theory, and until evidence suggests otherwise, it's the one to go with.

In the end, it doesn't really matter unless it's somehow going to make a difference somewhere other than on internet forums.

 

[Fervent]

FYI, epistemological solipsist -------->



Because building a physical model of reality from the ground up is so gosh darn much easier than building a mental one. It explains who I am and where I came from, unlike a mental construct alone, which from the very git go is simply left with... What am I, and where did I come from?

The ground up? What makes you think you know what the ground is? How do you know what's at bottom to build upon?

So the mental needs the physical in order to exist... if not for it's very being, then at least to give context to the concept of 'I Am'... but it's not readily apparent that the opposite is true, that the physical needs the mental. Thus the most likely scenario is that the mental is simply an emergent property of the physical. That's not necessarily true, but as a working theory, and until evidence suggests otherwise, it's the one to go with.

Does it? How do you know this? How do you know that the physical is what's underneath it all? Seems to me you just stop before you get to the bottom. As long as nobody asks the question, there is no problem.

In the end, it doesn't really matter unless it's somehow going to make a difference somewhere other than on internet forums.

I suppose. But its seems rather unreasonable to me to try to explain away the existence of mind by pretending to know what nature consists of. Why not admit you just don't know? Why do you pretend you have a reason?

 

[partinobodycular]

The ground up? What makes you think you know what the ground is? How do you know what's at bottom to build upon?

Did you not see 'epistemological solipsist'? The ground, to the best of my ability to ascertain it, is... 'cogito ergo sum'.

If you have a better option, please enlighten me.

Seems to me you just stop before you get to the bottom.

Then please do tell, what is your definition of "the bottom"?

 

[Fervent]

Did you not see 'epistemological solipsist'? The ground, to the best of my ability to ascertain it, is... 'cogito ergo sum'.

That's not the ground. The ground is A=A, the ground is the God Am.

If you have a better option, please enlighten me.

My guess is you'd demand I "prove" my faith if I did.

Then please do tell, what is your definition of "the bottom"?

That which exists by virtue of its own existence. Being. I am that I am. God. The one thing that cannot possibly be false.

 

[Hans Blaster]

That's not the ground. The ground is A=A, the ground is the God Am.

My guess is you'd demand I "prove" my faith if I did.

That which exists by virtue of its own existence. Being. I am that I am. God. The one thing that cannot possibly be false.

Your religion is irrelevant to the question. The question is on the nature of "physical" versus "natural". Differentiate between the two in a fashion that gives even a scintilla of value to your "solution" to the "exclusion problem" as stated in the OP.

 

[partinobodycular]

Does it? How do you know this? How do you know that the physical is what's underneath it all?

I don't.. I simply know that it's underneath me. I can't even form the concept of 'I think' without a context in which to define what 'I think' means. Therefore my existence presupposes a 'physical' reality. Even if that reality isn't actually physical.

Now if you want to argue for something that underpins the physical, then be my guest, but it ain't me, because I can't be the cause of something that I can't exist without.

Therefore if you want to propose a God, then be my guest, but you're gonna have to give me a darn good reason.

 

[partinobodycular]

That which exists by virtue of its own existence. Being. I am that I am. God. The one thing that cannot possibly be false.

So you're proposing a Trinity?