Causal exclusion problem

[Fervent]

You and I seem to have different definitions of what empirical evidence is.

Evidence drawn from experience, what else does "empirical" mean?

 

[The IbanezerScrooge]

Evidence drawn from experience, what else does "empirical" mean?

Observation and experience rather than pure logic or philosophy. What has been observed or experienced rather than just thought about that you have come to this conclusion? You haven't presented it here. You've just stated it philosophically.

 

[Fervent]

Observation and experience rather than pure logic or philosophy. What has been observed or experienced rather than just thought about that you have come to this conclusion? You haven't presented it here. You've just stated it philosophically.

Do you not observe your intentional actions? Do you not observe that you are an integrated whole? This isn't "pure logic or philosophy". This is logical analysis of empirically secure propositions to find the problem term that was creating an inconsistency. Separating causal closure dissolved the contradictory observations.

 

[Fervent]

Observation and experience rather than pure logic or philosophy. What has been observed or experienced rather than just thought about that you have come to this conclusion? You haven't presented it here. You've just stated it philosophically.

Perhaps if I make the issue explicit?

Empirically secure proposition: Causal closure of the natural world
Metaphysical hypothetical: Natural causes are physical causes
Empirically secure proposition: Mental action is causally effective
Empirically secure propositon: Mental is not physical, physical is not mental. They're different ontologies.
Empirically secure proposition: Causes are not overdetermined.

Well, gee...I wonder where the problem is?

 

[Hans Blaster]

Evidence drawn from experience, what else does "empirical" mean?

That sounds an awful lot like "anec-data".

 

[Fervent]

That sounds an awful lot like "anec-data".

It doesn't matter what it sounds like. Empirical means drawn from experience, it's the definition of the word. But this isn't a question about the data, it's about hidden premises snuck into the closure principle. Atheist's aren't skeptics, though. They settle for the world and then refuse to dig any deeper. You've made an unjustified assumption. Why'd you stop there?

 

[Hans Blaster]

It doesn't matter what it sounds like. Empirical means drawn from experience, it's the definition of the word.

The experience of measuring it.

But this isn't a question about the data, it's about hidden premises snuck into the closure principle. Atheist's aren't skeptics, though. They settle for the world and then refuse to dig any deeper.

Who said this has anything to do with "atheism"? Not I.

You've made an unjustified assumption. Why'd you stop there?

This is the science section. We should really stick the scientific usage.

 

[Fervent]

The experience of measuring it.

Oh? What's special about measurement? Why should that be more trustworthy than base experience?

Who said this has anything to do with "atheism"? Not I.

It's a simple inference. Otherwise why would you resist a simple solution to a conflict in observations? If all we have to do is stop calling our closure principle physical and switch to calling it natural, why is that a problem? What makes the change objectionable? If the problem is a metaphysical hypothesis about the nature of reality that forces us to twist ourselves into pretzels with fanciful theories to avoid accepting the simple solution that it seems like the mental is causally effective is because it is why keep that metaphysical hypothesis? What's the problem with my proposed solution?

This is the science section. We should really stick the scientific usage.

 

[The IbanezerScrooge]

Perhaps if I make the issue explicit?

Empirically secure proposition: Causal closure of the natural world

I have no issue with this.

Metaphysical hypothetical: Natural causes are physical causes

No issue with the statement. I question the category you've given it: "Metaphysical Hypothesis". It's just an observation, but whatever.

Empirically secure proposition: Mental action is causally effective

You need to define "Mental Action". What does that mean? How is it defined? How is it demonstrated and\or measured? And, no, "I saw a person walk, therefore he mentally caused his muscles to move, ergo mental causation" does not cut it. Show me what's going on in the body. What's the mechanism?

Empirically secure propositon: Mental is not physical, physical is not mental. They're different ontologies.

I reject this outright without hard evidence demonstrating it. I don't think the different ontologies are justified. We're not talking about mental "objects" versus physical objects. We're talking about causes. Show me that "mental action" can exist independent of physical causation.

Empirically secure proposition: Causes are not overdetermined.

This one is questionable to me, but I'll just set it aside.

Well, gee...I wonder where the problem is?

Just restating what you've already stated doesn't support what you've stated. If this is the drain we're going to circle then I'm not really interested in continuing the conversation.

Stating something doesn't demonstrate that it's valid either. SHOW ME.

 

[Fervent]

No issue with the statement. I question the category you've given it: "Metaphysical Hypothesis". It's just an observation, but whatever.

I've given it that category because it's not an observation, it's a hypothesis about what the fundamental nature of reality is. It's an imposed understanding. And it seems to be creating problems in our understanding of consciousness.

 

[Fervent]

Why is it not sufficient to just accept natural as natural and go no further? What is specifying that it is physical supposed to be adding to our understanding of the closure principle that preserving it is more important than solving a problem with our understanding of conscious experience?

 

[Hans Blaster]

Oh? What's special about measurement? Why should that be more trustworthy than base experience?

The "mind" is not reliable.

It's a simple inference.

It isn't. "Atheism" is the non-belief in gods, it is not a commitment to the non-existence of the supernatural.

Otherwise why would you resist a simple solution to a conflict in observations? If all we have to do is stop calling our closure principle physical and switch to calling it natural, why is that a problem?

Is there really a difference between the physical and the natural?

What makes the change objectionable? If the problem is a metaphysical hypothesis about the nature of reality that forces us to twist ourselves into pretzels with fanciful theories to avoid accepting the simple solution that it seems like the mental is causally effective is because it is why keep that metaphysical hypothesis? What's the problem with my proposed solution?

Reality exist, why twist oneself in pretzel with philosophical noodling?

 

[Fervent]

The "mind" is not reliable.

Then how do we justify doing science? What's our epistemic foundation?

It isn't. "Atheism" is the non-belief in gods, it is not a commitment to the non-existence of the supernatural.

The issue isn't natural vs supernatural. The question is, why resist giving up physiicalist metaphysics? What's the motivation? What harm is done to science by changing our terminology in such a simple fashion?

Is there really a difference between the physical and the natural?

There seems to be, because calling the closure princple physical causes a conflict in our phenomenal observations that calling it natural dissolves. So why don't we just restate causal closure on the natural and accept whatever natural causes we find?

Reality exist, why twist oneself in pretzel with philosophical noodling?

I agree we shouldn't, which is why I suggested this solution to the causal exclusion problem. It simplifies our explanations, but it means we need to discard physicalist notions of science.

 

[Hans Blaster]

Then how do we justify doing science? What's our epistemic foundation?

Is this solipsism?

The issue isn't natural vs supernatural. The question is, why resist giving up physiicalist metaphysics? What's the motivation? What harm is done to science by changing our terminology in such a simple fashion?

There seems to be, because calling the closure princple physical causes a conflict in our phenomenal observations that calling it natural dissolves. So why don't we just restate causal closure on the natural and accept whatever natural causes we find?

Sounds like word games to me.

I agree we shouldn't, which is why I suggested this solution to the causal exclusion problem. It simplifies our explanations, but it means we need to discard physicalist notions of science.

This "problem" seemed based on poor premises.

 

[Fervent]

Is this solipsism?

Nope, It's a simple question. If our mental experiences are unreliable then what is our epistemic foundation?

Sounds like word games to me.

It's not.

This "problem" seemed based on poor premises.

What premises? This isn't a problem that I invented. And the propositions aren't controversial. The only thing I did was uncouple physicalism from the closure principle and the issue dissolved. I demonstrated the issue is with the metaphysical conception of science, I didn't invent the issue.

 

[Hans Blaster]

It seems to me if we aren't committed to physicalism, the causal exclusion problem beomes a non-issue if we separate the ontological assumption that nature is physical from the causal closure principle. The causal exclusion problem states that we have good reason to believe four propositions:

Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient physical cause at t

Seems reasonable.

Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective

Have you met people? There is a lot of ineffective mental faculties out there.

Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.

There is a lack of evidence for this claim. I rarely (if ever) do any mental activity without my

No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause

sure, whatever. Nothing profound here.

Any 3 of these can be taken together, but when we add the 4th an inconsistency occurs. Now, there are various solutions but most attempt to preserve physicaliism because to give it up would be to give up closure which would be bad for science for what should be obvious reasons. But if we remove the metaphysical presupposition that nature is fundamentally physical from closure so that physicalism stands on its own, the problem seems to dissolve until we add physicalism back into the mix. What I mean by this is if instead of defining closure on the phyical, we define it on the natural and then leave the natural without specification there is no inconsistency. In other words:
Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient natural cause at t
Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective
Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.
No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause

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All four of these can be true with no inconsistency. So do we have enough evidence for non-physical causes yet, or do we still want to insist that the natural iis physical?

Like most scientists, I have no idea what a "non-physical cause" is. Sounds made up.

 

[Fervent]

Seems reasonable.

Have you met people? There is a lot of ineffective mental faculties out there.

There is a lack of evidence for this claim. I rarely (if ever) do any mental activity without my

sure, whatever. Nothing profound here.

[the-office-same-picture.png]

Like most scientists, I have no idea what a "non-physical cause" is. Sounds made up.

Mental causes in this case, but who knows what else will crop up. It's rather amusing to me how poor your understanding of these issues are since you are objecting to things that are broadly accepted. These aren't propositions that I came up with, this is a known problem in the studies of mind-body relations that has created a lot of very convoluted theories of mind as physical. The only thing I did was remove an assumption of physicalism from the propositions, not propose the issue to start with. I solved the problem, not created it.

Do you have a problem with my solution?

 

[partinobodycular]

Only if we presume that reality is fundamentally physical.

It seems to me that whether reality is 'fundamentally' physical or not is totally irrelevant. It's just that modelling it as such produces a highly accurate representation of reality's behavior, with no demonstrable need to invoke anything outside of that physical model.

You might as well invoke pixies... but why?

 

[Aaron112]

money, deception, pride, bribery ... ... ... ?

why?

 

[Hans Blaster]

Mental causes in this case, but who knows what else will crop up. It's rather amusing to me how poor your understanding of these issues are since you are objecting to things that are broadly accepted. These aren't propositions that I came up with, this is a known problem in the studies of mind-body relations that has created a lot of very convoluted theories of mind as physical. The only thing I did was remove an assumption of physicalism from the propositions, not propose the issue to start with. I solved the problem, not created it.

Do you have a problem with my solution?

You changed one word to a near synonym in a set of premises that were not that promising. I don't see anything "solved" here.