Are there multiple versions of Determinism?

[zippy2006]

Oh dear, I can't help myself. Besides, it's always fun to cherry-pick posts that weren't addressed to you.

Where I disagree with the determinist is that we cannot change our perception of the good. I think we can, but it is often more of process that just deciding to do differently. What has to change is my perception (both cognitive and affective) of what is good.

Good to know.

I don't see free-will, as we often talk about it, as some great boon. It is a malfunction of a creature that was created to be reasonable and free; instead we are foolish and bound.

I tend to think that free-will is the ground of merit rather than something meritorious in itself, but I do think it is good and not a malfunction. I grant that it is hard to describe what exactly free-will is, but it is some sort of potential for self-creation and, in the sphere of the external world, creatio ex materia. For a variety of reasons I think atheists more successfully critique the coherence of free-will than believers, in part because they do not believe in a free God.

Apparently you think that if the "malfunction" of free will were removed we would simply be blessed, living in a kind of paradise. I tend to think that we would either be automata or else constant riders on a rollercoaster constructed entirely by someone else.

Further, the theological difficulty of the "malfunction" claim is the idea that God created something with a malfunction, be it Adam, Satan, or whomever.

I have no experience of having ever done otherwise.

I certainly hope you're not surprised by this fact!

Of course the claim that we could have done something different than we did is not an empirical claim or even a logically provable claim. It is more of an intuition and axiom of practical life.

Maybe I should come out and say, I reject the notion that free will obtains, if and only if, I could have done otherwise. I have no experience of having ever done otherwise. I have only done what I have done. And, for the most part, I have done what I wanted. That is the experience of freedom with which I am familiar.

What does it mean to say that I could have done otherwise? It means that given the exact same set of circumstances, I could have made a different decision. The determinist will include one's thoughts and inclinations in that "same set of circumstances." The indeterminist will not, and say those set of circumstances do not include thoughts and inclinations. Honestly, I find the whole premise uninteresting.

I will say, like the determinist, in conisdering such a scenario of doing otherwise, I include one's thoughts and inclinations in that "same set of circumstances." I include them because they are integral, causal factors in the process that terminates in moral acts. And, once we include them, then I have no idea why I would choose otherwise. I must have some reason for choosing otherwise, but once we start adding changes, changes that will affect the process, then we no longer have the same set of circumstances. Even so, I find that particular approach to free will uninteresting, because even if I could have done otherwise, it doesn't mean I did what was good.

I think the starting point for this has to be the commonsensical intuition that if someone was responsible for their act then they must have been capable of not-doing it. That's why we punish humans but not computers. Secondly, the key distinction is apparently whether it was in our power to change any event that occurred in the entire chain of events. So if you believe that "we are able to change our perception of the good," even by a millionth of a percentage point, then we are capable of changing some causal factor. As you rightly point out, this would contradict determinism. If that perceptual change can be counted as a decision, then so be it. If that perceptual change must only be counted as a causal condition that eventually leads up to a decision, so be it. Either way determinism is out.

 

[Jok]

Oh dear, I can't help myself. Besides, it's always fun to cherry-pick posts that weren't addressed to you.

Hey no need to apologize at all. I mean it’s pretty clear that public hermit is the bad guy in this thread and as the saying goes the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men (Zippy) to do nothing. I guess it’s also clear that I’m trying to become the self appointed comic relief in this thread lol.

 

[Jok]

I will just insert an appropriate story here that touches on this thread, something from about 5 hours ago. So I just found myself in a situation that I have been in before 1000 times in my life. At the store the person in line in front of me was at the counter/register, and something happened that sparked a desire in me to make a funny comment.

Now this is a pretty good example for this thread because it has a very high level of consistency throughout my life of being almost perfectly a 50/50 decision in me on whether or not I make the funny comment or not to the stranger. It very consistently sparks the same internal inclinations inside of me. Meaning that usually it doesn’t matter if the person in line is a man or a woman, or if they are older or younger, I usually will simply feel like I could capitalize in making a funny comment (and that is my only incentive). However, opposing the urge to make a funny comment is my disposition of not being inclined to talk to strangers (yet I am not the most shy person in the world either). So I have these two opposing forces, I am LESS likely to talk to strangers than the average person, yet I am MORE likely to want to make a joke if I feel like there is a good opening for it. What this has tended to result in in my life is about a 50% chance that I will make the funny comment to the stranger in line (for the record tonight I did not make the comment, but it was on the tip of my tongue).

More information about my disposition, about 80% of the time that this situation arrises I would say that my internal inclinations are exactly the same, I simply want the credit of making a funny comment. But about 20% of the time there will be a different internal feeling attached to the situation due to certain circumstances such as - for whatever the reason I sense that it’s a girl that will feel awkward that I would be hitting on her, or the person just looks very annoyed, or the person is extremely young, or the person is extremely old, etc. HOWEVER, even in these more rare cases I’d probably still say that I’m at about a 50/50 chance to make the comment anyway. I only point out the difference in the 80% and 20% situations to illustrate that I CAN tell the difference in situations where my internal inclinations differ from other internal inclinations.

So perhaps some might be thinking that my inclinations and the percentage of times that I make the comment to the stranger fall perfectly in line with each other; perhaps you might be thinking that I have inclinations that pull me towards being introverted and not making the comment to a stranger, and I have inclinations that pull me towards being extroverted for the attention of making a funny comment...and therefore my 50% ratio would make total sense! Yes that does make sense IN REALITY, but I’m sorry it does NOT make sense for determinism!

Determinism would say that my inclinations simply are what they are, and one inclination is more powerful than another inclination and I will flow in the direction of the more powerful inclination every single time! There may be opposing influences on the flow of the Mississippi River, but the flow of the river will ultimately honor the dominant inclinations of the currents. There is no 50/50 toss up if a north east current is more powerful than a south west current, the river won’t fluctuate back & forth between north east and south west, it will simply honor the more powerful inclination and it will flow north east.

Likewise I simply have a stronger desire to either make funny comments, or I have a stronger desire to embrace being introverted. So why does my desire to be funny and my desire to be more introverted not have a clear deterministic winner like that of the river? Why would I fluctuate back & forth? That seems very non-deterministic, it seems more like I’m making choices.

 

[Jok]

First let's just delineate two definitions of freedom:

Freedom1: "Freedom From" - freedom from some form of restraint, including the restraint of determinism.

Freedom2: "Freedom For" - freedom for some activity or excellence, including moral or holy habits or actions.​

Yes, I was referring to the idea that desires have an absolute priority within the human being such that reasons are reducible to desires. On this view rationality is just a sort of secondary symptom of desire. Thus the ultimate answer for why a human being acts has to do with their desires rather than their reason.



Right: you think they should work in conjunction in order to bring about freedom2 in the subject. Now there is a principle of the moral life that if some act does not flow from the person, then they can't be held responsible for it. Thus if the movement towards freedom2 is to be meritorious (sorry Protestants ) then it must flow from the meriting person. This is the way that I see determinism entering into the discussion, for apparently on determinism merit is impossible. (We can explore that last idea if you like...) In any case, the relation of freedom2 to determinism isn't clear to me. Freedom1 understood in the libertarian sense properly contradicts determinism whereas freedom2 does not. Freedom2 is compatible with determinism.



True, and yet the vital question is How does the perceived good drive the human person? It seems to me that it could drive them according to determinism or according to freedom1. Certainly freedom2 could be present in either case.



I agree that in one sense it doesn't matter, but I wouldn't want to call that choice a non-moral decision. How would you define morality in order to make such a decision non-moral? Apparently you might say that morality only deals with things that matter, and the only decisions that matter are the ones that include a bad option. ..or something?

Now I agree that if two things are perceived to be equally good then the chooser would apparently be as happy (or as unhappy) with either of them, and be indecisive, but I wouldn't go on to infer those other things about moral significance, etc. That view seems to me to measure goodness relatively to badness and create some form of Manicheanism.



Looking at the quote you were responding to, which was an attempt to use your own premise to deny freedom1, are you agreeing that freedom1 must be denied? You here speak of choice and freedom2, but I'm not sure if you agree or disagree with what I said before. For reference, here is what I said:

It seems that if we cannot choose what appears to be good to us, then we are bound in the means by which we seek a hoped-for end. That is, we are bound to one way. This is because each step in the means to achieving that end will appear good to us, and at each step we cannot choose that something else appear good to us.
​

(In the antecedent to that first conditional I used your own words, which are a bit confusing but actually vaguely mean "If we cannot choose that something else appear good to us, then...")



Sure, you have freedom2.



As I've noted in other contexts, I'm not sure why acting according to desire would produce responsibility. If doing what you want makes you responsible (and free) then my dog and my goldfish are both responsible and free.



(Note that my comment about "moral significance" applies to various pieces of your post, but I don't want to be redundant in giving it again. )



Yes, the entity which is incapable of acting for the specified ends does not have freedom2. One contradictory of freedom2 would be sin.



Here again you are talking about freedom2 when I think the determinism conversation is about freedom1. I think I noted this same point above, but doesn't the ability to grow or not grow in freedom2 presuppose freedom1? That is, if freedom2 is a meritorious quality then freedom1 must be at play in the person who merits it.

Regarding this last point, we may not have sufficient time to explore whether a necessitated act can be meritorious or reflective of freedom1, but it seems like that question is lurking in the depths.



For Thomas it is sufficient that intellectual apprehension embraces good universally for it to possess freedom1. It's not about whether something is ontologically good, but rather whether the intellect can see and consider various different things under the aspect of goodness--whether it can embrace goodness universally.



I agree with your conclusions about freedom2, but I mostly want to talk about freedom1.



I am using freedom in a very libertarian sense. Correcting a mistaken will would be evidence of such freedom(1), but the intentional act of further corrupting a mistaken will would also be evidence of a free act. That is, double-downing on calling evil good. Unfree creatures can't do the first, but they also can't do the second. For example, Satan's fall required freedom. If Satan's fall was not a free act then he cannot be held responsible for his crime. It did not flow from him. In this case the contradictory of a free act--of freedom1--seems to be coercion or necessitation, and apparently Calvin was comfortable with both, as we've touched on in a different conversation.



I believe his point is that such dispositions are not determinative of the intellect in the way that our ultimate end of happiness is. The intellect is not subordinate to such dispositions in the same way it is subordinate to the desire for happiness.



Yes, and before the Fall the lower passions would always obey rational judgment, which is the more important point as far as freedom1 is concerned. This is because freedom1 is based on our intellect.



I don't think it is always subject either (nor does Thomas). But it can be and it sometimes is, even after the Fall, which opens the door to freedom1.



Sure, I agree freedom2 is not freedom to miss the mark. But freedom1 includes that ability.

This was great stuff to think about, at first I had to go read more about freedom1 & freedom2 because I wasn’t seeing the difference between them as clearly as I wanted to. It definitely helps to have this distinction in mind. It’s extremely difficult to look at the world and not see tons & tons of people all over the place failing miserably at attaining freedom2. But determinism seems to imply that “Subjective” freedom2 (people following their wants of their perceived good) is a given in life.

If determinism says that many are fooled and they just think that they are seeking their greatest good, but really their wants have them tricked instead towards their “bads”, it still wouldn’t add up that tons of people THINK that they drastically missed the good in their lives and they are miserable because of it! According to determinism there should instead be tons of people who are living in the mud pit yet they are happy because they THINK that the mud pit is really the good. Right? Am I looking at that right?

 

[zippy2006]

This was great stuff to think about, at first I had to go read more about freedom1 & freedom2 because I wasn’t seeing the difference between them as clearly as I wanted to. It definitely helps to have this distinction in mind.

Thanks, I find that distinction helpful too. Freedom1 is basically the ability to choose and freedom2 is basically virtue. Freedom2 requires some conception of the good life, some goal considered to be good, whereas freedom1 does not.

It’s extremely difficult to look at the world and not see tons & tons of people all over the place failing miserably at attaining freedom2. But determinism seems to imply that “Subjective” freedom2 (people following their wants of their perceived good) is a given in life.

If determinism says that many are fooled and they just think that they are seeking their greatest good, but really their wants have them tricked instead towards their “bads”, it still wouldn’t add up that tons of people THINK that they drastically missed the good in their lives and they are miserable because of it! According to determinism there should instead be tons of people who are living in the mud pit yet they are happy because they THINK that the mud pit is really the good. Right? Am I looking at that right?

I'm not sure determinism has moral implications of that sort. What it basically means is that everything about us is out of our control. That could result in any of the consequences you note here, but it could also result in opposite consequences, such as the idea that people believe they are living in a mud pit and yet have a very good life. In any case, whenever I say things like this about determinism I feel as if I am committing the stolen concept fallacy. For example, when we talk about mud pits and happiness we are inevitably alluding to premises about how things ought to be, about what would make us happy, etc. Yet oughtness and counterfactuals are simply illusory on determinism, so the strict determinist probably wouldn't talk that way.

 

[Jok]

Freedom1 is basically the ability to choose and freedom2 is basically virtue.

At first glance freedom2 could definitely not look like an obvious version of freedom, but after thinking about it it makes a lot of sense.

I'm not sure determinism has moral implications of that sort.

I wasn’t thinking of morals as much as thinking of personal failure vs personal success. For each individual person attaining Freedom2 = The Good (subjectively for them). So like I was saying before I see the term “Want” as being trapped by it’s own definition. To do what I know is the good approves determinism because I wanted the good (Freedom2 is what I accomplished). However to reject Freedom2 is to do what I know is NOT the good, but determinism still claims the victory by saying that in the immediate moment you “Wanted” to reject your Freedom2. They have given themselves a no lose situation lol. So I was trying to say that tons & tons of people living in shame & regret over (recognized) failures of their Freedom2 seems off, a lot of people seem extremely under determined (even if they are evil, and they know they’re evil but they don’t care, they are just miserable because of their failed evil Freedom2.

 

[zippy2006]

I wasn’t thinking of morals as much as thinking of personal failure vs personal success. For each individual person attaining Freedom2 = The Good (subjectively for them). So like I was saying before I see the term “Want” as being trapped by it’s own definition. To do what I know is the good approves determinism because I wanted the good (Freedom2 is what I accomplished). However to reject Freedom2 is to do what I know is NOT the good, but determinism still claims the victory by saying that in the immediate moment you “Wanted” to reject your Freedom2. They have given themselves a no lose situation lol. So I was trying to say that tons & tons of people living in shame & regret over (recognized) failures of their Freedom2 seems off, a lot of people seem extremely under determined (even if they are evil, and they know they’re evil but they don’t care, they are just miserable because of their failed evil Freedom2.

First I would say that there is no intrinsic relation between determinism and freedom2. Freedom2 could be deterministic or not, at least on a basic level. Second, the psychological approach to determinism (i.e. "We always choose according to our greatest inclination") is really just one form of determinism. Nevertheless, I see what you are saying.

Regarding your point, I definitely agree with you that the psychological determinist has a no-lose situation, that they have basically defined action as the direct consequence of one's greatest inclination. The position is unfalsifiable.

At the same time, there are also unfalsifiable aspects of the free will approach.

 

[Jok]

First I would say that there is no intrinsic relation between determinism and freedom2.

Yeah this is where I started from. That no matter what you do, think, feel, or believe it doesn’t matter, it just has to do with not being in control of any of it.

the psychological approach to determinism (i.e. "We always choose according to our greatest inclination") is really just one form of determinism.

I must have gotten myself too tunnel visioned towards this one version as the thread went on!

At the same time, there are also unfalsifiable aspects of the free will approach.

These are such fun brain teasers!