Are there multiple versions of Determinism?

[zippy2006]

Yes, I suppose that is one way to put it --that the will is just a way to denote the dispositions. But it is also the vehemence of decision, which plays into further decisions. But as you said, that doesn't add to your formula.

I'm not sure what a big deterministic machine is without any discrete parts. Discrete meaning, having no relation to or at least dependence on antecedent causes? I.e. "little first causes"? Any machine is made of disparate parts, each having their purpose as part of the machine. Each may be discrete from others, perhaps, but not discrete from the machine, as I take the thought. True the machine is not the part, and that may be what you meant.

That's a good point. I was basically wondering if theological determinism reduces to Occasionalism, or if materialistic determinism reduces to reductionism. If so, then to call something a baseball or a giraffe is just to give a name to an arbitrary designation of atoms, a collection that has no true reality qua collection.

By the way, I would like to use your post there on another forum, with or without attribution as you might prefer.

Feel free. You can cite my username if you like.

 

[zippy2006]

For me, the phenomenology of human wanting shows why the usual notion of human freedom is suspect. Sure, I can choose x, but will I? Nope. Why not? Reasons.

I was recently discussing this with Morel Orel. There are two premises I take issue with: 1) Wants are absolutely ontologically prior to reason/reasons, and 2) Reasoning is an essentially passive process.

If wants are always prior and reasoning is passive, then we are surely determined via a psychological argument, but I agree with Thomas that this is not the case. Reasoning is (also) an active process that involves freedom, and it has the ability to alter our desires in a way denies their absolute ontological priority.

Let me give a very simple example to try to illustrate. I go to the cafeteria for lunch and there are two options: hamburger or salad. I have a desire for savory, juicy meat, and I also have a desire for a healthy lunch. Reasoning now comes into play, and I can judge according to either rational aspect (flavor or health). Once the free act of reasoning terminates in a decision, that decision is seen as good/desirable because it is reasonable. Reason is capable of guiding, directing, and even overriding desire. It doesn't always do this, but it has the capacity.

Now the natural retort is to claim that reason is passive and is merely taking cues from desire, which is ontologically prior. But why think that reason is passive? Our experience tells us that our immediate desires are basically passive, but it also tells us that reason is not. This is an example of Jok's distinction between first and second-level evidence. The premise that reason is passive is often asserted, but it is not proved, and it contradicts our everyday experience.

 

[public hermit]

There are two premises I take issue with: 1) Wants are absolutely ontologically prior to reason/reasons, and 2) Reasoning is an essentially passive process.

I am going to take issue with these two premises, as well. 1) I wouldn't say wants/desires are absolutely ontologically prior to reason/reasons. 2) If you mean reasoning is essentially a passive process in regards to wants/desires, then I also disagree.

I would say, the reasoning process is passive in regards to what appears good. This is why I say, if we always chose what was truly good in any given situation, it would be clear that freedom of the will-as commonly understood in these discussion-is an illusion.

I think we should eliminate arbitrariness from our choices, to clarify. If we have two options, both of which are comparably good in all the relevant respects, then the choice is arbitrary. What responsibility do I have in choosing between two goods that are on equal, on par? None. It's random, it's a matter of taste, it doesn't matter. Freedom/responsibility comes into play in regards to choices that have to do with what is good (or not).

I would say, the reasoning process is passive in terms of the telos of the good. We can reason about the good, but we cannot simply choose to decide what is good. We are subject to appearances, whether the appearance actually tracks the truly good or not.

Reasoning is (also) an active process that involves freedom, and it has the ability to alter our desires in a way denies their absolute ontological priority.

We can reason towards a hoped for good in different ways, and are not bound to one way or another. If that is what you mean by freedom, then I agree. But, we cannot choose what appears good to us. i.e. that which I want. In a perfect world, one in which we always reasoned well to the greatest available good in any given situation, we would always chose that good, every single time. There would be no freedom to choose otherwise. But, as things stand, we have competing desires, flawed cognitive abilities, and other factors that affect what appears good to us. If we alter our desires, it can be because of reasoning or not, but it is because the appearance of the good has changed. We will lie to ourselves, and believe the lie, in order get what we want. Whether I believe the truth or the lie, I am going with what appears good at that moment.

Once the free act of reasoning terminates in a decision, that decision is seen as good/desirable because it is reasonable.

I disagree. It might terminate in what is reasonable, or it might not. That my reasoning process has ended, that is true. That it terminated in what was reasonable or not is another thing altogether. Simply having the capacity doesn't explain the movement of the will. Seeking the apparent good (what I want) does explain the movement, every time.

I think from an Aristotelian point of view, the telos is a determining factor. Or, at least, that is how it is supposed to function. In a perfect world we would never veer from the good we seek. But, we do and that failure to choose the good is exactly why we think we have freedom.

Why wouldn't Thomas see the intellect as passive in terms of the good? We passively receive the phantasm (passive intellect). The active intellect is extracting the essence of the perception. If the will always followed the dicates of reason it would always choose the perceived good, which if abstracted from the phantasm correctly would always be the actual good. Right, or no? So, what is going wrong when we don't choose what is good? Is it the intellect or the will? I don't know.

I guess what I am saying is this supposed freedom is actually a dysfunction of the intellect or the will. If the mechanism is not functioning properly, then can we really say it is free, in the truest sense of the word?

 

[zippy2006]

I am going to take issue with these two premises, as well. 1) I wouldn't say wants/desires are absolutely ontologically prior to reason/reasons. 2) If you mean reasoning is essentially a passive process in regards to wants/desires, then I also disagree.

I would say, the reasoning process is passive in regards to what appears good. This is why I say, if we always chose what was truly good in any given situation, it would be clear that freedom of the will-as commonly understood in these discussion-is an illusion.

Then it seems to me that you hold to (1). By (1) I mean that our desires are given and cannot be controlled (by reason or anything else we do). These desires terminate in action via various passive processes, including reason. That is, the acting agent plays no (active) role in transforming the desires into actions. My primary distinction is between agent/patient, active/passive, acting upon/acted upon. If (1) and (2) are true, then the human being is apparently not an agent at all in the real sense, for their actions are simply the consequences of past or logically antecedent events (see this post).

Some of this depends on whether you hold (2), which you focused on.

I think we should eliminate arbitrariness from our choices, to clarify. If we have two options, both of which are comparably good in all the relevant respects, then the choice is arbitrary.

I would want a more precise definition here. Am I choosing between two dyed eggs which are perceptually identical? Or am I choosing between celibacy and marriage when I think they are both equally good?

I would say, the reasoning process is passive in terms of the telos of the good. We can reason about the good, but we cannot simply choose to decide what is good. We are subject to appearances, whether the appearance actually tracks the truly good or not.

Okay.

We can reason towards a hoped for good in different ways, and are not bound to one way or another. If that is what you mean by freedom, then I agree. But, we cannot choose what appears good to us. i.e. that which I want.

It seems that if we cannot choose what appears to be good to us, then we are bound in the means by which we seek a hoped-for end. That is, we are bound to one way. This is because each step in the means to achieving that end will appear good to us, and at each step we cannot choose that something else appear good to us.

In a perfect world, one in which we always reasoned well to the greatest available good in any given situation, we would always chose that good, every single time.

Thomas disagreed with Leibniz that there is a perfect world, or that there is a path of "greatest available good," and I agree with Thomas. I don't find good to be quantitative or measurable in that way. This means that I don't think every situation has an objectively perfect decision.

There would be no freedom to choose otherwise. But, as things stand, we have competing desires, flawed cognitive abilities, and other factors that affect what appears good to us.

But does that mean that you are grounding freedom in arbitrariness and ignorance? For according to your understanding competing desires would only terminate in freedom in the case of equal desires and arbitrary choice. If they are unequal we will always choose the greater. It's similarly hard to see how flawed cognitive abilities themselves cater to freedom.

If we alter our desires, it can be because of reasoning or not, but it is because the appearance of the good has changed. We will lie to ourselves, and believe the lie, in order get what we want. Whether I believe the truth or the lie, I am going with what appears good at that moment.

First, is actively altering our desires necessary for freedom? Second, if so, then how does one actively alter their desires? Is such a thing possible on your view?

I disagree. It might terminate in what is reasonable, or it might not. That my reasoning process has ended, that is true. That it terminated in what was reasonable or not is another thing altogether. Simply having the capacity doesn't explain the movement of the will. Seeking the apparent good (what I want) does explain the movement, every time.

Well, the reasonableness I was talking about derives from the fact that it was reasoned to. I was not talking about objective reasonableness. I could have clarified that.

I think from an Aristotelian point of view, the telos is a determining factor. Or, at least, that is how it is supposed to function. In a perfect world we would never veer from the good we seek. But, we do and that failure to choose the good is exactly why we think we have freedom.

But for Thomas the good we seek is not one, nor would it be one in a perfect world:

Furthermore, that being is free which is not tied down to any one definite course. But the appetite of an intellectual substance is not under compulsion to pursue any one definite good, for it follows intellectual apprehension, which embraces good universally. Therefore the appetite of an intelligent substance is free, since it tends toward all good in general. (Shorter Summa, #76)​

Why wouldn't Thomas see the intellect as passive in terms of the good? We passively receive the phantasm (passive intellect). The active intellect is extracting the essence of the perception. If the will always followed the dictates of reason it would always choose the perceived good, which if abstracted from the phantasm correctly would always be the actual good. Right, or no? So, what is going wrong when we don't choose what is good? Is it the intellect or the will? I don't know.

I would say that understanding the essence of some substance and deliberating about a course of action are two different things, but I don't know that I will be able to answer this question very well. It is fun how you tried to deny (1) at the start of this post and now you're basically accepting it.

We may as well quote your objection in Thomas' Summa. It is similar to Morel Orel's objection:

Objection 5. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as each one is, such does the end seem to him." But it is not in our power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some particular end, and therefore we are not free in so doing.

Reply to Objection 5. Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual part, or in the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual part, he naturally desires his last end, which is happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not subject to free-will, as is clear from what we have said above (I:82:2). But on the part of the body and its powers man may be such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual part, since it is not the act of a corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him, because from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said (I:81:3. Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will.

The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant to free-will.
​

"But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason," hence (1) is denied. It is not reason that is subject to inclinations, but inclinations that are subject to reason. More precisely, reason is capable of this act even if in some individuals it rarely occurs.

I guess what I am saying is this supposed freedom is actually a dysfunction of the intellect or the will. If the mechanism is not functioning properly, then can we really say it is free, in the truest sense of the word?

No, I don't think so, and I noted this above. I don't think freedom is the result of a dysfunction.

 

[Jok]

Just enjoying the exchange for now, I feel like I need to read posts several times and then think about them for awhile. However this was a big curveball for me now;

God can see the free choices we make at each moment--past, present and future--from his divine eternity. It's not that he sees them ahead of time via deterministic prediction, but rather that since the future is not future to God, who is timeless, he is simply able to observe, in his eternal present, how we will freely choose to act in the future.

I haven’t even been giving much thought about how God being outside of time would affect this entire topic. This might actually be a huge factor! I so far have only been aware of the existence of arguments over the nature of time, but I never got into any of that yet. Do you think that the argument about what time is (with God existing outside of it) belongs alongside of the determinism/free will argument?

 

[Jok]

I like your thinking and writing. Do you mind if I quote you elsewhere (on a different site altogether)? Can do with or without attribution, according to your preference.

Hello. Is the different site also a Christian forum or is it something different? Do you like it just as much as this one, are there pros & cons if you compare them? This forum has way more traffic than any other ones that I’ve seen. Thanks

 

[public hermit]

Then it seems to me that you hold to (1). By (1) I mean that our desires are given and cannot be controlled (by reason or anything else we do). These desires terminate in action via various passive processes, including reason. That is, the acting agent plays no (active) role in transforming the desires into actions.

Maybe, I'm not understanding (1). "Wants are absolutely ontologically prior to reason/reasons" I would not say that desire is ontologically prior to reason, if you mean in order of being. These are faculties of a substantial entity. So, I took what you meant more in terms of "order of operation." In sense of order of operation, I would not say either reason or will are necessarily prior to the other. I would say, ideally, they should work in conjunction so that which is good, that which is perceived as good is good, and that which is wanted are all the same thing. That is the ideal. But the causal factor here is the perceived good. So, even if we say, as Thomas does, will is subject to reason, the driving factor is the perceived good (whether it actually it is good or not).

I hear Thomas saying the will is subject to reason, by design. I am not opposed to that. But, we know reason can be trumped by will if what we want is not truly good. What accounts for that? Some perceived good that overrides the deliverances of what is reasonable.

I would want a more precise definition here. Am I choosing between two dyed eggs which are perceptually identical? Or am I choosing between celibacy and marriage when I think they are both equally good?

If you are choosing between celibacy and marriage, and if they are actually comparably good in all the relevant respects, the choice is arbitrary to what matters in terms of freedom (i.e. responsibility). Of course, this also depends on if you perceive their actually, comparable goodness. Assuming they are, and assuming you do, then it is arbitrary. One good is as good as another good. Let's say that one is better than the other. So long as one of them doesn't become not-good (for whatever reason) it is still irrelevant in terms of moral significance. Be celibate or be married, just do it well either way, I guess.

It seems that if we cannot choose what appears to be good to us, then we are bound in the means by which we seek a hoped-for end. That is, we are bound to one way. This is because each step in the means to achieving that end will appear good to us, and at each step we cannot choose that something else appear good to us.

Let's approach it in terms of truth. Do we simply choose (decide) what is true? No, we find truth compelling, more or less. Maybe after much deliberation we come to see one option more likely to be true than another. Or, perhaps, we see it is obviously true. Whatever the case, truth is not something we choose, it is something that happens to us. Perceiving that which is good is similar. I can reason to what is good for any given moral decision. But my act is not going to be caused by that reasononing process, or if it is it is only part of a process. It will be caused, ultimately, by the perceived good, which may or may not be the same thing as the actual good.

Let's say I stop deliberation mid-route and decide to reason down another avenue. Whatever. Once I act it will be based on what I perceive as good at that moment. And what I want may be delivered by reason, or it may be delivered by desire so I use my reason to justify it, but the ultimate cause is some perceived good in that moment.

Let's say I have to choose between the healthy and the delicious meal. I can reason that it is good for me, even if it doesn't taste good. I can choose to eat it, because maybe I have other reasons (I have been fasting and exercising, so that it won't have a significant adverse effect on my health). I know the higher good is health, so I reason and choose accordingly. That's true freedom, and it is the percieved good that compels my act. Or, let's say I decide to eat it and have not been fasting, but gorging myself, instead. It just tastes so good! Here the perceived good that compels my act is the taste, and I am not free because I choose what is actually not good. In one instance reason seems to inform my act. In the other, desire. But in both the perceived good is what drives the act.

Thomas disagreed with Leibniz that there is a perfect world, or that there is a path of "greatest available good," and I agree with Thomas. I don't find good to be quantitative or measurable in that way. This means that I don't think every situation has an objectively perfect decision.

The world doesn't have to actually be that way to make the point. It can be an ersatz world, where we always choose that which is good. Even if we allow that there is a set of goods that can be chosen, instead of just one, so long as it is good, the choice between them is arbitrary in terms of moral responsibility. I am free so long as I choose something good. Or, so long as it is good, I perceive it as good, want it because it is good, and do it, then I am free. The moment one of those breaks down I am no longer free.

I am responsible no matter what, because it was what I wanted- i.e. perceived, chose, and did.

But does that mean that you are grounding freedom in arbitrariness and ignorance? For according to your understanding competing desires would only terminate in freedom in the case of equal desires and arbitrary choice. If they are unequal we will always choose the greater. It's similarly hard to see how flawed cognitive abilities themselves cater to freedom.

Yes, comparable goods are arbitrary in terms of goodness. One good is as good as another good, and anything "greater" is not morally significant. You could say we are truly free when confronted with multiple goods from which to choose. More to the point, we are truly free when we choose the good because it is good and we know (perceive) it. Of course, we will choose the one out of many goods that seems best to us, but it's no more noteworthy (morally speaking) than another, and it is free because the good, the perceived good, and the will are functioning in accord.

It's those moments when the choice is not good, but is perceived as good. This is where freedom breaks down. Reality, perceived reality, and will are not functioning in order. The entity is not functioning properly, and therefore is not free.

First, is actively altering our desires necessary for freedom? Second, if so, then how does one actively alter their desires? Is such a thing possible on your view?

Actively altering our desires is only necessary for freedom in the sense of proper function, which for the human entity is perceiving and acting on that which is truly good. We can alter our views by reconsidering. I can stop mid-reasoning process and look at it from a different angle. Does that make me free? I guess, but what is freedom if I reconsider one hundred times and still miss the mark in terms of what is good? If I miss the mark, it is because I perceived a good that is not real. Am I free in that case? No, I am broken, unable to act according to my own nature, because what I want is not good.

But for Thomas the good we seek is not one, nor would it be one in a perfect world:


Furthermore, that being is free which is not tied down to any one definite course. But the appetite of an intellectual substance is not under compulsion to pursue any one definite good, for it follows intellectual apprehension, which embraces good universally. Therefore the appetite of an intelligent substance is free, since it tends toward all good in general. (Shorter Summa, #76)

I am saying, the appetite (will?) of an intelligent substance is free, in so far as it tends toward all good in general. Not simply because it can. In this world it does not tend towards all good in general, which means it is not free. Maybe, I am misunderstanding. I don't think it matters if there is one good, many equal goods, or a variety goods, just so long as they are good. Of course, Thomas must hold there is One Ultimate Good, and all others secondarily and contingently? Then it is One Good to which we are designed to seek, and obtaining that Good is true freedom.

It is fun how you tried to deny (1) at the start of this post and now you're basically accepting it.

Did I? My apologies, if I did. I act like this is all clear in my mind, but it isn't, haha. I think I am saying the priority goes to the perceived good. Reason and will work together in terms of seeking out the actual good. In an ideal situation the perceived good would track the actual good, and the will would want and do what is perceived. I don't know if the breakdown is in the will or the reason, but there is a breakdown, I think.

From the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual part, he naturally desires his last end, which is happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not subject to free-will, as is clear from what we have said above (I:82:2).

This seems to be close to what I am saying. The end we seek is not subject to free-will. I am saying that end is the good. So, when our perception of the good is not actually good, that perception is what is driving my act, my choice, my decision. Something has gone awry, I think. We can use our faculties in hopes of correcting it (assuming I now recognize it is no longer actually good), I take it that is what you mean by freedom? I am going to say we are not free until our perception tracks the actual good and it terminates in action towards that good. I am surprised Thomas doesn't say the same thing given he knows the proper telos.

But on the part of the body and its powers man may be such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual part, since it is not the act of a corporeal organ.

Surely, temperament and disposition can affect the intellectual part. Help me understand this better.

But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said (I:81:3. Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will.

Does the lower part obey? Not always! Lol. Should it? Yes, it should. If it did we might be closer to being free in terms of the good.

And yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant to free-will.

Again, yes, in an ideal world. But if that ideal world obtained we would always choose the good that the judgment of reason delivers. My thinking is muddled here, possibly, but I just don't see (phenomenologically speaking) that the will is always subject to reason. I'm up for correction in my thinking here.

More precisely, reason is capable of this act even if in some individuals it rarely occurs

And this brings us back to my point. Having the capability of functioning properly does not mean one is free. One is only free to the extent that capability is realized. And the fact that it is often not realized in most people consistently and regularly means something has malfunctioned. Freedom to miss the mark of what is good is no kind of freedom, if you ask me.

 

[renniks]

Why does it matter? I used to look into this stuff but all theories of determinism end up at the same place: Nothing matters because I don't actually have any freedom. However, this makes zero sense in a world where the supernatural exists. Everything can't be an unbroken chain of causation, or at least there's not reason to believe it is, because God has no limits. He can allow as much freedom as he wants and still maintain everything.

 

[Jok]

What about the 3rd voice? With lots of choices that we make there is a first voice (or instinct) that tells us that choice A is the choice that is most good. A 2nd voice/instinct advises us against choice A in favor of the less good choice of B because of negative consequences associated with choosing A. And the 3rd voice nags us that “A real hero” would have chosen A even considering the consequences. And we are inconsistent with whether or not we heed the advice of the 3rd voice (even under equal degrees of consequences).

 

[Jok]

But the causal factor here is the perceived good. So, even if we say, as Thomas does, will is subject to reason, the driving factor is the perceived good (whether it actually it is good or not).

Do you refer to “Driving factor” as meaning the greatest influences (YET they could still be overridden), or do you mean it as absolutely determined (you can’t fight them off)?

I think that our teloses, the things that each person thinks of as good, ARE out of our control as you have said, but I think that just speaks of what kind of person we were born as. The personalized telos that tugs at each person throughout our lives influences our choices strongly but it doesn’t dictate them. To BE a unique individual person is to have a specialized unique mixture of telos inclinations attached to you (the substance of your personality). So for me it is a primary driving factor but not a deterministic one.

But I don’t think it follows to say that because different people are “Like something” that they are programmed to that personal flavor of determinism. Because they override their driving factor a lot of times in life. In extreme cases you even have self destructive people who habitually deny their driving factors of good (think of a person who keeps skipping class but knows that it’s a horrible choice because failing out of college will ruin everything). Also life circumstances rock people to the left and to the right, and to different degrees for different people. Changing up people’s default teloses that they were born with. You can care less about something that drove you 3 years ago.

You and Zippy’s posts got a bit deep, I feel like I can stay afloat against a couple of big waves but it has become a violent swell in here lol. I just lost focus on what you believe so I’m wondering if you disagree with anything I wrote up top? I know what Zippy believes. I can’t tell if all of your questions to him are your own questions or if some of them are you just volleying back & forth with him with hypothetical questions, like playing devil’s advocate. I’m getting a little lost in some of the distinctions between some of the terms too, like will vs passive reasoning.

 

[Mark Quayle]

Hello. Is the different site also a Christian forum or is it something different? Do you like it just as much as this one, are there pros & cons if you compare them? This forum has way more traffic than any other ones that I’ve seen. Thanks

Not that you necessarily implied that I wrote that to you, but just in case, it wasn't directed to you. It is a Religion Forum, not specific to any particular religion, often attracts atheists and agnostics. The site has many other forums, but the religion forum is probably the most busy. It is very poorly moderated, and responses are more or less immediate. Traffic is more responses, less people. Format is more chat-like.

 

[Mark Quayle]

That's a good point. I was basically wondering if theological determinism reduces to Occasionalism, or if materialistic determinism reduces to reductionism. If so, then to call something a baseball or a giraffe is just to give a name to an arbitrary designation of atoms, a collection that has no true reality qua collection.



Feel free. You can cite my username if you like.

The term, "Occasionalism" to me implies more than just what the definitions I have read include. I'm guessing that, like the majority of believers, those generating definitions, by their worldview assume a certain validity to Free Will without even realizing they have done so in their thinking and writing. The term, "Occasionalism", to me therefore, implies that God in causing only causes so much, and the rest just naturally evolves according to its nature. (i.e. naturalism plus free will plus God interjecting into the affairs of mankind and the universe, but particularly mankind, since "that is where the question of free will applies"). It is illogical, to me, that God should only from time to time interject in the affairs of men or the universe. It defies the meaning of Omnipotence and First Cause, because of the logically necessary attribute of immanence. It also defies the law of causality.

Materialistic determinism, to my thinking, is pretty much the same thing as naturalism, and therefore, cause and effect, and reductionism, although yes, applied to the question of choice. I think theological determinism is (or should be) no different from whatever truth there is to reductionism, because of the immanence of God.

To my thinking, all that is exists, and remains in existence, because of the particular attention of God in sustaining the smallest detail(s), even the cause(s) of virtual particles "popping in and out of existence". I consider it a possibility that the "Love of God" is, or contains or produces, a very "physical" reality, perhaps the old "God Particle" or force, that is the basic building block of all fact. I like to say that what is considered merely natural, such as the influence of physical laws, is also miracle, since it is caused by God.

 

[Jok]

Not that you necessarily implied that I wrote that to you, but just in case, it wasn't directed to you. It is a Religion Forum, not specific to any particular religion, often attracts atheists and agnostics. The site has many other forums, but the religion forum is probably the most busy. It is very poorly moderated, and responses are more or less immediate. Traffic is more responses, less people. Format is more chat-like.

Sounds like it would be a lot more vicious in there, poorer moderation probably makes sense though since it’s a broader forum. Chat-like style would probably feel weird coming from here.

 

[Hmm]

consider it a possibility that the "Love of God" is, or contains or produces, a very "physical" reality, perhaps the old "God Particle" or force, that is the basic building block of all fact.

The story goes that the Nobel Prize
physicist Leon Lederman was responsible for the term "God Particle" for the Higgs boson because he called it the "[bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse] Particle" as a joke because of how difficult it was to detect the particle. It took nearly half a century and the multi-billion euro Large Hadron Collider particle accelerator to find it.

 

[public hermit]

Do you refer to “Driving factor” as meaning the greatest influences (YET they could still be overridden), or do you mean it as absolutely determined (you can’t fight them off)?

I take to heart Aristotle's notion that we inherently seek what is good (fulfillment, blessedness, or eudaimonia). That's what I see as the driving factor. It can be overridden with effort, but it is not like a switch that I turn on or off, randomly deciding the "good" I seek. I might, in an instant, "see the light" and perceive things in such a way that I do something different. It happens. But, more often than not, that macro-decision is the outcome of many attempts and smaller micro-considerations that began to change how I am seeing things. Now, I want something different.

But, again for me, the issue of whether I can change my mind or not is not the key to freedom. True freedom, on the other hand, will be within boundaries that from the outside might appear very deterministic. Jesus appears as if he has no free will in so much as he always does the will of the Father. He can't help but to choose the good, because his mind and will recognize it for what it is, which is freedom.

It starts to seem circular to me, any path that someone takes no matter how inconsistent that person might be under identical inclinations

Maybe I should come out and say, I reject the notion that free will obtains, if and only if, I could have done otherwise. I have no experience of having ever done otherwise. I have only done what I have done. And, for the most part, I have done what I wanted. That is the experience of freedom with which I am familiar.

What does it mean to say that I could have done otherwise? It means that given the exact same set of circumstances, I could have made a different decision. The determinist will include one's thoughts and inclinations in that "same set of circumstances." The indeterminist will not, and say those set of circumstances do not include thoughts and inclinations. Honestly, I find the whole premise uninteresting.

I will say, like the determinist, in conisdering such a scenario of doing otherwise, I include one's thoughts and inclinations in that "same set of circumstances." I include them because they are integral, causal factors in the process that terminates in moral acts. And, once we include them, then I have no idea why I would choose otherwise. I must have some reason for choosing otherwise, but once we start adding changes, changes that will affect the process, then we no longer have the same set of circumstances. Even so, I find that particular approach to free will uninteresting, because even if I could have done otherwise, it doesn't mean I did what was good.

Where I disagree with the determinist is that we cannot change our perception of the good. I think we can, but it is often more of process that just deciding to do differently. What has to change is my perception (both cognitive and affective) of what is good.

I think that our teloses, the things that each person thinks of as good, ARE out of our control as you have said, but I think that just speaks of what kind of person we were born as. The personalized telos that tugs at each person throughout our lives influences our choices strongly but it doesn’t dictate them. To BE a unique individual person is to have a specialized unique mixture of telos inclinations attached to you (the substance of your personality). So for me it is a primary driving factor but not a deterministic one.

I will agree with this, and raise you one. I am going to say these influences are significantly strong in how we perceive the good. I am not going to say our perception (again, both cognitive and affective) cannot be changed. I believe the human entity, as a moral agent, has both agency and responsibility, so I don't think of us as robots. But, I think freedom is found within boundaries, and aligning ourselves within the boundaries where true freedom exists is not easy to do, at all. And, it's not simply a matter of choice. Narrow is the road, as someone once said.

You and Zippy’s posts got a bit deep, I feel like I can stay afloat against a couple of big waves but it has become a violent swell in here lol. I just lost focus on what you believe so I’m wondering if you disagree with anything I wrote up top? I know what Zippy believes. I can’t tell if all of your questions to him are your own questions or if some of them are you just volleying back & forth with him with hypothetical questions, like playing devil’s advocate. I’m getting a little lost in some of the distinctions between some of the terms too, like will vs passive reasoning.

Yeah, I apologize for muddying the waters, haha. I am not as clear on what I think, as I am on what I disagree with. I also have gotten to a place that I don't really have a vocabulary for how I am thinking about this issue these days. I make most of it up, haha. I consider myself a compatibilist in terms of the relationship between God's sovereignty and human choice/responsibility. I don't know how it works, but I believe both are true and feel no need to know how they work. I don't try to resolve the logical tension entailed. But, then again, I don't try to resolve the logical tension in the Trinity or Incarnation, so there is precedent. But I don't hold to determinism as commonly understood. I think we can change, and do so working against the usual causal factors, because we are seeking the good. It takes effort. But, that is something that is under our power. Or, it's by God's grace. Lol. I don't know.

I think our perception of the good is the prime motivation for our moral acts. I think, in a perfect world, our intellects would recognize the good, which our wills would agree with, and the resulting acts would be in harmony with reality. I wish we were determined to the good. I don't see free-will, as we often talk about it, as some great boon. It is a malfunction of a creature that was created to be reasonable and free; instead we are foolish and bound. We need help that comes from outside ourselves.

 

[Mark Quayle]

Sounds like it would be a lot more vicious in there, poorer moderation probably makes sense though since it’s a broader forum. Chat-like style would probably feel weird coming from here.

Yes, and what's worse, some of the most vicious and obscene things said there are by supposed Christians, of all different sorts of denominations. Yet sometimes there are pretty good discussions. Myself, I like to point out the inconsistencies and intellectual dishonesty of atheism, among other pov's.

 

[Jok]

That's what I see as the driving factor. It can be overridden with effort

Exactly, another way to word this is to simply say “You are correct Jok!” Lol just kidding.

more often than not, that macro-decision is the outcome of many attempts and smaller micro-considerations that began to change how I am seeing things. Now, I want something different.

True, we are definitely creatures of habit, so it can take a bit of a buildup of momentum before a gasket blows and results in a macro change of our “Want” settings.

I just think that such an undertow, that eventually builds up and blows a gasket, represents an opposing force to what determinism is. I don’t see the existence of such undertows as harmonious with determinism. It’s almost like a “Slowly building rage against determinism” to me. Why would this force be building up at all in the first place if we continuously honor our inherent mode of seeking the good? It seems like if that is all that we seek then things should always flow very smoothly. These occasional mutinies inside of us that go against our innate patterns look like an objection to determinism to me (however I don’t downplay the powerful force of our innate patterns, ie who we are born as, ie humans being creatures of habit).


And I’m only referring to one of the two situations; I totally understand the situation where micro changes keep happening over 20 years and one day a husband leaves his wife because it’s just not the same. I am pointing to the other situation where the husband leaving his wife leaves everyone speechless because everything is still hunky dory as if they just got married yesterday. HOWEVER, even in the first situation, if determinism is true WHY were there all of these micro changes over 20 years in his wife, or in his friend’s opinions, or micro changes in 1000 other things? Because THEY should have been stable as well if they continuously/consistently seek what they call good!

Maybe I should come out and say, I reject the notion that free will obtains, if and only if, I could have done otherwise. I have no experience of having ever done otherwise. I have only done what I have done. And, for the most part, I have done what I wanted. That is the experience of freedom with which I am familiar.

Me too, breaking my patterns sometimes, but most times being a creature of habit!

What does it mean to say that I could have done otherwise? It means that given the exact same set of circumstances, I could have made a different decision. The determinist will include one's thoughts and inclinations in that "same set of circumstances." The indeterminist will not, and say those set of circumstances do not include thoughts and inclinations. Honestly, I find the whole premise uninteresting.

I include my thoughts and inclinations in the "same set of all circumstances” when I say that I could have made an alternate choice! I think it would get too tedious and ridiculous if someone were to give the “You can never step in the same river twice” kind of rebuttal to me, like to claim that identical circumstances is totally impossible because my cellular structure becomes different every second lol.

will say, like the determinist, in conisdering such a scenario of doing otherwise, I include one's thoughts and inclinations in that "same set of circumstances." I include them because they are integral, causal factors in the process that terminates in moral acts. And, once we include them, then I have no idea why I would choose otherwise. I must have some reason for choosing otherwise, but once we start adding changes, changes that will affect the process, then we no longer have the same set of circumstances. Even so, I find that particular approach to free will uninteresting, because even if I could have done otherwise, it doesn't mean I did what was good.

Me too. I don’t know what I am because I thought that those things described an indeterminist not a determinist!

I will agree with this

Of course you do. Brilliant ideas just pour out of me and I don’t know how to shut them off lol

I am not going to say our perception (again, both cognitive and affective) cannot be changed. I believe the human entity, as a moral agent, has both agency and responsibility, so I don't think of us as robots. But, I think freedom is found within boundaries, and aligning ourselves within the boundaries where true freedom exists is not easy to do, at all. And, it's not simply a matter of choice. Narrow is the road, as someone once said.

I’m probably just too green with this stuff and all the terms seem a bit blurry to me still, but I will feel like we believe the same thing sometimes, then read something that makes me feel like we don’t. This part sounds accurate to me.

Yeah, I apologize for muddying the waters, haha. I am not as clear on what I think

It could definitely be me too though! I feel like a snake who ate a full sized mouse and is slowly digesting it. I’m trying to keep up but it gets confusing because I’m not used to these topics and the terms (some terms look identical to me).

I think our perception of the good is the prime motivation for our moral acts. I think, in a perfect world, our intellects would recognize the good, which our wills would agree with, and the resulting acts would be in harmony with reality. I wish we were determined to the good. I don't see free-will, as we often talk about it, as some great boon. It is a malfunction of a creature that was created to be reasonable and free; instead we are foolish and bound. We need help that comes from outside ourselves.

Oh that’s an interesting take! Free will is actually our sickness. Looks like I’m back again to not agreeing, but this was helpful for better understanding your position!

 

[Mark Quayle]

The story goes that the Nobel Prize
physicist Leon Lederman was responsible for the term "God Particle" for the Higgs boson because he called it the "[bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse] Particle" as a joke because of how difficult it was to detect the particle. It took nearly half a century and the multi-billion euro Large Hadron Collider particle accelerator to find it.

Hahaha, yes! But it got taken to mean something else --in the minds of many, the term Higgs Boson became more or less synonymous with "the most basic component of matter/ energy".

 

[Jok]

Yes, and what's worse, some of the most vicious and obscene things said there are by supposed Christians, of all different sorts of denominations. Yet sometimes there are pretty good discussions. Myself, I like to point out the inconsistencies and intellectual dishonesty of atheism, among other pov's.

Well if you get too overwhelmed in there and need help we can lend @2PhiloVoid to you, but you have to promise to give him back or else the atheists in here would lose their nemesis and start going stir crazy!

 

[zippy2006]

So I'm not going to lie. As much as I'd love to get sucked into a long debate on determinism on the Feast of St. Bernard, I am trying to give prayer a priority in the next couple of weeks and so I probably won't do this topic justice.

My hope would be to tie off our discussion at a reasonable place in the space of 3-5 posts. I will respond to this post in full, without too much concern for the overall direction, but then after that I will try to wind it down a bit to avoid a real long exchange. Sorry, but I'm sure we can have the long exchange on another date.


First let's just delineate two definitions of freedom:

Freedom1: "Freedom From" - freedom from some form of restraint, including the restraint of determinism.

Freedom2: "Freedom For" - freedom for some activity or excellence, including moral or holy habits or actions.​

Maybe, I'm not understanding (1). "Wants are absolutely ontologically prior to reason/reasons" I would not say that desire is ontologically prior to reason, if you mean in order of being. These are faculties of a substantial entity. So, I took what you meant more in terms of "order of operation."

Yes, I was referring to the idea that desires have an absolute priority within the human being such that reasons are reducible to desires. On this view rationality is just a sort of secondary symptom of desire. Thus the ultimate answer for why a human being acts has to do with their desires rather than their reason.

In sense of order of operation, I would not say either reason or will are necessarily prior to the other. I would say, ideally, they should work in conjunction so that which is good, that which is perceived as good is good, and that which is wanted are all the same thing. That is the ideal.

Right: you think they should work in conjunction in order to bring about freedom2 in the subject. Now there is a principle of the moral life that if some act does not flow from the person, then they can't be held responsible for it. Thus if the movement towards freedom2 is to be meritorious (sorry Protestants ) then it must flow from the meriting person. This is the way that I see determinism entering into the discussion, for apparently on determinism merit is impossible. (We can explore that last idea if you like...) In any case, the relation of freedom2 to determinism isn't clear to me. Freedom1 understood in the libertarian sense properly contradicts determinism whereas freedom2 does not. Freedom2 is compatible with determinism.

But the causal factor here is the perceived good. So, even if we say, as Thomas does, will is subject to reason, the driving factor is the perceived good (whether it actually it is good or not).

True, and yet the vital question is How does the perceived good drive the human person? It seems to me that it could drive them according to determinism or according to freedom1. Certainly freedom2 could be present in either case.

If you are choosing between celibacy and marriage, and if they are actually comparably good in all the relevant respects, the choice is arbitrary to what matters in terms of freedom (i.e. responsibility). Of course, this also depends on if you perceive their actually, comparable goodness. Assuming they are, and assuming you do, then it is arbitrary. One good is as good as another good. Let's say that one is better than the other. So long as one of them doesn't become not-good (for whatever reason) it is still irrelevant in terms of moral significance. Be celibate or be married, just do it well either way, I guess.

I agree that in one sense it doesn't matter, but I wouldn't want to call that choice a non-moral decision. How would you define morality in order to make such a decision non-moral? Apparently you might say that morality only deals with things that matter, and the only decisions that matter are the ones that include a bad option. ..or something?

Now I agree that if two things are perceived to be equally good then the chooser would apparently be as happy (or as unhappy) with either of them, and be indecisive, but I wouldn't go on to infer those other things about moral significance, etc. That view seems to me to measure goodness relatively to badness and create some form of Manicheanism.

Let's approach it in terms of truth. Do we simply choose (decide) what is true? No, we find truth compelling, more or less. Maybe after much deliberation we come to see one option more likely to be true than another. Or, perhaps, we see it is obviously true. Whatever the case, truth is not something we choose, it is something that happens to us. Perceiving that which is good is similar. I can reason to what is good for any given moral decision. But my act is not going to be caused by that reasononing process, or if it is it is only part of a process. It will be caused, ultimately, by the perceived good, which may or may not be the same thing as the actual good.

Let's say I stop deliberation mid-route and decide to reason down another avenue. Whatever. Once I act it will be based on what I perceive as good at that moment. And what I want may be delivered by reason, or it may be delivered by desire so I use my reason to justify it, but the ultimate cause is some perceived good in that moment.

Let's say I have to choose between the healthy and the delicious meal. I can reason that it is good for me, even if it doesn't taste good. I can choose to eat it, because maybe I have other reasons (I have been fasting and exercising, so that it won't have a significant adverse effect on my health). I know the higher good is health, so I reason and choose accordingly. That's true freedom, and it is the percieved good that compels my act. Or, let's say I decide to eat it and have not been fasting, but gorging myself, instead. It just tastes so good! Here the perceived good that compels my act is the taste, and I am not free because I choose what is actually not good. In one instance reason seems to inform my act. In the other, desire. But in both the perceived good is what drives the act.

Looking at the quote you were responding to, which was an attempt to use your own premise to deny freedom1, are you agreeing that freedom1 must be denied? You here speak of choice and freedom2, but I'm not sure if you agree or disagree with what I said before. For reference, here is what I said:

It seems that if we cannot choose what appears to be good to us, then we are bound in the means by which we seek a hoped-for end. That is, we are bound to one way. This is because each step in the means to achieving that end will appear good to us, and at each step we cannot choose that something else appear good to us.
​

(In the antecedent to that first conditional I used your own words, which are a bit confusing but actually vaguely mean "If we cannot choose that something else appear good to us, then...")

The world doesn't have to actually be that way to make the point. It can be an ersatz world, where we always choose that which is good. Even if we allow that there is a set of goods that can be chosen, instead of just one, so long as it is good, the choice between them is arbitrary in terms of moral responsibility. I am free so long as I choose something good. Or, so long as it is good, I perceive it as good, want it because it is good, and do it, then I am free. The moment one of those breaks down I am no longer free.

Sure, you have freedom2.

I am responsible no matter what, because it was what I wanted- i.e. perceived, chose, and did.

As I've noted in other contexts, I'm not sure why acting according to desire would produce responsibility. If doing what you want makes you responsible (and free) then my dog and my goldfish are both responsible and free.

Yes, comparable goods are arbitrary in terms of goodness. One good is as good as another good, and anything "greater" is not morally significant...

(Note that my comment about "moral significance" applies to various pieces of your post, but I don't want to be redundant in giving it again. )

It's those moments when the choice is not good, but is perceived as good. This is where freedom breaks down. Reality, perceived reality, and will are not functioning in order. The entity is not functioning properly, and therefore is not free.

Yes, the entity which is incapable of acting for the specified ends does not have freedom2. One contradictory of freedom2 would be sin.

Actively altering our desires is only necessary for freedom in the sense of proper function, which for the human entity is perceiving and acting on that which is truly good. We can alter our views by reconsidering. I can stop mid-reasoning process and look at it from a different angle. Does that make me free? I guess, but what is freedom if I reconsider one hundred times and still miss the mark in terms of what is good? If I miss the mark, it is because I perceived a good that is not real. Am I free in that case? No, I am broken, unable to act according to my own nature, because what I want is not good.

Here again you are talking about freedom2 when I think the determinism conversation is about freedom1. I think I noted this same point above, but doesn't the ability to grow or not grow in freedom2 presuppose freedom1? That is, if freedom2 is a meritorious quality then freedom1 must be at play in the person who merits it.

Regarding this last point, we may not have sufficient time to explore whether a necessitated act can be meritorious or reflective of freedom1, but it seems like that question is lurking in the depths.

I am saying, the appetite (will?) of an intelligent substance is free, in so far as it tends toward all good in general. Not simply because it can. In this world it does not tend towards all good in general, which means it is not free. Maybe, I am misunderstanding.

For Thomas it is sufficient that intellectual apprehension embraces good universally for it to possess freedom1. It's not about whether something is ontologically good, but rather whether the intellect can see and consider various different things under the aspect of goodness--whether it can embrace goodness universally.

Did I? My apologies, if I did. I act like this is all clear in my mind, but it isn't, haha. I think I am saying the priority goes to the perceived good. Reason and will work together in terms of seeking out the actual good. In an ideal situation the perceived good would track the actual good, and the will would want and do what is perceived. I don't know if the breakdown is in the will or the reason, but there is a breakdown, I think.

I agree with your conclusions about freedom2, but I mostly want to talk about freedom1.

This seems to be close to what I am saying. The end we seek is not subject to free-will. I am saying that end is the good. So, when our perception of the good is not actually good, that perception is what is driving my act, my choice, my decision. Something has gone awry, I think. We can use our faculties in hopes of correcting it (assuming I now recognize it is no longer actually good), I take it that is what you mean by freedom? I am going to say we are not free until our perception tracks the actual good and it terminates in action towards that good. I am surprised Thomas doesn't say the same thing given he knows the proper telos.

I am using freedom in a very libertarian sense. Correcting a mistaken will would be evidence of such freedom(1), but the intentional act of further corrupting a mistaken will would also be evidence of a free act. That is, double-downing on calling evil good. Unfree creatures can't do the first, but they also can't do the second. For example, Satan's fall required freedom. If Satan's fall was not a free act then he cannot be held responsible for his crime. It did not flow from him. In this case the contradictory of a free act--of freedom1--seems to be coercion or necessitation, and apparently Calvin was comfortable with both, as we've touched on in a different conversation.

Surely, temperament and disposition can affect the intellectual part. Help me understand this better.

I believe his point is that such dispositions are not determinative of the intellect in the way that our ultimate end of happiness is. The intellect is not subordinate to such dispositions in the same way it is subordinate to the desire for happiness.

Again, yes, in an ideal world. But if that ideal world obtained we would always choose the good that the judgment of reason delivers.

Yes, and before the Fall the lower passions would always obey rational judgment, which is the more important point as far as freedom1 is concerned. This is because freedom1 is based on our intellect.

My thinking is muddled here, possibly, but I just don't see (phenomenologically speaking) that the will is always subject to reason. I'm up for correction in my thinking here.

I don't think it is always subject either (nor does Thomas). But it can be and it sometimes is, even after the Fall, which opens the door to freedom1.

And this brings us back to my point. Having the capability of functioning properly does not mean one is free. One is only free to the extent that capability is realized. And the fact that it is often not realized in most people consistently and regularly means something has malfunctioned. Freedom to miss the mark of what is good is no kind of freedom, if you ask me.

Sure, I agree freedom2 is not freedom to miss the mark. But freedom1 includes that ability.