Fair enough. So your argument (that the two statements violate the law of non-contradiction) is wrong.
Like always, you are now shifting the goalposts and present a different argument. Which is actually an old argument that I have addressed numerous times.
But the proposition which is a statment of moral obligation contains two components as is illustrated in the example below.
Prop. (1) "It is my subjective view that a man should not rape a woman."
Component 1. - "It is my subjective view"
The above component demonstrates the source of the view. The source of the view in the proposition is the person making the statement regarding the view. This is not contestable.
Let us look at component 2.
Component 2. - "a man should not rape a woman."
The above component (2) is connected to the preceding component (1) by the word that. But what is component (2)? How would we define component (2)?
1. The phrase "a man should not rape a woman." is a normative moral statement regarding moral obligation or oughtness. This is evidenced by the presence of the phrase should not connecting sub component (x) "a man" and subcomponent (y) "rape a woman". (x) "a man", is an entity external to the person making the statement in component (1). (y) "rape a woman" is an act external to the person making the statement in component (1). These two subcomponents exist outside of the person making the statement in component (1).
To sum up this long-winded paragraph:
Yes, the man, the woman and rape are not the person making the statement.
We see from above that even though a person makes a subjective statement, the referent of that statement is something that exists objectively.
The man, the woman and the act are not the person making the value judgement.
Your assertion that therefore the value judgement exists outside the person doesn´t follow.
Therefore, the normative proposition "a man should not rape a woman." is the objective referent of the referer making the statement.
No. The "should" is qualified by "It is my subjective opinion." Nothing points to the "should" as intended to refer to an external or "objective" referent (particularly not when the sentence is introduced by "In my subjective opinion...").
It is the same if I say that the sum of 2+2=4, as the subject making the statement, I'm communicating a view that I hold about an external, objective truth. You see, 4 as the answer to 2+2 is true independent of my subjective reasoning process. I could very well make the wrong subjective reasoning and come to the conclusion that the answer is 5. But my subjective reasoning does not make the objective answer to 2+2 5. The answer to the equation is still 4 and it is 4 INDEPENDENTLY of my subjective reasoning. This is what is referred to as an objective truth.
Yes, I see how a moral objectivist presupposes the existence of an external "objective" morality, and therefore his value judgements are meant to refer to this concept. That´s why a moral objectivist would never say "In my subjective opinion...should...", in the first place.
A moral subjectivist, however, doesn´t intend to refer to "objective morality" when saying "It is my subjective opinion". . He´s a moral subjectivst, after all.
Time and again you are superimposing your worldview upon the statements of persons who don´t buy into it.
In the same way, the normative proposition "a man should not rape a woman." is maintained to be an objective moral fact by moral realist philosophers the same way that mathematicians maintain 4 as the answer to 2+2= is a fact.
Yes, I understand that this is the presupposition of a moral objectivist. Moral subjectivism, however, does not hold this view. A moral subjectivist considers the idea "should" to be a product of his subjective opinion.
A mathematician can say: "It is my subjective opinion that 2+2 is 5 all he wants to, JUST BECAUSE HE SAYS IT IS HIS OPINION does not make 5 the true answer.
A mathematician wouldn´t introduce a mathematical statement by "It´s my subjective opinion...", to boot. I have yet to meet a mathematical subjectivist.
We would say he was wrong in his opinion that 5 is the sum of 2+2 because the sum of 2+2 is not 5, it is 4. Likewise, moral realists maintain that just because a person says: "It is my subjective opinion that a man should rape a woman." does not mean that the man is speaking the truth regarding moral obligation. He may indeed be speaking what he thinks or believes or feels is true but the moral realist would simply say that he was wrong just like the person who says that 5 is the sum of 2+2. Moral realists say that the proposition: "rape is wrong" is true just like 4 is the true sum of 2+2. We say that the proposition: "rape is wrong" is true even if a person who rapes a woman says that it is his subjective opinion that rape is right. Moral realists would say that he was still wrong just like the man who says that it is his subjective opinion that 5 is the sum of 2+2.
That´s all fine and dandy. I know the presuppositions of moral objectivism.
Explaining them, however, does not help showing what you intended to show, namely:
1. That moral subjectivism leads to a violation of the law of non-contradiction.
2. That moral subjectivism is not a tenable view.
3. That moral subjectivists live as though they were moral objectivists.
In fact, just like 4 seems intuitively the right sum of 2+2
2+2=4 is right by rules of the formal system mathematics. No intuition involved.
so likewise, the proposition "a man should not rape a woman." seems intuitively right to say. In fact, we would say that the man who says that rape is right is simply wrong and think he was morally impaired.
I know that you (and the mouse in your pocket?) hold this view.
You, however, were trying to show that someone who uses the words "should, right, wrong..." necessarily refers to an external, objective morality. Simply repeating that this is what you (as a person who presupposes there to be an external objective morality) would do doesn´t help to make this case.
But the moral relativist or ethical subjectivist cannot say that rape is objectively wrong the way a moral realist can. The reason is because they do not believe that objective moral facts exist at all!
BINGO! Keep that thought, don´t lose it!!
It is the same as saying that there are no objective mathematical or scientific facts!
Yes, if mathematics and morality were the same, it would be the same. So far, however, that´s just your presupposition. You are entitled to it, but to present that which is your presupposition as your conclusion (or a logical process) is intellectually dishonest.
All of this leads one to a type of moral skepticism which people simply cannot live by.
That´s your assertion, and you haven´t done anything to support it. Any time I ask you to substantiate it you simply return to reasserting it.
We all actually believe that acts like rape, murder, torture are really wrong and that they are wrong even if the people committing the acts think they are right.
Yes, that´s what you guys believe.
But the moral relativist and ethical subjectivists and nihilists and skeptics cannot make these statements and still be consistent with their moral anti-realism.
A moral subjectivist can express his subjective opinion. Since he doesn´t intend his statements to be anything more than this, there is no inconsistency. Not until you superimpose your presuppositions on his statements.
In light of the above quatona, most philosophers today accept or lean towards moral realism, as do most meta-ethicists, and twice as many philosophers accept or lean towards moral realism as accept or lean towards moral anti-realism.
[2] Not only that but the majority of ATHEISTIC philosophers adhere to moral realism as opposed to anti-realism.
Preliminary Survey results | PhilPapers Surveys
So what? This band-waggon fallacy doesn´t impress me any more than the fact that 6 out of 7 participants in that survey leaned towards makes you abandon your theism.
Now of course it is logically possible that people have just somehow all been deceived into thinking that acts like burning babies is objectively wrong,
Band-waggon fallacy coming my way, eh?
but any argument for moral scepticism is going to be based upon premises which are less obvious than the existence of objective moral values themselves.
And which premises would that be?
To deny objective moral values and duties necessarily leads one to the inevitable conclusion of moral nihilism.
So if it
leads there "moral nihilism" in your use of the word obviously includes more than the denial of
objective moral values and duties. Just so I understand your assertion:
What is it that "moral nihilism" is including beyond the denial of
objective moral values and duties, and how does the latter lead to the first?
