@GDL , don't miss my above reply. In my typical fashion, I just had more I wanted to elaborate on.
You say it hasn't been proven that those whom the Father draws necessarily come to Jesus and are raised. On the contrary, I believe I have shown this. And I need to reiterate the fact that critical portions of that argument remain unaddressed. Let me bring it back into focus here.
What I have shown is that the contingency inherent in ability need not preclude the possibility that man's choices are also necessary
in another sense. There is no contradiction implied in the assertion that man
necessarily exercises his contingent ability, for it is contingent in a different respect (viz. as to its proximate cause, i.e. its mode of production) than that in which it is necessary (viz. as to its ultimate cause, i.e. the consequence of God's decree). Just as God ultimately causes the sun the shine, though it is the sun that does the shining, so God ultimately causes the enabled one to respond (via the regeneration of the spiritually dead heart), though it is the individual that does the responding.
I've argued for these categories from Scripture, appealing to Acts 2:23, the Exodus narrative, and other texts. I've also shown how the juxtaposition of these categories (what I've chosen to call
ultimate necessity and
proximate contingency) fits nicely with what we read in the context of John 6:44, namely concerning verses 37a, 39, and 37b, 40, respectively. Jesus definitely seems to be pointing to this, such that verses 39-40 expound upon a distinction raised in 37a-37b, respectively:
- We see ultimate necessity (i.e. the revelation of God's decree) in Jesus' promises that "all that the Father gives me will come to me" (vs. 37a) and "I should lose nothing of all that he has given me" (vs. 39).
- Note also that even within 37a the individual's coming (a contingent choice) is described in terms of purpose; the promise of a definite outcome.
- We see proximate contingency (i.e. the secondary causes, or the means by which, God works through agents to bring about His purposes) in the statements "whoever comes to me I will never cast out" (vs. 37b) and "everyone who looks on the Son and believes in him should have eternal life" (vs. 40).
Thus, the response of the elect is both contingent
and necessary. It is necessary in the sense that the decree of God orchestrates things in such a way that they
will choose to exercise faith. And yet this does not take away from the reality of their contingency, for they remain contingent in their mode of production. That is, the choice is still a choice, and the individual making it bears moral responsibility for the choice. It is the nature of choice (indeed, it is the nature of all created things) that it is contingent, and yet the choice follows necessarily from the inclination of the individual's heart, for man is
not free from the constraints of his nature. (Are spiritually dead sinners capable of pleasing God? Are those in heaven capable of sinning? Can a bad tree bear good fruit? Can a good tree bear bad fruit?) In other words, the contingency of the choice is with respect to its
intrinsic nature, but this says nothing of whether or not a choice may be made
extrinsically necessary by external factors affecting the orientation of the will that chooses.
Think about divine omniscience. Do you agree that God knows all things exhaustively? Is there anything that He does not know perfectly? I had a turkey sandwich for lunch the other day. My choice to have that sandwich, and not something else, was a contingent choice. That is, as to its mode of production, I was not
forced against my will to eat turkey. I "could have chosen" to eat something else (that is, in the sense that it is conceivable, from my perspective, that I could have done it; it was a logical potentiality). At the same time, however, is it not the case that God knew beforehand that I would choose to eat that turkey sandwich, and not something else? If I had chosen at the last possible second to scrap the sandwich and go for the leftover pizza instead, would I have thwarted God's foreknowledge? Or would He have foreseen that change in choice?
If we can agree that whatever it is I choose has already been perfectly foreknown by God, then we ought to be able to agree that there is
some sense in which those choices are necessary. It is not meaningful to speak of perfect knowledge of something that is not certain to take place. And it is not meaningful to speak of certainty without speaking of necessity. It must therefore be the case that everything God knows (which is, indeed,
all contingent realities) is
necessary, in some respect. But the sense in which it is necessary is different from the sense in which it is contingent, clearly. My choice to eat a turkey sandwich was a contingent choice. From my perspective, I could have made alternate choices,
in the sense that they are logical possibilities. But whatever possibility I choose, God has foreseen it, and the inescapable result of that is that
in some other sense the actual choice that I make is a necessary one. The choice is contingent with respect to
potentiality, but necessary with respect to
actuality.
I'm assuming you're not an Open Theist (I see that as the only meaningful alternative to the conclusions I'm laying out here), but correct me if you are. Assuming you're not, though, there ought to be no issue accepting that choices are therefore
both contingent
and necessary, in different respects. I am not forced against my will to choose contrary to what I desire. But my choices are mysteriously necessary as to their future certainty. Omniscience entails this.
So, since what is proximately contingent can
also be ultimately necessary, it does
not follow that "able" precludes the possibility of necessity. There is no contradiction implied in saying that contingent choices are made
extrinsically necessary by God's immutable decree. Thus, you are not actually responding to anything I have argued when you simply point out the contingency inherent in ability. That's not the issue. The issue is whether or not the decree of God necessitates particular contingent outcomes.
God knows, perfectly, who will choose to believe and who will not, yes? How is that any different from saying that it is
certainly the case that those who will choose to believe will do so? And how it
that any different from saying that it is
necessarily the case that those who will choose to believe will do so? No contradiction is implied if the choice is necessary in a
different respect than it is contingent. And is it not obvious that it is, when you think about it? My choice to have a turkey sandwich was certainly a contingent choice. And yet, in
some sense, it was also a necessary choice, if indeed God knew
with certainty that I would make that choice.
For some mysterious reason that continues to elude me, I always seem to get hungry when discussing omniscience.
To relate all of this back to John 6:44, the fact that the drawn one is
made able to come does not require the view that he will not contingently exercise that ability
necessarily. God can determine, as an ultimate cause, that the drawn one will come, in the same way that He determines that the sun will shine, and yet the drawn one's choice to come, as a proximate cause, is still his own choice, in the same way that it is the sun that does the shining, for the individual making the choice makes it as a consequence of the underlying desire of his heart,
which the drawing of the Father has graciously changed.
So "ability implies contingency" is not an
argument against the view that the "him" who is drawn is one-to-one the same "him" who is raised. What other argument can there be, given the logic and grammar of the verse?
Why should we not accept that when John 6:44 says "the Father draws
him," and "I will raise
him," that this is not talking, in every single instance, about the same individual? It is perfectly meaningful to take it that way, without doing violence to the will of man, and that seems to best fit the context.