A question for athiests

[Sojourner<><]

You do understand that some of us think that "the reason for everything that exists" is a logical impossibility, in the first place, and that your question is therefore invalid, don´t you?
Just to make sure we are not talking past each other.

I disagree. It's a very natural question and is certainly not an invalid one.

 

[Sojourner<><]

But looking at it philosophically, from outside, so to speak, why is there nothing rather than something is an equally valid question. After all, either nothing or something has to exist. Why is one more likely than the other?

I'm inclined to think that where there is something there is the effect of some cause. The question is quite natural in that case. But where there is nothing, there is no effect nor is there any cause. Therefore the question would also be nonexistant and invalid.

 

[ExistencePrecedesEssence]

But looking at it philosophically, from outside, so to speak, why is there nothing rather than something is an equally valid question. After all, either nothing or something has to exist. Why is one more likely than the other?

Nothing cannot exist, its impossible. how hard is that to understand. Something always has to exist, the nothingness that you speak of is something.

 

[David Gould]

I'm inclined to think that where there is something there is the effect of some cause.

And the cause would have to be something, and therefore itself caused ... ad infinitum. Thus, you can never answer the question of why is there something instead of nothing - it is meaningless.

The question is quite natural in that case.

No, it is nonsensical in that case.

But where there is nothing, there is no effect nor is there any cause. Therefore the question would also be nonexistant and invalid.

But if there is no infinite chain and something can come from nothing, the question as to why there is nothing would be valid, wouldn't it?

 

[David Gould]

Nothing cannot exist, its impossible. how hard is that to understand. Something always has to exist, the nothingness that you speak of is something.

It is just a conversation. I am unclear how nothingness can be something. If we talk about the set of all sets containing things, the null set is not a part of it.

 

[quatona]

I disagree. It's a very natural question and is certainly not an invalid one.

It´s only valid if the "reason for everything that exists" does not exist itself. Else you are assuming that something can exist without an external reason, and that would make your question - suggesting that there must be an external reason for everything - obsolete:

 

[Sojourner<><]

It´s only valid if the "reason for everything that exists" does not exist itself. Else you are assuming that something can exist without an external reason, and that would make your question - suggesting that there must be an external reason for everything - obsolete:

No... I don't think that it does. No matter where your line of logic leads, everything that exists still exists and anybody who wants to can still wonder why.

 

[quatona]

No... I don't think that it does. No matter where your line of logic leads, everything that exists still exists and anybody who wants to can still wonder why.

This is not my line of logic. It is basic logic. Once you would have found a reason for everything that exists you would consequently have to ask what the reason is for this reason to exist. And so forth.
Your question suggests that everything that exists must have a reason, whilst every potential answer would violate exactly that premise.

Of course wondering about you whatever you want is your prerogative. It doesn´t make it a meaningful question, though.

While we are at it What´s in the mirror if nobody looks into it?

 

[Lucretius]

Yes, I agree. I wasn't arguing that Christian metaphysics is valid because it helped give birth to science; I am saying that science doesn't depend on naturalism for its validity. The senses are ever changing and yet, science assumes a unity behind the changing senses. Under naturalism there is no reason to make that assumption except on the basis that is seems to work.

The sensitivity of the senses may change; but the fact that they only interact with the natural remains an unchanged — and unchangeable — fact. This comes out of how senses work. They interact with their environment in order to tell us somethin about the environment. Photon interactions with my eyes allow me to see — photons are natural. Atoms latch onto sense receptors in my nose, sending messages to my brain allowing me to smell. The same goes for the rest of the senses. Some sort of natural occurence is required in order for me to sense something. The supernatural cannot be definition be sensed!

But this whole discussion and naturalism itself does not rest on inductive reasoning, it rests on deduction. Eventually, without deduction, you have no content at all. Throw out deduction you throw out language and math. I can see the point of, say, something like light where our earlier definition was flawed which lead to a apparent contradiction. Once the definition was fixed, the apparent contradiction disappeared. By that situation is entirely different from this situation. This situation deals with the very nature of the naturalistic hypothesis and the fact that it depends on fundamental principles which, not that it can't explain, but that it explicitly excludes from its metaphysic. If I start with naturalism, I end with determinism. there is not way around that chain. It’s not a case of observation purifying definitions; it’s a case of the possible vs. the impossible.

I disagree that naturalism isn't based on inductive reasoning. It may seem deductive because we have observed the natural world for so long we are nigh 100% sure of it's being solely naturalistic, and it would be impossible to detect the supernatural BUT we still base our understanding of the world from what we experience. I suppose we can deductively prove that detection of the supernatural is impossible, leaving only detection of the natural but naturalism is a product of our senses. It's the logical conclusion we reach after having lived in the universe with the senses we have. We seem to be straying off topic by bringing in determinism — originally we were arguing about the methodology of science. Science MUST operate under the guise of naturalism; otherwise it tells us nothing. Try building a fridge or heat engine without knowledge of thermodynamics, laws which were derived from experience — experience derived from our senses — which, as I showed above, must be given to us by natural things. Naturalism may in the end be an "assumption", but the ONLY logical one.

 

[Eudaimonist]

But looking at it philosophically, from outside, so to speak, why is there nothing rather than something is an equally valid question. After all, either nothing or something has to exist. Why is one more likely than the other?

I think that is a good point.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Asimov]

I think that is a good point.


eudaimonia,

Mark

What it points to is a good question...

 

[MorkandMindy]

I guess what I am trying to say is that wondering why there is something other than nothing is a bit silly. Even if there was nothing, the question would still be why? (I know that it could not be asked, but philsophically it is just as much of a problem).

Because in space/time nothing is an exact amount and our universe isn't that precise at the elementary particle level.

 

[MorkandMindy]

I just this moment started to wonder if all properties we deal with in every day life are actually emergent properties.

 

[Silenus]

Science MUST operate under the guise of naturalism; otherwise it tells us nothing. Try building a fridge or heat engine without knowledge of thermodynamics, laws which were derived from experience — experience derived from our senses — which, as I showed above, must be given to us by natural things. Naturalism may in the end be an "assumption", but the ONLY logical one.

I don’t agree with this statement. Not being a metaphysical naturalist doesn't impede my application of the laws of thermodynamics one bit. And, again, there are things I see in existence upon which naturalism depends but which naturalism can't account for. Since we seem to be going in circles, I’m going to phone a friend. My friend, to ensure your consideration of his points, will be an atheist. I introduce Mr. Bertrand Russell.

There is to be no science unless there is a widespread instinctive conviction in the existence in the order of things. Science could only be created by men who already held this belief, and therefore, the original source was pre-scientific . . .

This is my basic point about the metaphysical origins of science proper. now, here he deals with my point that science has become anti-metaphysical despite the fact that it needs metaphysics.

As the particular is studied in the hope that it might throw light onto the general.

It (science) has remained predominantly an anti-rationalistic movement, based upon a naive faith. What reasoning it has required has been borrowed from mathematics following the deductive method

If you abandon the metaphysics, the belief in an ordered universe becomes faith. Now Russell talks about the difficulty I have been trying to point out . . .

Science is agreeable through the power it gives in manipulating our environment . . . It is disagreeable because it creates a determinism which seems to lesson human power

If all is cause and effect, so is our mental processes and our rationality.

Russell continues . . .

If we emphasize the fact that our belief in causality and induction is irrational, we must infer that we do not know science to be true, that it may, at any moment, cease to give us control over the environment . . . If we admit the claims of the scientific method, we cannot avoid the conclusion that causality and induction are applicable to human volition.

Russell concludes

The outcome seems to be that, though the rational justification of science in inadequate, there is no method for severing what is pleasant for what is unpleasant . . . we can do so by refusing to face the logic of the situation, but, if so, we shall dry up the impulse to scientific discovery at its source, which is the desire to understand the world.

This is my point.

Quotes taken from the Will To Doubt by Bertrand Russell

 

[David Gould]

To start science, we need to assume that the universe is comprehensible to some degree.

However, once we have started, we find that the universe is comprehensible to some degree.

As such, I do not see the problem. While we have to make the initial assumption in order to commence work, if the universe was not comprehensible to some degree, science would not work.

I also do not agree that determinism is disagreeable. It may be disagreeable to the vast majority of humans, but I do not have a problem with it.

With regard to causality, can you paraphrase what you think Russell is saying here, as I do not really know.

 

[Lucretius]

Silenus,

I'm very familiar with Bertrand Russell. You're right about natural law: it cannot explain itself. What you don't seem to realize is this: your answer of "God" is no better than my answer of "tooth fairy" or "Santa" or "<insert name of mythical being here>". Why does there have to be an origin to natural law? And if there does: how would we ever know there is one or what it is? We can't empirically test for something that would create nature without making arbitrary claims about what the evidence should look like, because we really have no way of knowing. What reason do we have for assuming an origin for natural laws in the first place?

 

[ExistencePrecedesEssence]

I don’t agree with this statement. Not being a metaphysical naturalist doesn't impede my application of the laws of thermodynamics one bit. And, again, there are things I see in existence upon which naturalism depends but which naturalism can't account for. Since we seem to be going in circles, I’m going to phone a friend. My friend, to ensure your consideration of his points, will be an atheist. I introduce Mr. Bertrand Russell.




This is my basic point about the metaphysical origins of science proper. now, here he deals with my point that science has become anti-metaphysical despite the fact that it needs metaphysics.



If you abandon the metaphysics, the belief in an ordered universe becomes faith. Now Russell talks about the difficulty I have been trying to point out . . .



Russell continues . . .



Russell concludes



This is my point.

Quotes taken from the Will To Doubt by Bertrand Russell

Didnt Russell emphasize totally insane ideas that were in no way true also?

 

[Silenus]

I also do not agree that determinism is disagreeable. It may be disagreeable to the vast majority of humans, but I do not have a problem with it.

With regard to causality, can you paraphrase what you think Russell is saying here, as I do not really know.]

I can't say exactly what Russell is saying here because I don't remember him expounding on it in detail. He was saying that naturalism requires that all activity, material or non-material, is subject to cause and effect analysis. I quoted Russell just to add some new words that are not my own and a new approach to the topic. What I think it reduces down to is that, if naturalism is correct, all is cause and effect, even our so-called independent rational thoughts. However, rational thoughts are only relevant if ground and consequence relationships exist, which they cannot in a naturalistic universe, because all is cause and effect. Therefore, the very basis of rationality, consciousness, and our beliefs about man no longer have ontological foundation. Furthermore, naturalistic metaphysics rests on man, at some point, being able to make ground and consequence arguments which naturalism itself cannot account for. So, inductive reasoning, within a naturalistic framework, is a belief of faith. In the end, under naturalism, our discussion on this forum is equivalent to two bottles fizzing at different velocities. I’ll get back to you about my thoughts on determinism. But, just to get the ball rolling, without free will, how do you view things like justice and government? Also, if determinism is true, how do we deal with disagreement?

Why does there have to be an origin to natural law? And if there does: how would we ever know there is one or what it is? We can't empirically test for something that would create nature without making arbitrary claims about what the evidence should look like, because we really have no way of knowing. What reason do we have for assuming an origin for natural laws in the first place?

Its not a matter of the origin of natural law. In fact, I’m not talking about origins at all. Neither is Russell talking about origins, he's talking about the fact that a purely naturalistic metaphysic contradicts itself. Also, just because the tests of God aren’t empirical, doesn't mean there aren’t ways to validate things. There were methods of validation long before the scientific method came into the field of knowledge. The claims of any religion can be tested according to correspondence theory, consistency within the so-called "revelation," or metaphysical statements provided. I don't accept or reject naturalism or supernaturalism according to empirical evidence, but according to the above methods. You accept naturalism because it seems to be the simplest explanation (using Occam’s razor which is a non-empirical method of knowledge) . . . I don't because I think it is self-contradictory. Religions make claims, and those claims can be verified historically, logically, and, yes, some of them empirically. Empiricism, as far as theories of knowledge are concerned, is late in the game and is based on one of these other theories of knowledge. Furthermore, atheism isn’t a scientific given because science is necessarily open-minded and only derives its facts from sound physical evidence. I would think anybody using the arguments you used would be agnostic. Absence of evidence is not the same as evidence of absence.

I don't think the god of the gaps explanation accounts for all spiritual explanations of the universe, and definitely not the Christian one.

And yes, I was not quoting Russell to endorse Russell. I was quoting him because he said something coherent on this particular topic and I thought it would be good to get other words that weren't my own. He did have some beliefs I don’t like, obviously.

Finally, “existence,” did you see my last question to you mixed in with a post to lucritus? You made some statements earlier on phenomenology, so I asked what you thought the relationship was between being and becoming? I don’t know if you saw it because it was buried in a post to Lucritus.

 

[jeff992]

Silenus,

I'm very familiar with Bertrand Russell. You're right about natural law: it cannot explain itself. What you don't seem to realize is this: your answer of "God" is no better than my answer of "tooth fairy" or "Santa" or "<insert name of mythical being here>". Why does there have to be an origin to natural law? And if there does: how would we ever know there is one or what it is? We can't empirically test for something that would create nature without making arbitrary claims about what the evidence should look like, because we really have no way of knowing. What reason do we have for assuming an origin for natural laws in the first place?

We can assume that there was an origin for natural law and the universe itself. The reason for this is that inifinity does not exist in in this reality, as David Hilbert, for example, asserts. Because of this and the fact that we live in a cause-effect universe, we know that there must be an initial cause. Therefore, the origin of natural law is contingent upon some sort of inifinite being that existed outside of our time with characteristics that are consistent with most concepts of what "god' (general term) is. He would have created natural law from the "outside" if you will.

 

[David Gould]

We can assume that there was an origin for natural law and the universe itself. The reason for this is that inifinity does not exist in in this reality, as David Hilbert, for example, asserts.

Did Hilbert actually test this assertion?

Because of this and the fact that we live in a cause-effect universe, we know that there must be an initial cause.

We do not live in a cause-effect universe. Quantum mechanics suggests that either there are things without causes or that causes need not come before effects. We could live in an effect-cause universe ...

Therefore, the origin of natural law is contingent upon some sort of inifinite being that existed outside of our time with characteristics that are consistent with most concepts of what "god' (general term) is. He would have created natural law from the "outside" if you will.

What does 'outside time' mean?
Why do you assume that an infinite being is logically possible if you assert that such a thing cannot exist in our universe?