The Saving results of the Death of Christ !

[Fervent]

You say, "the only condition required to make salvation possible is the Father's action." Great! Agreed. Does the Father's action succeed in making salvation possible? Or can it fail in making salvation possible?

Of course it makes salvation possible, and cannot fail in making salvation possible because it is nothing but the presence of a drawing that makes salvation possible.

You seem to want to say the former. Yet you also seem to want to say the Father's drawing can fail. What is the Father's drawing, according to John 6:44?

I want to say no such thing, and the fact that you had to ask a different question shows I have addressed your original question. You complain about an Abbot and Costello routine, but why did you feel the need to change your question if it wasn't addressed as stated?

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

Of course it makes salvation possible, and cannot fail in making salvation possible because it is nothing but the presence of a drawing that makes salvation possible.

Thank you! So the drawing does not fail, correct? The drawing is an enabling activity which makes salvation possible. The Father's act of drawing actually brings a person from οὐδεὶς δύναται (one position) to δύναται (a different position).

In other words, ἑλκύω describes an effectual change of position -- NOT from "able to come" to "irresistibly does so" (I have not once argued this), but from "unable to come" to "able to come."

This is why arguing about the semantics of ἑλκύω is irrelevant. It has nothing to do with the question of whether or not those drawn actually come. That is a different question that does not concern semantics. If we can finally agree that ἑλκύω refers to actual movement from the state of "inability" to the state of "ability," and that only, then we can move on to the next question... that being the identity of the one "raised," and how that relates to being drawn.

I want to say no such thing, and the fact that you had to ask a different question shows I have addressed your original question. You complain about an Abbot and Costello routine, but why did you feel the need to change your question if it wasn't addressed as stated?

Which question did I change? Quote me. I have not changed a thing throughout our conversation.

 

[Fervent]

Thank you! So the drawing does not fail, correct? The drawing is an enabling activity which makes salvation possible. The Father's act of drawing actually brings a person from οὐδεὶς δύναται (one position) to δύναται (a different position).

No, I wouldn't classify it as a change in position.

In other words, ἑλκύω describes an effectual change of position -- NOT from "able to come" to "irresistibly does so" (I have not once argued this), but from "unable to come" to "able to come."

Nope, it doesn't change the position...it is the act of drawing itself which creates the possibility, not any metaphysical change in the object being drawn.

This is why arguing about the semantics of ἑλκύω is irrelevant. It has nothing to do with the question of whether or not those drawn actually come. That is a different question that does not concern semantics. If we can finally agree that ἑλκύω refers to actual movement from the state of "inability" to the state of "ability," and that only, then we can move on to the next question... that being the identity of the one "raised," and how that relates to being drawn.

So why did you spend such energy arguing the semantics?

Which question did I change? Quote me. I have not changed a thing throughout our conversation.

You went from

If that act, "the Father draws," can fail, how is one able to come?

to:

making salvation possible? Or can it fail in making salvation possible?

One conditions the presence of drawing on the success of the act, and the other speaks only to whether the drawing is what makes salvation a possibility. These are not the same question.

 

[fhansen]

Respectfully, I'm not here for your entertainment. I've specifically challenged you on this already and you've not engaged that argument. If you are unwilling to do so, that says enough about the strength of your position.

This reads:

"If he is able, then he has been drawn, and I will raise him up on the last day."

Compare that to what you said:

"All who come have been drawn, and I will raise them up on the last day." (My emphasis)

Your paraphrase collapses ability (q) into actual coming, thereby reading into the verse what John did not say. Yes, of course those who come have been drawn (theologically true), but the grammar of John 6:44 is not framed as "those who come"; it is framed as "those who are made able to come." The final clause then identifies the enabled person as the one Christ will raise.

But how is that different from my statement, "All who come have been drawn [enabled to come]..."
And of course only enabled persons will come but the verse does not insist or mandate that all who are enabled will come. Grace makes a real change in the person: they are now able to come. Grace is not irresistible.

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

Nope, it doesn't change the position...it is the act of drawing itself which creates the possibility, not any metaphysical change in the object being drawn.

No, δύναμαι is not an atmospheric term. It is a predicate of the person. Someone either is able or is not able. That's an expression of an actual capacity possessed or not possessed by the person -- two positions, or states -- not a mere external "possibility" detached from the subject.

So why did you spend such energy arguing the semantics?

Because you (and fhansen, first) found it relevant. I was responding to fhansen's comments on semantics, making the point that it's not relevant to the issue. You then chose to chime in, so I responded to you as well. In my first response to you, I explicitly distinguished the relevance of the semantics from what my argument is.

One conditions the presence of drawing on the success of the act, and the other speaks only to whether the drawing is what makes salvation a possibility. These are not the same question.

They are the same question. You're misrepresenting what the question entails. You're claiming:

Question A ("If drawing can fail, how is one able to come?") supposedly assumes drawing exists only if it succeeds.
Question B ("Does the drawing succeed in making salvation possible, or can it fail in making salvation possible?") supposedly asks whether drawing accomplishes its stated effect.

Thus, you're alleging I switched from one concern (drawing depends on success) to another (drawing achieves possibility). Am I understanding you correctly?

If so, you're still not seeing the point. Both questions are the same question, from two angles. The first question is, what does John say drawing does? What is the drawing act of the Father in John 6:44? The second question merely asks, does that act actually produce the result John attributes to it -- ability?

If drawing is the necessary condition for ability, then the only meaningful question is, does drawing accomplish that? If it doesn't, the verse is false. If it does, then drawing is by definition effectual in the limited sense that it produces ability.

I have not conditioned "the presence of drawing on its success." I have conditioned the truth of John's conditional on its success. You're accusing me of changing the question because you're trying to avoid the logic of the text. Both questions I asked are the same: Does the Father's drawing accomplish the effect John assigns to it -- actual ability? If you say drawing can fail to produce ability, then you've denied the conditional John wrote. If you say drawing always produces ability, then your claim that drawing does not effect movement collapses.

 

[Dikaioumenoi]

But how is that different from my statement, "All who come have been drawn [enabled to come]..."
And of course only enabled persons will come but the verse does not insist or mandate that all who are enabled will come. Grace makes a real change in the person: they are now able to come. Grace is not irresistible.

I don't know how to be any clearer with you. You still continue to conflate a very clear distinction I have repeatedly been making since the very start of our conversation: ἑλκύω does not concern the question of irresistible grace. The semantics of that term is NOT what the Calvinist argument is based on.

What do you not understand about this?

The point is that if you define ἑλκύω in a way the implicitly includes the idea of fallibility, then the Father's act of enabling a person to come to Christ can fail, because ἑλκύω IS that act of enablement.

 

[Fervent]

No, δύναμαι is not an atmospheric term. It is a predicate of the person. Someone either is able or is not able. That's an expression of an actual capacity possessed or not possessed by the person -- two positions, or states -- not a mere external "possibility" detached from the subject.

Capability does not imply metaphysical status, the positional change is accountable by the act of drawing itself and not a change in the object of that drawing. If I say "It is only possible to get to Catalina Island by boat" I am not implying that something changes about Catalina Island when I get in a boat. You are once again imposing your framework on the text.

Because you (and fhansen, first) found it relevant. I was responding to fhansen's comments on semantics, making the point that it's not relevant to the issue. You then chose to chime in, so I responded to you as well. In my first response to you, I explicitly distinguished the relevance of the semantics from what my argument is.

My response was to you presenting the semantics as an argument.

They are the same question. You're misrepresenting what the question entails. You're claiming:

Nope, they are quite different because one conditions the possibility on the success of the drawing, and the other simply deas in the possibility of success. Though perhaps you meant the latter with the former, they are not the same question.

Question A ("If drawing can fail, how is one able to come?") supposedly assumes drawing exists only if it succeeds.
Question B ("Does the drawing succeed in making salvation possible, or can it fail in making salvation possible?") supposedly asks whether drawing accomplishes its stated effect.

Yes, the first denies that the drawing happens if it isn't succcessful by conditioning the possibility on success, the latter simply delineates possibility(though not how that possibility comes about) They're different questions.

Thus, you're alleging I switched from one concern (drawing depends on success) to another (drawing achieves possibility). Am I understanding you correctly?

Yes,

If so, you're still not seeing the point. Both questions are the same question, from two angles. The first question is, what does John say drawing does? What is the drawing act of the Father in John 6:44? The second question merely asks, does that act actually produce the result John attributes to it -- ability?

"Ability" is a rather vague term, and speaking to the creation of a possibility is not the same as conditioning possibility on success.

If drawing is the necessary condition for ability, then the only meaningful question is, does drawing accomplish that? If it doesn't, the verse is false. If it does, then drawing is by definition effectual in the limited sense that it produces ability.

Again, "ability" is a vague term that you seem to be loading with theological import that it need not have.

I have not conditioned "the presence of drawing on its success." I have conditioned the truth of John's conditional on its success. You're accusing me of changing the question because you're trying to avoid the logic of the text. Both questions I asked are the same: Does the Father's drawing accomplish the effect John assigns to it -- actual ability? If you say drawing can fail to produce ability, then you've denied the conditional John wrote. If you say drawing always produces ability, then your claim that drawing does not effect movement collapses.

You're simply trying to backload your theological presuppositions into the verse. The questions aren't the same, though given what you've elaborated I can see how you would consider them close enough.

 

[fhansen]

I don't know how to be any clearer with you. You still continue to conflate a very clear distinction I have repeatedly been making since the very start of our conversation: ἑλκύω does not concern the question of irresistible grace. The semantics of that term is NOT what the Calvinist argument is based on.

What do you not understand about this?

The point is that if you define ἑλκύω in a way the implicitly includes the idea of fallibility, then the Father's act of enabling a person to come to Christ can fail, because ἑλκύω IS that act of enablement.

Ok, so bear with me on this if you will. We agree that ἑλκύω, itself, allows for resistance: a person can resist and thwart the enablement, can refuse to act on it themselves. The word does not imply an act that cannot be resisited, an act that must be completed. That implication comes from the fact that God raises those who've come. Is that correct?