What do you say to anti-theists on the formation of the universe?

[Fervent]

Yes, we are. And the physical tests to be used to verify its existence. Tests that will give verifiable and repeatable results.

Given the context and subtext, the dragon is an analogue and not the true focus of the conversation. And the only reason to deny as much is to avoid dealing with the category mistake involved in such an analogue.

I personally accept the results that those who I trust (see previous posts about this) have verified. Gee, you're making this a lot more complicated than it actually is.

I'm simply presenting skeptical hypotheses, didn't you make a blanket affirmation of skepticism? Now it's "complicated"?

I do. But it's tiresome to keep prefacing everything with 'As far as I know, from the evidence available so far...'etc etc

Considering you're not a solipsist, and I doubt you would take solipsism seriously, you clearly don't doubt everything. If you truly did, you'd have to confront Munchaussen's trilemma, and if you have a solution to it the floor is yours.

See previous posts.

Previous posts say nothing, other than that you accept "peer review" which simply moves the question up a level considering there are numerous journals of varying quality which requires some expertise in the field to distinguish which journals are reliable and which are full of nonsense. So how do you determine what sources are trustworthy without simply trusting the word of some stranger or institution?

Maybe this is where your problem lies. You don't want people trying to prove something that they want to be proved. You want people to disprove it. It's what most scientists do. Look for faults in existing theories.

Not quite, I'm expecting those who build their worldview around a metaphysical framework and then insist on a methodology that only considers things that are amenable to that framework to defend their framework philosophically. I honestly am not invested in what other people believe, that's their business. Though when they enter into a disccussion pretending to have something to say, only to resort to a plea of ignorance(agnosticism) when asked to back up their position I can't help but marvel at the dishonesty.

Be careful please...I'm giving you a lot of leeway here.

I'm only being plain, I have no respect for you because you engage in intellectually dishonest pretzel logic on a regular basis.

 

[SelfSim]

Not quite, I'm expecting those who build their worldview around a metaphysical framework and then insist on a methodology that only considers things that are amenable to that framework to defend their framework philosophically.

Achem .. (throat clearing from the peanut gallery ..).
The science I understand doesn't know whether the metaphysical framework is necessary or sufficient for ruling things out, but if we follow such a framework/methodolgy and it reveals things with a clarity that wasn't available by any other way we know of, (for the purpose of achieving practical utility and progress in some inquiry), then its a better bet than any other known way.
No-one says its perfect ... namely because it doesn't have to be perfect.

 

[Larniavc]

That sounds like a rather biased claim.

Hard to believe given my previous evidence.

 

[Larniavc]

I pointed out that there was a field dig and they found that at a point in time people living in Israel no longer ate pork, so no more pork bones, only sheep. And they began to use another type of pottery creation. People have seen a place on a mountain in Sinai, with evidence of water running out, that was milky with minerals in it. But that is like nothing to my scientismic fellows.

They are claims not evidence.

 

[Larniavc]

Neuroscience and QM do offer quite a number of scientific challenges to materialism,

No they don’t. Exclaim how they do?

 

[Larniavc]

The hostility towards philosophy and metaphysics that is en vogue in academia only serves to reify the scientific model by adding metaphysical restrictions without due criticism.

Often because in a effort to stay relevant philosophy insists inserting itself n areas where it’s relevance has ended.

Very much like religion or that annoying family member you don’t want to sit next to.

 

[GoldenKingGaze]

They are claims not evidence.

What evidence is there that the Exodus took place?

 

[GoldenKingGaze]

For one scientist discovering and understanding DNA explains why things are as is, and means there is no more need to believe in God. But another perhaps in the same room, DNA means to him that God must exist.

 

[Larniavc]

What evidence is there that the Exodus took place?

None.

 

[Hans Blaster]

And how is "the natural" defined?

Natural: what is not supernatural.

(I see a few fine distinctions ahead, so maybe you should define it since you used it.)

Sure they are, their faith is in materialist metaphysics that they justify circularly through methodological materialism.

That anti-theists typically rely on circular reasoning? It's not me who needs to recognize.

Is metaphysics really a "faith"?

Since you deflected from it, do you not assume the bible is true (generally)?

You should also define what you mean by "anti-theist". Your argument depends on it.

Sure there is, Libet's experiments, commisutory studies, Penfield's experiments all fit more comfortably with aa dualist framework but metaphysical baggage biases the field from being able to follow the evidence wherever it leads.

Don't know who Libet and Penfield are or what their experiments were. Nor, what a "commisutory study" could even be. What are the two things in this "dualist framework" you mention. You references lack context.

Oh? Then why do materialists now retreat to a less-specified "physicalism" rather than mainting historic materialism?

I think we're going to need a few definitions on your usage here, because these sound like different words to say the same thing as each other to me (and to "naturalism").

QM makes the typical claims of spatial extension untenable, as well as the notion that there is a fundamental physical to call "matter".

Is quantum field theory confusing you?

Materialism has been undermined by QM by exposing that atomistic models aren't true and that the universe may very well be infinitely divided.

Citation needed and a definition of what *you* mean by "infinitely divided".

That is also not considering the role that the observor plays in QM with challenges to mterialism like Wigner's friend.

Methinks you may need to learn what an "observer" is in QM.

It's quite clear that metaphysics plays far more of a role in interpretating the evidence than naturalists are willing to admit, so they rely on a circular argument pointing to metaphysical naturalism to defend methodological naturalism and then defending methodological naturalistm on the metaphysics. It's a position that is impervious to evidential correction, and describing it as faith seems perfectly appropriate to me.

I have no interest in adding meta to my physics. As for methodological naturalism, all you really need to support it is that it works.

 

[SelfSim]

For one scientist discovering and understanding DNA explains why things are as is, and means there is no more need to believe in God. But another perhaps in the same room, DNA means to him that God must exist.

I suppose.
Such is the nature of belief, eh?

 

[Fervent]

Natural: what is not supernatural.

(I see a few fine distinctions ahead, so maybe you should define it since you used it.)

That's not really a definition, and I'm not the one restricting explanations to a certain category. So how do you define natural?

Is metaphysics really a "faith"?

Depends on how faith is defined. If we mean it as a largely irrevocable a priori belief, then I would certainly call it as much.

Since you deflected from it, do you not assume the bible is true (generally)?

My view of the Bible is that it is subject to ordinary errors of human documents, but through it the Word of God is made manifest. So yes and no.

You should also define what you mean by "anti-theist". Your argument depends on it.

An anti-theist is someone who opposes religious belief, a religious skeptic.

Don't know who Libet and Penfield are or what their experiments were. Nor, what a "commisutory study" could even be. What are the two things in this "dualist framework" you mention. You references lack context.

Libet's experiments were where he used fMRI data to measure people's decision to push a button, and then in the second stage he asked them to veto the decision as soon as they decided. In the first case, there was brain activity. But the vero added no further veto. Commusitory studies are where hemispheres are surgically disconnected, which if materialism was true should have severed consciousness but it did not. Penfield was a neurosurgeon who did a lot of brain mapping, and while he could trigger concrete actions by stimulating the brain was unable to trigger abstract thinking or novel beliefs. All of these hint that there is more to mind than can be explained on the basis of the brain alone, but due to metaphysical biases they are distorted.

I think we're going to need a few definitions on your usage here, because these sound like different words to say the same thing as each other to me (and to "naturalism").\

And the fact that you recognize no distinction shows how blind you are to your own metaphysical beliefs.

Is quantum field theory confusing you?

It's not about understanding or not understanding, but that the more we learn the less classic definitons of materialism fit. Extension in spacce doesn't really make sense for quantum fields, and it appears that fields themselves are not fundamental. The physicalist notion that there is a fundamental physical unit appears to be indefensible, and the only reason "physicalism" persists is because it is nebulously defined by those who commit themselves to the belief. I

Citation needed and a definition of what *you* mean by "infinitely divided".

Methinks you may need to learn what an "observer" is in QM.

I'm quite aware that the "observer" is theoretically non-concscious, but that is an ad hoc condition that isn't really an intelligible concept.

I have no interest in adding meta to my physics. As for methodological naturalism, all you really need to support it is that it works.

I'd rather be a scientifically informed philosopher than a philosophically illiterate scientist.

 

[Fervent]

Often because in a effort to stay relevant philosophy insists inserting itself n areas where it’s relevance has ended.

Seems to me the hostility is more because philosophy asks people to defend things that they have no defense for, so being hostile towards it allows them to preserve notions of knowledge that aren't as solid as they think.

 

[SelfSim]

Seems to me the hostility is more because philosophy asks people to defend things that they have no defense for, so being hostile towards it allows them to preserve notions of knowledge that aren't as solid as they think.

The only 'things' we're talking about in this sub-conversation are 'metaphysical things', yes(?)
When these are viewed with neutrality by scientific thinkers, philosophical 'intrusions' about them are irrelevant, (ie: until they become objectively testable).
'Hostility' is an expression of emotions .. (which is perhaps motivated by annoyance .. caused by the irrelevancy).

 

[Fervent]

The only 'things' we're talking about in this sub-conversation are 'metaphysical things', yes(?)
When these are viewed with neutrality by scientific thinkers, philosophical 'intrusions' about them are irrelevant, (ie: until they become objectively testable).
'Hostility' is an expression of emotions .. (which is perhaps motivated by annoyance .. caused by the irrelevancy).

Scientific thinkers aren't neutral, and their biases and limits common to humanity bleed into their understanding and theory building. The general disdain for philosophy serves to insulate them from critically assessing the metaphysical understanding they bring to their conclusions. The idealization of science as a neutral investigation of phenomena free from a priori commitments is a false impression. The supposed "irrelevancy" appears to me to be more motivated by being confronted with questions that those who have defined themselves in terms of believing "science" don't want to answer since they pretend they have no a priori beliefs. The metaphysical idea of "objective testability" is itself a philosophic position, and is only a small part of how science actually operates. Philosophy raises questions that those who have an emotionl attachment to scientific positivism don't want raised because there is no defense for such positivism.

 

[Hans Blaster]

That's not really a definition, and I'm not the one restricting explanations to a certain category. So how do you define natural?

What conforms to the (natural) regular laws of physics. So far that includes space time, the "four forces", and a few provisional things like dark matter and dark energy.

Depends on how faith is defined. If we mean it as a largely irrevocable a priori belief, then I would certainly call it as much.

What about that which is believed without and often counter to evidence. Or religion.

My view of the Bible is that it is subject to ordinary errors of human documents, but through it the Word of God is made manifest. So yes and no.

I'll keep that in mind if it ever becomes relevant.

An anti-theist is someone who opposes religious belief, a religious skeptic.

First those two things are not the same. A religious skeptic would be someone who is skeptical (distrustful) of the claims of religions and wants proof of their truth or efficacy. Someone opposed to religion might have many reasons for doing so, such as concerns that religions cause harm. Neither of these require or imply belief that no gods exist, which is the typical definition used for "anti-theist" (also sometimes called a "strong" or "hard" atheist.) These two groups overlap with many people being in both, but they are not the same. (I am anti-religion and skeptical of religion, because I find no evidence for the truth claims of religion and see the harm. While, I've not seen any evidence *for* a god, and suspect that most of the human worshiped gods couldn't exist, I cannot demonstrate that no possible gods could exist, so I do not make that claim.)

I suspect the OPer intended "anti-theist" in the "claims there is no god(s)" sense.

Libet's experiments were where he used fMRI data to measure people's decision to push a button, and then in the second stage he asked them to veto the decision as soon as they decided. In the first case, there was brain activity. But the vero added no further veto.

fMRI is known to be a bit "fuzzy" and doesn't show many things. In this second stage, did the experimenter tell the subject *before* to immediately change their minds or did he wait until after they had decided but before they announce the decision to change it?

Commusitory studies are where hemispheres are surgically disconnected, which if materialism was true should have severed consciousness but it did not.

I don't know what a "severed consciousness" is, but I am aware of split-brain studies where one hemisphere is unaware of what the other is thinking until it does something.

Penfield was a neurosurgeon who did a lot of brain mapping, and while he could trigger concrete actions by stimulating the brain was unable to trigger abstract thinking or novel beliefs. All of these hint that there is more to mind than can be explained on the basis of the brain alone, but due to metaphysical biases they are distorted.

Do neuroscientists really think there is a "consciousness" locus like the various loci for motor responses?

And the fact that you recognize no distinction shows how blind you are to your own metaphysical beliefs.

Umm, no. That fact that I use them interchangeably indicates that I neither know nor care what distinction you make between natural/physical/material. If you'd like to tell me what distinction you make, I can try to accommodate that usage for this thread, but until then I'll continue to use them interchangeably and expect no complaints.

It's not about understanding or not understanding, but that the more we learn the less classic definitons of materialism fit.

Then maybe you need a proper definition, instead of one that doesn't account for material stuff as we know it.

Extension in spacce doesn't really make sense for quantum fields, and it appears that fields themselves are not fundamental.

Says whom?

The physicalist notion that there is a fundamental physical unit appears to be indefensible, and the only reason "physicalism" persists is because it is nebulously defined by those who commit themselves to the belief.

What do these "physicalists" mean by a "fundamental physical unit"?

I

I'm quite aware that the "observer" is theoretically non-concscious, but that is an ad hoc condition that isn't really an intelligible concept.

Huh? If you really are aware of it why do you think it is unintelligible or ad hoc? The only reason anyone thinks the observer is conscious is because the first explanations (a century ago) of how interaction affected entangle quantum states involved experiments where humans did or did not insert a probing interaction with a system.

I'd rather be a scientifically informed philosopher than a philosophically illiterate scientist.

If you don't want to address science, but instead philosophy, I suggest a transfer to the philosophy section instead of the science section.

 

[SelfSim]

Scientific thinkers aren't neutral, and their biases and limits common to humanity bleed into their understanding and theory building. The general disdain for philosophy serves to insulate them from critically assessing the metaphysical understanding they bring to their conclusions. The idealization of science as a neutral investigation of phenomena free from a priori commitments is a false impression. The supposed "irrelevancy" appears to me to be more motivated by being confronted with questions that those who have defined themselves in terms of believing "science" don't want to answer since they pretend they have no a priori beliefs. The metaphysical idea of "objective testability" is itself a philosophic position, and is only a small part of how science actually operates. Philosophy raises questions that those who have an emotionl attachment to scientific positivism don't want raised because there is no defense for such positivism.

I use the term 'scientific thinker' as being, in part, a person sensitive to unevidenced (untestable) bias. Those who consider themselves this way can be called out on that, when any bias, (distinguished or undistinguished), is demonstrated.

Science occasionally runs with metaphysical assumptions in order to formulate testable hypotheses. What happens going forwards from that depends on the test evidence produced (and not the metaphysical assumptions). I can say this with assurance because metaphysical assumptions are distinguished as being untestable from the outset. The argument shifts to testability .. which is the method in action. The concept of the existence of 'a truth' in any assumption, is irrelevant in scientific thinking, yet that seems to be a major sticking point with science's detractors who tend to be sensitive about the existence of 'truths'.

What you see as 'positivism', I see as being a determination to pursue testing until objective consensus is achieved amongst others demonstrating a track record of objective scientific thinking. There's no need for defenses of philosophical concepts like 'positivisim' once the method is initiated. (I might concede here that its not always obvious when it is underway or how long it might last, mind you).

 

[Fervent]

What conforms to the (natural) regular laws of physics. So far that includes space time, the "four forces", and a few provisional things like dark matter and dark energy.

Bit of a circular definition, which is to say its no definition at all.

What about that which is believed without and often counter to evidence. Or religion.

That's not a definition that anyone who has faith would accept.

I'll keep that in mind if it ever becomes relevant.

Ok

First those two things are not the same. A religious skeptic would be someone who is skeptical (distrustful) of the claims of religions and wants proof of their truth or efficacy. Someone opposed to religion might have many reasons for doing so, such as concerns that religions cause harm. Neither of these require or imply belief that no gods exist, which is the typical definition used for "anti-theist" (also sometimes called a "strong" or "hard" atheist.) These two groups overlap with many people being in both, but they are not the same. (I am anti-religion and skeptical of religion, because I find no evidence for the truth claims of religion and see the harm. While, I've not seen any evidence *for* a god, and suspect that most of the human worshiped gods couldn't exist, I cannot demonstrate that no possible gods could exist, so I do not make that claim.)

They tend to overlap, so they can be functionally synonymous as far as I'm concerned.

I suspect the OPer intended "anti-theist" in the "claims there is no god(s)" sense.

fMRI is known to be a bit "fuzzy" and doesn't show many things. In this second stage, did the experimenter tell the subject *before* to immediately change their minds or did he wait until after they had decided but before they announce the decision to change it?

I'm not going to get into a detailed discussion across this forum, if you're interested in it you can google Libet's experiements and the conclusions that they made to see the experimental design.

I don't know what a "severed consciousness" is, but I am aware of split-brain studies where one hemisphere is unaware of what the other is thinking until it does something.

That's not true, the split-brain patients expierienced a unified field of consciousness and only had deficiencies in motor functions that were invisible except under specific experimental designs.

Do neuroscientists really think there is a "consciousness" locus like the various loci for motor responses?

There are multiple materialist theories of mind, all of which are contraindicated by experience and neuroscientific data. The mere existencce of such a variety of understandings speaks to the weakness of materialist models of mind. What all have in common is an insistence that mind is a product of the brain, and that commitment is from a metaphysical committment to materialism rather than due to what experimental data and experience demonstrate.

Umm, no. That fact that I use them interchangeably indicates that I neither know nor care what distinction you make between natural/physical/material. If you'd like to tell me what distinction you make, I can try to accommodate that usage for this thread, but until then I'll continue to use them interchangeably and expect no complaints.

Failing to make a distinction implies that you haven't developed your understanding and critically assessed its validity.

Then maybe you need a proper definition, instead of one that doesn't account for material stuff as we know it.

I'm not the one who is imposing a restriction on where explanations can lead. So perhaps you can offer a distinction that is testable and falsifiable?

Says whom?


What do these "physicalists" mean by a "fundamental physical unit"?


Huh? If you really are aware of it why do you think it is unintelligible or ad hoc? The only reason anyone thinks the observer is conscious is because the first explanations (a century ago) of how interaction affected entangle quantum states involved experiments where humans did or did not insert a probing interaction with a system.

It's unintelligible because the concept of a non-conscious observer is a self-contradictory concept. Observations require conscious observers, so in 3 of the 4 most tenable interpretations there is a need for a term that is only coherent with consciousness of some sort. Separating out observers from consciousness is an unintelligible concept, even if it is a mathematical construct.

If you don't want to address science, but instead philosophy, I suggest a transfer to the philosophy section instead of the science section.

I'm of the opinion that the two are inseparable, and philosophy of mind is a life science. Your unwillingness to engage in philosophical discussion simply appears to be an unwillingness to step out of your metaphysical assumptions about reality and submit them to scrutiny. Insisting that naturalist explanations are the only places science can go is nothing more than restricting what explanations are available, and disallowing going wherever the evidence may lead.

 

[Fervent]

I use the term 'scientific thinker' as being, in part, a person sensitive to unevidenced (untestable) bias. Those who consider themselves this way can be called out on that, when any bias, (distinguished or undistinguished), is demonstrated.

This is nonesense. "Scientific thinkers" wouldn't be opposed to philosophy if they were sensitive to biases and improper a priori commitments. It's quite apparent to me that many supposedly scientific thinkers are consensus thinkers, subject to peer pressures and other illicit commitments.

Science occasionally runs with metaphysical assumptions in order to formulate testable hypotheses. What happens going forwards from that depends on the test evidence produced (and not the metaphysical assumptions). I can say this with assurance because metaphysical assumptions are distinguished as being untestable from the outset. The argument shifts to testability .. which is the method in action. The concept of the existence of 'a truth' in any assumption, is irrelevant in scientific thinking, yet that seems to be a major sticking point with science's detractors who tend to be sensitive about the existence of 'truths'.

Methodologicl naturalism has metaphysical assumptions baked in, i.e. metaphysical naturalism. And metaphysical naturalists rely on methodological naturalism as support for their naturalism, without recognizing that all they are doing is begging the question. By pretending that there aren't metaphysical questions involved renders those metaphysics insulated from critical inquiry, which is the domain of philosophy.

What you see as 'positivism', I see as being a determination to pursue testing until objective consensus is achieved amongst others demonstrating a track record of objective scientific thinking. There's no need for defenses of philosophical concepts like 'positivisim' once the method is initiated. (I might concede here that its not always obvious when it is underway or how long it might last, mind you).

Objective consensus? Talk about an oxymoron. The notion that science is objective is highly questionable, and consensus is never objective. It's intersubjective at best. The very notion that science is objective, despite being mediated by the subjective, is an idealization that isn't sustainable when we get into the philosophical questions such as epistemics or ontological questions. This idealization only serves to insulaate metaphysical beliefs from criticism, the very opposite of what those committed to a scientific positivism claim to desire avoiding.

 

[SelfSim]

This is nonesense. "Scientific thinkers" wouldn't be opposed to philosophy if they were sensitive to biases and improper a priori commitments. It's quite apparent to me that many supposedly scientific thinkers are consensus thinkers, subject to peer pressures and other illicit commitments.

Methodologicl naturalism has metaphysical assumptions baked in, i.e. metaphysical naturalism. And metaphysical naturalists rely on methodological naturalism as support for their naturalism, without recognizing that all they are doing is begging the question. By pretending that there aren't metaphysical questions involved renders those metaphysics insulated from critical inquiry, which is the domain of philosophy.

Objective consensus? Talk about an oxymoron. The notion that science is objective is highly questionable, and consensus is never objective. It's intersubjective at best. The very notion that science is objective, despite being mediated by the subjective, is an idealization that isn't sustainable when we get into the philosophical questions such as epistemics or ontological questions. This idealization only serves to insulaate metaphysical beliefs from criticism, the very opposite of what those committed to a scientific positivism claim to desire avoiding.

And, yet again, you dig in on your fixed position ..

Brother, you come to a Physical and Life Sciences forum looking for support for philosophical positions based on the supposed existence of their posits held as being true, when science has no concept of truths?

Wrong place for it man!