Is Moral Neutrality a Myth?

[partinobodycular]

Everyone gets angry. You're no exception.

So you're equating those quotes with anger?

Answer me this then, is it possible to be displeased and exasperated with the actions of a child without being angry at them? I've never been angry with @Mountainmike, and he has probably never been angry with me either, exasperated, quite probably, but angry, I've never gotten that impression.

Perhaps we have a different understanding of the concept of anger.

Are you angry with me now?

 

[zippy2006]

So you're equating those quotes with anger?

Answer me this then, is it possible to be displeased and exasperated with the actions of a child without being angry at them? I've never been angry with @Mountainmike, and he has probably never been angry with me either, exasperated, quite probably, but angry, I've never gotten that impression.

It seems to me that after Mike implied that you were being irrational you got angry, questioned his grasp on reality, implied that he may be senile, and compared him to the infamous terrorist, Ted Kaczynski. This is pretty straightforward. It's beyond exasperation, although exasperation is also a form of mild anger. The "good grief" part of your post was exasperation.

In any case, the deeper point is that you responded to a perceived injustice with retaliation. I don't think it is remotely plausible that that post was free of anger, but it certainly wasn't free of a sense of injury, fault, and retaliation, which are sufficient in themselves for objective morality.

 

[partinobodycular]

It seems to me that after Mike implied that you were being irrational you got angry, questioned his grasp on reality, implied that he may be senile, and compared him to the infamous terrorist, Ted Kaczynski. This is pretty straightforward. It's beyond exasperation, although exasperation is also a form of mild anger. The "good grief" part of your post was exasperation.

In any case, the deeper point is that you responded to a perceived injustice with retaliation. I don't think it is remotely plausible that that post was free of anger, but it certainly wasn't free of a sense of injury, fault, and retaliation, which are sufficient in themselves for objective morality.

That's kosher, you can read into it whatever you want to, but you didn't answer my question, are you angry now?

 

[Moral Orel]

The most productive way to assess (2) is to ask ourselves, each time we get angry, whether we are being irrational. If the answer every time is 'yes', then moral subjectivism is in the clear. If we find on one occasion or another that the answer is 'no', then moral subjectivism is confronted with a problem.

Actually, I think verb tenses are super duper important here.

"...each time we have been angry, whether we were being irrational..." We need to assess things after we've calmed down.

But aside from that, what other reason could there be for me to say "no" other than me deciding that a wrong occurred, which would require proving moral objectivity.

 

[zippy2006]

But aside from that, what other reason could there be for me to say "no" other than me deciding that a wrong occurred, which would require proving moral objectivity.

I agree that justifying rational anger requires recognizing the occurrence of a wrong, but I think it is easier for people to see that not all of their anger is irrational, than to directly see that wrongs occur. The presence of anger is a prima facie case that you yourself already believe that a wrong has occurred.

...which would require proving moral objectivity.

Oh, I don't think that recognizing the existence of rational anger and wrong require a proof of objective morality. I think they require a recognition of objective morality. We recognize all sorts of things that we cannot prove, or at least that we cannot prove at the time of recognition.

I would say that it is a crucially important aspect of logical reasoning that we be able to recognize things before they are proven. Denying this truth befuddles the purpose of a syllogism, which is to move from what is better known to what is less known. Rational anger is something that I would suggest is best known.

...The other tack would have been to say that rational anger effects the proof of objective morality via premise (1). If I took that tack I would have asked what further thing you believe is required for "proving moral objectivity." Apparently you are claiming that objective morality must be proven independent of anger in order for anger to count as evidence for objective morality. That's fine - anger may not be a definitive demonstration, but it does suggest the existence of wrong and establish a thesis that should therefore be taken more seriously.

 

[Ana the Ist]

A neutral stance cannot exist because neutral actions do not exist. Any action is a choice to either support one or the other in a dispute say, and by choosing not to support either, you are in effect choosing to aid the stronger party. Similarly, by choosing to not consider morality, you are choosing to potentiate a certain outcome regardless. If I do nothing against child trafficking say, I am in effect potentiating its continuation.

This is a ridiculous position to hold.

You aren't responsible for the actions of othrrs.

To say that there is no nuetral behavior means that what you don't do (because you don't engage in far far more behaviors than you engage in) is by far the most important aspect of your behavior.

Imagine a man on trial for murdering a child....

Judge-You're being charged with child murder...

Defendant-You're honor, I'd like the charges dismissed, after all...think of the millions of children I didn't murder!

Jury- this man is practically a saint!

Another way to look at it, is the modern bugbear of environmentalism. I could stop using plastic cutlery, or choose to ignore the issue - in which case, I am of necessity still choosing sides.

Your actions determine what you're responsible for.

I don't see why this is an issue.

Ignoring the case of what the real morality is,

Real morality?

Any action you do, either wilful or in ommission, will have a moral sphere - whether you yourself place any weight to that consideration or not.

You are responsible for what you do....not what you don't do.

 

[Ana the Ist]

"I think I'm right" is an admission, sort of, of a subjective position. I have my reasons. My interlocutor may have their reasons. I may or may not be able to convince my interlocutor. They may or may not be able to convince me. There is nothing objective about this. There is nothing here absurd. We simply recognize that we each have a different opinion. The very fact of this renders morality subjective.

This is why I think "objective/subjective" is a distraction from real moral discourse. How does one make a moral choice? Again, saying there is objective morality solves nothing.

I think the problem arises from the self analysis of morality that most people, philosophers or otherwise, begin with.

I think people tend to imagine that they have a set of "values" regarding "behavior" that they hold....and these values are the cause of the emotional reaction to certain behavior.

It's a simple conception, but it's easy to grasp....and serves as a starting point.

The problem with such explanations is that they are hard to let go of. Simple to understand, emotionally satisfying, explains nothing about reality.

 

[zippy2006]

I think the problem arises from the self analysis of morality that most people, philosophers or otherwise, begin with.

I think people tend to imagine that they have a set of "values" regarding "behavior" that they hold....and these values are the cause of the emotional reaction to certain behavior.

It's a simple conception, but it's easy to grasp....and serves as a starting point.

The problem with such explanations is that they are hard to let go of. Simple to understand, emotionally satisfying, explains nothing about reality.

Like all of your recent posts, all you are doing here is giving bland, naked opinions without offering any sort of argumentation for those opinions. Such an approach is very far from rational; it is decidedly irrational. I will not be spending any more time responding to this empty posturing.

 

[Ana the Ist]

This raises a very good question, what exactly is a "morally neutral stance" and does such a thing actually exist? I must admit that I'm often guilty of taking a stance on something without actually understanding what it is that it's referring to, and this may be one of those instances.

So to understand my position on a "morally neutral stance" let me first explain what I think it's not. Some might consider that most animals have a morally neutral stance because they act without regard to that action's moral implications. But they do this simply because they lack a concept of good and evil which is indispensable to making such judgments. Therefore they're not morally neutral they're simply morally oblivious.

Likewise people are often morally oblivious as well when they act without fully understanding the implications of what they're doing. But in such cases we're not morally neutral, we're simply morally oblivious. In our ignorance we humans are often guilty, not only of being morally oblivious, but through our ignorance, of actually doing things which are morally wrong.

On the other hand let's consider two countries which are engaged in a dispute for some reason or other, with skirmishes and conflicts stretching back generations. Each side will likely claim the moral high ground, and point to history to justify their claim. In such a case an outside observer may well take a stance that's morally neutral, understanding that both the action being taken and the events that precipitated it are equally unjust. We as a species have long recognized that certain acts, although fundamentally immoral, are none the less justified if they are undertaken for a just cause. Which can inevitably lead us to taking a position that's morally neutral.

In other words these are actions, such as killing others, that we would never claim to be morally right, but we would accept as being morally justified.

Now I'm very open to differing opinions on this. So please give it some thought and let me know what you think.

Well I'm glad you explained that to @durangodawood...because I never would have guessed this is what you meant by morally nuetral.

By your description of "morally oblivious"...we can describe all moral judgements that way. You never have a perfect set of all knowledge regarding all the causes for or consequences of any act.

What you call morally nuetral I call moral hypocrisy....unless you refrain from describing these judgements as "values" that you "hold".

 

[Ana the Ist]

Like all of your recent posts, all you are doing here is giving bland, naked opinions without offering any sort of argumentation for those opinions.

Do you imagine you've done something else?

Such an approach is very far from rational; it is decidedly irrational. I will not be spending any more time responding to this empty posturing.

Would you like a list of philosophers who have considered morality as a "set of values" vs those who haven't?

How about religions?

I'm pretty sure I can prove most moral conceptions begin with this starting point.

Would you like some evidence?

 

[Ana the Ist]

Like all of your recent posts, all you are doing here is giving bland, naked opinions without offering any sort of argumentation for those opinions.

By the way....

This?

It seems to me that a lot of folks who are critical of morality envision themselves as standing on the sidelines, watching a game they have no interest in, and making jokes to one another about how silly the players are. We could call the game “Moral inquiry” or “Moral reasoning.”

In this thread I am questioning the idea of whether the sidelines exist. It seems to me that everyone is a player in the game of moral reasoning, and there are no sidelines. What do you think? Is moral neutrality possible?

Just bland naked opinion. The "argument" you defer to?

Rather than give my own arguments, I am going to let a quote from Alasdair MacIntyre do the work of the OP. This quote comes from his 2019 keynote lecture at a Notre Dame ethics conference, “Moral Relativisms Reconsidered.” I think it will be sufficient to get the thread off the ground, although I will also anticipate an objection in post #2. Comments about other parts of the lecture are also welcome.

Prior to this quote MacIntyre is talking about the question of trying to determine which competing moral system is correct, including very recent forms of pluralistic relativism. He goes on:

---------------

One answer to this question that has to be rejected is this: that just because we now have to make a choice between rival sets of standards that are to govern our moral choices, we are condemned to making a higher order choice that cannot itself be governed by standards. Judging from within a morality, it may be said we appeal to standards by what Harmon calls a frame of reference. But when judging between alternative moralities we can only make a criterionless choice of a frame of reference—a conclusion that was argued for by Sartre a long time ago. Are we then condemned to be existentialists? I think not. For it’s never true that we are compelled to make criterionless choices of this kind. Why not?

Every rational agent has—cannot but have—some conception of her or his good. Perhaps inchoate, inadequately spelled out, indeterminate to varying degrees, but every such agent confronted by the claims upon her or him of some particular morality has it in them to ask, “Would it be for my good to live like this?”, and the answers elicited by this question will vary from agent to agent, and from morality to morality.

Note now something oft not noticed about relativists and by relativists. They are agents who have suppressed in themselves, for the moment at least, any inclination to ask this question. And the self who they envisage has committed to no particular morality--as able from a standpoint external to all moral commitments to compare and contrast moralities, to choose between them—is an imaginary self. For every actual self, in virtue of its conception of its good, is already inclined in one direction rather than another.

This myth of the morally neutral self is a powerful and recurring one in modern intellectual and academic life. It gives one more expression to the characteristically modern conception of the self as autonomous, as recognizing no authority external to itself, and it’s often presented in disguised form in versions of the claim that the social sciences—sciences that study human agency in its institutionalized forms—can only be objective if they are value free, value neutral. It's a presupposition of all those who, in presenting some version of relativism from some non-relativistic standpoint, take that standpoint to guarantee their own objectivity and neutrality. But it's a myth. Any agent confronted by the incompatible claims of rival moralities has the resources to ask, first, what reasons do I have for deciding that it would be best for me to acknowledge the authority of this set of claims rather than that, and secondly, if they can identify no sufficient reasons for arriving at such a decision, to ask what it is they must first learn in order to be able to make such a choice. What skills must they acquire, what qualities of character must they develop, if they are to know how to deliberate and to make choices in a relevant way? To these questions the most interesting answer is Aristotle’s…

-Moral Relativisms Reconsidered - 22:40-26:40, Emphasis Mine​

Naked opinion.

Such an approach is very far from rational; it is decidedly irrational. I will not be spending any more time responding to this empty posturing.

Why not? Your thread is empty posturing.

 

[Ana the Ist]

It seems to me that after Mike implied that you were being irrational you got angry, questioned his grasp on reality, implied that he may be senile, and compared him to the infamous terrorist, Ted Kaczynski. This is pretty straightforward. It's beyond exasperation, although exasperation is also a form of mild anger. The "good grief" part of your post was exasperation.

In any case, the deeper point is that you responded to a perceived injustice with retaliation. I don't think it is remotely plausible that that post was free of anger, but it certainly wasn't free of a sense of injury, fault, and retaliation, which are sufficient in themselves for objective morality.

Yeesh....where do I begin with this nonsense?

I agree that justifying rational anger requires recognizing the occurrence of a wrong, but I think it is easier for people to see that not all of their anger is irrational, than to directly see that wrongs occur. The presence of anger is a prima facie case that you yourself already believe that a wrong has occurred.



Oh, I don't think that recognizing the existence of rational anger and wrong require a proof of objective morality. I think they require a recognition of objective morality. We recognize all sorts of things that we cannot prove, or at least that we cannot prove at the time of recognition.

I would say that it is a crucially important aspect of logical reasoning that we be able to recognize things before they are proven. Denying this truth befuddles the purpose of a syllogism, which is to move from what is better known to what is less known. Rational anger is something that I would suggest is best known.

...The other tack would have been to say that rational anger effects the proof of objective morality via premise (1). If I took that tack I would have asked what further thing you believe is required for "proving moral objectivity." Apparently you are claiming that objective morality must be proven independent of anger in order for anger to count as evidence for objective morality. That's fine - anger may not be a definitive demonstration, but it does suggest the existence of wrong and establish a thesis that should therefore be taken more seriously.

Rational anger? Seriously? Ok...

Rational how? In what sense? Rational as a natural consequence of a biological system that creates emotions as responses to stimuli?

Or rational as a response to certain stimuli, and therefore irrational as a response to other stimuli, and you somehow believe you are able to separate the two in a way that is objective?

I don't see objective morality resulting from either possibility (that is, regardless of what you mean by "rational anger"). In the first possibility, you're arguing for biological determinism...which you can argue for rationally, but you will end at a point where you don't really make choices so you don't really have morals. In the second possibility...I don't think you can ever satisfy the proposed premise. We can take the exact same stimuli and demonstrate wildly contradictory emotional responses to it. It becomes a matter of perception and therefore argues for subjective morality.

Either way, I don't see how you reach objective morality.

 

[Ken-1122]

A neutral stance cannot exist because neutral actions do not exist. Any action is a choice to either support one or the other in a dispute say, and by choosing not to support either, you are in effect choosing to aid the stronger party.

No; to aid the stronger party would be to actively help them; inactivity is not helping.

Similarly, by choosing to not consider morality, you are choosing to potentiate a certain outcome regardless. If I do nothing against child trafficking say, I am in effect potentiating its continuation.

that is as ridicules' as saying I am a rapist because somewhere someone is being raped and I am not helping them, therefore I am a rapist; somewhere a child is starving to death and because i am not helping to feed him, I am starving that child to death which makes me a murderer. See how ridicules that sounds? Inactivity is a neutral position.

 

[zippy2006]

that is as ridicules' as saying I am a rapist because somewhere someone is being raped and I am not helping them, therefore I am a rapist; somewhere a child is starving to death and because i am not helping to feed him, I am starving that child to death which makes me a murderer. See how ridicules that sounds? Inactivity is a neutral position.

Read what he wrote. "...potentiate a certain outcome." "...potentiating its continuation."

 

[partinobodycular]

Read what he wrote. "...potentiate a certain outcome." "...potentiating its continuation."

But isn't this poor reasoning?

It's essentially saying that unless a person takes a stance against immoral behavior they are in fact "potentiating" that behavior. But isn't this presuming that the behavior is immoral in the first place? Something that the person is specifically not doing.

Or am I missing something?

 

[zippy2006]

Let me first say that Quid is more intelligent than I am, so my defense of his ideas will be inferior to his own defense.

But isn't this poor reasoning?

It's essentially saying that unless a person takes a stance against immoral behavior they are in fact "potentiating" that behavior. But isn't this presuming that the behavior is immoral in the first place? Something that the person is specifically not doing.

Or am I missing something?

Note that Quid does not say anything at all about "immoral behavior." The point about potentiation applies to all actions equally, moral or immoral.

Instead of giving my own example, we can just use his:

Another way to look at it, is the modern bugbear of environmentalism. I could stop using plastic cutlery, or choose to ignore the issue - in which case, I am of necessity still choosing sides. Ignoring the case of what the real morality is, or only a subjective cultural variant, you are still inadvertently going one way or the other. Any action you do, either wilful or in ommission, will have a moral sphere - whether you yourself place any weight to that consideration or not.

 

[partinobodycular]

Note that Quid does not say anything at all about "immoral behavior." The point about potentiation applies to all actions equally, moral or immoral.

Great, see I learned something. Except...

Ignoring the case of what the real morality is, or only a subjective cultural variant, you are still inadvertently going one way or the other. Any action you do, either wilful or in ommission, will have a moral sphere - whether you yourself place any weight to that consideration or not.

The argument seems to be assuming that there is in fact a "real morality", even if the person is unaware of what it is. That's where my objection lies, in that seemingly innocuous assumption. If it were rephrased to remove the mention of morality completely then it would be better. Except that even then our inaction in regards to something doesn't by necessity amount to our approval of it. As @Ken-1122 pointed out my inaction in regards to each and every rape doesn't amount to my approval of rape.

But as you said it may be up to Quid to clarify what was meant.

 

[zippy2006]

The argument seems to be assuming that there is in fact a "real morality", even if the person is unaware of what it is. That's where my objection lies, in that seemingly innocuous assumption. If it were rephrased to remove the mention of morality completely then it would be better. Except that even then our inaction in regards to something doesn't by necessity amount to our approval of it. As @Ken-1122 pointed out my inaction in regards to each and every rape doesn't amount to my approval of rape.

Well he also doesn't say anything about approval. For example, one can potentiate outcomes without carrying them out oneself, and also without approving of them.

Do you think there is a neutral moral position vis-a-vis environmentalism? Do you think the actions of the person who chooses to ignore the issue of environmentalism are going to have an effect on the environment?

 

[Ken-1122]

Read what he wrote. "...potentiate a certain outcome." "...potentiating its continuation."

I did read what he wrote. To potentiate means to increase the likelihood of something happening. So for me to potentiate rape would be saying I am increasing the likelihood of this person being raped. IOW He is saying by me doing nothing I am increasing the likelihood of someone being raped; do you agree with this?

 

[zippy2006]

I did read what he wrote. To potentiate means to increase the likelihood of something happening. So for me to potentiate rape would be saying I am increasing the likelihood of this person being raped. IOW He is saying by me doing nothing I am increasing the likelihood of someone being raped; do you agree with this?

Sure, I think that is a workable definition. Namely, if I do nothing with regard to sex trafficking, then sex trafficking will be more likely than it would have been if I had done something to oppose it. How does this support your claims about rapists and murderers?