Just or Merciful

[PuerAzaelis]

To me forgiveness is always in spite of the law not as a result of it.

 

[Moral Orel]

So it is unjust to give and receive gifts, or to find a dollar on the sidewalk, or to be born with functioning eyes?

Mmm... The dollar on the sidewalk gives me pause.
I can't see how to justify saying someone "deserves" functioning eyes at all.

I think maybe justice as a concept requires at least two actors.

If so, we are departing from common usage of the word "unjust."

I agree, in a way. I think what people mean when they use the word "unjust" is to say "that isn't deserved" but they only use it in places where they don't like that the thing happened, and they don't use it in places where they do like the thing that happened. The common definition is always the same, but where it is used differs. I think it's a massive case of special pleading.

What I would say is that giving a gift is not a just act, but neither is it an unjust act. It is a liberal act.

If what is deserved is an aspect of some act, it falls in the purview of justness. Perhaps we could say that a gift is neither deserved nor undeserved. Perhaps. But that wouldn't solve the issue of mercy. Not giving a person a punishment that they do deserve is unjust.

Let me ask you this. Is mercy never unjust?

 

[zippy2006]

Mmm... The dollar on the sidewalk gives me pause.
I can't see how to justify saying someone "deserves" functioning eyes at all.

I think maybe justice as a concept requires at least two actors.

[...]

If what is deserved is an aspect of some act, it falls in the purview of justness. Perhaps we could say that a gift is neither deserved nor undeserved. Perhaps.

I think what you are trying to do is define the object of desert. That is: what is the sort of thing that is deserving or undeserving? I think what you are trying to say is that the object of desert is a person who has performed some action. The nature of that action will determine the just deserts of the person in question. For example, the action could be praiseworthy or blameworthy, and incur reward or punishment. This would mean that finding a dollar or being born with functioning eyes is apart from the realm of justice because the person in question didn't perform any action which could be punished or rewarded.

That is fine to a large extent, but it still limps. Your definition is, "an unjust act is one in which someone gets something they don't deserve." The counterexample is clear: a recipient may be punished for no reason, and this would be unjust both on your definition and on the colloquial understanding. That is, even apart from an act on the part of the person on the receiving end (the "patient") injustice can exist.

Or maybe the object of desert is a person being acted upon by another person, and thus we have the two-actors case. That might work.

I agree, in a way. I think what people mean when they use the word "unjust" is to say "that isn't deserved" but they only use it in places where they don't like that the thing happened, and they don't use it in places where they do like the thing that happened. The common definition is always the same, but where it is used differs. I think it's a massive case of special pleading.

But what about Aquinas? Your "two-actors" idea is important. Injustice requires a victim who can legitimately complain about what has happened to them, and this means that their unjust reality must be in some way the result of another agent's volitional choice. If your boss gives you a bonus no injustice has occurred because no one has a legitimate complaint. No one has been harmed or unjustly treated. It seems to me that you are conflating justice with some form of equity or proportionality. A bonus is not proportional to your work or your contract, and yet it is not unjust.

Obviously as a Christian Matthew 20:1-16 comes to mind (link). The landowner actually spells out the logical problem with the laborers' complaint, "Am I not allowed to do what I choose with what belongs to me?" The claim that giving a gift in generosity is unjust entails the untenable proposition that we are not allowed to dispense with our own goods in the way we see fit. Santa Claus is not an unjust man by any stretch of the imagination.

But that wouldn't solve the issue of mercy. Not giving a person a punishment that they do deserve is unjust.

It depends who the punishment is owed to.

Let me ask you this. Is mercy never unjust?

No, it can be unjust. Say Bill smashes your windshield and refuses to pay you for damages. You take him to court. I am the judge and I am Bill's friend. In mercy I forgive Bill his debt. Leaving aside questions of the judiciary, the outcome is unjust because the punishment and recompense is owed to you, not to me. If Bill owed me money I could mercifully forgive him without injustice. Yet he owes you money, not me.

 

[Moral Orel]

I think what you are trying to do is define the object of desert. That is: what is the sort of thing that is deserving or undeserving? I think what you are trying to say is that the object of desert is a person who has performed some action. The nature of that action will determine the just deserts of the person in question. For example, the action could be praiseworthy or blameworthy, and incur reward or punishment. This would mean that finding a dollar or being born with functioning eyes is apart from the realm of justice because the person in question didn't perform any action which could be punished or rewarded.

That is fine to a large extent, but it still limps. Your definition is, "an unjust act is one in which someone gets something they don't deserve." The counterexample is clear: a recipient may be punished for no reason, and this would be unjust both on your definition and on the colloquial understanding. That is, even apart from an act on the part of the person on the receiving end (the "patient") injustice can exist.

True. I started thinking there was a difference between "not deserving punishment" and "deserving to not be punished", if that makes sense, but I don't think the difference is really there, now.

Or maybe the object of desert is a person being acted upon by another person, and thus we have the two-actors case. That might work.

Right. Say we have Bob and Jim and Sally. Jim kills Sally. So now he deserves to be killed. Bob kills Jim. It is the act of Bob killing Jim that we say is just because Jim was deserving.

But what about Aquinas? Your "two-actors" idea is important. Injustice requires a victim who can legitimately complain about what has happened to them, and this means that their unjust reality must be in some way the result of another agent's volitional choice. If your boss gives you a bonus no injustice has occurred because no one has a legitimate complaint. No one has been harmed or unjustly treated. It seems to me that you are conflating justice with some form of equity or proportionality. A bonus is not proportional to your work or your contract, and yet it is not unjust.

Obviously as a Christian Matthew 20:1-16 comes to mind (link). The landowner actually spells out the logical problem with the laborers' complaint, "Am I not allowed to do what I choose with what belongs to me?" The claim that giving a gift in generosity is unjust entails the untenable proposition that we are not allowed to dispense with our own goods in the way we see fit.

This assumes that being unjust is bad. And that's my point. You're saying it isn't unjust when it isn't bad. But why? Simply because we find it good? It's still unfair. It's still a tipping of the scales out of balance.

No, it can be unjust. Say Bill smashes your windshield and refuses to pay you for damages. You take him to court. I am the judge and I am Bill's friend. In mercy I forgive Bill his debt. Leaving aside questions of the judiciary, the outcome is unjust because the punishment and recompense is owed to you, not to me. If Bill owed me money I could mercifully forgive him without injustice. Yet he owes you money, not me.

And therein lies my first major problem with justice and Christianity. I'll go ahead and assume for the sake of argument that any wrongdoing is against God. But it isn't only against God. Jim killed Sally. God can forgive Jim for sinning against God, but what if Sally doesn't want to forgive Jim? So with Christianity you do have God as the judge forgiving debt that isn't owed to Him. Even if I grant that some of the debt is owed to Him (not going down that rabbit trail).

ETA I keep having to go through my posts and changing the word "just" when I mean "only" because I think it's confusing. lol

 

[zippy2006]

True. I started thinking there was a difference between "not deserving punishment" and "deserving to not be punished", if that makes sense, but I don't think the difference is really there, now.

Yes, well I think some of those distinctions do hold as well, but obviously we are skipping over some pieces of this.

Right. Say we have Bob and Jim and Sally. Jim kills Sally. So now he deserves to be killed. Bob kills Jim. It is the act of Bob killing Jim that we say is just because Jim was deserving.

Okay, sure.

This assumes that being unjust is bad. And that's my point. You're saying it isn't unjust when it isn't bad. But why? Simply because we find it good? It's still unfair. It's still a tipping of the scales out of balance.

So we are inquiring as to whether there is a coherent and colloquially accepted definition of injustice which isn't a form of special pleading. I pointed out that if no one can legitimately complain then no injustice has occurred. So maybe we could say that an unjust act is an act in which the perpetrator harms the victim in an undeserving way. What's wrong with that?

Again, I would say that a disproportionate act "tips the scales out of balance," and can do so in a positive (generous/liberal) or negative (unjust) way. If someone called Scrooge's behavior but not Santa's behavior disproportionate, then they would be engaging in special pleading. I don't think calling Scrooge unjust rather than Santa is special pleading. There really is something about the nature of injustice that involves harm. Unjust acts break a law that we are expected to uphold whereas liberal acts go beyond the law in a way that is not unlawful. It is unjust to short-change the waiter, but not to tip him. The common genus is disproportionality, not injustice.

And therein lies my first major problem with justice and Christianity. I'll go ahead and assume for the sake of argument that any wrongdoing is against God. But it isn't only against God. Jim killed Sally. God can forgive Jim for sinning against God, but what if Sally doesn't want to forgive Jim? So with Christianity you do have God as the judge forgiving debt that isn't owed to Him. Even if I grant that some of the debt is owed to Him (not going down that rabbit trail).

I think that's a legitimate critique, but I think it's actually a bit off-topic because it consitutes a case where justice and mercy can co-exist rather than one in which they are mutually exclusive, as your OP claims. I think the more central case is this: could a parent who is merciful to their child be doing him an injustice? That is, is undue lenience or softness unjust? (Yes, probably.) Also related: is partiality unjust? Is the landowner unjust? Does selective generosity somehow contradict impartiality? (Christianity often wrestles with this question in regard to salvation. For example, Romans 9:18 and context.)

ETA I keep having to go through my posts and changing the word "just" when I mean "only" because I think it's confusing. lol

Haha

 

[Paulomycin]

Empty assertions are dismissed.

Okay, it's your analogy. Prove your claim that it is analogous.

False.

Empty assertions are dismissed. <-- But that never applies when you do it. Right?

You are using "not justice" and "unjust" interchangeably, not me.

Empty assertions are dismissed, but that never applies when you do it. Right?

They can't be used interchangeably.

Empty assertions are dismissed, but that never applies when you do it. Right? <-- There's your hint.

I'm not stalling, I'm refusing to repeat myself.

Empty assertions are dismissed, but that never applies when you do it. Right?

 

[Moral Orel]

So we are inquiring as to whether there is a coherent and colloquially accepted definition of injustice which isn't a form of special pleading. I pointed out that if no one can legitimately complain then no injustice has occurred. So maybe we could say that an unjust act is an act in which the perpetrator harms the victim in an undeserving way. What's wrong with that?

Because sometimes reward is deserved and we'd have to stretch the definition of "an act that harms" to include "non-action".

I think that's a legitimate critique, but I think it's actually a bit off-topic because it consitutes a case where justice and mercy can co-exist rather than one in which they are mutually exclusive, as your OP claims.

Not at all. There are two court cases, essentially. One in which God is both plaintiff and judge, and another where He is just the judge. In the former, He might act justly, though there's a whole other angle of a problem with that I won't go into yet.* But in the latter He must make a choice between being just and being merciful. God showing mercy for Jim's crime against Sally is unjust. Even if showing mercy for Jim's crime against God is just. The contradiction lies in His role as judge in which Sally is the plaintiff.

*This whole concept of justice is a big can of worms that I see a lot of problems with. Waddya say we try to drop a subject and move to another if one of us feels the other is being... let's call it obtuse. I like talking to you, Zippy, and I'd like to hear your take on all the issues I have in mind. Just Only... one at a time.

 

[Paulomycin]

But see, I would say that giving someone more than they deserve does something against justice, even a gift. A just act is one in which someone gets what they deserve, and an unjust act is one in which someone gets something they don't deserve (reward or punishment). What is incomplete about this?

"something"

"something"

I suppose asserting "something-something" is a killer argument where you come from?

 

[Moral Orel]

"something"

"something"

I suppose asserting "something-something" is a killer argument where you come from?

It's good that you're still hanging around. Read Zippy's posts. Learn 2 Logick, bro.

 

[InterestedAtheist]

"something"

"something"

I suppose asserting "something-something" is a killer argument where you come from?

He won, and you wouldn't admit it.

 

[zippy2006]

Because sometimes reward is deserved and we'd have to stretch the definition of "an act that harms" to include "non-action".

Okay, so the revised version would be, "So maybe we could say that an unjust act is an act or omission in which the perpetrator harms the victim in an undeserving way. What's wrong with that?" That is a coherent definition of injustice that does not constitute special pleading, no?

Injustice has something to do with breaking a law--moral or civil. But things like generosity... "Against such there is no law" (Galatians 5:23). I think your hangup has to do with moral relativism. That is, substantive justice is impossible on moral relativism and things like "harm," "badness," or "evil" do not have an "objective" existence or definition and therefore if the definition of justice requires recourse to these concepts then it too fails to be anything more than a matter of will or whim.

Not at all.

Let me clarify since what I said above is quite sloppy. I should have gone to bed before writing that part.

To say that a merciful judge is unjust because his action makes some third party a victim of injustice is different from saying that a merciful judge is unjust because mercy and justice are per se opposed. Because there may or may not be a victimized third party, the first case is not sufficient to demonstrate an intrinsic contradiction between justice and mercy, if that makes sense. So the former is not entirely off-topic, but it is less on-topic than the latter.

There are two court cases, essentially. One in which God is both plaintiff and judge, and another where He is just the judge. In the former, He might act justly, though there's a whole other angle of a problem with that I won't go into yet.* But in the latter He must make a choice between being just and being merciful. God showing mercy for Jim's crime against Sally is unjust. Even if showing mercy for Jim's crime against God is just. The contradiction lies in His role as judge in which Sally is the plaintiff.

Right, but why would mercy in the former case be an act of justice? I don't think the act in the former case is just or unjust. It is merciful.

*This whole concept of justice is a big can of worms that I see a lot of problems with. Waddya say we try to drop a subject and move to another if one of us feels the other is being... let's call it obtuse. I like talking to you, Zippy, and I'd like to hear your take on all the issues I have in mind. Just Only... one at a time.

That's sounds good, but I'm not really interested in talking about the question of vicarious atonement or the sufficiency of divine forgiveness right now. Maybe in a week or two, but right now I'm just peeking into CF for a shorter visit.

 

[Paulomycin]

He won, and you wouldn't admit it.

Okay, I will admit he asserted "something."

 

[Moral Orel]

Okay, so the revised version would be, "So maybe we could say that an unjust act is an act or omission in which the perpetrator harms the victim in an undeserving way. What's wrong with that?" That is a coherent definition of injustice that does not constitute special pleading, no?

Let's test it out. I go out to eat, have my meal, and then leave without paying. My not paying is the non-action, the omission, but how does that omission harm the restaurant? The harm happened when I took their food, and justice happens when I balance the scales by paying for it. The omission doesn't do the harm.

Also the example of a judge that grants undue mercy doesn't fit either. Later you'll describe it as "making some third party a victim of injustice". If that's the "harm" that's caused by the omission of a ruling against the defendant, then your definition has become circular. The injustice is now the harm that the definition of injustice speaks of. Rather, the victim is already harmed and it is the judgement by the judge we evaluate as just or unjust based on whether it balances the scales or not.

Injustice has something to do with breaking a law--moral or civil. But things like generosity... "Against such there is no law" (Galatians 5:23). I think your hangup has to do with moral relativism. That is, substantive justice is impossible on moral relativism and things like "harm," "badness," or "evil" do not have an "objective" existence or definition and therefore if the definition of justice requires recourse to these concepts then it too fails to be anything more than a matter of will or whim.

I don't think so. The way I'm looking at it, I'm granting objective morality to the extent that I'll treat someone deserving punishment and someone deserving reward as objective facts. So sure, I'll grant that evil objectively exists, but how does "justice" weigh in? Is it objectively good if tilting the scales out of balance is also objectively good? Is "justice" even something we evaluate as good or evil at all?

Let me clarify since what I said above is quite sloppy. I should have gone to bed before writing that part.

To say that a merciful judge is unjust because his action makes some third party a victim of injustice is different from saying that a merciful judge is unjust because mercy and justice are per se opposed. Because there may or may not be a victimized third party, the first case is not sufficient to demonstrate an intrinsic contradiction between justice and mercy, if that makes sense. So the former is not entirely off-topic, but it is less on-topic than the latter.

I see problems with both.

Right, but why would mercy in the former case be an act of justice? I don't think the act in the former case is just or unjust. It is merciful.

I dunno. I could maybe sorta grant that forgiveness tilts the scales. But if it doesn't, then it remains unjust.

That's sounds good, but I'm not really interested in talking about the question of vicarious atonement or the sufficiency of divine forgiveness right now. Maybe in a week or two, but right now I'm just peeking into CF for a shorter visit.

So what do you want to talk about? Just try to achieve a coherent definition for justice that allows for stuff we think is good? We should construct a truth table for all the different ways you want it to work. I don't think you can unless you completely abandon a concept of balance and fairness that is inherent to the word.

 

[zippy2006]

Let's test it out. I go out to eat, have my meal, and then leave without paying. My not paying is the non-action, the omission, but how does that omission harm the restaurant? The harm happened when I took their food, and justice happens when I balance the scales by paying for it. The omission doesn't do the harm.

No, I don't think so. If taking/eating a restaurant's food were harmful to restaurants then every person who patronizes a restaurant would be harming it. The failure to pay really is the relevant omission, and it does harm the restaurant. Call it something like "Failing to pay for a priced good or service." It is a species of theft. Not-paying harms the restaurant because the restaurant's existence is predicated on payment--on the idea that people who eat their food will pay for it. Of course theft isn't really an omission, and we could just say that stealing food from a restaurant is an unjust act. That would fit under my first definition which omitted "omission."

Also the example of a judge that grants undue mercy doesn't fit either. Later you'll describe it as "making some third party a victim of injustice". If that's the "harm" that's caused by the omission of a ruling against the defendant, then your definition has become circular. The injustice is now the harm that the definition of injustice speaks of.

No, it's not circular. The harm/injustice incurred by the judge is the obstruction of recompense. It doesn't matter whether we call that obstruction harm or an injustice. In this case it is both, but harm is only one way of representing injustice. Injustice is a unique concept. It can't simply be replaced by harm or any other concept.

Rather, the victim is already harmed and it is the judgement by the judge we evaluate as just or unjust based on whether it balances the scales or not.

There are two acts. The defendant harmed the victim by acting unjustly towards him, and the judge did too, yet in a different way. The unjust decision of the judge will harm the victim, for the victim deserves and expects a just decision (and recompense).

I don't think so. The way I'm looking at it, I'm granting objective morality to the extent that I'll treat someone deserving punishment and someone deserving reward as objective facts. So sure, I'll grant that evil objectively exists, but how does "justice" weigh in? Is it objectively good if tilting the scales out of balance is also objectively good? Is "justice" even something we evaluate as good or evil at all?

I'm not exactly following you here. I would say that justice--proper balancing--is good. But justice in the way we are talking about it has to do with correcting "breaches of law" or somesuch thing.

Apparently you think there can be victimless injustices, and that generosity is an instance of this. How would that work? What is unjust about a gift?

I see problems with both.

Yes, I know.

I dunno. I could maybe sorta grant that forgiveness tilts the scales. But if it doesn't, then it remains unjust.

Above you went with the idea that God's act of mercy is an act of justice in the case "in which God is both plaintiff and judge." Are you now saying that in that case God's act of mercy is an act of injustice?

So what do you want to talk about? Just try to achieve a coherent definition for justice that allows for stuff we think is good? We should construct a truth table for all the different ways you want it to work. I don't think you can unless you completely abandon a concept of balance and fairness that is inherent to the word.

But not all imbalances are unjust. A key point is that balance is a matter of perspective. If I have pelts and you have coins what is the objectively correct exchange rate? I think we could construct a bare-minimum definition of justice that is based on consent and "contract." So when you dine at a restaurant there is a tacit agreement that you will give payment for the food that you eat. This is a cultural convention and it is provided for by the fact that the restaurant gives you a menu which fixes prices to each dish. When you choose an option you have also chosen a price. This is why, for example, I only need the dollar menu at McDonald's and the $4-8 menu at Perkins.

To be incredibly straightforward, stealing a dollar from a man is unjust and giving a dollar to a man is not, yet both imply an unbalanced exchange. Can we agree on at least that much? The reason is simple: private property is a real thing. I am allowed to own property. Others are not allowed to arbitrarily take away my property and I am allowed to dispose of my property as I see fit. There is an intrinsic asymmetricity in things like private property, and the asymmetricity in the concept of justice builds upon precisely those sorts of reality-based asymmetricities.

(What is truly curious is the premise that all human moral concepts must have this sort of symmetricity that you are imposing on justice... or something like that. Yet as a computer-scientist-become-essentialist, I am familiar with the difficulty. )

 

[Moral Orel]

No, I don't think so. If taking/eating a restaurant's food were harmful to restaurants then every person who patronizes a restaurant would be harming it.

If you track all the goings on of a restaurant in real-time then yes, taking the food is when the harm occurs. They lost food, equipment suffered degradation, employee wages were spent, etc. It's just to bring back balance by paying, and it's unjust to allow that imbalance to continue to exist by not paying.

No, it's not circular. The harm/injustice incurred by the judge is the obstruction of recompense. It doesn't matter whether we call that obstruction harm or an injustice. In this case it is both, but harm is only one way of representing injustice. Injustice is a unique concept. It can't simply be replaced by harm or any other concept.

If the victim is harmed by a lack of justice, then the scales are tipped further. Harm moves the scales. The victim isn't owed more because the judge was unjust, the victim continues to be owed the same amount.

I'm not exactly following you here. I would say that justice--proper balancing--is good. But justice in the way we are talking about it has to do with correcting "breaches of law" or somesuch thing.

Apparently you think there can be victimless injustices, and that generosity is an instance of this. How would that work? What is unjust about a gift?

Say we have Jim and Bob. If Jim steals $5 from Bob, the scales are tilted against Bob. If Jim gifts $5 to Bob the scales are tilted against Jim. You aren't a victim if you volunteer, but if there is imbalance in the scales you don't have justice.

Above you went with the idea that God's act of mercy is an act of justice in the case "in which God is both plaintiff and judge." Are you now saying that in that case God's act of mercy is an act of injustice?

If you believe that retributive justice is intrinsically good, then yeah. It's an injustice to not punish people that deserve punishment. If forgiveness tilts the scales, I don't see how it really could, but if it did, then it wouldn't be an injustice. So here's a theological question I don't know the answer to. When God forgives, do you cease to be deserving of death?

But not all imbalances are unjust. A key point is that balance is a matter of perspective. If I have pelts and you have coins what is the objectively correct exchange rate? I think we could construct a bare-minimum definition of justice that is based on consent and "contract." So when you dine at a restaurant there is a tacit agreement that you will give payment for the food that you eat. This is a cultural convention and it is provided for by the fact that the restaurant gives you a menu which fixes prices to each dish. When you choose an option you have also chosen a price. This is why, for example, I only need the dollar menu at McDonald's and the $4-8 menu at Perkins.

Okay, and the just thing to do is to rebalance the scales after you take the food, like I talked about earlier.

To be incredibly straightforward, stealing a dollar from a man is unjust and giving a dollar to a man is not, yet both imply an unbalanced exchange. Can we agree on at least that much? The reason is simple: private property is a real thing. I am allowed to own property. Others are not allowed to arbitrarily take away my property and I am allowed to dispose of my property as I see fit.

You are allowed to be unjust in that manner. It is good for a person to be unjust by donating money to charity. I do not agree that things cease to be unjust simply because they are good.

There is an intrinsic asymmetricity in things like private property, and the asymmetricity in the concept of justice builds upon precisely those sorts of reality-based asymmetricities.

(What is truly curious is the premise that all human moral concepts must have this sort of symmetricity that you are imposing on justice... or something like that. Yet as a computer-scientist-become-essentialist, I am familiar with the difficulty. )

I don't think I'm "imposing" symmetricity on justice. I think it's inherent. I just think it's good to be unjust sometimes. Why do we need to redefine justice instead of just acknowledging that it isn't best to have perfectly balanced scales?

 

[Mark Quayle]

No, you guys can prove your own claims. It isn't my responsibility to prove you wrong. That's why it's called the "burden" of proof. If someone not getting what they deserve isn't an injustice to you guys, then I have no idea what you think an injustice is.

Who did not get what they deserve?

 

[zippy2006]

This seems like a good opportunity for me to break for awhile. I won't have much time this week so I won't try to squeeze in posts here and there. Hopefully I will respond to this post of yours on Saturday. I will just leave you with something to think on:

I don't think I'm "imposing" symmetricity on justice. I think it's inherent. I just think it's good to be unjust sometimes. Why do we need to redefine justice instead of just acknowledging that it isn't best to have perfectly balanced scales?

If "it is good to be unjust sometimes," then what word would you use to describe the set of rules that ought to guide the actions and exchanges that take place between humans? Above I said, "Not all imbalances are unjust." You would say the same thing with different words, "Not all injustices are bad." Yet once you give that set of good things a name in a way that is not "special pleading," then you will have done what you claim is impossible. You will have defined "Justice 2.0" in a way that is coherent and does not rely on special pleading.

Of course I think we already have a name for that set of rules: justice. Justice was never thought to be a procedural balancing for the sake of balancing. It was always anchored in foundational rights and obligations which are more fundamental than the balancing, and which establish the nature and priority of the balancing itself. I suppose we can give it a different name if you like.

 

[Moral Orel]

If "it is good to be unjust sometimes," then what word would you use to describe the set of rules that ought to guide the actions and exchanges that take place between humans? Above I said, "Not all imbalances are unjust." You would say the same thing with different words, "Not all injustices are bad." Yet once you give that set of good things a name in a way that is not "special pleading," then you will have done what you claim is impossible. You will have defined "Justice 2.0" in a way that is coherent and does not rely on special pleading.

Of course I think we already have a name for that set of rules: justice. Justice was never thought to be a procedural balancing for the sake of balancing. It was always anchored in foundational rights and obligations which are more fundamental than the balancing, and which establish the nature and priority of the balancing itself. I suppose we can give it a different name if you like.

I don't think you actually agree with that definition. You've already said that things like mercy are outside and "above" justice. Giving gifts is a good thing to do, and we ought to do good things, but you've said that gifts are neither just nor unjust, ergo not justice.

A long time ago you and I had a discussion on retributive justice that went nowhere. But here when you say justice isn't "a procedural balancing for the sake of balancing" that's exactly what retributive justice is. Justice for the sake of justice. Delivering suffering in response to suffering is intrinsically good, no? I dunno, maybe you've changed your stance on retributive justice in that time, maybe my point from back then will be clearer now in light of exploring what it means to balance scales for the sake of balance.

I dunno what word I'd like to use to describe "promoting good" but it ain't "justice". It's better to do more good than it is to blindly balance scales and you can't have justice without that balance.

 

[InterestedAtheist]

Okay, I will admit he asserted "something."

No, he didn't. He used the word "something" in making a valid argument. Either you understand that and you don't want to engage the argument, or you don't understand it, in which case you shouldn't be debating him because he's above your level.

 

[Paulomycin]

No, he didn't. He used the word "something" in making a valid argument.

About "something." Got it.

Either you understand that and you don't want to engage the argument, or you don't understand it, in which case you shouldn't be debating him because he's above your level.

Or, he's deliberately vague or something.