Hopefully this thread will put this tired old dilemma to bed once and for all. Somehow I doubt it will .
The Euthyphro Dilemma (ED hereon) seeks to show that there is an absurdity or paradox in the idea of God and his relation to the good. It poses a question, assuming that there are only two possible answers. The question is: "Where does good come from?" In relation to God, the only two possible answers are:
The problem with (2) is that it suggests that goodness is arbitrary. God says that murder is wrong. But he could have just as well said that murder is good. This makes morality fairly meaningless.
The theist doesn't have to submit to this dilemma because there's a third option. The third option is that "good" is what coheres to God's eternal character. God is good. God is love, he is patient and kind, he is generous, he is beautiful, he is powerful, he values life (he is life), etc... Everything we would normally call "good" really is just some derivative attribute of God and his eternal, unchanging character. God's commands, then, are an expression of his character. They are not based in a standard outside of himself. The standard is himself. And they are not arbitrary because they are based in the most meaningful and enduring reality that there is - the character of the eternal one.
If someone wants to claim that the dilemma has not been solved, I suppose they must show how commands based on God's character are arbitrary. Or they must show how God's character is something outside of himself. Or they must admit there is no dilemma at all.
The Euthyphro Dilemma (ED hereon) seeks to show that there is an absurdity or paradox in the idea of God and his relation to the good. It poses a question, assuming that there are only two possible answers. The question is: "Where does good come from?" In relation to God, the only two possible answers are:
- "Good" is a standard outside of God to which even God must submit. God calls something good because it really is good.
- "Good" is simply what God decides to be good. Something is good only because God calls it good.
The problem with (2) is that it suggests that goodness is arbitrary. God says that murder is wrong. But he could have just as well said that murder is good. This makes morality fairly meaningless.
The theist doesn't have to submit to this dilemma because there's a third option. The third option is that "good" is what coheres to God's eternal character. God is good. God is love, he is patient and kind, he is generous, he is beautiful, he is powerful, he values life (he is life), etc... Everything we would normally call "good" really is just some derivative attribute of God and his eternal, unchanging character. God's commands, then, are an expression of his character. They are not based in a standard outside of himself. The standard is himself. And they are not arbitrary because they are based in the most meaningful and enduring reality that there is - the character of the eternal one.
If someone wants to claim that the dilemma has not been solved, I suppose they must show how commands based on God's character are arbitrary. Or they must show how God's character is something outside of himself. Or they must admit there is no dilemma at all.