Carroll is wrong there. Mixing levels of description is metaphysics; it's in the etymology of the word "meta-physics" itself. It's the goal of any truth-seeker to find explanations which coherently unify various levels and various views of what reality might be.
There's a difference between coherently unifying various levels and various views of what reality might be, and mixing the concepts of the descriptive languages of different levels in the same context - here's a quote from Carroll on it:
"... All the mess comes when people try to mix up vocabularies across different levels. ... We can talk about people as animals with minds and reasons, or we can talk about them as collections of cells and tissues, or we can talk about them as collections of protons, neutrons and electrons. It’s only when you start asking “what effect do my feelings have on my protons and neutrons?” that you start getting syntax errors."
Having said that, yes, I completely understand that there's some magic which takes place, which allows me to write a beautiful poem about a beautiful woman, that I could not write about the molecules which comprise her.
OK, so you see the point - I'll take the 'magic' as rhetorical.
Just what I said - experiential evidence of experience. I experience a "me", therefore there is a "me", by your definition. You say "a statement is true if it corresponds to a state of affairs in the world". How can you arbitrarily decide that the experience of "2 + 2 = 4" is a true state of affairs, but the experience of the "you" which experiences it is not?
I don't. I've already said I think there's a 'you' because there's a self-identifying experiential 'you'. I'm saying that not all your perceptions necessarily correspond to objective reality (states of affairs in the world), and that some of these perceptions contribute to your sense of self. Just as with a phantom limb, we don't realise that aspects of our experience are mistaken until the discrepancy is demonstrable, e.g. we see evidence of our missing limb or our visual blind-spot, or whatever.
We know from everyday experience that people's perceptions of themselves can be seriously mistaken; I'm saying the evidence suggests that we're all mistaken in our perceptions of ourselves in quite fundamental ways. It feels like we look directly out at the world through our eyes as if through windows, it feels like colours are constant properties of objects in the world, it feels like sight and sound are synchronised within ~500 metres, it feels like what we hear is independent of what we see, it feels like we don't sense something unless we're conscious of sensing it, it feels like we don't make decisions until we're consciously aware of making them, and so-on.
I don't know that the supernatual hypothesis makes any specific prediction.
So how can it be verified? how can we know anything about it? how is it more than just a label for not knowing?
I didn't say it was better than those things.
I'm looking the reasons why you invoke it at all.
I can't read every book recommendation you give me for purposes of responding to you in this wordy thread. But the book synopsis says he has at least one "radical hypothesis", which is always a red flag that I'll likely be getting some non-science passed off as science.
The relevance is not so much in any radical hypothesis he proposes (although the hypotheses about their field by experts in the field are usually pretty interesting), but in the depth and breadth of empirical evidence he summarises.
Anyway, I could just as easily make this a "science-of-the-gaps" issue: we may be able to explain it with God in the future, which will show you to be wrong then, therefore you are wrong now.
You'd have to make God a well-defined hypothesis first, and I don't see how that's likely to happen. The abductive criteria (for inference to the best explanation) rest primarily on testability and fruitfulness, i.e. testable predictions and how well they correspond to observations. Then there's explanatory power - how well does an explanation help us understand the phenomenon itself, how it arises, and how much that explanation unifies our knowledge; an explanation that raises more questions than it answers, particularly if those questions are unanswerable is no explanation at all - you can't explain the unexplained with the inexplicable.
It can't be deconstructed as you described. Set aside complexity. Before you can have any "simple logical steps", you have to have axiom from which to build logical steps. It's the ability to magically "see" and understand how and why a thing is or is not self-evident.
The 'magical' ability to see what is or isn't self-evident is the activity of the unconscious mind (System I), an automatic, fast, involuntary, highly parallel processing system based on simple heuristics, associations, habits, and conditioning. It's usually 'good enough' to get by, but has biases, often gets things wrong (not least because it has a tendency to answer a simpler question or problem than that actually posed).
It's an uncomfortable but demonstrable fact that the majority of the content of conscious awareness, i.e. what 'comes to mind' - the words and phrases that pop into your head as you speak, the answers you give without deliberation, the hunches and intuitions you have, etc., is the product of this rather unreliable system. If I had to recommend one book that can give you an insight into this aspect of the mind, it's Kahneman's 'Thinking, Fast and Slow', because it's full of little exercises and examples you can try for yourself to demonstrate the way it works.
If you're going to insist that mice or any animals have this ability, I think the burden is on you to show that.
I've explained what the mouse example was intended to be; but inference is generally thought to be required for problem solving that doesn't involve trial and error, and various creatures are capable of that - for example, some birds are pretty good puzzle solvers, particularly the crow family (corvids) and old world parrots, particularly the African Grey. They can solve multi-stage puzzles using tools and an understanding of the natural world, e.g. how dropping stones into water will raise its level, how bending a twig or a wire will make a hook tool, etc.
Other primates (chimps, gorillas, etc) are known to draw pragmatic inferences from social contexts - see
Social cognition and pragmatic inference in primates.
Oh, and I just saw
an article describing how wasps show transitive inference.
It's one thing to say something is of little interest, it's another to denounce it as wrong.
Agreed. The point is that, in critical thinking, let alone scientific investigation, when one has a plausible mundane explanation that fits well into an established body of knowledge, it will inevitably be preferred over an exotic and unsubstantiated explanation that invokes a whole new unexplained ontology, appears to contradict the established body of knowledge, and raises multiple questions that cannot be answered.
But the empirical evidence does not support any one interpretation to the exclusion of others.
It strongly supports the brain being the system that performs the various aspects of cognition we call the mind. Specific areas have been identified with specific functions, and specific changes in these areas, or communications between them, produce specific changes in the way the mind works. Brain plasticity has been demonstrated at the neuronal level in the way neuronal connections are reinforced with repeated training (activation). There is no supporting evidence for the mind being external to or independent of the brain, and no known means by which this could be achieved.
Hypothetically, if there come to be consistent experiements where a subject's brain is actually shown to make a decision, even seconds rather than milliseconds, before the subject was aware of the decision, that still would not prove anything one way or another. Let me give you a passage from C. S. Lewis:
And suddenly all was changed. I saw a great assembly of gigantic forms all motionless, all in deepest silence, standing forever about a little silver table and looking upon it. And on the table there were little figures like chessmen who went to and fro doing this and that. And I knew that each chessman was the idolum or puppet representative of some one of the great presences that stood by. And the acts and motions of each chessman were a moving portrait, a mimicry or pantomime, which delineated the inmost nature of his giant master. And these chessmen are men and women as they appear to themselves and to one another in this world. And the silver table is Time. And those who stand and watch are the immortal souls of those same men and women.
Now that is just a fantasy dream vision, but the point is this: even if our brains appear to have made a decision before "we" do, that does not at all imply that "we" didn't make the decision. I'm not asking you to accept this vision, I'm just asking you to be scientific; to not rule out what the evidence does not rule out.
No, that's broadly my view also; this is why I previously mentioned that it's a mistake to think of the conscious self as somehow separate from the rest of the system; it's all 'us', but only a superficial part, involving the focus of attention, is consciously aware.
I didn't say you could change the content of the signal.
But the signal is what is broadcast, and when I asked if you thought "messing with the receiver can change the content of the broadcast", you said,
"Of course. Why do you think it wouldn't?"
So now I'm wondering whether you really didn't understand the question or whether you're being deliberately obtuse.
But everything you've said so far could just as easily lead to the conclusion that "consciousness is fundamental". And doesn't your materialist view lead to solipsism?
Consciousness is certainly fundamental to appreciating the world, and the evidence suggests it's something the brain does. Solipsism is an extreme form of idealism; I don't see how materialism could lead to solipsism, they're metaphysically incompatible.
If your brain can produce your experience of your self, it could also produce your experience of me, and this conversation, and your chair, and everything.
That would be idealism. The evidence of our senses can be metaphysically interpreted in various ways. Going by what I think I have good reason to accept and what I have good reason to doubt, I incline towards naturalism.