The Problem With The Argument From Morality

[Hawisher]

The argument from morality is an apologetic that pops up from time to time and has been wielded with varying degrees of efficacy (see Mere Christianity, the thread entitled "Objective Morality, Evidence for God's Existence"). To summarize, it follows the following form:

1. Objective moral laws imply a moral law-giver. This is a contentious premise, which is why a competent user of this apologetic will preface the Argument from Morality itself with a discussion of this premise.
2. Objective moral laws exist. This is also a contentious premise, which is why I personally prefer the moral argument as an apologetic to bolster faith, rather than to inspire it.
3. Therefore, a moral law-giver exists. If you thought the first two were contentious, you've not yet seen anything.

In terms of formal logic, this syllogism is perfectly valid.
1. If moral laws, (p), then moral law-giver (q).
2. Moral laws (p).
3. Therefore moral law-giver (q).

However, its soundness as an argument, that is to say, the accuracy of its premises, is greatly disputed. For the purposes of the rest of this writing, I shall be using the term "atheists" to mean "atheists who take a belligerent attitude towards religion, that is, the type of atheists one would expect to find in a Christian forum." There are two sorts of disputes atheists have with the Argument from Morality. The first sort is disputes of argument; that is to say, they take issue with the accuracy of the two premises. The second sort I shall call disputes of evidence; these disputes are raised against the conclusion that, should the Argument from Morality be accepted, the Christian God cannot be this moral law-giver because He is not a moral god. I chose these terms because, in the first case, those that argue against the user of this apologetic take issue with the argument itself, that is, they believe the Argument from Morality to be invalid in its entirety, while in the second case, they merely believe that the Christian God does not fit the evidence provided by the Argument from Morality.

To those who follow the first course, I would say little. Not because I believe that they are correct, but because I find the argument from morality is a wonderful thing to say all at once with no dissent (as did C. S. Lewis), but is very difficult to argue against someone. Far better to argue from evidence of the resurrection, or ontology. The argument from morality is very difficult to use in the context of a debate because it first requires establishing a tricky point of philosophy as one premise (tricky, but doable -- Lewis managed it with flair) and then for the next premise requires that one wrangle an objective law out of subjective experience, all the while against the naysaying of atheists, whose subjective experience is every bit as subjective and experiential as one's own. Again, I believe Lewis managed this as well, but as I have said, he did not suffer from direct and precise arguments in response to his own. Of course, it is important not to hold those arguments against those who make them: one might as well hold against it the rabbit's flight from the hounds, or the mighty struggle of a fish against the fisherman.

To those who follow the second course, I would say perhaps a bit more, not out of any mistaken hope that it would find purchase in their hearts but out of a desire to explain why their argument finds no hold in my own heart. Those who argue that the Christian God does not meet the moral requirements to be the Moral Law-Giver point to such occurrences as the Biblical genocide of the Canaanites. With this point I must disagree, although it is important that I elaborate on why. I do not disagree with this point because I feel there is a neat and tidy solution to this problem. I don't believe that if one merely looks at it from the right angle, all of a sudden from our point of view that which seems wrong will become right -- were that the case, our morality would not be objective. Rather, I find it likely that there is a crucial fact which has not been revealed to us humans, and perhaps never will. You do understand the difference between that which seems moral from a certain point of view, and that which seems moral as soon as one has all the facts? I am certain you do, but to become even more certain: the one is clearly not morally objective, as the morality changes with your point of view. The other, however, can be said to be morally objective, as the morality of the situation becomes apparent as knowledge is gained. That this gained knowledge results in a shift of perspective is immaterial. It is the knowledge learned, not the perspective shifted, that makes the truth apparent.

Now it may seem obvious to Christians reading this that I have raised the Argument from Morality from the shadows of the disputes of evidence. Well, I have, but I have not. From the point of view of a Christian -- that is, one who is prepared to take some things on faith, being convinced by his reason that the Christian God is real and true -- I clearly have. It is not so difficult at all for a Christian to conceive of facts which -- though we cannot know them to be true -- would demonstrate that God does, in fact, fit the description of the Moral Law-Giver. That allows a Christian, hearing this argument, to settle back and focus on the Argument from Morality itself, by doing his best to establish premises one and two as true. So, in that sense, I have 'fixed' the Argument from Morality.

However, I have also failed to save the Argument from Morality, and here is how. An atheist, being exposed to the Argument from Morality by a Christian who seeks to convert him, cannot reasonably be expected to take on faith any part of the argument whatsoever. That is not just putting the cart before the horse; that is insisting that the cart, being in front of the horse, should now proceed to tow the horse to its destination. Now, one can make all sorts of pretty arguments to attempt to explain away the disputes of evidence; however, one is left with the central facts that the Book we revere tells us God told the Israelites to commit genocide, and they did, and that though it is not unreasonable for already-convinced Christians to continue to believe in a moral God in spite of this, it is an absolute non-starter to expect to convert atheists on the basis of this argument.

Many will take this as an attack on the Christian faith; I assure you, it is not. Though God reveals himself in many ways (and I do not dispute that one of these ways is moral objectivity) it is unreasonable to expect moral objectivity to, by mere virtue of being God-given, be a workable argument for God. After all, God gave us squirrels, did he not? If you truly believe that any way in which God reveals himself is a workable argument for His existence, then go and preach the Argument from Squirrels. If you are successful, then you never needed the Argument from Morality in the first place. If not, I suspect you will have learned a valuable lesson about the nature of apologetics.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

However, I have also failed to save the Argument from Morality, and here is how. An atheist, being exposed to the Argument from Morality by a Christian who seeks to convert him, cannot reasonably be expected to take on faith any part of the argument whatsoever. That is not just putting the cart before the horse; that is insisting that the cart, being in front of the horse, should now proceed to tow the horse to its destination. Now, one can make all sorts of pretty arguments to attempt to explain away the disputes of evidence; however, one is left with the central facts that the Book we revere tells us God told the Israelites to commit genocide, and they did, and that though it is not unreasonable for already-convinced Christians to continue to believe in a moral God in spite of this, it is an absolute non-starter to expect to convert atheists on the basis of this argument.

Many will take this as an attack on the Christian faith; I assure you, it is not. Though God reveals himself in many ways (and I do not dispute that one of these ways is moral objectivity) it is unreasonable to expect moral objectivity to, by mere virtue of being God-given, be a workable argument for God. After all, God gave us squirrels, did he not? If you truly believe that any way in which God reveals himself is a workable argument for His existence, then go and preach the Argument from Squirrels. If you are successful, then you never needed the Argument from Morality in the first place. If not, I suspect you will have learned a valuable lesson about the nature of apologetics.

I think the argument is unconvincing principally because there are many unsung assumptions embedded in the premises and these assumptions are really what's doing the work. Some of these assumptions were laid bare in the thread "Objective Morality, Evidence for God's Existence", so I won't go through them here, except to say that a theist using the Moral Argument may simply take them for granted.

With regard to the Argument from Squirrels, I think you are right. It begins with the assumption that God has created something, and that the something in question is thus evidence for the existence of the Creator of that something. It is begging the question.

 

[Hawisher]

With regard to the Argument from Squirrels, I think you are right. It begins with the assumption that God has created something, and that the something in question is thus evidence for the existence of the Creator of that something. It is begging the question.

Even that's not quite what I meant to address, although that's certainly something Christians do. I meant to address the idea that since everything is given to us by God, who reveals himself in everything he creates, that there is a way to create a reasonable argument for God using anything. Now, in a perfect world, perhaps there would be. Until that time, the Argument from Squirrels will not work, and once we arrive at that world, I suspect it will be unnecessary.

 

[Ken-1122]

The argument from morality is an apologetic that pops up from time to time and has been wielded with varying degrees of efficacy (see Mere Christianity, the thread entitled "Objective Morality, Evidence for God's Existence"). To summarize, it follows the following form:

1. Objective moral laws imply a moral law-giver. This is a contentious premise, which is why a competent user of this apologetic will preface the Argument from Morality itself with a discussion of this premise.
2. Objective moral laws exist. This is also a contentious premise, which is why I personally prefer the moral argument as an apologetic to bolster faith, rather than to inspire it.
3. Therefore, a moral law-giver exists. If you thought the first two were contentious, you've not yet seen anything.

In terms of formal logic, this syllogism is perfectly valid.
1. If moral laws, (p), then moral law-giver (q).
2. Moral laws (p).
3. Therefore moral law-giver (q).

However, its soundness as an argument, that is to say, the accuracy of its premises, is greatly disputed. For the purposes of the rest of this writing, I shall be using the term "atheists" to mean "atheists who take a belligerent attitude towards religion, that is, the type of atheists one would expect to find in a Christian forum." There are two sorts of disputes atheists have with the Argument from Morality. The first sort is disputes of argument; that is to say, they take issue with the accuracy of the two premises. The second sort I shall call disputes of evidence; these disputes are raised against the conclusion that, should the Argument from Morality be accepted, the Christian God cannot be this moral law-giver because He is not a moral god. I chose these terms because, in the first case, those that argue against the user of this apologetic take issue with the argument itself, that is, they believe the Argument from Morality to be invalid in its entirety, while in the second case, they merely believe that the Christian God does not fit the evidence provided by the Argument from Morality.

To those who follow the first course, I would say little. Not because I believe that they are correct, but because I find the argument from morality is a wonderful thing to say all at once with no dissent (as did C. S. Lewis), but is very difficult to argue against someone. Far better to argue from evidence of the resurrection, or ontology. The argument from morality is very difficult to use in the context of a debate because it first requires establishing a tricky point of philosophy as one premise (tricky, but doable -- Lewis managed it with flair) and then for the next premise requires that one wrangle an objective law out of subjective experience, all the while against the naysaying of atheists, whose subjective experience is every bit as subjective and experiential as one's own. Again, I believe Lewis managed this as well, but as I have said, he did not suffer from direct and precise arguments in response to his own. Of course, it is important not to hold those arguments against those who make them: one might as well hold against it the rabbit's flight from the hounds, or the mighty struggle of a fish against the fisherman.

To those who follow the second course, I would say perhaps a bit more, not out of any mistaken hope that it would find purchase in their hearts but out of a desire to explain why their argument finds no hold in my own heart. Those who argue that the Christian God does not meet the moral requirements to be the Moral Law-Giver point to such occurrences as the Biblical genocide of the Canaanites. With this point I must disagree, although it is important that I elaborate on why. I do not disagree with this point because I feel there is a neat and tidy solution to this problem. I don't believe that if one merely looks at it from the right angle, all of a sudden from our point of view that which seems wrong will become right -- were that the case, our morality would not be objective. Rather, I find it likely that there is a crucial fact which has not been revealed to us humans, and perhaps never will. You do understand the difference between that which seems moral from a certain point of view, and that which seems moral as soon as one has all the facts? I am certain you do, but to become even more certain: the one is clearly not morally objective, as the morality changes with your point of view. The other, however, can be said to be morally objective, as the morality of the situation becomes apparent as knowledge is gained. That this gained knowledge results in a shift of perspective is immaterial. It is the knowledge learned, not the perspective shifted, that makes the truth apparent.

Now it may seem obvious to Christians reading this that I have raised the Argument from Morality from the shadows of the disputes of evidence. Well, I have, but I have not. From the point of view of a Christian -- that is, one who is prepared to take some things on faith, being convinced by his reason that the Christian God is real and true -- I clearly have. It is not so difficult at all for a Christian to conceive of facts which -- though we cannot know them to be true -- would demonstrate that God does, in fact, fit the description of the Moral Law-Giver. That allows a Christian, hearing this argument, to settle back and focus on the Argument from Morality itself, by doing his best to establish premises one and two as true. So, in that sense, I have 'fixed' the Argument from Morality.

However, I have also failed to save the Argument from Morality, and here is how. An atheist, being exposed to the Argument from Morality by a Christian who seeks to convert him, cannot reasonably be expected to take on faith any part of the argument whatsoever. That is not just putting the cart before the horse; that is insisting that the cart, being in front of the horse, should now proceed to tow the horse to its destination. Now, one can make all sorts of pretty arguments to attempt to explain away the disputes of evidence; however, one is left with the central facts that the Book we revere tells us God told the Israelites to commit genocide, and they did, and that though it is not unreasonable for already-convinced Christians to continue to believe in a moral God in spite of this, it is an absolute non-starter to expect to convert atheists on the basis of this argument.

Many will take this as an attack on the Christian faith; I assure you, it is not. Though God reveals himself in many ways (and I do not dispute that one of these ways is moral objectivity) it is unreasonable to expect moral objectivity to, by mere virtue of being God-given, be a workable argument for God. After all, God gave us squirrels, did he not? If you truly believe that any way in which God reveals himself is a workable argument for His existence, then go and preach the Argument from Squirrels. If you are successful, then you never needed the Argument from Morality in the first place. If not, I suspect you will have learned a valuable lesson about the nature of apologetics.

Assuming objective moral laws exist, you don't have to be God to be an objective moral law-giver.

K

 

[Jade Margery]

The argument from morality is an apologetic that pops up from time to time and has been wielded with varying degrees of efficacy (see Mere Christianity, the thread entitled "Objective Morality, Evidence for God's Existence"). To summarize, it follows the following form....
[snip]

...Many will take this as an attack on the Christian faith; I assure you, it is not. Though God reveals himself in many ways (and I do not dispute that one of these ways is moral objectivity) it is unreasonable to expect moral objectivity to, by mere virtue of being God-given, be a workable argument for God. After all, God gave us squirrels, did he not? If you truly believe that any way in which God reveals himself is a workable argument for His existence, then go and preach the Argument from Squirrels. If you are successful, then you never needed the Argument from Morality in the first place. If not, I suspect you will have learned a valuable lesson about the nature of apologetics.

All in all, a very well reasoned, thorough, and intelligent dissection of the existing debate, to which I have really no argument. You seem very good at grasping not only your own perspective, but the perspective of people who believe differently to yourself, which is a rare and admirable quality.

In the end it all boils down to faith, doesn't it? If you have faith in that particular version of god, it is easy to accept the argument from morality. If you don't have faith, it is very difficult. To that I would only point out that an argument which only convinces those who are already biased towards its conclusion is not a very useful argument at all.

To those who follow the first course, I would say little. Not because I believe that they are correct, but because I find the argument from morality is a wonderful thing to say all at once with no dissent (as did C. S. Lewis), but is very difficult to argue against someone. Far better to argue from evidence of the resurrection, or ontology. The argument from morality is very difficult to use in the context of a debate because it first requires establishing a tricky point of philosophy as one premise (tricky, but doable -- Lewis managed it with flair) and then for the next premise requires that one wrangle an objective law out of subjective experience, all the while against the naysaying of atheists, whose subjective experience is every bit as subjective and experiential as one's own. Again, I believe Lewis managed this as well, but as I have said, he did not suffer from direct and precise arguments in response to his own. Of course, it is important not to hold those arguments against those who make them: one might as well hold against it the rabbit's flight from the hounds, or the mighty struggle of a fish against the fisherman.

I confess that I have not read much of C.S. Lewis's theological musings, though I did enjoy his fiction as a child. Do you have any links to these particular passages online that manage the 'tricky, but doable, with flair'?

 

[JGG]

The argument from morality is an apologetic that pops up from time to time and has been wielded with varying degrees of efficacy (see Mere Christianity, the thread entitled "Objective Morality, Evidence for God's Existence"). To summarize, it follows the following form:

1. Objective moral laws imply a moral law-giver. This is a contentious premise, which is why a competent user of this apologetic will preface the Argument from Morality itself with a discussion of this premise.
2. Objective moral laws exist. This is also a contentious premise, which is why I personally prefer the moral argument as an apologetic to bolster faith, rather than to inspire it.
3. Therefore, a moral law-giver exists. If you thought the first two were contentious, you've not yet seen anything.

In terms of formal logic, this syllogism is perfectly valid.
1. If moral laws, (p), then moral law-giver (q).
2. Moral laws (p).
3. Therefore moral law-giver (q).

However, its soundness as an argument, that is to say, the accuracy of its premises, is greatly disputed. For the purposes of the rest of this writing, I shall be using the term "atheists" to mean "atheists who take a belligerent attitude towards religion, that is, the type of atheists one would expect to find in a Christian forum." There are two sorts of disputes atheists have with the Argument from Morality. The first sort is disputes of argument; that is to say, they take issue with the accuracy of the two premises. The second sort I shall call disputes of evidence; these disputes are raised against the conclusion that, should the Argument from Morality be accepted, the Christian God cannot be this moral law-giver because He is not a moral god. I chose these terms because, in the first case, those that argue against the user of this apologetic take issue with the argument itself, that is, they believe the Argument from Morality to be invalid in its entirety, while in the second case, they merely believe that the Christian God does not fit the evidence provided by the Argument from Morality.

To those who follow the first course, I would say little. Not because I believe that they are correct, but because I find the argument from morality is a wonderful thing to say all at once with no dissent (as did C. S. Lewis), but is very difficult to argue against someone. Far better to argue from evidence of the resurrection, or ontology. The argument from morality is very difficult to use in the context of a debate because it first requires establishing a tricky point of philosophy as one premise (tricky, but doable -- Lewis managed it with flair) and then for the next premise requires that one wrangle an objective law out of subjective experience, all the while against the naysaying of atheists, whose subjective experience is every bit as subjective and experiential as one's own. Again, I believe Lewis managed this as well, but as I have said, he did not suffer from direct and precise arguments in response to his own. Of course, it is important not to hold those arguments against those who make them: one might as well hold against it the rabbit's flight from the hounds, or the mighty struggle of a fish against the fisherman.

To those who follow the second course, I would say perhaps a bit more, not out of any mistaken hope that it would find purchase in their hearts but out of a desire to explain why their argument finds no hold in my own heart. Those who argue that the Christian God does not meet the moral requirements to be the Moral Law-Giver point to such occurrences as the Biblical genocide of the Canaanites. With this point I must disagree, although it is important that I elaborate on why. I do not disagree with this point because I feel there is a neat and tidy solution to this problem. I don't believe that if one merely looks at it from the right angle, all of a sudden from our point of view that which seems wrong will become right -- were that the case, our morality would not be objective. Rather, I find it likely that there is a crucial fact which has not been revealed to us humans, and perhaps never will. You do understand the difference between that which seems moral from a certain point of view, and that which seems moral as soon as one has all the facts? I am certain you do, but to become even more certain: the one is clearly not morally objective, as the morality changes with your point of view. The other, however, can be said to be morally objective, as the morality of the situation becomes apparent as knowledge is gained. That this gained knowledge results in a shift of perspective is immaterial. It is the knowledge learned, not the perspective shifted, that makes the truth apparent.

Now it may seem obvious to Christians reading this that I have raised the Argument from Morality from the shadows of the disputes of evidence. Well, I have, but I have not. From the point of view of a Christian -- that is, one who is prepared to take some things on faith, being convinced by his reason that the Christian God is real and true -- I clearly have. It is not so difficult at all for a Christian to conceive of facts which -- though we cannot know them to be true -- would demonstrate that God does, in fact, fit the description of the Moral Law-Giver. That allows a Christian, hearing this argument, to settle back and focus on the Argument from Morality itself, by doing his best to establish premises one and two as true. So, in that sense, I have 'fixed' the Argument from Morality.

However, I have also failed to save the Argument from Morality, and here is how. An atheist, being exposed to the Argument from Morality by a Christian who seeks to convert him, cannot reasonably be expected to take on faith any part of the argument whatsoever. That is not just putting the cart before the horse; that is insisting that the cart, being in front of the horse, should now proceed to tow the horse to its destination. Now, one can make all sorts of pretty arguments to attempt to explain away the disputes of evidence; however, one is left with the central facts that the Book we revere tells us God told the Israelites to commit genocide, and they did, and that though it is not unreasonable for already-convinced Christians to continue to believe in a moral God in spite of this, it is an absolute non-starter to expect to convert atheists on the basis of this argument.

Many will take this as an attack on the Christian faith; I assure you, it is not. Though God reveals himself in many ways (and I do not dispute that one of these ways is moral objectivity) it is unreasonable to expect moral objectivity to, by mere virtue of being God-given, be a workable argument for God. After all, God gave us squirrels, did he not? If you truly believe that any way in which God reveals himself is a workable argument for His existence, then go and preach the Argument from Squirrels. If you are successful, then you never needed the Argument from Morality in the first place. If not, I suspect you will have learned a valuable lesson about the nature of apologetics.

I don't really see much to disagree with here. However, although I don't exactly subscribe to the objective moral law, I don't see why it is necessarily is the result of a deity.

 

[yasic]

The biggest issue with the idea of explaining that God is still the perfect moral-provider by reason of an external factor that we either do not know or cannot yet know is that this argument works for every single God regardless of what actions they take. In fact you could even claim that any entity is perfect morally, even if they performed actions that we commonly consider immoral, on the basis that a mitigating factor exists that we do not know and the issue can be resolved by simply having faith this factor exists.

EDIT: It also works the other way around. As soon as you introduce a higher level of rules to morality that humans do not understand in an effort to 'throw away the bad', this also necessitates that any actions we consider 'good' to also be thrown out for the same reasons, namely we don't actually know if they are good or not. Upon introducing the idea of us not being able to properly assess God's morality this includes things like the Resurrection - Jesus sacrificing himself for our sins might be an absolute evil that for mitigating factors we do not understand.

 

[madaz]

One only has to study the complex civilizations of ants or primates to witness behaviour which is "morally" good and essential for that civilisation to succeed.

Also, if the moral argument is considered evidence for deities, then the theist is really clutching at straws and if one derives their morals from the bible then mankind is in deep trouble.

In my personal opinion, deities have as much to do with morals as ham samwich's have to do with bicycles.

 

[quatona]

Firstly, Hawisher, let me commend you on your post. Well done.
For the time being I am going to address just a few points.

The argument from morality is an apologetic that pops up from time to time and has been wielded with varying degrees of efficacy (see Mere Christianity, the thread entitled "Objective Morality, Evidence for God's Existence"). To summarize, it follows the following form:

1. Objective moral laws imply a moral law-giver. This is a contentious premise, which is why a competent user of this apologetic will preface the Argument from Morality itself with a discussion of this premise.
2. Objective moral laws exist. This is also a contentious premise, which is why I personally prefer the moral argument as an apologetic to bolster faith, rather than to inspire it.
3. Therefore, a moral law-giver exists. If you thought the first two were contentious, you've not yet seen anything.

In terms of formal logic, this syllogism is perfectly valid.
1. If moral laws, (p), then moral law-giver (q).
2. Moral laws (p).
3. Therefore moral law-giver (q).

However, its soundness as an argument, that is to say, the accuracy of its premises, is greatly disputed. For the purposes of the rest of this writing, I shall be using the term "atheists" to mean "atheists who take a belligerent attitude towards religion, that is, the type of atheists one would expect to find in a Christian forum."

Why would you do that? It reeks of a "poisoning the well", and the rest of your post doesn´t even seem to require such a redefinition.
By the same token, I could, for purposes of this discussion, define "Christian" as "Christians who shift fallacious arguments upon fallacious argument in favour of their beliefs".

For investigating the validity of an argument it should be irrelevant whether one holds the conclusion to be true or not. You, Sir, have demonstrated this ability quite nicely in your post, and I am wondering why you want to exclude the possibility that non-believers can do the same.

There are two sorts of disputes atheists have with the Argument from Morality. The first sort is disputes of argument; that is to say, they take issue with the accuracy of the two premises.

Again: you needn´t be an atheist (and even less an atheist of that narrow definition you have introduced) for that. You just need to be in favour of sound reasoning.
To be more precise, I just would like to see a substantiation of these premises.
But before that, I would expect proper definitions of "objective (morality)" (what exactly are the requirements for a morality to be objective), and "moral law-giver". I would like to make sure that these definitions (as has been shown with Elioenai´s approach) are of a kind that render the argument circular at best or tautological, at worst.
These definitions should also give me an idea as to why the moral law-giver is to be considered "objective".

The second sort I shall call disputes of evidence; these disputes are raised against the conclusion that, should the Argument from Morality be accepted, the Christian God cannot be this moral law-giver because He is not a moral god.

While that may be an interesting discussion, it actually doesn´t refer to the argument as presented. The syllogism doesn´t even mention "God" (and even less a "Christian God"). So discussing this question would distract from the argument itself. After all, perfectly non-divine concepts (such as e.g. "nature" or "evolution") could possibly turn out to fill the space-holder "moral law-giver".

 

[Eudaimonist]

1. If moral laws, (p), then moral law-giver (q).
2. Moral laws (p).
3. Therefore moral law-giver (q).

As a nontheistic moral realist who rejects (1) and accepts (2), I would be far more inclined to reject (2) if I had to accept (1). The reasons I have for accepting (2) have entirely to do with an ethically naturalistic and nontheistic approach to morality. If somehow (1) was made more plausible than its rejection, I would conclude that some form of moral non-realism must be correct, such as subjectivism or non-cognitivism. I would no longer have any reason to accept (2), and the Argument from Morality would simply fall apart.

It's a losing strategy with nontheistic moral realists such as myself, even if partial victory is achieved by the apologist.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Sectio Aureo]

If true, the Christians still wouldnt be convinced of Zeus......

 

[Hawisher]

Why would you do that? It reeks of a "poisoning the well", and the rest of your post doesn´t even seem to require such a redefinition.
By the same token, I could, for purposes of this discussion, define "Christian" as "Christians who shift fallacious arguments upon fallacious argument in favour of their beliefs".

The only reason I stipulated that is because many atheists do not argue for their atheism at all. It wouldn't exactly be correct to say that atheists say x when many atheists do not say x by virtue of not even caring.

Perhaps a better word would have been "argumentative."

 

[Gadarene]

The only reason I stipulated that is because many atheists do not argue for their atheism at all. It wouldn't exactly be correct to say that atheists say x when many atheists do not say x by virtue of not even caring.

Perhaps a better word would have been "argumentative."

Simply arguing your case is not belligerence. This is sounding suspiciously like the tired old "militant atheist" canard, where publishing some books and becoming publicly more outspoken is made out to be an inherently bad thing.

If some of us are belligerent, it's because of umpteen encounters with chronically intellectually dishonest Christians like Elioenai - which I would say is reason enough to be belligerent. But do try not to tar all atheists with the same brush. That sort of carry-on is the Elioenai route, and I'm sure you're better than that.

 

[Jade Margery]

I think 'belligerent' probably describes me just fine.

 

[Hawisher]

Simply arguing your case is not belligerence. This is sounding suspiciously like the tired old "militant atheist" canard, where publishing some books and becoming publicly more outspoken is made out to be an inherently bad thing.

If some of us are belligerent, it's because of umpteen encounters with chronically intellectually dishonest Christians like Elioenai - which I would say is reason enough to be belligerent. But do try not to tar all atheists with the same brush. That sort of carry-on is the Elioenai route, and I'm sure you're better than that.

I didn't mean to associate anything negative with the word "belligerent." I'm belligerent towards atheism. Nothing wrong with that.

 

[Ken-1122]

I didn't mean to associate anything negative with the word "belligerent." I'm belligerent towards atheism. Nothing wrong with that.

Care to comment on what I said on post #4?

K

 

[Hawisher]

Assuming objective moral laws exist, you don't have to be God to be an objective moral law-giver.

K

I think I've already touched on this in another thread, but I'd argue that if objective moral values exist, there is nothing else that could possibly have established them BUT God. However, I don't think the Argument from Morality is a particularly effective apologetic.

 

[Ken-1122]

I think I've already touched on this in another thread, but I'd argue that if objective moral values exist, there is nothing else that could possibly have established them BUT God.

With this I disagree.

However, I don't think the Argument from Morality is a particularly effective apologetic.

With this I agree.

K

 

[quatona]

The only reason I stipulated that is because many atheists do not argue for their atheism at all. It wouldn't exactly be correct to say that atheists say x when many atheists do not say x by virtue of not even caring.

Perhaps a better word would have been "argumentative."

Maybe I wasn´t entirely clear. What I meant to communcate was:
In order to put a certain argument to scrutinity you needn´t disagree with the conclusion (or even argue for a contrary position).

So, while it´s true that most atheists don´t argue for their atheism at all (there is nothing to argue for, imo), participating in the discussion of the moral argument doesn´t require them to, in the first place.

 

[quatona]

I think I've already touched on this in another thread, but I'd argue that if objective moral values exist, there is nothing else that could possibly have established them BUT God.

Would you like to expand on that and discuss it?