A Real Man Is...

[variant]

If these folks are non-Christian, then what a real man is...is the least of their worries.

Yes, the chief concern of the non-religious ought to be religion according to the religious.

 

[Crandaddy]

It seems to me that this question (as interesting as it may be) is completely besides variant´s point.
He merely takes issue with a terminology that deliberately accepts and invites an unneccessary risk of false equivocation. We have plenty of terms to signify positivity (good, actualized, self-actualized, virtuous, excellent, fine, perfect - just to pick some of those that have been used in recent posts) - there is absolutely no need to introduce a doubtful colloquialism into the philosophical discussion. Poorly performing men, men short of excellence, men who are not virtuous (no matter by which standards the person speaking judges, and no matter whether the standard is supposedly objective or subjective) do exist: they are real. You are free to judge persons, but imo you are not free to define them out of existence.

Yes, that seems to be his main point, but at times he seems to hint at something more than that. Maybe I'm reading more into his posts than is actually there, but at times he seems to suggest that such entities as men, persons, etc. are just really, actually there, and that we have to acknowledge this reality before we can start to assess whether or not they are good or bad. Their reality is thus disconnected from their goodness. This is what I'm most interested in, and it is also where I disagree (if in fact variant is making such a suggestion).



While you are correct that we can't define our terms out of existence, I'm not so sure that all such men as you have listed are real, depending of course on how we understand “real.” To be sure, each would have to exhibit individual existence before being subject to evaluation, but such existence needn't attain the level of real manhood or personhood if we take “real” to denote the full and complete actualization of these properties.



And I am inclined to agree, by the way, that “real” is perhaps too vague and blunt a term for rigorous philosophical treatment of the relevant issues. It would probably behoove us to try to dissect it into more tangible terms.

As for your actual question: I´m always a little baffled when the only alternative to objective morality someone can think of is hedonism or instant gratification ("likes and dislikes"). I find it a little odd that to someone like yourself - who apparently is well versed in philosophy - it needs to be explained that a person can strive for ideals, goals, virtues in a way that are in conflict with his immediate "likes" - even though he may not believe that these virtues, goals, ideals are "objective".

You're thinking of simple hedonism (i.e. instant gratification). Hedonism is just the belief that pleasure is the only intrinsic good, and one needn't be a simple hedonist in order to be a hedonist simpliciter. One might also be more cerebral, calculating hedonist who considers balances of pleasures and pains in the long run.



As I see it, the immorality of an immoral act consists in its being directed toward the attainment of some pleasure or avoidance of some pain (whether immediately or in the long run, it doesn't matter) despite the person's knowledge that he ought not to so act. Whether he believes this moral impulse to be imposed upon him from without by some external standard, or merely an impulse that happens to arise, for whatever reason, absent any such imposing standard seems not to matter as regards the moral/immoral status of the particular act.

(just like "perfect" doesn´t [allow for degrees], btw.).

Used as a superlative, “perfect” doesn't admit of degrees. But in order for something to be “good,” another “better,” and yet another “worse,” mustn't there be some standard by which they're measured? Might not this standard admit of a superlative ideal? When I talk of “degrees of perfection,” I mean degrees of approximation to some superlative, perfect ideal.

(On a light-hearted sidenote: Geeze, you really have a way with words: "exhibits the perfection of personhood more excellently". While I suspect that "he´s a better man/he´s more excellent" would have said just the same, this monster of a sentence - if dissected carefully - runs you in all sorts of semantics trouble.)

But he's not a better man, at least not insofar as he exhibits manhood as I use the term here. I explicitly stated as much. And if he's more excellent, then how is he more excellent, in what way? He's more excellent than the tyrant in the category of personhood, and, therefore, I would say he's a better individual altogether because to excel in personhood is better than to excel in manhood (we're assuming, of course, that he is more excellent in the category of personhood; this is all hypothetical). I try to not be needlessly verbose, but I do try to be wordy enough to adequately convey my ideas.

Finally, and only slightly related, I am not sure I find it helpful or useful for any given purpose to judge an entire person. Ymmv.

Not an actual, existing person, no. (I would say this is largely for epistemic reasons; we simply don't know the full and complete story of what makes a given person the way he is.) But we can evaluate certain specific character traits in order to see whether those traits are good for us to have and how we might improve ourselves.

 

[quatona]

Yes, that seems to be his main point, but at times he seems to hint at something more than that. Maybe I'm reading more into his posts than is actually there, but at times he seems to suggest that such entities as men, persons, etc. are just really, actually there, and that we have to acknowledge this reality before we can start to assess whether or not they are good or bad. Their reality is thus disconnected from their goodness. This is what I'm most interested in, and it is also where I disagree (if in fact variant is making such a suggestion).

Well, at least I would make that suggestion - and if only in order to keep things workable. If we assume that bad entities are not real/do not exist we couldn´t make those distinctions that you (and Mark) are out to make, in the first place.

While you are correct that we can't define our terms out of existence,

Maybe I wasn´t clear: I didn´t mean to talk about "defining terms out of existence" but about "defining entities out of existence".

I'm not so sure that all such men as you have listed are real, depending of course on how we understand “real.” To be sure, each would have to exhibit individual existence before being subject to evaluation, but such existence needn't attain the level of real manhood or personhood if we take “real” to denote the full and complete actualization of these properties.

...and that´s why there isn´t much good coming from using "real" to denote two completely different concepts in the same argument.
Of course, the nature of language allows us to apply whatever definition to a term (and nobody could keep me to use "reality" as a synonym for "banana milkshake" - it´s just not in the best interest of successful communication.

And I am inclined to agree, by the way, that “real” is perhaps too vague and blunt a term for rigorous philosophical treatment of the relevant issues. It would probably behoove us to try to dissect it into more tangible terms.

While I agree with this, it is not really the problem I was trying to get at (after all, the same would apply to terms like "good", "excellent", "perfect" or "self-actualized", as well).
My point was and still is that using "real" in the way you use it here is accepting and inviting false equivocations.

You're thinking of simple hedonism (i.e. instant gratification). Hedonism is just the belief that pleasure is the only intrinsic good, and one needn't be a simple hedonist in order to be a hedonist simpliciter. One might also be more cerebral, calculating hedonist who considers balances of pleasures and pains in the long run.



As I see it, the immorality of an immoral act consists in its being directed toward the attainment of some pleasure or avoidance of some pain (whether immediately or in the long run, it doesn't matter) despite the person's knowledge that he ought not to so act. Whether he believes this moral impulse to be imposed upon him from without by some external standard, or merely an impulse that happens to arise, for whatever reason, absent any such imposing standard seems not to matter as regards the moral/immoral status of the particular act.

Do I understand this correctly: You concede that your original dichotomy
'acting on a (supposedly) objective standard vs. acting upon your likes/dislikes' was a false dichotomy, in that it leaves out a whole lot of other possibilities of motivation (e.g. people who don´t believe there to be an objective morality yet are driven by something else than the mere consideration of their own pleasures)?

(I´d also like to add a caveat: I don´t think that stretching the term "hedonism" too far is helping clear thinking. Even a theist who believes in objective morality as decreed by god and who takes eternal reward/punishment into consideration would have to be categorized as "hedonist", because he fits your definition of "consider[ing] balances of pleasures and pains in the long run".
With your definitions in mind, every sort of idealism could be considered "hedonism" because we can assume that the person acting out of idealism takes some kind of "pleasure" in the idea that their ideals will actualize. Even the striving for self-actualization would fall into that category.

However, as far as I am concerned, I do not care much for these distinctions, anyway. I am convinced that succesful self-actualization will result in the insight that my well-being and the well-being of others are not in conflict but interdependent. But that´s a whole 'nother story.)

Used as a superlative, “perfect” doesn't admit of degrees. But in order for something to be “good,” another “better,” and yet another “worse,” mustn't there be some standard by which they're measured? Might not this standard admit of a superlative ideal? When I talk of “degrees of perfection,” I mean degrees of approximation to some superlative, perfect ideal.

Yes, sure, and because this fact is implicit in terms such as "good" and "bad" these terms are good enough, and "doing better" needn´t be replaced by semantic monsters like "exhibiting perfection more excellently".

But he's not a better man, at least not insofar as he exhibits manhood as I use the term here. I explicitly stated as much. And if he's more excellent, then how is he more excellent, in what way? He's more excellent than the tyrant in the category of personhood, and, therefore, I would say he's a better individual altogether because to excel in personhood is better than to excel in manhood (we're assuming, of course, that he is more excellent in the category of personhood; this is all hypothetical). I try to not be needlessly verbose, but I do try to be wordy enough to adequately convey my ideas.

Yes, my proposal for a simpler way of putting it should have read "a better person" - not "a better man" - I missed your very point (and without trying to find an excuse for my careless reading, I´d say that the - as I think - unnecessary verbosity played a part in distracting me from the actual point.)

Not an actual, existing person, no. (I would say this is largely for epistemic reasons; we simply don't know the full and complete story of what makes a given person the way he is.) But we can evaluate certain specific character traits in order to see whether those traits are good for us to have and how we might improve ourselves.

Certainly. Talking about "real men" vs. "not real men" doesn´t seem to communicate the emphasis on the latter.

 

[jpcedotal]

Yes, the chief concern of the non-religious ought to be religion according to the religious.

Christ isn't a religion...He is where the living hope is.

 

[jpcedotal]

Apparently unmarried men aren't real men.

The context of the question and the responses seemed to point that we were talking about a husband and/or a father.

What I gave is what Scripture teaches us what a husband should be.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I dont mind too much if a religion is untrue if it produces secular value. Eg meditation can calm the mind and instill compassion. It is when people believe they ought to do the life denying stuff, and make that part of the constructed telos of humanity that we really pay the price for illusion. Like criminalising homosexuality. Then its best to get back to roots experience - science and phenomenology, rather than the grand schemas of the faithful. Of course the frame of reference whereby we ought to be in the world is the epistemically less controversial nd more rational. But really going from is to ought involves truth to the nth degree. Pick and mix and run the risk. Metaphysics is perhaps more significant than navigation but people barely know what a high standard map looks like and are tyranically prone to credulity rather than insight.

 

[variant]

If these folks are non-Christian, then what a real man is...is the least of their worries.

Yes, the chief concern of the non-religious ought to be religion according to the religious.

Christ isn't a religion...He is where the living hope is.

Christianity is a religion of which the Christian is a member.
Christianity - Definition and More from the Free Merriam-Webster Dictionary

One would think with all the nitpicking I do about language that I would mean things EXACTLY as I say them and choose my words carefully and appropriately.

The whole line about Christianity not being a religion is actually just hilarious propaganda.

 

[Gracchus]

Christ isn't a religion...He is where the living hope is.

Different Christians have different takes on the nature of "Christ". If you look back at the history of Christianity, they always have.
I have come to the tentative conclusion that "Christ" is a blank screen on which each Christian projects his desires and prejudices.

 

[Crandaddy]

Maybe I wasn´t clear: I didn´t mean to talk about "defining terms out of existence" but about "defining entities out of existence".

Actually, I believe it is I who wasn't clear. Entities is what I should have said.

...and that´s why there isn´t much good coming from using "real" to denote two completely different concepts in the same argument.
Of course, the nature of language allows us to apply whatever definition to a term (and nobody could keep me to use "reality" as a synonym for "banana milkshake" - it´s just not in the best interest of successful communication.

Agreed.

While I agree with this, it is not really the problem I was trying to get at (after all, the same would apply to terms like "good", "excellent", "perfect" or "self-actualized", as well).
My point was and still is that using "real" in the way you use it here is accepting and inviting false equivocations.

I'm not sure that I see your point. How should I use it? Should I use it at all? It is a nebulous term that invites false equivocations, which is why I say that we should try to move away from it and on to more tangible terms. But I do think it's safe to say that wherever the term is used, something is meant by it, and that its use might prove fruitful for distinguishing its different meanings and finding better replacement terms.

Do I understand this correctly: You concede that your original dichotomy
'acting on a (supposedly) objective standard vs. acting upon your likes/dislikes' was a false dichotomy, in that it leaves out a whole lot of other possibilities of motivation (e.g. people who don´t believe there to be an objective morality yet are driven by something else than the mere consideration of their own pleasures)?

No, it wasn't a false dichotomy, but I might wish to retract this sentence:

Whether he believes this moral impulse to be imposed upon him from without by some external standard, or merely an impulse that happens to arise, for whatever reason, absent any such imposing standard seems not to matter as regards the moral/immoral status of the particular act.

This sentence gave me a good bit of trouble and almost didn't survive the editing cuts, but against my better judgment, I decided to leave it in. The idea I was working with is that one might have a faulty moral philosophy and still be capable of moral action. Take utilitarianism, for example. I think that utilitarianism is a faulty moral philosophy. I don't agree with the utilitarians that our primary moral objective should be to maximize overall pleasure and minimize overall pain. But for its faults, utilitarianism does share in common with other moral philosophies the idea that we have moral obligations. These obligations differ according to different philosophies, but they all say that we ought to act in certain ways. I would say that this awareness of some moral obligation, of some ought that imposes itself upon ourselves, is a necessary ingredient for there to be a truly moral act.


I had thought, when I originally composed that sentence, that it might perhaps be the case that one might believe (quite mistakenly, in my view, then as now) that there are no objectively imposing oughts, that these feelings of moral obligation that arise within us are nothing more than feelings that we may do away with if we are able and if we believe it will suit our interests, and still be capable of moral action. But this view is not like our previous philosophies, such as utilitarianism, which, though perhaps mistaken in their content, nevertheless assert that there are morally-binding oughts. I had thought that I might get away with lumping this view in together with other moral philosophies as mistaken, to be sure, but not precluding the very possibility of moral action--to some extent, maybe. I now rather doubt this. It seems such a view, if really believed, would constitute an inability to grasp the essential content of morality, itself, as it would constitute an inability to grasp an ought as a true ought.

(I´d also like to add a caveat: I don´t think that stretching the term "hedonism" too far is helping clear thinking. Even a theist who believes in objective morality as decreed by god and who takes eternal reward/punishment into consideration would have to be categorized as "hedonist", because he fits your definition of "consider[ing] balances of pleasures and pains in the long run".
With your definitions in mind, every sort of idealism could be considered "hedonism" because we can assume that the person acting out of idealism takes some kind of "pleasure" in the idea that their ideals will actualize. Even the striving for self-actualization would fall into that category.

I think that the idea that heaven is a reward and hell a punishment for our conduct in this life is a very mistaken one. What I mean is that the belief that we should choose to do good deeds, to believe the right things (assuming we can choose our beliefs), or to say the right prayers so that we will be rewarded with entry into heaven rather than punished with consignment to hell is a fundamentally mistaken view, both of the nature of morality and that of the afterlife.


I would say that doing the right things in order to score brownie points with God or in order to further one's own hedonistic interests (i.e. toward the acquisition of pleasure or avoidance of pain, either for its own sake) in any way can never constitute morally righteous behavior. Morally righteous behavior is by its very essence kenotic, selfless. It seeks to give rather than receive. It seeks to build virtuous character for its own intrinsic worth, not so that it might be rewarded down the line with receipt of pleasures.


Essential to Christianity is the view that we can be truly selfless, that we can act without any intent to incur pleasure or avoid pain. We have the ability to so act, I would say, because it is possible for us to recognize goods that are not identical to our pleasures. It is possible for us to see, for example, that it is good for us to behave certain ways, to have certain character traits, to have certain desires, and that certain other behaviors, character traits, and desires are bad.


Heaven, I would say, is what awaits us at the full consummation of our personhood. When we are thoroughly purified of every trace of immoral, selfish vice and the imago dei within us is fully restored, then we will be able to gaze directly upon the eternal, uncreated essence of God in what is known as the Beatific Vision. (On a side note, I might mention that my avatar is a Gustave Doré engraving of Dante and Beatrice gazing upon the Beatific Vision as described by Dante in Paradiso, Canto XXXI of the Divine Comedy, and the Lewis quote in my signature is also an allusion to the Beatific Vision, just in case any might be curious.) For Roman Catholics, as well as for many other Christians (including some Anglicans, such as myself), the Beatific Vision is the very content of heaven. Heaven will essentially consist in being able to directly look upon the eternal, uncreated essence of God.


Hell, on the other hand, is a bit more difficult to explain. It is not, however, an extrinsic punishment for doing bad deeds, just as heaven is not an extrinsic reward for doing good deeds. Nor do I think that it is literally a place of fire and brimstone where people burn forever. Rather, it might more properly be thought of as the condition of being separated from God, or perhaps of being deprived of the Beatific Vision. Eastern Orthodox Christians seem to think that the damned will stand in the full presence of God along with the saved, but since the damned are deprived of sanctifying grace, they will experience God's presence as hell, whereas the saved will experience it as heaven. But whatever hell is, it is what we choose to make it for ourselves. This is to say that it is perfectly just and completely merited because it consists in the fruits of our evil labors, which will then be seen for what they truly are.

 

[quatona]

I'm not sure that I see your point. How should I use it? Should I use it at all?

You could use it to distinguish a factually existing man from a fictive, mythological or imagined man.

It is a nebulous term that invites false equivocations, which is why I say that we should try to move away from it and on to more tangible terms. But I do think it's safe to say that wherever the term is used, something is meant by it, and that its use might prove fruitful for distinguishing its different meanings and finding better replacement terms.

Ok. Now, we have found some better terms : good, self-actualized, perfect....
(They are still as generic - in that they still require to be filled with concrete meaning - but they don´t carry the risk of false equivocation).
Let´s use them.

No, it wasn't a false dichotomy, but I might wish to retract this sentence:





This sentence gave me a good bit of trouble and almost didn't survive the editing cuts, but against my better judgment, I decided to leave it in. The idea I was working with is that one might have a faulty moral philosophy and still be capable of moral action. Take utilitarianism, for example. I think that utilitarianism is a faulty moral philosophy. I don't agree with the utilitarians that our primary moral objective should be to maximize overall pleasure and minimize overall pain. But for its faults, utilitarianism does share in common with other moral philosophies the idea that we have moral obligations. These obligations differ according to different philosophies, but they all say that we ought to act in certain ways. I would say that this awareness of some moral obligation, of some ought that imposes itself upon ourselves, is a necessary ingredient for there to be a truly moral act.


I had thought, when I originally composed that sentence, that it might perhaps be the case that one might believe (quite mistakenly, in my view, then as now) that there are no objectively imposing oughts, that these feelings of moral obligation that arise within us are nothing more than feelings that we may do away with if we are able and if we believe it will suit our interests, and still be capable of moral action. But this view is not like our previous philosophies, such as utilitarianism, which, though perhaps mistaken in their content, nevertheless assert that there are morally-binding oughts. I had thought that I might get away with lumping this view in together with other moral philosophies as mistaken, to be sure, but not precluding the very possibility of moral action--to some extent, maybe. I now rather doubt this. It seems such a view, if really believed, would constitute an inability to grasp the essential content of morality, itself, as it would constitute an inability to grasp an ought as a true ought.

Yes, this was the very sentence that got me confused. Thanks for clarifying and for updating me on your most recent changes of view!

As interesting as it would be to discuss these your ideas (as well as your clarifying apologetic elaborations - which I hope you don´t mind me ignoring for the time being since they are driving us a little off-topic) I would like to insist that they don´t save your dichotomy (which was the subject of my objection):
Let´s assume for a moment that there exists an objective morality. Imagine a guy who accepts all sorts of suffering for maintaining an ideal that is wrong/bad/evil (by standards of this objective morality), without any prospect of gaining pleasure from it, neither on the short nor on the long run. He doesn´t believe in an afterlife, so he can´t even hope for a reward there. He is subjected to torture and execution for not renouncing his ideals, he knows what´s coming his way and he accepts it.
Now, you may call him "immoral", "deluded", "misguided", "wrong", "evil" etc., but not by any stretch his behaviour can be described as "acting on his likes/dislikes" or "striving for pleasure (on the short or long run)".
So your dichotomy was false.

 

[Crandaddy]

quatona,

I'm not entirely sure that you understand what I was trying to say in my dichotomy, so before I directly address your objection, I'd like to devote some space to trying to clarify my meaning.


For ease of reference, here's the passage in question:

Do you think [moral goodness] ultimately boils down to our subjective likes and dislikes, or do you think it's grounded in something more objective, something outside our subjective selves, perhaps something that imposes a normative standard upon our moral dispositions?

What I'm asking here is a meta-ethical question. More specifically, what I'm asking is whether what we recognize as morally righteous actions or as morally virtuous character ultimately reduces to mere feelings or attitudes toward certain behaviors or character traits, or whether these feelings or attitudes are subject to an irreducible normativity. In other words, I'm asking whether moral oughts, on the final analysis, ultimately reduce to subjective ought-feelings that just happen to exist for whatever reason without retaining any of their normative oughtness, or whether their normative oughtness can't be explained away in terms of the way things happen to be sans any normativity.


As I see it, if normative oughtness is to be preserved, then it would seemingly have to be grounded in something over and above our individual selves, since it would impose the standards by which our behaviors and dispositions are evaluated, not in a hypothetical sense of what is conducive to our hedonistic interests, but in a categorical sense of how we just ought to behave and how we just ought to be. This is what I mean when I speak of it being “grounded in something more objective,” i.e. more objective than merely how our subjective dispositions just happen to be, how it just happens to be that we feel about certain things, in other words.


Moreover, by “subjective likes and dislikes,” I'm not referring to just any likes or dislikes. I'm specifically referring to moral attitudes. Thus, a moral “like” would be something like moral approval, and a moral “dislike” something like moral disapproval. So, for example, we might morally “like” it that someone should choose to devote his energies to aiding the relief effort in the wake of some disaster, in that we would morally approve of such a deed as good and noble. By contrast, we would probably morally “dislike” it if a man were to murder someone in cold blood just because he doesn't like the way she looks; this is to say that we would morally disapprove of his behavior as a deed that he ought not to have done.


Finally, notice that my dichotomy takes the logical form of a tautology--namely that, for any proposition p, “either it is the case that p, or it is not the case that p.” Applying this to my dichotomy (as I intend its meaning) yields, basically:


Either it is the case that moral oughts are reducible to non-normative ought-feelings, or it is not the case that moral oughts are reducible to non-normative ought-feelings.


Logically, there are no other options. So, assuming that the expression that “moral oughts are reducible to non-normative ought-feelings” expresses a meaningful proposition which has a truth value, the dichotomy holds by logical necessity.


Now on to your objection...


You write:

Let´s assume for a moment that there exists an objective morality. Imagine a guy who accepts all sorts of suffering for maintaining an ideal that is wrong/bad/evil (by standards of this objective morality), without any prospect of gaining pleasure from it, neither on the short nor on the long run. He doesn´t believe in an afterlife, so he can´t even hope for a reward there. He is subjected to torture and execution for not renouncing his ideals, he knows what´s coming his way and he accepts it.
Now, you may call him "immoral", "deluded", "misguided", "wrong", "evil" etc., but not by any stretch his behaviour can be described as "acting on his likes/dislikes" or "striving for pleasure (on the short or long run)".
So your dichotomy was false.

But he would have to maintain that ideal for some reason. It needn't be a good reason, mind you. It might be a very bad reason. But there would have to be a reason of some sort. And wherever there is a volitional reason it must needs be directed toward the attainment of some good. It needn't successfully accomplish that good, but it must be directed toward the accomplishment of that good. Volitional actions must always be intended to accomplish some good, even if that good is as petty as stopping an itch by scratching it.


So he would have to seek some good of some sort, or else I don't think that he would be able to act at all. Perhaps he acts so as to appease his moral convictions, faulty though they may be. But this would be a good that he seeks to accomplish, whether it be the pangs of his own conscience he wishes to settle or the faulty ideal he wishes to uphold for its own sake.

 

[quatona]

quatona,

I'm not entirely sure that you understand what I was trying to say in my dichotomy, so before I directly address your objection, I'd like to devote some space to trying to clarify my meaning.

Ok, thanks. Good idea!

For ease of reference, here's the passage in question:





What I'm asking here is a meta-ethical question. More specifically, what I'm asking is whether what we recognize as morally righteous actions or as morally virtuous character ultimately reduces to mere feelings or attitudes toward certain behaviors or character traits, or whether these feelings or attitudes are subject to an irreducible normativity. In other words, I'm asking whether moral oughts, on the final analysis, ultimately reduce to subjective ought-feelings that just happen to exist for whatever reason without retaining any of their normative oughtness, or whether their normative oughtness can't be explained away in terms of the way things happen to be sans any normativity.

I´m sorry, Crandaddy, but now I am even more confused. Maybe it´s just me, but whenever you (or someone else) starts using language that mainly consists of neologisms and unusual nominalizations I am lost.

I´ve tried to paraphrase what I understand you saying here - so that you could give me a feedback whether I am getting it right or not - but for the life of me I find myself unable to do that.

I also tried to identify which of the options you are contrasting here might be meant to signify which of the two options that you are contrasting your original statement, but I don´t succeed there, either.

What I think confuses me:
You seem to mingle two entirely different categories as though they were one or would at least correlate:
1. the question whether there exists an objective morality,
2. the question whether a particular person´s acting is motivated by his idea of "oughtness" or by his "likes/dislikes".
(If, however, it should be the case that you are intending to declare a sense of "oughtness" just a subset of "likes/dislikes" I think this would be close to the end of using language meaningfully. Once we stretch meanings that far, the wish for an "irreducible normative oughtness" to be met would be a "like/dislike" as well, after all.)

Another thing that appears to be crucial to your point but which I can´t seem to make sense of: "normative oughtness". As far as the language that I am used to is concerned, "oughtness" that already implies and actually emphasizes the idea that there´s a norm. I wouldn´t know what "non-normative oughtness" could possibly mean.

As I see it, if normative oughtness is to be preserved, then it would seemingly have to be grounded in something over and above our individual selves, since it would impose the standards by which our behaviors and dispositions are evaluated, not in a hypothetical sense of what is conducive to our hedonistic interests, but in a categorical sense of how we just ought to behave and how we just ought to be. This is what I mean when I speak of it being “grounded in something more objective,” i.e. more objective than merely how our subjective dispositions just happen to be, how it just happens to be that we feel about certain things, in other words.

Well, seeing that people accept a lot of discomfort (to say it mildly) for acting upon their feeling of "(normative?) oughtness", they quite obviously are determined to do so because they feel it is "grounded in something more objective". However, the fact that different people accept this discomfort for entirely different and partly even contrary ideals leaves me with the objection that I have given above: The question what motivates a person (a feeling of "(normative) oughtness" or some form of hedonism is one thing, the question whether the ideal pursued would conform with "objective" moral standards (assuming for the sake of the argument there were such) is another.

If I get at least a faint sense of what you are trying to communicate (and, again: I am not at all sure I do), the litmus test would be:
Out there is an "irreducible normative oughtness" that is completely contrary to my ideals and feelings of "oughtness". Let´s say that this "irreducible normative oughtness" dictates us to rape, steal, commit genocides and do all sorts of things that I find not only repulsive but also intellectually unjustifiable.
This scenario (and none else) would exclude that my decision to act upon "irreducible normative oughtness" is a result of my "likes/dislikes" (even in the very broad sense of these terms you seem to use them in: even if striving for my subjective ideals - peace, non-violence, respect, etc - would be a form of pursuing my "likes/dislikes" in that they are just chosen because they´d help to create the world I would like to live in, I have to disregard these non-objective ideals when I decide to conform with the "irreducible normative oughtness".)

Moreover, by “subjective likes and dislikes,” I'm not referring to just any likes or dislikes. I'm specifically referring to moral attitudes. Thus, a moral “like” would be something like moral approval, and a moral “dislike” something like moral disapproval. So, for example, we might morally “like” it that someone should choose to devote his energies to aiding the relief effort in the wake of some disaster, in that we would morally approve of such a deed as good and noble. By contrast, we would probably morally “dislike” it if a man were to murder someone in cold blood just because he doesn't like the way she looks; this is to say that we would morally disapprove of his behavior as a deed that he ought not to have done.

So if I get this right, what you are actually asking is: Could it be possible that despite your moral "dislike (non-normative ought-feeling"?) of murdering someone because of her unpleasant looks there might be a "irreducible normative oughtness" that actually dictates you to murder people because of their unpleasant looks - and the ultimate meta-meta-moral standard would be to conform with this "irreducible normative oughtness" no matter how much it is in conflict with your subjective ideals ("non-normative ought feelings"?)?

Finally, notice that my dichotomy takes the logical form of a tautology--namely that, for any proposition p, “either it is the case that p, or it is not the case that p.” Applying this to my dichotomy (as I intend its meaning) yields, basically:


Either it is the case that moral oughts are reducible to non-normative ought-feelings, or it is not the case that moral oughts are reducible to non-normative ought-feelings.

As said above: In my terminology, if you take the "normative" out of "ought" there´s nothing left.

Now on to your objection...


You write:




But he would have to maintain that ideal for some reason. It needn't be a good reason, mind you. It might be a very bad reason. But there would have to be a reason of some sort. And wherever there is a volitional reason it must needs be directed toward the attainment of some good. It needn't successfully accomplish that good, but it must be directed toward the accomplishment of that good. Volitional actions must always be intended to accomplish some good, even if that good is as petty as stopping an itch by scratching it.


So he would have to seek some good of some sort, or else I don't think that he would be able to act at all. Perhaps he acts so as to appease his moral convictions, faulty though they may be. But this would be a good that he seeks to accomplish, whether it be the pangs of his own conscience he wishes to settle or the faulty ideal he wishes to uphold for its own sake.

No disagreeement. Now, since we are discussing the validity of your dichotomy, you seem to have avoided the answer to my question:
Does all this (acting for a reason, striving for a subjective good - even though it is actually evil by standards of an assumed "irreducible normative oughtness" - regardless of his personal well-being, appeasing his moral convictions etc.) point to the fact that he merely acts upon his moral "likes/dislikes" or to the fact that he acts more objectively than that?
I.e. are you positing that e.g. the fact that someone "holds an ideal for a reason" precludes that his ideal is an "irreducible normative oughtness"?

Finally, let me try to point out the problem with another example:
Let´s assume that there is an "irreducible normative oughtness". Let´s for argument´s sake also assume that this is somehow linked to the Christian god concept (afterlife, etc.).
Now, there´s a Christian who has fully grasped this "irreducible normative oughtness" and with all his efforts strives to behave accordingly. Yet, he does all that out of the (as you have previously elaborated) wrong and immoral motive of gaining a pleasant afterlife.
Is (in the sense of your dichotomy) his behaviour grounded in his "subjective likes/dislikes" or "in something more objective, something outside our subjective selves, perhaps something that imposes a normative standard upon our moral dispositions"?

Point being: The two aren´t antagonists - neither are they mutually exclusive nor does necessarily one of them need to be the case.
They are taken from two different categories.

Now here´s a personal statement: I couldn´t care less whether a "irreducible normative oughtness" exists out there or not. Reason: In case it would go detrimental to my "subjective moral likes/dislikes" (in that it would e.g. dictate me to kill, steal, rape, commit genocides) I wouldn´t acknowledge it´s normativity. Accepting the normativity of an "irreducible normative oughtness" only under the assumptions/premise that it is to my "moral likings" would be intellectually dishonest.

However, I concede that the question whether an objective morality (completely disconnected from our reasons, feelings, make-up) may exist out there, may be of academic interest to some.
OTOH, if you maintain that there is some sort of connection there´s hardly a basis for your dichotomy, anyway. It would be somewhat reasonable to assume that what´s "objectively good" is reflected more or less accurately in our "moral likes/dislikes".

 

[sandwiches]

To me, a man is logical, sensitive, reasonable, patient, loving, caring, strong mentally, a leader, intelligent, wise, cunning, courageous and confident. These traits are independent of physical or financial status. Muscles fade, bones break, and money melts and burns. But, to me, these qualities would last - from rich to poor, peak fitness to sickness - in a real man.

Wisdom fades, knowledge vanishes, reasoning dulls, emotions can run rampant in some. So, are men who had those characteristics not "real" men after they age?And why are those characteristics the defining of men when they fade with age just as strength and looks can?

 

[1234321]

Wisdom fades, knowledge vanishes, reasoning dulls, emotions can run rampant in some. So, are men who had those characteristics not "real" men after they age?And why are those characteristics the defining of men when they fade with age just as strength and looks can?

Why don't you tell us?

 

[Crandaddy]

What I think confuses me:
You seem to mingle two entirely different categories as though they were one or would at least correlate:
1. the question whether there exists an objective morality,
2. the question whether a particular person´s acting is motivated by his idea of "oughtness" or by his "likes/dislikes".

My intent with the dichotomy is to focus on the first of those two categories.


Let's see if putting this another way will help at all:


We have moral attitudes. We experience ought-feelings. When we consider certain states of affairs, we feel a sense of moral approval; we feel about them a sense of moral, approving goodness. On the other hand, when we consider certain other states of affairs, we feel a sense of moral disapproval, a sense of moral badness about those states of affairs.


That we do in fact experience these ought-feelings seems to me incontrovertible. I experience them myself all the time. But in our commonsense understanding of morality, when we assert a moral ought, it seems we mean to assert something more than simply that we feel a certain way toward a certain state of affairs. It seems we mean to assert something about the state of affairs itself, namely that it is either good or bad in some objective sense. That we feel a subjective sense of approval or disapproval is something that we seem to take as derivative of “seeing,” as it were, the goodness or badness inherent in the state of affairs itself. Once again, this seems to be (as I see it) the commonsense understanding of morality that we naturally have.


Now, when we turn to the meta-ethical question of what morality is and what moral statements are talking about, our theories may take one of two forms:


1. The propositions which describe our theory are completely exhausted by indicative is-propositions (i.e. “it is the case that...&#8221 that are completely devoid of any ought content. Thus, it might include propositions stating that it is the case that people feel certain ways, or that it is the case that evolution “selected” for certain moral dispositions because they enabled our ancestors to survive, etc. But nowhere in such a theory would there be any such propositions as that it ought to be the case that (whatever), or that it is (normatively) the nature of such and such to have these certain characteristics, or that for such and such to lack these characteristics would constitute some sort of ontological deficiency, etc.


or


2. The propositions which describe our theory are not completely exhausted by indicative is-propositions completely devoid of any ought content. Such a theory may contain indicative is-propositions. Indeed, it may consist almost exclusively of them. But it does retain some objectively normative content for at least some of its propositions.


The difference to notice between these two types of theories is that theories of the former sort completely strip the world bare of all of its intrinsic, objective value, and theories of the latter sort do not.


The question that I originally posed to variant is rather (alright, very) sloppily constructed, but it is intended to inquire of him which sort of theory he would endorse. I'm trying to ask him whether he believes a correct theory of what moral goodness is would preserve or eliminate our natural, commonsense (as I think it is) view that there are objective moral values.

(If, however, it should be the case that you are intending to declare a sense of "oughtness" just a subset of "likes/dislikes" I think this would be close to the end of using language meaningfully. Once we stretch meanings that far, the wish for an "irreducible normative oughtness" to be met would be a "like/dislike" as well, after all.)

As I see it (and here we're moving on to my own views on the matter), “oughtness” in and of itself is not just a subset of our “likes/dislikes.” We might think of moral “oughtness” as a personal individual's relation of conformity to his or her essential (normative) nature as a person. Thus, a personal individual ought to be a certain way only if being that certain way is normatively proper to the essential nature of being a person. “Likes/dislikes,” in the restricted moral senses I use here, are merely subjective detectors of objective ought conditions (if they're functioning properly, that is).

Another thing that appears to be crucial to your point but which I can´t seem to make sense of: "normative oughtness". As far as the language that I am used to is concerned, "oughtness" that already implies and actually emphasizes the idea that there´s a norm. I wouldn´t know what "non-normative oughtness" could possibly mean.

“Normative” as descriptive of “oughtness” is redundant. I did that in order to emphasize the intrinsic normativity of “oughtness.” So yes, you're right. I'm sorry that it got you confused.

Well, seeing that people accept a lot of discomfort (to say it mildly) for acting upon their feeling of "(normative?) oughtness", they quite obviously are determined to do so because they feel it is "grounded in something more objective". However, the fact that different people accept this discomfort for entirely different and partly even contrary ideals leaves me with the objection that I have given above: The question what motivates a person (a feeling of "(normative) oughtness" or some form of hedonism is one thing, the question whether the ideal pursued would conform with "objective" moral standards (assuming for the sake of the argument there were such) is another.

It seems to me that your objection here is epistemic: How do we know that our moral beliefs conform to objective moral standards (assuming they exist)? Well, for one thing, there comes a point, I think, when we can no longer justify certain things we believe and have to accept them on a sort of faith. I believe, for example, that there exists a world outside my mind, that my memory correctly tells me that the world has existed for more than five minutes, and that my rational faculties are configured so as to give me mostly true beliefs. It would be extremely difficult (if not impossible) for me to offer justifying reasons for why I believe these things, but I believe them, nevertheless.


I think that my belief that my moral faculties are configured so as to give me (mostly) true moral beliefs, or at least that they are configured so as to not give me wildly (presumably) false moral beliefs (e.g. that I ought to murder anyone whose appearance I don't like) is a belief much like the previous examples. In other words, it's a belief that I have to accept on a sort of faith, as it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to justify it.


Beyond that, given that our God-given moral faculties are basically reliable, we must use them to try to discern what is morally right and what is morally wrong behavior. Of course, people have moral disagreements, but I think there's a broad sense in which all of us who have properly functioning moral faculties are basically, more or less, on the same page. I think we would all agree, for example, that I ought not to go out murdering anyone I see whose appearance I don't happen to like. Precisely why I ought not to do such a thing would differ, but that I ought not to do it would be constant, I think.

If I get at least a faint sense of what you are trying to communicate (and, again: I am not at all sure I do), the litmus test would be:
Out there is an "irreducible normative oughtness" that is completely contrary to my ideals and feelings of "oughtness". Let´s say that this "irreducible normative oughtness" dictates us to rape, steal, commit genocides and do all sorts of things that I find not only repulsive but also intellectually unjustifiable.
This scenario (and none else) would exclude that my decision to act upon "irreducible normative oughtness" is a result of my "likes/dislikes" (even in the very broad sense of these terms you seem to use them in: even if striving for my subjective ideals - peace, non-violence, respect, etc - would be a form of pursuing my "likes/dislikes" in that they are just chosen because they´d help to create the world I would like to live in, I have to disregard these non-objective ideals when I decide to conform with the "irreducible normative oughtness".)

No. You are morally obligated to act on your (sincerely-held) moral impulses for the sake of the content of those moral impulses. In other words, you are obligated to act so as to accomplish what you understand to be right because, so far as you can see, it's just the right thing to do. You wouldn't be capable of conforming your actions with the objective standard because you would be incapable of adequately understanding it, but I still think you would be obligated to act in accordance with the morality that you understand.


This raises an interesting question: What if we have someone who, quite sincerely, believes he is morally obligated to do something truly awful? He feels the moral impulse to kill any person he sees, let's say. I suppose I would have to say that, if he truly, sincerely believes that he morally ought to so act and can't be persuaded otherwise, then, I suppose, he would be morally obligated to attempt to so act. To be sure, such an individual would have horribly malfunctioning moral faculties and would be, basically, bat-sh** insane, but surely we couldn't morally blame him for his behavior. He would be morally incompetent by reason of insanity and for that reason I would say he should be forcibly restrained, as opposed to forcibly restraining him for any penal reason, which would have to presume his moral competence to be just.

So if I get this right, what you are actually asking is: Could it be possible that despite your moral "dislike (non-normative ought-feeling"?) of murdering someone because of her unpleasant looks there might be a "irreducible normative oughtness" that actually dictates you to murder people because of their unpleasant looks - and the ultimate meta-meta-moral standard would be to conform with this "irreducible normative oughtness" no matter how much it is in conflict with your subjective ideals ("non-normative ought feelings"?)?

Since I don't ask a question in the passage you're responding to with this, I'll assume you're referring to the original dichotomy question. But if that's the case, then no, I'm afraid it's not what I'm asking. What I'm asking (or trying to ask) is (something like) this: Does a correct meta-ethical theory (i.e. of what morality is and of what moral statements mean, what they're talking about) leave the world completely devoid of all of its intrinsic, objective value or not?

As said above: In my terminology, if you take the "normative" out of "ought" there´s nothing left.

Right, but the ought-feeling isn't the ought itself. It's just the feeling that indicates the ought (assuming the ought exists and one's moral faculties are functioning properly).

No disagreeement. Now, since we are discussing the validity of your dichotomy, you seem to have avoided the answer to my question:
Does all this (acting for a reason, striving for a subjective good - even though it is actually evil by standards of an assumed "irreducible normative oughtness" - regardless of his personal well-being, appeasing his moral convictions etc.) point to the fact that he merely acts upon his moral "likes/dislikes" or to the fact that he acts more objectively than that?
I.e. are you positing that e.g. the fact that someone "holds an ideal for a reason" precludes that his ideal is an "irreducible normative oughtness"?

Simply for the fact that he holds a reason at all? No, all actions--even moral actions--would have to have some reason. But again, I should say that it seems you misunderstand my dichotomy, since I fail to see the relevance of this.

Finally, let me try to point out the problem with another example:
Let´s assume that there is an "irreducible normative oughtness". Let´s for argument´s sake also assume that this is somehow linked to the Christian god concept (afterlife, etc.).
Now, there´s a Christian who has fully grasped this "irreducible normative oughtness" and with all his efforts strives to behave accordingly. Yet, he does all that out of the (as you have previously elaborated) wrong and immoral motive of gaining a pleasant afterlife.
Is (in the sense of your dichotomy) his behaviour grounded in his "subjective likes/dislikes" or "in something more objective, something outside our subjective selves, perhaps something that imposes a normative standard upon our moral dispositions"?

Point being: The two aren´t antagonists - neither are they mutually exclusive nor does necessarily one of them need to be the case.
They are taken from two different categories.

I don't see how this is relevant in the sense of my dichotomy. You seem to be reading my dichotomy in the sense of your second category above. I don't mean it in that sense. I'm not asking a question regarding the epistemology of moral standards or what motivates us to act morally. I'm sorry if I made it seem that way. No, I'm more concerned with your first category, of whether morality is objective and whether its objectivity would be preserved on a correct meta-ethical theory.

Now here´s a personal statement: I couldn´t care less whether a "irreducible normative oughtness" exists out there or not. Reason: In case it would go detrimental to my "subjective moral likes/dislikes" (in that it would e.g. dictate me to kill, steal, rape, commit genocides) I wouldn´t acknowledge it´s normativity. Accepting the normativity of an "irreducible normative oughtness" only under the assumptions/premise that it is to my "moral likings" would be intellectually dishonest.

Well, in that case I think you would fail to understand it (if I may use a computer analogy, you're moral faculties would fail to recognize it as valid programming), so you couldn't really acknowledge its normativity. But of course I don't like those things either, nor do the large majority of people, it seems. So at least you would have some company.

It would be somewhat reasonable to assume that what´s "objectively good" is reflected more or less accurately in our "moral likes/dislikes".

Yes, I agree, and I believe that in fact it is!

 

[quatona]

Crandaddy,
thanks again for your thoughtful and helpful reply.
I will try to keep my response short, if you don´t mind.

My intent with the dichotomy is to focus on the first of those two categories.


Let's see if putting this another way will help at all:


We have moral attitudes. We experience ought-feelings. When we consider certain states of affairs, we feel a sense of moral approval; we feel about them a sense of moral, approving goodness. On the other hand, when we consider certain other states of affairs, we feel a sense of moral disapproval, a sense of moral badness about those states of affairs.


That we do in fact experience these ought-feelings seems to me incontrovertible. I experience them myself all the time. But in our commonsense understanding of morality, when we assert a moral ought, it seems we mean to assert something more than simply that we feel a certain way toward a certain state of affairs. It seems we mean to assert something about the state of affairs itself, namely that it is either good or bad in some objective sense. That we feel a subjective sense of approval or disapproval is something that we seem to take as derivative of “seeing,” as it were, the goodness or badness inherent in the state of affairs itself. Once again, this seems to be (as I see it) the commonsense understanding of morality that we naturally have.

Thanks - I think I understand what you are saying here.
I disagree, though: I do not want to be included in this "we". This is not my understanding of morality that I naturally have.
I think we should be very careful with assumptions that our own understanding is "commonsense".

Now, when we turn to the meta-ethical question of what morality is and what moral statements are talking about, our theories may take one of two forms:


1. The propositions which describe our theory are completely exhausted by indicative is-propositions (i.e. “it is the case that...”) that are completely devoid of any ought content. Thus, it might include propositions stating that it is the case that people feel certain ways, or that it is the case that evolution “selected” for certain moral dispositions because they enabled our ancestors to survive, etc. But nowhere in such a theory would there be any such propositions as that it ought to be the case that (whatever), or that it is (normatively) the nature of such and such to have these certain characteristics, or that for such and such to lack these characteristics would constitute some sort of ontological deficiency, etc.


or


2. The propositions which describe our theory are not completely exhausted by indicative is-propositions completely devoid of any ought content. Such a theory may contain indicative is-propositions. Indeed, it may consist almost exclusively of them. But it does retain some objectively normative content for at least some of its propositions.


The difference to notice between these two types of theories is that theories of the former sort completely strip the world bare of all of its intrinsic, objective value, and theories of the latter sort do not.

Again: I think I understand what you are saying here.

The question that I originally posed to variant is rather (alright, very) sloppily constructed, but it is intended to inquire of him which sort of theory he would endorse. I'm trying to ask him whether he believes a correct theory of what moral goodness is would preserve or eliminate our natural, commonsense (as I think it is) view that there are objective moral values.

1. Ok, so would you agree that we can put the "like/dislike" thing to rest? That´s what I initially took issue with, you are conceding that it was a sloppy way of wording one of the options of the dichotomy, and you have explained what you mean in a way that a. is better understandable and b. doesn´t give me the feeling of an association fallacy.

2. Can´t speak for variant, but I think that even prior to your question he has made pretty clear that he doesn´t believe there to be an objective morality of the sort you are postulating in #1.
variant aside for a moment: I certainly don´t. I find that a far fetched and actually absurd idea that is contrary to what I would assume to be commonsense.

I do not, however, think that I necessarily have to ascribe to a "theory" just because I do not believe in your idea of an "objective morality". The part I believe in (i.e. that we experience "ought"-feelings, and that these "ought"- feelings are in very rare instances almost universal, and in other instances vary greatly even not only from culture to culture, but from individual to individual) doesn´t seem to be in dispute. What would need substantiation is your additional idea.
I am looking forward to you making your case for it. Just claiming it to be "commonsense" won´t cut it, though.

As I see it (and here we're moving on to my own views on the matter), “oughtness” in and of itself is not just a subset of our “likes/dislikes.” We might think of moral “oughtness” as a personal individual's relation of conformity to his or her essential (normative) nature as a person. Thus, a personal individual ought to be a certain way only if being that certain way is normatively proper to the essential nature of being a person. “Likes/dislikes,” in the restricted moral senses I use here, are merely subjective detectors of objective ought conditions (if they're functioning properly, that is).

I´ll abstain from commenting on the "like/dislike" thing. If you insist that subjective ought-feelings must be called "likes/dislikes" I will insist that the idea of objective morality must be called the quest for "unconditional obedience". Just so we both feel uncomfortable with the way the other person describes our views.
Apart from that I think I understand the distinction you are making, and I understand what you are postulating. I have no idea, though, how you could possibly make a case for it - but I am open to learning.

“Normative” as descriptive of “oughtness” is redundant. I did that in order to emphasize the intrinsic normativity of “oughtness.” So yes, you're right. I'm sorry that it got you confused.

No problem at all.

It seems to me that your objection here is epistemic: How do we know that our moral beliefs conform to objective moral standards (assuming they exist)?

That´s certainly part of my objection, but of course the first question woud be: "What would prompt me to believe in objective moral standards?". The fact that I pointed out the broad diversity of takes on morals was more or less an attempt to point out an additional problem:
While when it comes to "is"-propositions we have few problems coming to a universal agreement, we find very few "ought"-propositions that are universally agreed upon. This is not really a valid argument against the existence of an "objective morality" - it just is meant to demonstrate that this assumption can not as easily defended as a matter of "commonsense". When we have e.g. a disagreement concerning a particular object being in a particular place, we simply can solve it by investigating the place. If one of us sees it, he points to it and shows it to the other. Keyword: Intersubjectivity.

Well, for one thing, there comes a point, I think, when we can no longer justify certain things we believe and have to accept them on a sort of faith. I believe, for example, that there exists a world outside my mind, that my memory correctly tells me that the world has existed for more than five minutes, and that my rational faculties are configured so as to give me mostly true beliefs. It would be extremely difficult (if not impossible) for me to offer justifying reasons for why I believe these things, but I believe them, nevertheless.

Now, I don´t think that it´s really that hard to justifiy these ideas; and even if it were hard to justify them, the fact that pretty much everyone believes in them means that you will rarely face the necessity of justifying them.
This is not the case with your idea of "objective morality". Many people do not believe in there being such, and of those who believe there exists such many disagree on what they prescribe.
Thus, I have problems accepting the analogy.

I think that my belief that my moral faculties are configured so as to give me (mostly) true moral beliefs, or at least that they are configured so as to not give me wildly (presumably) false moral beliefs (e.g. that I ought to murder anyone whose appearance I don't like) is a belief much like the previous examples. In other words, it's a belief that I have to accept on a sort of faith, as it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to justify it.

Yes. Of course, you wouldn´t have this problem if you would let go of the idea that your feeling of oughtness points to an "objective morality", and instead would simply stand up for your opinion that certain things should be done or should not be done (and hopefully could give good reasons for your take on it).
Which leads us to another - pragmatic - problem:
No matter how much you assert that there is an objective morality out there, no matter how much you assert that it says what you think it says: These two mere claims don´t help giving your opinion (or "ought"-feelings) any more weight than the opinion of any other person. Not until you can demonstrate both claims to be true.
Thus, while the idea of an objective morality existing might certainly provide you with some comfort, it won´t help you to substantiate your idea and won´t help you convince others.

Beyond that, given that our God-given moral faculties are basically reliable, we must use them to try to discern what is morally right and what is morally wrong behavior. Of course, people have moral disagreements, but I think there's a broad sense in which all of us who have properly functioning moral faculties are basically, more or less, on the same page. I think we would all agree, for example, that I ought not to go out murdering anyone I see whose appearance I don't happen to like. Precisely why I ought not to do such a thing would differ, but that I ought not to do it would be constant, I think.

I find it somewhat odd that in order to demonstrate our "broad sense" we have to resort to very extreme views like "killing someone for the reason that we dislike their looks is good" or (even more often mentioned) "torturing innocent children for the sheer fun of it is good".
If we would all be on the same page in the important questions of morality this entire discussion would be obsolete.
Whatever - the fact that there´s an almost universal moral agreement on very few hand-selected scenarios (while there is broad disagreement on most every other scenario) doesn´t help making a case for an "objective morality". The band-waggon you are appealing to is very small.

Whatever - what you´d need to do in order to defend your position is:
a. make a case for the idea that an "objective morality" exists,
b. make a case for the idea that it prescribes and prohibits what you are claiming, and finally
c. give a good reason why this "objective morality" should be of any interest or relevance at all. (E.g. even if you could demonstrate that there´s a God, and that this God is the author of "objective morality", and if you could substantiate which moral prescriptions God has given out, you´d still have to convince me to accept them as normative, from my perspective).

IOW: There is a lot of work to do for you. The time you spend on substantiating your ideas I can spend on simply trying to give good reasons for my ideas as to what we ought or oughtn´t do. Granted, these my "good reasons" won´t be convincing to everyone, but then again simply declaring them "objective" don´t make them any more convincing to those who disagree with them, anyway.

 

[sandwiches]

Why don't you tell us?

Because I'm not the one proposing any of those things are what defines a man. You are. So, I'll ask again, and maybe you'll not evade this time:

Wisdom fades, knowledge vanishes, reasoning dulls, emotions can run rampant in some. So, are men who had those characteristics not "real" men after they age?And why are those characteristics the defining of men when they fade with age just as strength and looks can?

 

[1234321]

Because I'm not the one proposing any of those things are what defines a man. You are. So, I'll ask again, and maybe you'll not evade this time:

Wisdom fades, knowledge vanishes, reasoning dulls, emotions can run rampant in some. So, are men who had those characteristics not "real" men after they age?And why are those characteristics the defining of men when they fade with age just as strength and looks can?

I wasn't asking why you won't tell us, I was asking you to tell us. It seems you already know the answers to the questions you have asked.

I didn't evade any question you posted, I just didn't feel like repeating the same things I have said with the result of someone who clearly does not care about a philosophical discussion, but instead would rather vindicate one's own self. My intention with the thread was to explore what a "real man" is - the phrase is hackneyed, and the implication goes beyond anatomy.

Now, since you have clarified that if I do not answer your question, I am evading/running away, I will address your second paragraph...

It seems you, and several other people are focused on technicality. So much so, that the exchange of discussion (from your position, and people on the thread that share your position) becomes about moral nihilism, rather than normative ethics (which is more what this thread is about.)

To be terribly technical, everything fades, ultimately down to the life of every human. There is a difference between ephemeralities, relative waning. Muscles, bones and money are independent of one's virtuosity. It does not define the moral substance of what it means to be a man. Moreover, wisdom, knowledge, reasoning and even emotions are compound virtues - the work one puts in to attain these virtues (and keep them) is in and of itself a virtue. If you are wise (both in being, and actively,) your wisdom will not be fleeting. These are virtues that show your character. Serial killers are not reasonable: they are sociopaths. Rapists are not compassionate. Adulterers are not considerate. Liars are not wise. Abusers are not leaders. Bigots are not sensitive. And, arrogance does not yield patience. However, bigots, rapists, murderers, adulterers, and liars can all be muscular, physically attractive, rich, etc. Those traits do not say anything about their character as men. It does not morally separate them from the responsibilities and mindset of a child, and the mindset and responsibility of an adult male (in every sense of the phrase.) The traits and virtues I mentioned are what I believe a real man possesses.

Now, it seems like you are trying to argue that the character traits and virtues I previously mentioned should not be indicators of one's manhood because they fade. As I said before, virtues are kept (just like muscles, money and bone density are kept) : it takes work, and in the case of virtues keeping them (or letting them fade) is an indication of one's character and virtuosity in and of itself. A sage stays a sage as long as he can help it, because he is wise to begin with. A bodybuilder may keep his muscles for a few years, and decide he wants to focus on his business more than bodybuilding (thereby losing muscle tone.) In the case of the bodybuilder, the transition from muscular to skinny (or what have you) does not necessarily say anything about his character/virtues, especially as an adult mature man. In the case of the sage, however, it does. Age can cause a person to forget things (like in the case of Alzheimer's disease,) but it doesn't have to. And, that wouldn't have a bearing in this discussion anyway, because it would be a change that is beyond the person's control. We are discussing what is in the control of a male, and what he chooses to do with his tools and experiences.


The thread question is similar to the question "Are you alive, or are you just living?" Of course, a living human is both physically alive and living (just as a male is anatomically a man,) but there is a cultural, moral, psychological and philosophical difference between being "alive" and "living," just as there is a similar difference between a male [who is a certain age,] and a [real] man.

 

[Gracchus]

The thread question is similar to the question "Are you alive, or are you just living?" Of course, a living human is both physically alive and living (just as a male is anatomically a man,) but there is a cultural, moral, psychological and philosophical difference between being "alive" and "living," just as there is a similar difference between a male [who is a certain age,] and a [real] man.

No, there isn't. Men and women come in all shapes, sizes, colors, and persuasions. And from a moral perspective they are nearly indistinguishable. The thief may strut because he is not an adulterer, and the murderer preens himself because he is not a child molester, and the child molester is, at least, not a Republican, and the Republican ...
Well, OK, there is a bottom to the barrel, but: It is not your prerogative to decide for the rest of us who or who isn't a real human being. That is just something that self-righteous hypocrites do to try and separate themselves from their own failings. "Look how good I am Lord! I am a REAL Christian. I am a REAL man. I am not like these sinners."

 

[1234321]

No, there isn't. Men and women come in all shapes, sizes, colors, and persuasions. And from a moral perspective they are nearly indistinguishable. The thief may strut because he is not an adulterer, and the murderer preens himself because he is not a child molester, and the child molester is, at least, not a Republican, and the Republican ...
Well, OK, there is a bottom to the barrel, but: It is not your prerogative to decide for the rest of us who or who isn't a real human being. That is just something that self-righteous hypocrites do to try and separate themselves from their own failings. "Look how good I am Lord! I am a REAL Christian. I am a REAL man. I am not like these sinners."

When did I ever decide anything for you, or the rest of the world? I said this is what I think... The "...for the rest of the world" has been said before, and if you feel like that then that is your misunderstanding. I have never said my definition of what a real man is is what a real man is for the world. I asked for other people's thought which, by implication, means I am not imposing my own thoughts on others.