Vitalism is True (I think)

[DisingenuousChristian]

The hallucinated doughnut was a set of brain states which so far as I know is physical.

No, the hallucinated doughnut was CAUSED BY a set of brain states which were physical but, BEQUEATHED as it were, something non-physical, namely a mental state.

That's anyway the most natural attitude to have here, I think.

 

[sandwiches]

Are you saying that the sum of the angles of a triangle is not 180 degrees unless someone thinks it?

Correct. Sums, angles, divisions, etc aren't things that exist outside of a computational processing machine such as the brain.

I don't think it's been proved computers have a mental life. We are talking as of now about human minds, not computers.

..Though if a computer did have a mental life, as I think Chalmers has postulated, then that mental life would be non-physical, sure.

This didn't answer my question. Are the computational processes in a computer "non-physical?"

 

[sandwiches]

Yes, exactly. You start off assuming there is no transcendant mind, and then lay out an argument that concludes there is no mind-body problem.

What is a transcendent mind and why should we consider the possibility this is something real?

 

[sandwiches]

Because the physical is not the mental, put simply.

You just repeated yourself. So, I'll repeat my question: Why isn't the mind physical? Everything we know of are either mere abstractions of the physical or physical itself. How do we conclude the mind isn't physical? Better yet, how can we falsify or even just tentatively verify this claim?

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

Correct. Sums, angles, divisions, etc aren't things that exist outside of a computational processing machine such as the brain.

Interesting. So mathematics do not exist except when there exists a mind. So in a universe without minds, 2+2 might not equal 4? Or how about logic. Does logic exist only when minds exist in tandem with it?

This didn't answer my question. Are the computational processes in a computer "non-physical?"

If you mean by "computational processes" the nuts and bolts which make a computer process than by all means they are physical. Just like the neural inputs and outputs in a human mind are physical. But that is beside the point of whether there exists a mental life.

 

[sandwiches]

Interesting. So mathematics do not exist except when there exists a mind. So in a universe without minds, 2+2 might not equal 4? Or how about logic. Does logic exist only when minds exist in tandem with it?

Logic and mathematics are abstractions (and abstractions of those abstractions) of that which we know to exist physically. We know that a cow is a cow and cannot be NOT a cow simultaneously. We have mathematics due to the fact that we can discern discrete objects and sets of objects. For instance, addition is the combination of two sets. Sets and objects within them are abstractions of observations of reality, that is, of the physical.

If you mean by "computational processes" the nuts and bolts which make a computer process than by all means they are physical. Just like the neural inputs and outputs in a human mind are physical. But that is beside the point of whether there exists a mental life.

We can measure neural activity in the same way we can measure activity in a computer processor. Where's the mind there? How can we detect it?

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

Logic and mathematics are abstractions (and abstractions of those abstractions) of that which we know to exist physically. We know that a cow is a cow and cannot be NOT a cow simultaneously. We have mathematics due to the fact that we can discern discrete objects and sets of objects. For instance, addition is the combination of two sets. Sets and objects within them are abstractions of observations of reality, that is, of the physical.

As far as I can tell this is a minority view which few philosophers hold as tenable.

Maverick Philosopher: What are Numbers? Some Dubious Philosophy of Mathematics Exposed

We can measure neural activity in the same way we can measure activity in a computer processor. Where's the mind there? How can we detect it?

Strictly speaking minds ARE undetectable... and this follows as a direct result of their being non-physical!

 

[Tinker Grey]

No, the hallucinated doughnut was CAUSED BY a set of brain states which were physical but, BEQUEATHED as it were, something non-physical, namely a mental state.

That's anyway the most natural attitude to have here, I think.

I think of it as the hallucinated doughnut is the brain states. Nothing (WRT the doughnut), at all, exists outside the brain states.

So far as the doughnut goes, it doesn't exist at all. All that exists is the brain state.

Similarly, when we think of a unicorn, it doesn't actually exist either physically or non-physically. All that exists is the brain state.

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

I think of it as the hallucinated doughnut is the brain states. Nothing (WRT the doughnut), at all, exists outside the brain states.

And that is something I find completely absurd. An experience is not the same as a section of the brain undergoing change.

So far as the doughnut goes, it doesn't exist at all. All that exists is the brain state.

Last I could tell, experiences exist, the objects of experience exist. And they are different from the brain state. Thus, your position is refuted.

Similarly, when we think of a unicorn, it doesn't actually exist either physically or non-physically. All that exists is the brain state.

Some philosophers would actually contest that.

 

[Tinker Grey]

And that is something I find completely absurd. An experience is not the same as a section of the brain undergoing change.

Yes it is.

Last I could tell, experiences exist, the objects of experience exist. And they are different from the brain state. Thus, your position is refuted.

No they aren't. Thus, your position is refuted.

As for philosophers: I read one neuro-scientist saying, "You go to the philosophers for the questions, but not the answers."

 

[Resha Caner]

As far as I can tell this is a minority view which few philosophers hold as tenable.

Maverick Philosopher: What are Numbers? Some Dubious Philosophy of Mathematics Exposed

I don't know that there is a majority view of "number." It's not as if sandwiches position is something on the fringes. As far as I know it is considered a serious possibility by most philosophers that number is contigent on mind - even if they argue against it.

BTW, the link you posted is a nice summary of the Platonist position. It is another of the major positions on number.

Yet a 3rd is the Fregelian view. I don't know if I can assign the proper soundbite to it, but it takes the position that number emerges from necessity - specifically, the way Frege defined his first number (zero) was based on the fundamental principle of logic - the law of noncontradiction.

I can see the pros/cons of each view. I understand your view as well as that of Tinker Grey's position. I'm not settled on it myself, though there is something very compelling about "number" as a metaphysical possibility.

If it is metaphysical, I think the two examples with the most potential are Euler's identity and the affine transformation.

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

I don't know that there is a majority view of "number." It's not as if sandwiches position is something on the fringes. As far as I know it is considered a serious possibility by most philosophers that number is contigent on mind - even if they argue against it.

You're right. After looking it over, it is an undecided issue in the philosophy community.

I think I'll refrain from mentioning it much more as an aside, as I need to do more research myself. I still think mental-life is far from being "physical." Neuroscientists are not philosophers and shouldn't try to be.

 

[KCfromNC]

Of course there is, and I'm not denying that. What I say, rather, is that something mental (an emotion say) is in a medium all its own rather than an electrical impulse

What reason do you have for assuming this?

Was the doughnut physical? Of course not.

The correct question is "was the thought of the doughnut physical"? I say yes, since that's all we have evidence of it being. It was the result of normal physical processes in the brain. I'm not sure why you're confusing "thoughts about something" with that something, but it's leading you in the wrong direction. I don't know of anyone advocating the idea that if I think of an elephant one physically appears in my brain, so arguing against that sort of idea isn't going to get you very far.

I invoke the non-physical, because that's exactly what is missing. I know because we do have non-physical thoughts (like the doughnut example).

You're assuming your conclusion here. Of course if you pretend that thoughts are not physical then there must be a non-physical substance to thoughts. But there's no reason to assume that.

 

[KCfromNC]

As far as I can tell this is a minority view which few philosophers hold as tenable.

Maverick Philosopher: What are Numbers? Some Dubious Philosophy of Mathematics Exposed

Numbers and mathematics are a language. Without anyone to use the language, it doesn't exist. The language may use symbols and syntax which correspond to reality in some cases, but they're not the reality itself. I don't see what's controversial here.

And more importantly, why are you asking philosophers about mathematics? They don't study math. They study philosophy, which means that they're particularly ill-equipped to handle questions about the details of fields outside their specialties. Likewise :

I think I'll refrain from mentioning it much more as an aside, as I need to do more research myself. I still think mental-life is far from being "physical." Neuroscientists are not philosophers and shouldn't try to be.

Why do philosophers think they are qualified to comment on brain chemistry and neurobiology?

Last I could tell, experiences exist, the objects of experience exist.

I'm thinking of a unicorn. Please show me where one exists.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Why do you believe the mental is physical? Both seem like fair questions, but why should one default on the physical side when this is in no way obvious?

Maybe the default comes from applying Occams Razor.

It isn't as though non-physical things don't exist; look at numbers and universals.

But they are not generally regarded as having causal power, afaik. But minds cause actions, so they are (probably) physical. This may be tenuous reasoning, but maybe all we have are tiny footholds on the crag.

Actually, "brain science" as you so call it does not offer an explanation so far as an actual account of why opium or any intoxicant renders us unconscious. It can only go so far as to detail the steps within the human body which proceed on the basis of this interaction.

I desagree. It may not explain everything, but it does give insight into relevant mechanisms. Are you saying that a brain scientist knows no more about drug action than a newborn bambino?

in the OP, this is all imagination and imagination is "meaningless" when it comes down to the mental. This is in no small degree because we can't really "imagine" why the opium molecule, when it binds to certain receptors in the brain, gives us the experience of sleep. It merely does because there is a commonality between the state of being and its cause. And on that basis is why I maintain "like meets with like" and that the effect can only be non-different from the cause, which is efficacious due to this identity.

Like affects like? So opium must be mental if it affects the mental?

 

[Resha Caner]

I find this topic very interesting, but I'm only beginning to educate myself about it, so hopefully people will pardon my stumbling about.

I think part of the problem is that we have no examples to work with, so there is nothing to entice people to come out of their trenches. That's why I mentioned the 2 examples that I did.

Numbers and mathematics are a language. Without anyone to use the language, it doesn't exist. The language may use symbols and syntax which correspond to reality in some cases, but they're not the reality itself. I don't see what's controversial here.

You might be right, but are you familiar with the indispensibility argument?
Indispensability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mathematics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

I think Euler's identity might be a good example to use for wrestling that.

But they are not generally regarded as having causal power, afaik. But minds cause actions, so they are (probably) physical. This may be tenuous reasoning, but maybe all we have are tiny footholds on the crag.

That's an intriguing condition to throw out there. I don't think it's valid to say anything with causal power is physical - that seems to go right back to assuming the non-physical doesn't exist. But it probably provides a good distinction between mere abstractions of the mind and those things that are not exclusively dependent on the mind.

So, that's where the affine transformation might be a good example.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Yes, exactly. You start off assuming there is no transcendant mind, and then lay out an argument that concludes there is no mind-body problem. (Maybe not the exact phrasing you would like, but that's the essence of it) Duh. Of course that's going to be your conclusion.

My point was that no one denies the existence of the body, and rather it's the nature of the mind that's under scrutiny. The mind-body problem doesn't refer to whether or not the body is real.

I'd be curious to know what you think is untestable ... yet exists. Also, note that I qualified what types of past events are scientificially untestable. I never said science is useless to all of history, but there are instances when it does not apply. You seem to indirectly agree with that.

I gave an example of a hypothetical thing which exists but is untestable: a particle that only interacts with itself. It doesn't decay into other, detectable particles, it doesn't affect and isn't affected by gravity, it has its own 'other-gravity', etc, yet it exists. There are whole constellations of the stuff, which we cannot detect in any way, shape, or form.

As for scientific testability, I'm of the opinion that the historical method is a specific instance of the more general scientific method. That is, when historians deduce this or that, what they're doing is not all that different from what scientists usually do: hypothesising, testing, and re-hypothesising. So no, I don't agree that there are parts of history where science doesn't apply. Science may have difficulty, but it's purview isn't restricted by the past.

Parts of it. You've already admitted the mind still has some mysteries. If you've found a way to test those mysteries, I'm anxious to hear about it. Maybe (most likely) science will find ways to do more in the future. But it would be special pleading to speak of anything other than what we know now.

True, but what exactly do we know now? We know the brain and the mind are inextricably linked, we know the physical brain exists, and we don't know that the mind is some terribly distant entity. Everything points to physicalism, and nothing points to dualism or transcendentalism (whatever the correct term is).

You're right, I do agree that the mind is mysterious, but that isn't an argument in favour of dualism (I've settled on 'dualism'). As you say, it would be special pleading to speak with certainty about anything more than we know, and we certainly don't know that the mind is transcendental.

I'm surprised you don't see the interesting irony in all this. What is one possible approach a dualist could take? To show a contradiction in the physicalist approach. OK, let's do that:

1. Assume neuroscience can explain mind phenomena X.
2. Use neuroscience to explain how the brain makes that connection to mind.
3. Neuroscience fails to make the connection, therefore the assumption is false - X can't be explained by a physical brain.

That would be the technique ... except ... you have a back door. Well, the special pleading begins, neuroscience is incomplete. We'll know that in the future.

I don't see how that logically works. Physicalism says that the mind is an emergent phenomenon of the brain. That doesn't mean we know how, only that it is. In my opinion, we have evidence for physicalism, but I wouldn't say we've solved physicalism - that is, we don't yet have a working theory as to how all of the mind's functions and properties actually, physically emerge from the brain.

Take paracetamol. It has a genuine (non-placebo), theraoeptic effect, but by and large we just don't know how it works. We know bits and pieces, and we can probe its effects blindly, but the underlying mechanics are unknown to us.

I actually accept that using current neuroscience for the argument does not prove a mind-body problem. It merely establishes that we must leave the door open. What I don't understand is why people don't get that - why they think the issue is closed - since we can explain a few things it follows with absolute certainty that we will be able to explain all things. It does? Hmm.

It's called 'evidence'. If we have two opposing ideas - the mind is a wholly physical phenomenon, vs. the mind is a wholly transcendental phenomenon - with one having evidence and the other not, even if one idea is incomplete we still lean towards it rather than the the unevidenced counterpart.

Take climate change. We may not know all there is to know about it, but we nonetheless have ample evidence for it. We don't need to know all there is to know in order to be certain of its truth.

The same, I think, is true of physicalism. However tantalising the idea of dualism is, however unsettled the issue is, I still see no evidence for dualism and quite a bit of evidence for physicalism. Do we know how the mind emerges from the brain? No. Does that negate the evidence? No.

I never told you what my experience was, so I doubt you know if there is good evidence against it or not. There seems to be a confirmation bias at work here.

On the contrary, I was speaking with regard to my hypothetical scenario:

"I'd even go so far as to say the event you attribute to a spiritual cause could be tested - suppose you believed that various physical goings-on were the result of poltergeists, but we then went back 10 years later and discovered, using science, that it was all a hoax (walkways behind the walls where people tried to trick you, etc). Now, it's true that it's still possible for your experience to be spiritual and the hoaxers are a happy coincidence - but as far as science is concerned, there is good evidence that your experiences weren't, in fact, spiritual, and science can conclude this despite the fact that the events happened in the past."

My conclusion ("There is good evidence...") is based on that particular hypothetical spiritual experience, not your real spiritual experience.

My point, which I guess I didn't make very clearly, was that even if you had a genuinely spiritual experience, we could potentially still test for it.

In a way that would satisfy you? Probably not. It is something I roll around in my head, though. When I come up with something, I'll let you know. I suppose we could discuss some of the preliminaries I've been pondering, but I don't expect they'll be convincing yet because of what I'm trying to point out in this thread. For example, ...

If you don't have a definition of 'spiritual', how can you speculate that your experience had a spiritual cause? Don't you need a working idea before you can start attributing things to it?

Yeah, exactly. You won't accept any evidence except that which you consider to be evidence of the physical. We've been through this before. By your thinking, anything that interacts with us is physical. If that is your assumption, we're not going to get far.

But that's just it: anything that interacts with us is physical. That's the only coherent definition I can see - if neutrinos are physical, then ghosts must be too. I'll accept any evidence you care to mention, so long as it actually is evidence. Don't conflate my definition with yours.

IMO, not "could be," but "is," and hence the difficulty of the problem.

I don't see how that's any more a difference in views - you, the believer, believe it to be true, hence the 'is'. I, the sceptic, don't believe it to be true, but acknowledge that it might be, hence the 'could be'.

My point was simply that, in my terminology, 'spiritual' and 'physical' aren't mutually exclusive.

You're not familiar with Monty Python? A shame. The point is, I see this problem of "common cause" all the time - the idea that since unusual causes are unlikely, that everything must have a common cause.

It's a real problem for history - the "common man" argument. Since all Frenchman are dutiful to the king, Napoleon would never have usurped royal authority, therefore accusations that he did are false. Those activities must have come from outside France, from its enemies - the Brits.

It's a bad argument. Most Frenchmen may have been dutiful to the king, but Napoleon wasn't. He was an uncommon man.

That's just a made-up example, but I see it happen from time to time. It appears you might be trying to apply the same argument to science - that all causes must be common.

On the contrary, I'm arguing my position based on what I perceive to be the evidence. In my opinion, there is evidence for physicalism but not dualism, hence the logical position should be the former and not the latter. Just because I've concluded that it is the former doesn't mean I've made no a priori assumption that it must be the former.

 

[Resha Caner]

I'm sorry. I read your response several times and I can't tell if you understand my position and reject it or if you just don't understand it. Honestly, it feels more like the latter, but I can't be sure.

As such, it seems anything I could say would just be to repeat myself.

I gave an example of a hypothetical thing which exists but is untestable: a particle that only interacts with itself.

I'm not interested in hypotheticals, hence the reason for adding the phrase "untestable yet exists." I was asking for an example of a real thing that you think is scientifically untestable.

As for scientific testability, I'm of the opinion that the historical method is a specific instance of the more general scientific method. That is, when historians deduce this or that, what they're doing is not all that different from what scientists usually do: hypothesising, testing, and re-hypothesising. So no, I don't agree that there are parts of history where science doesn't apply. Science may have difficulty, but it's purview isn't restricted by the past.

Historical and scientific methods may share some similarities, but there are also important differences. I wouldn't call one a subset of the other. Rather, they are overlapping sets. Your comments here lead this dangerously close to meaningless positions like "science is all things" or "science is all the things I agree with."

Everything points to physicalism, and nothing points to dualism ...

I disagree (or at least I disagree that there is no indication that something non-physical impinges on the mind).

Further, I don't think I'm conflating our different definitions of evidence. I realize they are different, and that you reject my definition. All I'm trying to say is that your definition shuts the door on something that must be conceded as possible. At the same time, I understand why you want to keep the door shut.

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

What reason do you have for assuming this?

Because of the completely different character of the subjective experience as opposed to objective fact. The experiential character of a rose, its "isness" is simply not the same as a neuron firing. If you disagree then I feel the onus is on you to demonstrate me the opposite - something which I find confusing and counter-intuitive (as should most people).

The correct question is "was the thought of the doughnut physical"?

Nice try. What difference is there from "the doughnut" (and a doughnut it is, by account of experience) and the "thought of the doughnut"? A thought is necessarily a thought about something. So in that sense there is a doughnut. A though-doughnut but an existent doughnut nonetheless. Are you willing to say that this doughnut is physical?

I say yes, since that's all we have evidence of it being.

Nope. And actually we have very logical evidence that it must be immaterial. This is because to say otherwise is to force a contradiction. You then are trying to smuggle in a non-existing (meaning non-physical) "thought-doughnut" that is, nonetheless, somehow physical.

I'm not sure why you're confusing "thoughts about something" with that something, but it's leading you in the wrong direction. I don't know of anyone advocating the idea that if I think of an elephant one physically appears in my brain, so arguing against that sort of idea isn't going to get you very far.

Your problem is you fail to see that a "thought about" something is not essentially different from that something. If I think about an elephant, I think of an elephant. If I hallucinate an elephant, I sense an elephant. Any thought necessitates the thing's existence of what is thought, even if it is only mental instead of physical. You dispense with the mental as being in a medium all of its own, so you are left perforce only with the physical. On that basis, you would HAVE to say an elephant literally does physically appear. Otherwise it is meaningless to say that thoughts are physical in nature.

You're assuming your conclusion here. Of course if you pretend that thoughts are not physical then there must be a non-physical substance to thoughts. But there's no reason to assume that.

Have fun with your elephant.

My conclusion is assumed, in this case, that our thoughts are non-physical, because without a mental sphere all its own we would be left with the absurdity of a real physical elephant.

 

[sandwiches]

As far as I can tell this is a minority view which few philosophers hold as tenable.

Maverick Philosopher: What are Numbers? Some Dubious Philosophy of Mathematics Exposed

The author of that page does a shoddy job of defending his opinion. His argument boils down to "If mathematics didn't exist before minds, how did reality have properties that we now describe mathematically?" The same way that colors didn't exist before eyes and brains. Light of different wavelengths existed but colors, as such, didn't.

Also, neuroscientists are discovering that, as humans, we develop our mathematical sense by invoking higher brain functions as one would when learning anything else about reality. In other words, as kids, we learn to associate real, existent objects to our first mathematical concepts.
The Neural Development of an Abstract Concept of Number
http://www.lphslibrary.org/uploads/7/2/9/6/7296009/ib_11.pdf

Strictly speaking minds ARE undetectable... and this follows as a direct result of their being non-physical!

So, how do you even know minds exist, as something separate or "transcendent" from brains?