Vitalism is True (I think)

[sandwiches]

That's an intriguing condition to throw out there. I don't think it's valid to say anything with causal power is physical - that seems to go right back to assuming the non-physical doesn't exist.

I have a huge problem with this argument. It is merely one from ignorance. For instance, we don't know that all of reality acts simply because elves in the pinkflower reality are pushing things in the background of reality but one does not argue "Well, now we're simply assuming the elves from the pinkflower reality don't exist," when we say that my car isn't working because the battery died. We're assuming nothing. We're merely stating facts. There is no reason whatsoever to believe something called "non-physical" exists, whatever that means, than we do to believe something called "elves from pinkflower reality exist." So, to me, this argument merely boils down to "Well, it could be real. After all, there is no evidence to the contrary." If that's the reason for believing in the "non-physical," then any idea (including the elves) are equally justified.

Another problem that I have with this is that we seem to only attribute to this "non-physical" label to things we seem to wish were special. We never say that phones work on "non-physical" energy or that a basketball bounces because of "non-physical" causes. Why not? Also, it seems proponents of "non-physicality" seem to vehemently oppose it when it comes to other computational machines and even sometimes go as far as to deny the possibility that a computer could ever achieve the level of "non-physicality" as a human mind.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

I'm not interested in hypotheticals, hence the reason for adding the phrase "untestable yet exists." I was asking for an example of a real thing that you think is scientifically untestable.

I figured it was obvious from my example that such things are completely unknown, and indeed are completely unknowable. That's the point. Obviously I don't know of a real, untestable thing, but nonetheless such a thing can be imagined, and it would eb outside the purview of science.

Historical and scientific methods may share some similarities, but there are also important differences. I wouldn't call one a subset of the other. Rather, they are overlapping sets. Your comments here lead this dangerously close to meaningless positions like "science is all things" or "science is all the things I agree with."

Not at all, merely that the scientific method is the best method we have for acquiring information. The historical method works because, at least in theory, it's a subset of the scientific method.

I disagree (or at least I disagree that there is no indication that something non-physical impinges on the mind).

Can you define 'non-physical'? Otherwise, your statement is as odd as "I don't know what 'spiritual' means, but I have a spiritual experience" (paraphrasing, of course).

Further, I don't think I'm conflating our different definitions of evidence. I realize they are different, and that you reject my definition. All I'm trying to say is that your definition shuts the door on something that must be conceded as possible. At the same time, I understand why you want to keep the door shut.

I honestly don't see how my definition could be any more broad. The only things it shuts out are those things inaccessible to science, which in my opinion constitutes all those things which are completely untestable. If you can't test for it, there can never be any evidence for it (otherwise, at least in principle, there could be some test for it), and thus it's outside the purview of science.

While I fully admit that there are potentially some things in existence that cannot be evidenced (by my definition), such things cannot, by definition, affect us in any way, even if the mind is transcendental. Even God, if he exists as per traditional Christianity, falls under the purview of science.

So, what, in your opinion, am I closing the door on? Or rather, what am I closing the door on that is of relevance?

 

[KCfromNC]

You might be right, but are you familiar with the indispensibility argument?
Indispensability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mathematics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Never heard of it, and after reading the page you linked, I'm not even sure what it's supposed to mean. The argument for seems to be mired in incomprehensible philosobpy-speak (what the heck is an ontological commitment in this context). Since the objections section seems to line up with what I know of the reality of how science and engineering actually work, and I can't make heads or tails of what the argument is supposed to be talking about, I'm not inclined to give it much more thought.

That's an intriguing condition to throw out there. I don't think it's valid to say anything with causal power is physical - that seems to go right back to assuming the non-physical doesn't exist.

But this gets back to the question of what exactly people mean by non-physical. It's thrown out as a panacea for all of the (real or imagined) failings in naturalism, and yet no one seems to ever talk about what it actually is. What can the non-physical do that the natural can not? How does it work? Why do we think it answers outstanding questions in a given field? And so on.

 

[KCfromNC]

Because of the completely different character of the subjective experience as opposed to objective fact. The experiential character of a rose, its "isness" is simply not the same as a neuron firing. If you disagree then I feel the onus is on you to demonstrate me the opposite - something which I find confusing and counter-intuitive (as should most people).

I'm supposed to find an argument against "I feel it therefore it must be reality"?

There's lots of scientific evidence that one of the things our consciousness is good at is taking credit for things it's not doing and making itself seem special. So your feeling here may just it doing it's job of promoting itself and not an indication of anything real.

What difference is there from "the doughnut" (and a doughnut it is, by account of experience) and the "thought of the doughnut"?

One's made of dough and sugar, the other is electrical impulses in the brain. I'm really not sure why this is a such a hard concept to understand.

A thought is necessarily a thought about something. So in that sense there is a doughnut. A though-doughnut but an existent doughnut nonetheless. Are you willing to say that this doughnut is physical?

Again, a thought and a doughnut are two totally different things. Just like weather is different from a doughnut. That doesn't make weather non-physical, though, just a different type of physical thing.

Nope. And actually we have very logical evidence that it must be immaterial. This is because to say otherwise is to force a contradiction. You then are trying to smuggle in a non-existing (meaning non-physical) "thought-doughnut" that is, nonetheless, somehow physical.

So you say, but you've presented no reason other than you feel this should be so.

Your problem is you fail to see that a "thought about" something is not essentially different from that something.

Of course I fail to see it, because it's patently false.

If I think about an elephant, I think of an elephant. If I hallucinate an elephant, I sense an elephant. Any thought necessitates the thing's existence of what is thought, even if it is only mental instead of physical.

Yes, if you think of something you're having a thought. Kind of by definition, but whatever.

You dispense with the mental as being in a medium all of its own, so you are left perforce only with the physical. On that basis, you would HAVE to say an elephant literally does physically appear. Otherwise it is meaningless to say that thoughts are physical in nature.

Or the idea that thoughts, while physical, don't create actual instances of what's being thought about.

 

[Resha Caner]

I'm not inclined to give it much more thought.

That's a shame, but OK.

 

[Resha Caner]

Can you define 'non-physical'? Otherwise, your statement is as odd as "I don't know what 'spiritual' means, but I have a spiritual experience" (paraphrasing, of course).

??? Is this supposed to be rhetorical?

As succinctly as I can state it, here is what I've said:
1) Do I know what "non-physical" is? Yes.
2) Can I put that into a formalized definition? No, but I'm working on it.
3) Why can't I define it? There are 3 reasons:

A) Assumptions - We start from a very different world view.
B) Part of my world view is that "knowing" can come through experience not connected to language.
C) Further, it is my belief that these experiences are best shared through the medium of "story" so that the hearer can vicariously experience the same thing and, hopefully, since we are both human, gain a similar understanding.

So, when I say, "I'm working on it," what does that mean? I find it an interesting challenge when people subscribe to a paradigm of "knowing" that is different than mine. Can I communicate with that person? In a sense, the challenge is to translate my understanding into the other person's paradigm. As such, when I "lose" a debate, it is not always the case that the other person has proven me wrong - sometimes, but not always. Sometimes it is that I have failed to properly translate.

That's where we're at right now.

You may not feel like you're shutting the door on something. But, to me the view that everything is a subset of science means you are. If anything, it is the other way round. Mathematics is a language. Science is a language. But my experiences are not a subset of those languages. I think of those experiences in different terms - some of them not even linguistic. That you appear to not use those terms at all means you are using a much more restricted "language" than I am.

I don't mean that in a pejorative way. The language of science is more precise ... the language of mathematics even more precise. But precision is gained at the price of versatility ... if that's even the right word.

So, what, in your opinion, am I closing the door on? Or rather, what am I closing the door on that is of relevance?

My my my. How many answers to that question did I have to delete? My sarcasm was like a horse straining at the bit, but I think I've managed to rein it in.

So, let's try an example ... a physical one ... I think.

This is the first time I've tried this example, so you get to be my guinea pig. Hopefully this gains us something.

How is velocity measured?

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

I'm supposed to find an argument against "I feel it therefore it must be reality"?

Nope. Rather, it is incumbent upon you that, if you see actual evidence in the form of subjective states that doesn't mesh with non-subjective fact, you should run with it and not dismiss it.

There's lots of scientific evidence that one of the things our consciousness is good at is taking credit for things it's not doing and making itself seem special. So your feeling here may just it doing it's job of promoting itself and not an indication of anything real.

What is real? Is anything you experience real, or is it all a dream? Technically, if we go by our subjective experiences alone, nothing is real at all. Everything is in the form of thought, and everything is a thought-doughnut. So, why should we believe in actual non-subjective existence? Why couldn't that just be the act of consciousness promoting itself and not an indication of anything real?

Using your own reason, there is now no room to assume the existence of an actual brain.

One's made of dough and sugar, the other is electrical impulses in the brain. I'm really not sure why this is a such a hard concept to understand.

Actually, there is no difference when it comes to our subjective states. The actual doughnut as is presented to us looks and appears a certain way, and the thought of it matches this description. Of course, the human mind lays down a certain a priori interpretation of the doughnut such that "dough" and "sugar" appear differently to us than as the doughnut exists "in-itself" but this does not depart from the fact that our affections lock onto an identifiable real with certain necessary and sufficient conditions.

Again, a thought and a doughnut are two totally different things. Just like weather is different from a doughnut. That doesn't make weather non-physical, though, just a different type of physical thing.

They are not two "totally different things." If they were they would not match up within our mind. In fact, characteristically, they are the same. They could not be different in identity because then one might have a thought that is other than the thing thought of which is obviously absurd.

However, I do agree that a thought is not a physically existent thing. So on that basis a thought is not the thing in the mode of physicality. That's the way you resolve any possible contradiction; you differentiate the same thing by two different modes: the physical and the mental. So, there is a difference in category, you can say.

So you say, but you've presented no reason other than you feel this should be so.

Read very carefully what I have just written to you. In order to maintain a meaningful division between the thought of something and the thing about which is thought of, you need to preserve their sameness in essence but separate their respective modalities. Otherwise you are left with absurdities such as the elephant in your head.

Of course I fail to see it, because it's patently false.

And that is your problem, not mine.

Yes, if you think of something you're having a thought. Kind of by definition, but whatever.

No, not "whatever." This is the lynchpin right here. If you can understand this point of difference, you will understand why materialism is untenable.

Or the idea that thoughts, while physical, don't create actual instances of what's being thought about.

Thoughts can't be physical. It's not logical.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

??? Is this supposed to be rhetorical?

No. I am trying to have a serious conversation, and your patronisation makes it a little difficult do to so. You said you had a spiritual experience, I asked what 'spiritual' meant, you couldn't (or wouldn't) tell me - why say you had a spiritual experience if you can't (or won't) explain what that means?

As succinctly as I can state it, here is what I've said:
1) Do I know what "non-physical" is? Yes.
2) Can I put that into a formalized definition? No, but I'm working on it.
3) Why can't I define it? There are 3 reasons:

A) Assumptions - We start from a very different world view.
B) Part of my world view is that "knowing" can come through experience not connected to language.
C) Further, it is my belief that these experiences are best shared through the medium of "story" so that the hearer can vicariously experience the same thing and, hopefully, since we are both human, gain a similar understanding.

OK.

So, when I say, "I'm working on it," what does that mean? I find it an interesting challenge when people subscribe to a paradigm of "knowing" that is different than mine. Can I communicate with that person? In a sense, the challenge is to translate my understanding into the other person's paradigm. As such, when I "lose" a debate, it is not always the case that the other person has proven me wrong - sometimes, but not always. Sometimes it is that I have failed to properly translate.

I do hope I don't have such trouble communicating my ideas.

That's where we're at right now.

You may not feel like you're shutting the door on something. But, to me the view that everything is a subset of science means you are. If anything, it is the other way round. Mathematics is a language. Science is a language. But my experiences are not a subset of those languages. I think of those experiences in different terms - some of them not even linguistic. That you appear to not use those terms at all means you are using a much more restricted "language" than I am.

I don't mean that in a pejorative way. The language of science is more precise ... the language of mathematics even more precise. But precision is gained at the price of versatility ... if that's even the right word.

I don't see how. Certainly technical jargon doesn't flow as well or sound as pretty or evoke the same emotions as a particularly well-written book, but I don't think it has any actual limitations. Precision certainly limits versatility, but a) there's a reason we want precision, and b) it doesn't preclude using more versatile language as well.

The issue is that we're talking about something quite precise. Poetic flourish are all well and good, but they have no place in mathematics, right? Mysterious Exposition Man on the telly might well speak in cryptic messages and non-technical language, but he can talk much more meaningfully if he spoke plainly.

So it is with this discussion. Originally, we were talking about the mind-body problem, specifically, whether the mind is an emergent property of the brain or a transcendental entity in its own right. To even have a discussion we really do need to nail down the core terms - how can we even begin to exchange ideas if we don't agree on the topic of conversation?

And I don't think I'm restricting myself either; again, my definition of what is 'physical' and what falls under the purview is as broad as it could possibly be - how much broader do you want me to go?

If you could give concrete examples of what you mean, instead of talking in abstract, that'd be great, but I get the feeling your New Age approach to language means you can't.

How is velocity measured?

Once you've established your units and a frame of reference, you can measure velocity by any number of means depending on what it is you're measuring. A car's speedometre measures rotations of the wheel (I think) and extrapolates its velocity relative to the road in metres per second (defined using (apparently) immutable properties of photons and Caesium-133, respectively). Your question is broad, so I have no idea if I fell into your trap or not

 

[Resha Caner]

No. I am trying to have a serious conversation, and your patronisation makes it a little difficult do to so.

My apologies. I was trying to add some humor here and there, but it was never meant to patronize you.

Your question is broad, so I have no idea if I fell into your trap or not

It wasn't meant as a trap. If I just dumped the whole thing into one post it wouldn't be a conversation. It would be a lecture. And, in my experience, things get missed that way such that they have to be repeated.

But, I suppose I need to tighten up my approach before it will be productive.

 

[KCfromNC]

Nope. Rather, it is incumbent upon you that, if you see actual evidence in the form of subjective states that doesn't mesh with non-subjective fact, you should run with it and not dismiss it.

True. So what are the facts pointing to a magical source for thoughts, again?

What is real? Is anything you experience real, or is it all a dream?

Oh god, here we go. Solipsism as a defense for the supernatural after logic, reason and evidence don't lead us there. Why am I not surprised?

Technically, if we go by our subjective experiences alone, nothing is real at all.

Why would you think this?

So, why should we believe in actual non-subjective existence?

Because it best fits the evidence.

Using your own reason, there is now no room to assume the existence of an actual brain.

You'll have to show your work here.

Actually, there is no difference when it comes to our subjective states.

Show me a picture of a thought about a doughnut. I'll show you a picture of a doughnut. They're two different things.

However, I do agree that a thought is not a physically existent thing.

Where did you get the idea that I think that thoughts are non-physical?

Read very carefully what I have just written to you. In order to maintain a meaningful division between the thought of something and the thing about which is thought of, you need to preserve their sameness in essence but separate their respective modalities. Otherwise you are left with absurdities such as the elephant in your head.

I have no difficulty understanding that thoughts are different than physical objects. And I don't have to pretend there's magic going on for it to happen. If you can't understand that your answer is not the only possible one, you really shouldn't be the one pretending to be the teacher here.

No, not "whatever." This is the lynchpin right here. If you can understand this point of difference, you will understand why materialism is untenable.

And if a frog had wings... Really, I think I understand that a thought and a doughnut are two different things. I have no idea why you're trying to confuse the two, but I guess it's so you can come to this conclusion :

Thoughts can't be physical. It's not logical.

Then why do physical changes to the brain change thoughts? I don't care how logical you think something is - when the facts show differently, it's not a sign that reality is wrong.

 

[KCfromNC]

That's a shame, but OK.

If I had an idea that I was missing anything important I would be more interested, but so far I don't see any reason to believe that. How does the fact that science is easier when you use certain tools lead to the conclusion that those tools predate humanity? Seems like a lot of wishful thinking to get from point A to point B in that argument.

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

True. So what are the facts pointing to a magical source for thoughts, again?

Our own subjective awareness of them. That is a fact.

Oh god, here we go. Solipsism as a defense for the supernatural after logic, reason and evidence don't lead us there. Why am I not surprised?

Solipsism? No, what I meant was, basing yourself on the facts of subjective experience alone, and without postulating anything outside, you are left with only a thought-world. The very fact that we do postulate the existence of a real world, means that our thoughts are not only thoughts but thoughts about something; namely, the physical world and all its constituents.

Why would you think this?

Because there is no difference in kind then between a thought-doughnut and the actual doughnut. Why should you mistake it as somehow being over and above your own conscious awareness? Going by thought alone, that is a logical misstep and completely unjustified. Why should there be something "beyond" what you think? The only answer forthcoming is that what you think and what you think about have, along with their unity, some division among themselves: thus you get the mental/physical distinction.

If you don't have this, then you are left with two choices. Either you become an idealist, in which case there is no such thing as matter and everything is thought/mind, or on the contrary, everything is physical, in which case your thought of a doughnut is just as physical as the doughnut itself, which sounds absurd from a neuro-physical standpoint since there is not an actual doughnut lodged in your brain or anything of the sort.

Because it best fits the evidence.

Not from the point of view of subjectivity. Maybe if you discount subjectivity it would make sense, but if you actually factor in our experience, it does not make any sense.

You'll have to show your work here.

I already have. Since asserting anything "beyond" your own experience is mere postulation, to assume that a brain is necessary for your subjectivity is a logical misstep. It could, after all, be just as well that your brain is an entirely accidental appendage you may drop at will.

Now, I don't believe this. I do postulate that the brain is necessary for our current condition of mind. But starting from the premise that all is mental, you cannot simply postulate something beyond unless you already have the presupposition that your thoughts are actually about something. Without this belief, at the very least, we are simply floating bubbles, entirely bereft of outer understanding.

Show me a picture of a thought about a doughnut. I'll show you a picture of a doughnut. They're two different things.

No, LOOK at a doughnut, and then postulate its real existence therefrom! You can't separate them that way because whatever you think, even if it is "about" P) something "out there" is a thought of your own. In that purely subjective sense, the doughnut and the thought of the doughnut are one-and-the-same. All the necessary and sufficient conditions found in the mental doughnut match up exactly with the actual doughnut postulated "out there" (only, of course, we can't actually see it in concrete terms since any thought of it in-itself would itself only be a thought about again, and not the absolute article).

Where did you get the idea that I think that thoughts are non-physical?

You yourself presuppose it whenever you try to separate the actual doughnut and the thought-doughnut. The actual doughnut is made of matter. The thought-doughnut is only a thought about the actual article which is cast in darkness. To say that the thought is also physical would be to say that the physical can be "about" another physical state, which is impossible. Both for the fact that nothing in nature is "about" something else, but also because the thought in your mind would be one and the same, conflated, with the thing thought about. Hence, the elephant would really, really appear in your brain. Otherwise there is no identity between one physical thing and another so as to confer meaning (remember, the idea and the reality have to match up so as to be comprehensible). They would have to be different, and of course they are, but not in terms of identity. Only modality. Thus, there is the physical and there is, logically, the non-physical or spiritual.

I have no difficulty understanding that thoughts are different than physical objects.

With all due respect, I think you do.

And I don't have to pretend there's magic going on for it to happen. If you can't understand that your answer is not the only possible one, you really shouldn't be the one pretending to be the teacher here.

But, I think my argument is sound. Therefore correct and refutes materialism.

And if a frog had wings... Really, I think I understand that a thought and a doughnut are two different things. I have no idea why you're trying to confuse the two, but I guess it's so you can come to this conclusion :

"Thoughts can't be physical. It's not logical."

Then why do physical changes to the brain change thoughts? I don't care how logical you think something is - when the facts show differently, it's not a sign that reality is wrong.

All you show here is that there is a relationship between the mental and the physical, not that the physical is the end-all of the mental, or that the mental (deary me...) doesn't even exist.

I am not trying to confuse the two. Confusion invariably results though, when you can't find the right way to divide something that is self-identical.

 

[sandwiches]

Not from the point of view of subjectivity. Maybe if you discount subjectivity it would make sense, but if you actually factor in our experience, it does not make any sense.

So, you don't believe things exist independent of our minds? You don't think there's a difference between believing an apple is red and an apple reflecting light in the range of frequencies we refer to as 'red,' regardless of belief?

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

So, you don't believe things exist independent of our minds? You don't think there's a difference between believing an apple is red and an apple reflecting light in the range of frequencies we refer to as 'red,' regardless of belief?

I never said I believe that. In fact, everything I have just said should lead you to the opposite conclusion. I do believe in external reality. It is our own mental grasping of it that proves the object of thought and the thought itself are non-different from each other in identity, not modality. One is a physical thing-in-itself, the other is a NON-physical mental state. But they both refer to the same thing. Therefore, an apple's redness is identical to it's exuding a range of light frequencies. If I mention the redness of an apple I immediately refer to the effect of various frequencies. Those things are synonymous. The only difference lies in that the former is expanded underneath a mental attribute, while the latter is a physical attribute.

Of course we have to have a belief in wavelengths. Otherwise there is no point in assuming anything more than mental fact.

 

[sandwiches]

I never said I believe that. In fact, everything I have just said should lead you to the opposite conclusion. I do believe in external reality. It is our own mental grasping of it that proves the object of thought and the thought itself are non-different from each other in identity, not modality. One is a physical thing-in-itself, the other is a NON-physical mental state. But they both refer to the same thing. Therefore, an apple's redness is identical to it's exuding a range of light frequencies. If I mention the redness of an apple I immediately refer to the effect of various frequencies. Those things are synonymous. The only difference lies in that the former is expanded underneath a mental attribute, while the latter is a physical attribute.

Of course we have to have a belief in wavelengths. Otherwise there is no point in assuming anything more than mental fact.

Can you be a little clearer? I am confused as it seems you're saying "I never said that," and then proceed to say just that. You're basically saying, "I never said that there's no difference between belief and reality. It's just that there is no difference between the two." If I am misunderstanding, can you please expand on this?

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

"I never said that there's no difference between belief and reality. It's just that there is no difference between the two."

There is mental life, which reflects actual things in the world. This is done by what Spinoza called the "affections" - those outlets for sense-contact which allow us to gain information from the "outside", which is then transmitted and reinterpreted by our brain. The problem is, as Kant and others have shown, there is no way to get "beyond" mental life. It's as though we are covered in cellophane. Whenever we try touching something, we don't touch it really. Our touch passes through the medium of cellophane, so at most we get an intimation. It is on the basis of this intimation that we found our "belief" that reality is external.

But, reality really is so and not just as a belief. The intimation is enough. Why is not something I can really explain. I'll simply say that I'm not a radical skeptic. Our thoughts really do reflect what is "out there" and so, on that basis, are identical with their referents. It's as though your mind was a mirror. The objects in the mirror (thoughts) are the same as the objects in front of the mirror. The only difference may be that, the mirror is colored red, and so the objects are tinged red. This still does not mean that the red object in the mirror is not to be identified with the actual object.

 

[sandwiches]

There is mental life, which reflects actual things in the world. This is done by what Spinoza called the "affections" - those outlets for sense-contact which allow us to gain information from the "outside", which is then transmitted and reinterpreted by our brain. The problem is, as Kant and others have shown, there is no way to get "beyond" mental life. It's as though we are covered in cellophane. Whenever we try touching something, we don't touch it really. Our touch passes through the medium of cellophane, so at most we get an intimation. It is on the basis of this intimation that we found our "belief" that reality is external.

I am not asking about whether our perception of reality is accurate or true. I am merely asking whether you believe that reality is independent of belief.

But, reality really is so and not just as a belief. The intimation is enough. Why is not something I can really explain. I'll simply say that I'm not a radical skeptic. Our thoughts really do reflect what is "out there" and so, on that basis, are identical with their referents. It's as though your mind was a mirror. The objects in the mirror (thoughts) are the same as the objects in front of the mirror. The only difference may be that, the mirror is colored red, and so the objects are tinged red. This still does not mean that the red object in the mirror is not to be identified with the actual object.

So, our mental processes CAN reflect reality. However, it seems to me you extend this to mean "EVERYTHING our mind shows ARE reflections of reality." Am I in the ballpark?

 

[KCfromNC]

Our own subjective awareness of them. That is a fact.

Yes, we have awareness. It's either physical or non-physical consciousness producing this awareness. The simple fact it exists doesn't point one way or the other.

Solipsism? No, what I meant was, basing yourself on the facts of subjective experience alone, and without postulating anything outside, you are left with only a thought-world. The very fact that we do postulate the existence of a real world, means that our thoughts are not only thoughts but thoughts about something; namely, the physical world and all its constituents.

Yes, we seem to observe a physical reality. How does this imply that consciousness is not physical?

Because there is no difference in kind then between a thought-doughnut and the actual doughnut

Yes there is. Or maybe not, since I have no idea what a difference in kind is and how it relates to a difference in the normal usage of the word.

The only answer forthcoming is that what you think and what you think about have, along with their unity, some division among themselves: thus you get the mental/physical distinction.

Yep, thinking about something is a physical process in the brain which different from a physical object outside the brain. I figured that would be obvious.

If you don't have this, then you are left with two choices. Either you become an idealist, in which case there is no such thing as matter and everything is thought/mind, or on the contrary, everything is physical, in which case your thought of a doughnut is just as physical as the doughnut itself, which sounds absurd from a neuro-physical standpoint since there is not an actual doughnut lodged in your brain or anything of the sort.

Yes, I agree that believing thoughts are a physical process doesn't require the object of the thought to physically appear inside someone's brain. That's absurd, I have no idea why you'd bring it up since no one believes it.

Not from the point of view of subjectivity. Maybe if you discount subjectivity it would make sense, but if you actually factor in our experience, it does not make any sense.

You'll have to show your work here.

I already have. Since asserting anything "beyond" your own experience is mere postulation, to assume that a brain is necessary for your subjectivity is a logical misstep.

I've never said it's necessary, just that it's what seems to be true based on the evidence.

It could, after all, be just as well that your brain is an entirely accidental appendage you may drop at will.

Sure, it's a logical possibility - one which is refuted by everything we know about human physiology, but not illogical if you ignore that minor problem. It's the same problem I have with the rest of this rant - you're putting way too much weight into abstract reasoning and very little on actual observation. I guess that's par for the course for philosophy but that also explains why it goes so far astray when trying to talk about scientific topics like this.

Now, I don't believe this. I do postulate that the brain is necessary for our current condition of mind. But starting from the premise that all is mental, you cannot simply postulate something beyond unless you already have the presupposition that your thoughts are actually about something. Without this belief, at the very least, we are simply floating bubbles, entirely bereft of outer understanding.

Good thing I don't assume this, then.

No, LOOK at a doughnut, and then postulate its real existence therefrom! You can't separate them that way because whatever you think, even if it is "about" P) something "out there" is a thought of your own.

Sorry, I'm not convinced that observation is the same brain process as abstract though . Do you have any links to scientific literature which show this is the case?

In that purely subjective sense, the doughnut and the thought of the doughnut are one-and-the-same.

If I leave the room and then someone eats the doughnut, does it automatically disappear from my thoughts? Or vice versa, if I stop thinking about it does it disappear from other people's vision? No, of course not so they're obviously two different things.

You yourself presuppose it whenever you try to separate the actual doughnut and the thought-doughnut. The actual doughnut is made of matter. The thought-doughnut is only a thought about the actual article which is cast in darkness.

Nope, the doughnut I'm thinking about is well lit. In other words, what the heck is this supposed to mean?

To say that the thought is also physical would be to say that the physical can be "about" another physical state, which is impossible.

Proof of this claim? Or any of the rest which follow? I see lots of conjecture and word games, but no real evidence or proof, just assertion. This is a great example of why the philosophy of the mind is bad for neuroscience. There's all sorts of guessing going on here, but nothing to back it up. The bad part is that some of the people making these guesses are good at creative writing, meaning that some people buy into it. And this colors the type of research people are going to find useful.

Luckily I think science has moved past much of this baggage of the past, but to see it still out there is a bit strange.