Interaction ("mind body") problem

[GrowingSmaller]

Yes, everyone who's made it past their freshman year of college (or seen The Matrix) knows there's no way to really prove that we're not just brains in a vat and that reality might not be really real. Most people move beyond that and realize that absolute proof isn't a realistic requirement for knowledge.

Apparently there is no empirical proof possible to falsify the brain in the vat theorem. No matter what evidence is produced, it always remains a possibility. I saw a logical proof somewhere in a book on epistemology years ago. But i don't think that panpsychism is regarded as a "skeptical alternative" in the sense that brain in the vat theory is, although I may be wrong.

Now you are apparently saying that there is an empirical proof (or a universal empirical test) for consciousness, or at least one that clearly rules out quarks. I think if that is right than the analogy breaks down, because there one theorem (relating to quarks) is empirically related and testable and the other (relating to brains in vats) is not.

So if consciousness is empirically related, and we have a scientifically validated universal empirical test for it or one that rules out quarks, we must know the necessary and sufficient conditions at last to that extent in empirical terms. I am of the mind that scientists do not know them (or they would, as I have said, be all over the internet).

Like I have said btw, I don't think that the presence of a medical designed for consciousness in humans is proof that all non-humans are non-conscious. Or even that it proves that only brains are conscious. If you think it proves that, then provide a syllogism please. If that is not your argument, then what is?

 

[Eudaimonist]

It seems to me that if quarks do not exhibit behaviors normally associated with conscious beings, there's no point in including them in a list of conscious beings without some evidence. This is the "ruling in" principle.

I've never experienced life as a cat, but my cat does things that make me strongly suspect conscious awareness.

Quarks seem lacking in this respect. I pet them and pet them and they don't purr.

If you have good reason to include quarks, present your reasons. Just saying that we don't know that we should exclude them isn't terribly convincing.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[GrowingSmaller]

It seems to me that if quarks do not exhibit behaviors normally associated with conscious beings, there's no point in including them in a list of conscious beings without some evidence. This is the "ruling in" principle.

I've never experienced life as a cat, but my cat does things that make me strongly suspect conscious awareness.

Quarks seem lacking in this respect. I pet them and pet them and they don't purr.

If you have good reason to include quarks, present your reasons. Just saying that we don't know that we should exclude them isn't terribly convincing.


eudaimonia,

Mark

IIRC I never argued that I know quarks are consicous, or that panpsychism is true. I argued the agnostic point of view, I don't know whether they are, or whether they are not.

My current position is science does not know necessary and sufficient conditions for all (any physically possible) cases of consciousness. Thereforescience if -because of this - science cannot say being a quark is insufficient for the presence of consciousness, it therefore cannot rule out quark consciousness.

 

[Eudaimonist]

IIRC I never argued that I know quarks are consicous, or that panpsychism is true. I argued the agnostic point of view, I don't know whether they are, or whether they are not.

In that case, all lists are utterly meaningless. You can't include or exclude quarks from your list of potentially conscious beings. You haven't even gotten to the list stage yet.

My current position is science does not know necessary and sufficient conditions for all (any physically possible) cases of consciousness. Thereforescience if -because of this - science cannot say being a quark is insufficient for the presence of consciousness, it therefore cannot rule out quark consciousness.

And you can't rule it in either.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[GrowingSmaller]

In that case, all lists are utterly meaningless. You can't include or exclude quarks from your list of potentially conscious beings. You haven't even gotten to the list stage yet.

Something like that, possibly. I am not quite sure that a "meaningful list stage" is in science though. Does science have an empirically advanced theory of consciousness that actually rules out panpsychism (or quark consciousness) with an impressive enough degree confidence to make the rest of us seem like utter crackpots?

And you can't rule it in either.

Exactly. Which is why I say "I do not know".

 

[sandwiches]

Something like that, possibly. I am not quite sure that a "meaningful list stage" is in science though. Does science have an empirically advanced theory of consciousness that actually rules out panpsychism (or quark consciousness) with an impressive enough degree confidence to make the rest of us seem like utter crackpots?


Exactly. Which is why I say "I do not know".

OK. So, why did you even start this thread then, if you don't even understand your own question? How can there be a problem of consciousness and brain when you don't even understand what consciousness is?

 

[KCfromNC]

I thought that you were saying something like quarks were not conscious because they did not pass a medical examination designed for humans (with brains).

Nope, I've never said that.

 

[KCfromNC]

Thats not an argument, sorry. A basic syllogism would be helpful.

​

Can you provide a universal definition of argument from a definitive source which requires all arguments to be syllogisms?

 

[KCfromNC]

So does science know the necessary and sufficient conditions for all physically possible consicousness, or not?
​

Yes, absolutely one or the other.

I think we've already established that people are not omniscient. That doesn't mean that we just get to use our imaginations to trump reality just because we feel like it. What's your point here again?

 

[KCfromNC]

Yes we can know that certain brain states are sufficient for consciousness, but my remark was about quarks. Just because certain brain states are sufficient for consciousness it does not mean that being a quark is not sufficient.
​

And just because certain chemical states are sufficient for chocolateness it does not mean that being a house is not sufficient. We do rule out the idea that houses are chocolatey for other reasons, though, just like we can rule out the idea of quarks being conscious for other reasons as well. The primary one being lack of evidence, although a lack of knowing what it even means for a sub-atomic particle to be conscious is a big problem as well.

 

[KCfromNC]

Apparently there is no empirical proof possible to falsify the brain in the vat theorem. No matter what evidence is produced, it always remains a possibility. I saw a logical proof somewhere in a book on epistemology years ago. But i don't think that panpsychism is regarded as a "skeptical alternative" in the sense that brain in the vat theory is, although I may be wrong.

They seem to have the same amount of evidence and testability in their favor.

Now you are apparently saying that there is an empirical proof (or a universal empirical test) for consciousness, or at least one that clearly rules out quarks.

Yes, there's no real way to test for consciousness in quarks since you can't seem to tell us what we would see if it were true. All this necessary and sufficient nonsense really has nothing to do with the fact that you're co-opting the word consciousness and applying it to a case where as far as any of us know, even if it existed it would be far different than any other type of consciousness we've ever conceived of. Which is why I keep going back to the idea that office furniture is chocolate - which might be possible, so long as you create a special definition of chocolate totally different than any other chocolate we've ever seen. You rightfully object to that idea, but don't see the issue when you do the same for consciousness. The rules apply equally in all cases - if you're going to say that there might be more than we've observed that's sufficient for consciousness it's only fair to allow it for chocolate as well.

I can call a blue car red - that doesn't suddenly draw all of optics into question because scientists have failed to universally define red to match your twisting of the words. Likewise, the fact you can imagine that maybe quarks have a property which you'll label consciousness (even though it's not like anything else labeled consciousness) says nothing about science. It just says you're making up things and randomly throwing words at them to make them sound more important than the random guessing they really are.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

So KCfromNC what is youtr positive view on consciousness? What can be conscious, and what cannot, and where is the line drawn? And what reasons can be given for this?

 

[KCfromNC]

So KCfromNC what is youtr positive view on consciousness? What can be conscious, and what cannot, and where is the line drawn? And what reasons can be given for this?

What does it matter, in relation to your claim that there's something fundamental that naturalism can't explain about consciousness? Either you have a reason to believe in your OP or you don't. My views on the limits of our understanding shouldn't matter one way or the other if you have a convincing point.

 

[Eudaimonist]

Exactly. Which is why I say "I do not know".

The starting point must then be entities that shown signs of being conscious, as best as we can determine this. We don't need a theory of consciousness at this point. We are only trying to figure out which entities we'd like to explain in terms of conscious behavior.

For instance, I will include human beings other than myself. They behave much as I do, and since conscious awareness is an aspect of my own behavior, it seems likely that other human beings are conscious as well.

I will also include my pet cat. She isn't human, but her eyes seem to express active awareness just as human eyes do. When I toss her toy mouse, she acts very much like a human would in catching the mouse, albeit with more speed and grace.

So, living beings (with largish brains) seem like excellent candidates for conscious entities. We have to start here, rather than to require a fully formed theory of consciousness, since we haven't even come close to that yet. Perhaps what we learn from this initial category will allow us to broaden our search, e.g., to AI consciousness.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[quatona]

I will return to my very first point in this thread: define "consciousness" for purposes of this thread.
The OP rejects scientific definitions because he feels philosophy needs a different definition. Ok.
However, the definitions he provides are pretty loose. He also concedes that "consciousness of quarks" would be "very different" from consciousness as we know it.
So the issue is not agnosticism concerning the consciousness of quarks, but rather agnosticism whether some people at some point in time manage to come up with a definition of "consciousness" that will necessitate us to include quarks.

 

[sandwiches]

I will return to my very first point in this thread: define "consciousness" for purposes of this thread.
The OP rejects scientific definitions because he feels philosophy needs a different definition. Ok.
However, the definitions he provides are pretty loose. He also concedes that "consciousness of quarks" would be "very different" from consciousness as we know it.
So the issue is not agnosticism concerning the consciousness of quarks, but rather agnosticism whether some people at some point in time manage to come up with a definition of "consciousness" that will necessitate us to include quarks.

That's exactly why I replied as I did in my last post.

Essentially it went like this:
GS: "What about this problem between consciousness and the brain?"
Us: "It isn't a problem because of X, Y, Z.
GS: "You can't say that when we don't even understand what consciousness is."

So, how can we even say there is a problem, then we supposedly don't even understand consciousness?

 

[KCfromNC]

So, how can we even say there is a problem, then we supposedly don't even understand consciousness?

Because consciousness feels special and magical, therefore we need to invent reasons to turn these feelings into "facts" and discredit explanations which say that consciousness is just another biological system (no matter how much you have to torture language, reason or evidence to make it happen).

 

[GrowingSmaller]

So KCfromNC what is youtr positive view on consciousness? What can be conscious, and what cannot, and where is the line drawn? And what reasons can be given for this?

Again^^

 

[GrowingSmaller]

That's exactly why I replied as I did in my last post.

Essentially it went like this:
GS: "What about this problem between consciousness and the brain?"
Us: "It isn't a problem because of X, Y, Z.
GS: "You can't say that when we don't even understand what consciousness is."

So, how can we even say there is a problem, then we supposedly don't even understand consciousness?

I am still looking for arguments form the other suide to extablish waht consciousness is etc. I have defended my prespective for pages now but why not discuss the alternatives with equal rigor?

 

[GrowingSmaller]

The starting point must then be entities that shown signs of being conscious, as best as we can determine this. We don't need a theory of consciousness at this point. We are only trying to figure out which entities we'd like to explain in terms of conscious behavior.

For instance, I will include human beings other than myself. They behave much as I do, and since conscious awareness is an aspect of my own behavior, it seems likely that other human beings are conscious as well.

I will also include my pet cat. She isn't human, but her eyes seem to express active awareness just as human eyes do. When I toss her toy mouse, she acts very much like a human would in catching the mouse, albeit with more speed and grace.

So, living beings (with largish brains) seem like excellent candidates for conscious entities. We have to start here, rather than to require a fully formed theory of consciousness, since we haven't even come close to that yet. Perhaps what we learn from this initial category will allow us to broaden our search, e.g., to AI consciousness.


eudaimonia,

Mark

Yes we start off with an argument from analogy. But afaik that is not sufficient for what is normally regarded as scientific understanding. The presocratics used analogy, but they were not scientists. The scientific method is (usually considered to be) more sophisticated than that.