Classical theism doesn't, though the more popular modern version might.
Ok, you are about right here. Some classical philosophical theism gets quite abstracts, though it still is considered "personal". Even the god concept of Aristotle is a personal, if highly abstracted god.
I would agree that we are what we are because the universe is what it is, but I think it very much worth asking if we could exist at all had the potentiality for something like humanity not always been there all along. Could life arise from nonlife by accident, could consciousness spring from a dead, material universe, could rationality arise by chance (and if it could, how can it be trusted at all)?
These are interesting questions, and, as I see it, perfect examples of this "backward thinking" that I try to adress here.
You start from a position that acknowledges the existence (and the distinct existence on top) of things like "life" "non-life", "consciousness", "matter", "rationality".
The first problem I personally see is the essentialist position that this list demonstrates. I don't adhere to the platonic idea system. I don't think that concepts like "life", "consciousness", "rationality" (or "Love", "green" and "up") have independent existence. They are only expressions of "real" existence. (Which may be indentified with "physical", but not necessarily so.)
The second problem is the main point. You present the concept/question of "Could life arise from nonlife?", but you can only do that because we as humans make this distinction. An exclusive human distinction, that might not be "real".
If you follow the line of this question, you might have to consider others. "Could matter come from non-matter? Could energy come from non-energy? Can gravity come from non-gravity? Can the complex structure of the universe, the whole of existence come from something that is not an equally complex structure?"
Usually we don't ask these questions, because, based on our experience, we don't even consider "non-energy, non-matter, a universe that doesn't exist". We have no way to make such a distinction, as in "life vs. non-life", because we have no idea, no concept of these things.
But if we are to accept that these are "created" in the same way that people think "life" is created, by a "living" being... wouldn't it be, in the same way, reasonable to conclude that this being must be also dead and material and structured in the same way as the universe?
Again as I see it, there are only two basic options: either the "cause" or "creator" of this universe is basically just the same as "us" (meaning, all of the "material" existence), or not.
In the first case, the rational conclusion arises - always put down by special pleading from Christians: If we need to be "created", then so should the creator.
In the second case: nothing that we, from our experience, attribute to this "cause" or "creator" needs to apply.
I hold to the second position. Call it my "personal theology": I believe that the "ground of existence" is different from all that we "know", and indescribable, because of that difference. I use the term "primal chaos".
I don't believe God is personal because we are persons; I would sooner say that I believe that God is subjective because subjectivity certainly appears to exist, and I honestly do not think it could if it were not built into the nature of reality.
Hm... no, I have to disagree here. Not with the first part: I also don't think God is personal because we are persons. Rather, that we
see God as personal because we are persons.
But I disagree on the subjectivity. It "exists"... but it only exists because there are "subjects". You don't need subjectivity
to create subjects, you create subjectivity simply
by there being subjects.
I also don't believe that God is intelligent because humans are intelligent. I believe that because the universe itself seems to be intelligible, and it makes no sense that a non-intelligent God would give rise to an ordered universe by accident.
As above, we
see God as intelligent because we are. But that goes back to my one-before-the-last paragraph: why are we intelligent? How does our intelligence work?
It is not that there is a bunch of molecules and then some "intelligence" put into it.
It is the way that these molecules behave and interact that "gives rise" to what we call "intelligence". Without this basis, there wouldn't be any "intelligence".
Think about it. Think about how it works, would work. You will always come to a point where you either need a structured system already existing for these "emergent properties", or something completely different.
With that logic, you're back to the universe as a brute fact and theism stops being coherent. This certainly doesn't mean that God is intelligent in the same way that we are, though. That's crazed anthropomorphism.
How different can "intelligence" or any other concept like this get before not being "intelligence" any more?
I agree with you for the most part, though. I just don't see how it's an argument against theism, or at least the version I'm sympathetic to. But I'm a wild medieval throwback.
More than medieval, I would say. Antique. But as Platonism is still a philosophical system, I wouldn't call it a throwback.
As an argument against theism, well, that's difficult. It may sound wierd, but my personal belief system doesn't exclude the existence of deities, or even "One Single God". I don't believe in any, but that doesn't mean they would be impossible.
Yet for the reasons I explained above, I claim that these "gods" would not be the "basic existence". They would be expressions of this basis, just like an "accidental" (I dislike this term) universe would be.
I agree. I do not think that objective values make sense except in a theistic context. But if we address the scenario where something like the Triune God exists--a god concept that is simultaneously singular and plural, then relationality and everything that follows from it become an inherent aspect of reality. Objective values springing from God's nature as communal.
I would still say that this doesn't make these values objective. They don't exist independently from the subject holding these values, in this case God. And I still would say that they cannot be "objective" even if you don't use this term in this way I do. You still cannot disconnect the "values" from the "value-holder". And that means that all values
must be subjective.
Obviously I do not expect you to decide that objective values exist and therefore that God exists, but the two do make sense together, at least in a Christian or Neoplatonic framework.
I fear I cannot see any way this concept can make sense, in any framework. That's why I called it a "contradiction in terms". At best, you could call them "authoritative values"... and I think that
this makes a lot more sense in a Christian framework.
Interestingly I find that my "primal chaos" idea has a lot in common with the Neoplatonic concept of "the One". I mainly disagree with the theistic conclusions added to it.