William Lane Craig vs James White - Calvinism vs Molinism on the Problem of Evil

[Yekcidmij]

but at least there is no OBVIOUS conflict with the biblical God.

It seems there are "obvious" problems to me.

In terms of plausibility, then, isn't Molinism the clear winner?

I explained a few reasons why I don't think it's a "winner" of anything, much less is it "clearly" so. Maybe some people think it's "clear", "more plausible than", or "obvious" - just doesn't seem much like an argument to me and so isn't very interesting to me since I don't see merit to those qualifications.

 

[JAL]

It seems there are "obvious" problems to me.

Yes, you claimed that you should not be morally culpable for your own freely willed choices - you should be declared innocent merely because God selected this world as one of many possible worlds. I just can't make sense of your reasoning here. Far from being obvious, it virtually requires the ingenuity of a professional theologian/philosopher to reach such a strange conclusion.

 

[JAL]

And at the same time, as a Calvinist, you believe that men SHOULD be held morally culpable for choices coerced of them by Calvinistic divine sovereignty. You really do have an odd sense of what is "obvious."

 

[Yekcidmij]

Yes, you claimed that you should not be morally culpable for your own freely willed choices - you should be declared innocent merely because God selected this world as one of many possible worlds.

On Molinism, God's decision was the critical factor in the outcome. God actualized one possible world from among many. In some possible worlds Bob accepts Christ in others he doesn't. Bob is judged on the basis of 1 possible world though he was not a factor in it's selection. Had God selected a different possible world, Bob would be judged differently. God's action is the critical factor in Bob's judgment and so Molinism has some problems. I think the problems are that Molinism doesn't really retain the kind of free will it purports to preserve; it doesn't really resolve the problems it sees with with the freedom of God, the freedom of man and God's action vs man's responsibility.

So contrary to your assertions, I'm not sure anything about Molinism is obvious, clear or more plausible than anything else.

There are other problems with it as well that would more fall into your category of professional-philosopher-strange-conclusion category. One would be that WLC's view may result in modal collapse; that given his system there is in fact only one possible world - so the actual world is necessary.

 

[JAL]

On Molinism, God's decision was the critical factor in the outcome. God actualized one possible world from among many. In some possible worlds Bob accepts Christ in others he doesn't. Bob is judged on the basis of 1 possible world though he was not a factor in it's selection. Had God selected a different possible world, Bob would be judged differently. God's action is the critical factor in Bob's judgment and so Molinism has some problems. I think the problems are that Molinism doesn't really retain the kind of free will it purports to preserve; it doesn't really resolve the problems it sees with with the freedom of God, the freedom of man and God's action vs man's responsibility.

So contrary to your assertions, I'm not sure anything about Molinism is obvious, clear or more plausible than anything else.

There are other problems with it as well that would more fall into your category of professional-philosopher-strange-conclusion category. One would be that WLC's view may result in modal collapse; that given his system there is in fact only one possible world - so the actual world is necessary.

Doesn't make sense to me. In ANY cosmogony including Calvinism, God has to pick an initial state of affairs and decide when and where to intervene. In ALL cosmogonies, then, He selects a possible world. You seriously want to claim that His doing so exonerates you from freely willed sins? That it grants you a license to kill and a license to sin? This is your "obvious" objection?

I mean, I get your point - He COULD have picked a world more favorable to you (and probably less favorable to others). But according to Molinism YOU were the one who made the free choices and are therefore culpable.

So I don't see it. You seem to have a strange sense of the obvious - especially in light of the fact that, as noted, Calvinism indicts men for decisions coerced of them.

In my mind, the exact reverse is the "obvious" - on both counts:
- If I freely choose to sin, I am culpable
- If God inexorably coerces me to do something, I am NOT culpable.

I just don't see what I'm missing here.

 

[Yekcidmij]

I mean, I get your point - He COULD have picked a world more favorable to you (and probably less favorable to others). But according to Molinism YOU were the one who made the free choices and are therefore culpable.

I'm contended that Molinism doesn't resolve the issues it was designed to resolve. I don't have the sort of freedom that it purports that I have. I am not involved in the critical decision to actualize a possible world. The decision to actualize this possible world over other possible worlds is independent of my actions and this decision is determinative of the choices I make. Choices are not arbitrary, random matters on Molinism; they are made on particular background environments, contexts and information that are causally related to choices presented and choices made. On Molinism, God selects a possible world and this decision plays a decisive causal role in choices made. So Molinism doesn't seem to me to preserve the sort of human freedom it asserts and seems to me to create other problems on top. And so I don't see how Molinism resolves some things it sets out to resolve, much less is it obvious, clear, or more plausible than anything else.

 

[JAL]

The decision to actualize this possible world over other possible worlds is independent of my actions and this decision is determinative of the choices I make. Choices are not arbitrary, random matters on Molinism; they are made on particular background environments, contexts and information that are causally related to choices presented and choices made. On Molinism, God selects a possible world and this decision plays a decisive causal role in choices made. So Molinism doesn't seem to me to preserve the sort of human freedom it asserts and seems to me to create other problems on top. And so I don't see how Molinism resolves some things it sets out to resolve, much less is it obvious, clear, or more plausible than anything else.

Regarding the words in bold:

No, Molinism asserts precisely the opposite of that - it is rather explicitly opposed to control-freak divine sovereignty. It insists that God's choice, ultimately, does NOT cause your behavior. Rather God merely foreknows your (freely willed) behavior. Admittedly Molinism doesn't clearly explain HOW God obtains this foreknowledge.

 

[Yekcidmij]

Regarding the words in bold:

No, Molinism asserts precisely the opposite of that

I'm aware of what it asserts. Too bad it's propositions lead to conclusions that are inconsistent with it's assertions. At best it's an incomplete and/or inaccurate account. At worst, it's just not true.

- it is rather explicitly opposed to control-freak divine sovereignty.

Well, I guess it's too bad it doesn't resolve the issue against which it purports to be explicitly opposed.

It insists that God's choice, ultimately, does NOT cause your behavior.

Well, insistence and assertions don't make such things automatically true. I think the view leads to the conclusion that God's choice, ultimately, DOES play a critical causal role in behavior as I explained.

 

[JAL]

I'm aware of what it asserts. Too bad it's propositions lead to conclusions that are inconsistent with it's assertions. At best it's an incomplete and/or inaccurate account. At worst, it's just not true.



Well, I guess it's too bad it doesn't resolve the issue against which it purports to be explicitly opposed.



Well, insistence and assertions don't make such things automatically true. I think the view leads to the conclusion that God's choice, ultimately, DOES play a critical causal role in behavior as I explained.

I think you're putting words in their mouth but feel free to have the final say on that, if you feel inclined.

 

[zoidar]

Good Day, All


I have respect for these 2 men, and I am really looking forward to this interview. My hope is this will lead to a formal 3–4-hour moderated debate with long sessions of cross examinations. YouTube will premiere the interaction today at 100 PM EST.

Soteriology 101 did a response to this video. I know they take WLC's side on things, but it helped me to understand the discussion and concepts better. I think it will be helpful also for Calvinists, even I believe Calvinists will disagree on how Flowers and his colleague are reasoning.

 

[Job 33:6]

It seems like James White's main objection is the "grounding problem" of Molinism and question the truth content of the subjunctive conditionals:

Middle Knowledge | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The grounding objection hasn't been adequately answered to my mind, though possibilities have been put forward. I'm also not convinced that Molinism actually solves the problem of retaining creaturely freedom and doesn't either represent another form of determinism or lead to the conclusion of determinism.

It also seems on WLC's view that God is really The Great Utilitarian (James White calls him a super computer), which seems to be a large moral problem. In his view God is simply solving on objective function, maximizing benefits and minimizing costs under a set of constraints. He selects an environment to create which maximizes souls saved and minimizes souls lost given the constraints of human freedom. It seems to me that such a utilitarian view of God's activity may result in viewing God as acting immorally (assuming for a moment that utilitarianism is a wrong account of morality).

Makes sense. I feel like this utilitarian God idea makes a lot of sense personally.

 

[Job 33:6]

God has no need to limit the freewill of man because God is sovereign meaning He can accomplish whatever He wants to accomplish without the need of the cooperation of men.

What if it were God's free will that Man should have free will? A father could choose to place his child in a jail cell, or a father could let his child be free. Both options are in the control of the father.

 

[bbbbbbb]

First, I confess that I have met William Lane Craig and enjoyed a wonderful discussion with him and other friends over dinner at my house. I find his position rational and convincing.

Perhaps I am a bit dense, but Molinism does not impress me and I am perplexed that otherwise fine and sensible individuals seem to find in it the theological answers to the Gordian knot of sovereignty vs. free will. There are other arguments from the Arminian camp which seem to me to be much more rational.

 

[JAL]

First, I confess that I have met William Lane Craig and enjoyed a wonderful discussion with him and other friends over dinner at my house. I find his position rational and convincing.

Perhaps I am a bit dense, but Molinism does not impress me and I am perplexed that otherwise fine and sensible individuals seem to find in it the theological answers to the Gordian knot of sovereignty vs. free will. There are other arguments from the Arminian camp which seem to me to be much more rational.

I didn't manage to follow you here. First you say that WLC's position is rational and convincing, and next you express surprise that supposedly sensible people hold to such a non-impressive view? Could you clarify please?

 

[bbbbbbb]

I didn't manage to follow you here. First you say that WLC's position is rational and convincing, and next you express surprise that supposedly sensible people hold to such a non-impressive view? Could you clarify please?

I find the reasoning of Molinism to be dense and fraught with inconsistencies, which have been brought out in previous posts here. There are other alternatives to Molinism within general Arminianism which succeed in aspects of logic in which Molinism seems to stall.

I will also add that, as I am sure you know, there are many varieties within Calvinism, some of which are as, or more, fraught with difficulties than Molinism.

 

[jamiec]

I did discuss the text. And I did show a flaw. I don't have to always name chapter and verse to debate theology. It is well known that:
1. The text declares God to be impeccably kind and loving.
2. Many Calvinists, for instance James White on the video, understand the text as asserting divine sovereignty to the exclusion of real libertarian human freedom.

Such TEXT is what I was discussing, when I pointed out that it extrapolates to a God who authors evil and then punishes men for it, as WLK pointed out time and again in the video.

Maybe the libertarian type of human freedom is the problem.

And maybe we need to ask what people on both sides of the debate think man is free for, & free from, and why.

And what is it, that is said to be free ? Human willing ? Human action ? Something else ?

 

[jamiec]

Sure, I have been assuming that God foreknows future outcomes. Relaxing that assumption could be one way out of the issues I've expressed here.

I think also in these discussions, another assumption is that God is also somehow constrained by time itself so that he exists in the present, has perfect knowledge of the past, and well, we argue about what he knows about the future. In essence, an "A-theory" of time is assumed (Time, metaphysics of - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy) and this may not be warranted.

Since God is said to be in-finite, IOW, bound-less, God cannot be limited or constrained by space-time. Infinity is a negative attribute - it says only that God is not bounded/limited - but it tells us nothing about the positive "content" of God's Nature/Life.

Nice cuneiform signature, BTW.

 

[bbbbbbb]

Maybe the libertarian type of human freedom is the problem.

And maybe we need to ask what people on both sides of the debate think man is free for, & free from, and why.

And what is it, that is said to be free ? Human willing ? Human action ? Something else ?

Definitions can be very slippery and difficult to nail down. How free is "free will"? Who possesses it - God or man? Both? Neither?